Dignāga on air
or
how to get hold of supersensible objects by means of a credible person
With preliminary remarks on the composition of the Pramāṇasamuccaya

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1. Introduction

In the second chapter of his Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) which is devoted to the explanation of inference Dignāga supplies us with a discussion on air (vāyu) (PS[V] 2.3c–5b) which might be a summary of an independent work entitled Vāyuprakaraṇa. There, an unnamed opponent attacks Dignāga’s claim that inferences operate only with universals (sāmānyas) arguing that we also know of inferences whose objects are non-universals (asāmānyas). Stating that

1 This paper is a revised and expanded version of the lecture «Das Selbstverständnis der buddhistischen erkenntnistheoretischen Schule und ihr Zugang zu Übersinnlichem,» held in Vienna in 2005.

2 On the Vāyuprakaraṇa, see p. 175, Appendix 1.

3 «If so, you cannot say that all inferences have a universal as their object. Why?
Because one sees inferences also with regard to non-universals. PS 2.3c
Also in the case of such things (svabhāva) as air which are non-univer-

inferences refer to non-universals could either mean they refer to particulars (svālakaśāna), the objects of perception, or that there is a third kind of object different from the two accepted by Dignāga, namely, particulars (svālakaśāna) and universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Since Dignāga does not discuss the latter possibility and concludes this 'airy' discussion with the statement that inference does not refer to particulars,¹ we can understand 'non-universal' in the sense of 'particular.'² Towards the end of this somewhat obscure discussion³

³ On the interpretation of sparśa as temperature in this context, see Preisen-danz 1994: 503–504.

PSV₂ 28a1–2: gal te 'di ltar rjes dpag thams cad spyi'i yul can no ŋes ni brjod par mi bya ste / ci'i phyir ŋe na /

spyi ma yin la'aṅ (asāmānye 'pi PST 2 13,13) mthoṅ ba'i phyir // PS 2.3c

spyi ma yin la'aṅ ŋes bya ba ni mthoṅ ba'i rluṅ la sogs pa'i raṅ bžin (vāyvādisvabhāve PST 2 13,14) reg bya la sogs pas rjes su dpog pa'o // de skad du yaṅ (yathāha PST 2 13,15) (³)reg bya ni reg bya mthoṅ ba rnams kyi ma yin no (³)źes bya la sogs pas brjod do ŋe na /

PSV₂ 109b5–7: 'on te thams cad spyi'i yul can yin no ŋes bya ba de yaṅ brjod par mi bya'o / ci'i phyir ŋe na /

spyi ma yin la mthoṅ ba'i phyir // PS 2.3c

rluṅ la sogs pa spyi'i raṅ bžin ma yin pa la yaṅ reg bya la sogs pa rnams kyi rjes su dpag pa mthoṅ ba yin no // ji skad du (³)reg bya yaṅ mthoṅ ba rnams kyi reg bya ma yin no (³)źes bya la sogs ba bṣad pa lta bu'o //

³ sparsa'ca, na ca drṣṭānām sparsaḥ VSū 2.1.9–10, PST 2 14,3. For a discussion of these sūtras, see Lasic 2010: 518–519.

⁴ PSV₂ 111a5–6: de'i phyir raṅ gi mtshan ŋid kyi yul can gyi rjes su dpag pa ni med do // = PSV₂ 29a3: de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa'i yul ni raṅ gi mtshan ŋid ma yin no //

⁵ See also asāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayam iti / svalakaśāṇaviśayam (PST₁₅ 153a2) referred to below p. 178.

⁶ A summary of the arguments is given in Onoda 2004 (in Japanese) and
Dignāga gives his definition of a credible person’s statements (āptavāda), āptavādāvisanvādasāmānyād anumāna-tā/tvam (PS 2.5ab). While in another paper I have examined this definition in the light of Dharmakīrti’s understanding, here I will examine Dignāga’s ideas.

2. Dignāga on the statements of a credible person (āptavāda)

The definition of a credible person’s statements in PS(V) 2.5ab has already been dealt with by a number of modern scholars. Recently, Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on this work has become available in its original Sanskrit. On its basis, we can reconstruct at least parts of Dignāga’s PSV and thus get a better understanding. For this reason we will have another look at this definition. I will first present a Sanskrit reconstruction with the two Tibetan translations, then a tentative translation based on that, and finally a discussion of the problems involved. The reconstruction, which I have modified slightly, was kindly put at my disposal by Horst Lasic, who is currently preparing an edition and translation of the entire second chapter.

The reader must be warned here that the Sanskrit reconstruction/retranslation, sometimes following PSVₛ, sometimes PSVₛ, sometimes being a mixture of both, and sometimes only being based on Jinendrabuddhi’s PST, represents an artificial text that certainly never existed in this form. Nevertheless, this reconstruction is a necessary first step in order to get at least a rough understanding of the text.

Words that are not based on either Jinendrabuddhi’s PST or any other Sanskrit source are printed in italics.

in Lasic 2010: 516–520.

7 See the chapter «2. PVSV 108,1–109,22 on PS 2.5ab» in Krasser 2012b: 84–102.

8 See, e.g., Eltschinger 2007: 70 (with n. 9) and Lasic 2010: 509–510. Mention should also be made of Onoda 2004.

9 It goes without saying that any remaining mistakes are my own.
2.1 Reconstruction of PS(V) 2.5ab with Tibetan translations

\[\text{śabdām api tu\textsuperscript{(1)} sambandhābhāva\textsuperscript{(2)} asādhāraṇaviṣayatvena dvidhānu-mānaṁ kalpayitavyam} \quad \text{— drṣṭārtham\textsuperscript{(3)} drṣṭārtham\textsuperscript{(3)} ca. tatra drṣṭārthe saṅjñāvyutpattiḥ\textsuperscript{(4)}, drṣṭārthe 'ṛṣṭhivikalpamātram\textsuperscript{(5)}, na viśiṣṭārtha-pratītiḥ\textsuperscript{(6)}, kathāṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam\textsuperscript{(7)}, na hi svargādīśabdādair arthāmātram ucyate\textsuperscript{(8)}.}\\
\]

\[\text{āptavādāvivādaśāmānyād anumānatvam\textsuperscript{(9)} | PS 2.5ab}\\
\text{āptavacanatvam} \quad \text{grhītvā\textsuperscript{(10)}, arthāvivāдавadutulyatvāt\textsuperscript{(11)} tasya\textsuperscript{(12)}-apy anumānatvam\textsuperscript{(12)} uktam.} \quad \text{tathā hy āhā\textsuperscript{(13)} – pratyakṣapūrvavatvāt saṅjñākarmaṇa\textsuperscript{(14)} iti.}\\
\]

\[\text{anayā diśā pradhānādi\textsuperscript{(15)}svabhāveṣv apy anumānaṃ pratiṣēdhyaṃ. tas-
mān na svalakṣaṇavivāyaṁ anumānam asti.}\\
\]

References are, if not otherwise indicated, to PST 2: \(\text{(1)} 26,14–15 \quad \text{(2)} 26,15; 27,4; 28,1 \quad \text{(3)} 27,5 \quad \text{(4)} 27,5–6; 28,3 \quad \text{(5)} 27,7–8; 28,6 (quoted PSV 37,27) \quad \text{(6)} 28,6 \quad \text{(7)} 28,4 \quad \text{(8)} 29,9–10; 28,12 \quad \text{(9)} 29,1; 29,3; 30,11 \quad \text{(10)} 30,1; 31,4 \quad \text{(11)} 30,2–3 \quad \text{(12)} 30,2 \quad \text{(13)} 31,9 \quad \text{(14) VSū 2.1.19} \quad \text{(15) 31,14}\\
\]

\[\text{sgra las byun ba yañ 'brel pa med par thun moñ ma yin pa'i yul mthon ba dañ ma mthon ba las rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gñis su brtag par bya'o || de la mthon ba'i don la mìn bstan pa'o} \quad \text{ma mthon ba'i don la don du rnam par rtag pa tsam yin gyi don gyi khyad par rtags pa ni ma yin no || ji ltar de rjes su dpag pa ñid yin te mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra rnam kyis don tsam brjod pa ni ma yin no ||}\\
\]

\[\text{yid ches tshig ni mi slu ba} \quad \text{|| spyi las rjes su dpag pa ñid || PS 2.5ab}\\
\text{yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuñ nas don de la mi bslu ba'i phyir dañ / mi 'dra ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid du bśad pa yin te || de ltar yañ mìn gi la ni mìn sum sion du 'gro ba can žes bya ba yin no || phyogs 'dīs ni gts'o bo la sogs pa'i ran bzin rnam s la rjes su dpag pa bkag pa yin no || de'i phyir ran gi mshan ñid kyi yul can gqi rjes su dpag pa ni med do || PSV.111 a1–6}\\
\]

\[\text{sgra yañ yul thun moñ ma yin pa dañ 'brel ba yod pa ma yin pas rnam pa gñis ka rjes su dpag pa brtag par bya ste / mthon ba'i don dañ ma mthon ba'i don no || de la mthon ba'i don la ni mi (read: min) gsal bar byed pa'o} \quad \text{|| ma mthon ba'i don la ni rnam par rtag pa tsam 'ba' zig ste} \quad \text{|| don gyi bye brag rtags par byed pa ni ma yin no || gal te mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgras don tsam brjod pa ni ma yin na ji ltar rjes su dpag pa ñid du 'gyur že na ||}\\
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\[\text{2.1 Reconstruction of PS(V) 2.5ab with Tibetan translations}\\
\]
2.2 Translation of PS(V) 2.5ab

On the other hand (api tu), inference consisting in words (śābda) is, due to its having different objects (asaṃhāraṇaśāsaṭaya), to be conceived as being of two kinds: one whose object has been seen at the time when there was no knowledge of the connection between a word and its referent (sambandhābhāva), and one whose object has not been seen. From among these (tatra), in the case of the one whose object has been seen, we learn its name (saṃjñāvyutpatti). In the case of the one whose object has not been seen (adṛṣṭārtha) we have a mere conception of the object (arthaśikālaṃpātra), but no knowledge of the specific object (na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ). How then (kathāṃ tariḥ) is this latter an inference? Answer: Because (hi) it is not (na) the case that by words like 'heaven' (svarjādiśabda) the mere non-specific object (arthaṃṭra) is denoted (ucyate).

Because the character of being non-belying of a credible person’s statement is the same (sāmānya), it is an inference. (PS 2.5ab)

This (tasya) too (api) has been said to be inference, because, having grasped a statement’s being the statement of a credible person, it is equal in not belying with regard to the object (arthaśiṃśavāda-tulyatvāt). For in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra it is said accordingly (tathā hy āha): «Because giving a name to something (saṃjñākarmanāḥ) is preceded by its perception (pratikesapārvaṃvātāt).»

In this way (anavādiśā), also an inference with regard to things such as primordial matter (pradhānādīvaṃbhāva) is to be negated (pratīṣedhya). Thus, an inference that refers to a particular (svalaṃśaṇaśaya) does not exist.
2.3 Explanation of PS(V) 2.5ab

To distinguish between the two kinds of inferences, Dignāga simply follows the opposing school of Nyāya. In Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7 and 8, where one of the four means of knowledge accepted by the Naiyāyikas\(^{10}\) is defined and explained, namely «word» (śabda), we read:

\[āptopadesāḥ śabdaḥ // \text{NSū 1.1.7} \]
\[sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt // \text{NSū 1.1.8} \]

The means of knowledge 'word' is the statement of a credible person. This is of two kinds, due to its having an object that has either been seen or not seen.

This is explained in Pāṇḍīsanvāmin's Nyāyabhāṣya as follows:

\[\text{yasyeha dṛṣṭyate 'ṛthaḥ, sa dṛṣṭārthaḥ. yasyāmutra pratīyate, so 'dṛṣṭārthaḥ. evam ṛṣilaukikavākyānāṁ pravibhāga iti. kimartham punar idam ucayate? sa na manyeta «dṛṣṭartha evāptopadesāḥ pramāṇam arthasyā- vadhāraṇāt» itī, adṛṣṭārtha 'pi pramāṇam, arthasyānumānad itī. NBh 14,10–13 on NSū 1.1.8} \]

That statement is said to have a seen object, whose object is seen here in this world. The one, whose object is seen above, i.e. not in this world, is said to have an unseen object. In this way one distinguishes between worldly statements and those of the sages.\(^{11}\) With what purpose has this been said? So that this person (sa)\(^{10}\) cannot maintain that only the statement of a credible person whose object has been seen is a means of knowledge, because one can determine the object; also the one whose object is not seen is a means of knowledge, because its object is inferred.

\(^{(10)}\) sa might refer to the one who asked this question (?). In the NVTṬ (172,1–2) it is explained as referring to a non-believer who, however, is remote: sa na manyeta dṛṣṭānāṁ vākyānāṁ prāmāṇyān. sa iti viprakräṣṭo nāstikaḥ parāmprṣyata iti.

Although Dignāga does not count the Naiyāyikas' means of knowledge śabda as a separate pramāṇa but subsumes it under inference, there can be little doubt that his distinction between two kinds of in-

\(^{10}\) See pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāṇi // NSū 1.1.3.

\(^{11}\) On the relation of NSū 1.1.8 with Pāṇḍīsanvāmin's explanation to the Carakasaṃhitā, see Preisendanz 2009: 282–285.
ferences, one whose object has been seen and one whose object has not been seen, is the same as the Naiyāyikas’ distinction of śabda.

Dignāga’s explanation contains, however, a bit more information than the NBh’s. Although the meaning of the expression sambandhābhāve is far from being self-evident, and although Jinendrabuddhi’s comments must be used with caution as he generally tries to interpret Dignāga in the light of Dharmakīrti’s innovative elucidations, I see no harm in following Jinendrabuddhi here and understanding sambandhābhāve, «when the connection is absent,» as «at the time of convention» (sambandhābhāva iti saṅketakāle PSṬ 2 26,15). Although the term sambandha has not yet been used in this discussion, it is clear from the context that it refers to the connection between words and their referents. This is what this sentence is about. And since such a connection between words and referents exists only in our mind, according to Buddhists, we can understand sambandhābhāve as ‘when there is no knowledge of the connection between a word and its referent.’ Moreover, since Dignāga is talking about ‘word’ in this sentence, this is what śabdam anumānam means, and this word is one that we learn now, this sambandhābhāve is restricted to the time when we hear such a word for the first time. Through this, the time before hearing the word for the first time, which is also characterized by the absence of the connection, is excluded. In this way we arrive at Jinendrabuddhi’s saṅketakāle. Thus, the first kind of inference is one whose object has been seen at the time of convention when we are told its name, saṅjñāvyutpatti, e.g. «This is a bread-fruit tree» (āyaṁ panasa iti PSṬ 2 27,6). The second kind of inference is different. When we learn the word «heaven» (svarga), we do not see heaven and thus, we can only have a conception of it. This seems to imply the problem that we cannot obtain what is taught in the scripture if it is based on mere conceptions, be it heaven or finally niḥśreyasa in the case of the Naiyāyikas or nirvāṇa in the case of the Buddhists.

In both the NBh and the PSV the problems involved are formulated very vaguely: «With what purpose has this been said?» (NBh) and «How then is this latter an inference?» (PSV).
The answers given to these questions are not very elucidating either. The NBh simply states that, because in both cases of a credible person’s statement the object is determined or inferred, both can be regarded as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Dignāga would certainly not agree that we ascertain a real object (arthāvadāhana) in the case of a credible person’s statement whose object we have seen previously, as is assumed in the NBh. This would imply that words refer to real objects. But for Dignāga ordinary words only refer to the «exclusion» (apoha), as he then explains in PS(V) 5.\(^{12}\) However, in the case of statements of sages regarding supersensible objects, he seems to follow the NBh’s explanation, for he tells us that words like heaven are not belying with regard to real objects (arthāvisamvādatulyatvāt) and do not merely denote an object in general (arthamātra).\(^{13}\) Thus, as in the case of the NBh, we obtain what they teach us.

Because of their «similarity in being non-belying» (avisamvādatulyatvāt) such words of credible persons can be called inference (anumāṇa). Unfortunately, Dignāga does not tell us with whom or what these words of credible persons share their character of being non-belying. An explanation may have been contained in his Vāyu-prakaraṇa, but even if this were the case, this is of no help as long as we do not have it. Thus, in order to avoid relying on Dharmakīrti’s and post-Dharmakīrtiian interpretations and to avoid thereby the risk of being misled by them, it is better to look for possible pre-Dignāgan candidates. As Pākṣilasyāmin has been a good companion so far, he seems a promising candidate for helping us to solve this problem as well. And indeed, in his comments on NSū 2.1.68 we find a few explanations that might shed some light on Dignāga’s cryptic formulation in PS 2.5ab. NSū 2.1.68 is located within a series of arguments against the accusation brought forward in NSū 2.1.57 that «word» (śabda), in the sense of the credible statements of the sages

\(^{12}\) The text of PS(V) 5 has recently been published with an annotated translation in Pind 2009.

\(^{13}\) This is also explained by Jīnendrabuddhi: tasmān naṃpatprayuktaih svār-gādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate. kim tarhi. laukikaśabdāśadhāraṇe bāhye ‘py artha iti PSṬ 2 28,12–13.
as available in the Veda, cannot be a means of knowledge, since the Veda contains untrue statements and is full of contradictions and repetitions.\textsuperscript{14} NSū 2.1.68 states that the Veda is a means of knowledge in the parts teaching supersensible objects which one cannot check to be true, just as it is a means of knowledge in the parts about mantras or the Āyurveda, which teach perceptible objects that one can see are true. The reason provided is that a credible person is a means of knowledge. How this works is explained by Pāṇḍita in the following way.

\begin{quote}
\textit{drṣṭārthenāptopadeśeṇyuryvedenādṛṣṭārtha vedabhūga ‘numātavyaḥ ‘pramāṇam iti, āptaprāmāṇyasya hetoḥ samānatvād iti. NBh 97,8–9 on NSū 2.1.68}
\end{quote}

By means of the Āyurveda, being a teaching by a credible person the objects of which have been seen, that part of the Veda the object of which has not been seen can be inferred as a means of valid knowledge (\textit{pramāṇam iti}), because the credible person's authoritativeness (\textit{prāmāṇya}), which makes up the logical reason for such an inference, is the same.

If we now compare Pāṇḍita's explanation to Dignāga's formulation \textit{āptavādāvisamvādāsāmānyād anumānatvam}, we can easily see that the credible person's character of being non-belying (\textit{avisamvāda}, PS) corresponds to the credible person's authoritativeness (\textit{prāmāṇya}) in the NBh which is identified as the logical reason (\textit{hetu}). \textit{sāmānyāt} (PS), paraphrased by Dignāga himself as \textit{tulyatvāt}, is the equivalent of \textit{samānatvāt} (Nbh). And since when dealing with inferences with seen and unseen objects Dignāga, from the beginning, follows Pāṇḍita to the degree compatible with his own teachings, we might safely assume that the similarity of the character of being non-belying of this credible person consists in, as the validity in the NBh, a similarity between perceptible and imperceptible objects. We can thus understand Dignāga's definition of \textit{āptavāda} in PS 2.5ab as follows.

Because the character of being non-belying of a credible person's statement is the same in the case of supersensible objects as in the case of objects that are accessible to us, such a statement is an inference in the

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{tadaprāmāṇyaḥ, anṛtvāyāghātapunaruktadoṣebhyāḥ} NSū 2.1.57.
sense of an inferential mark.

If we formulate an inference of this type based on our reading of Dignāga through the lens of Pākṣilavāmin, it might look like this:

This statement of this credible person regarding supersensible objects is non-belying, because it is this credible person’s statement, like another statement of this credible person concerning perceptible objects.

If we reformulate this in terms of Dharmakīrti’s svabhāvahetu, we arrive at the following:

Any statement of a credible person is non-belying, because it is the statement of a credible person.

And this is exactly the formulation we find in the comments of Śākyabuddhi/Kaṇḍakagomin and Jinendrabuddhi, whose understanding is in accordance with Dharmakīrti’s interpretation:

\[ \text{gaṅ daṅ gaṅ ņes pa zad pa’i tshig de daṅ de ni mi slu ba yin te PV}\] \[\text{Je D242b3 = yo ya āptavādaḥ, so ‘visamvādi PVSV 390,16} \]
\[\text{yad āptavacanam, tadd aśvisaṃvādi PS 2 30,7} \]

We thus arrive at the same understanding of PS 2.5ab when guided by Pākṣilavāmin and when basing ourselves on Dharmakīrti and his commentators.\(^{15}\) We can therefore safely say that Dignāga was following the Nyāya model when formulating his definition of āptavāda.

In the Vṛtti on PS 2.5ab Dignāga then answers the first question: katham tarhi tasyānumāvatvam? When we hear the statement of a credible person, we can infer that it is correct and that it finally makes known an external object such as heaven, because its non-belying character is the same as in those cases we can check. Jinendrabuddhi’s comments read:

«Having grasped the statement of a credible person» and so forth. It (tasya) has been said to be an inference, having grasped the statement of a credible person which is a logical reason (hetu) for understanding that it is not belying (avisaṃvāda). The question why this (tasya) is

\(^{15}\) For the interpretation of PS 2.5ab based on Dharmakīrti and his commentators, see Krasser 2012b: 99.
now an inference is to be explained by «because it is equal in being non-belying with regard to the object» (arthāvisāṃvādatulyatvāt). \(^{16}\)

The quotation from the Vaiśeṣikasūtra serves the purpose of proving that a credible person must have seen what he relates and thus, being a credible person, what he tells us must be true. He gave the name «heaven» to something that he has seen, because giving a name to something is preceded by its perception (pratyakṣapūrva- katvāt saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ VSū 2.1.19). Therefore, even if we only have a mere conception of this external object, he finally makes it known. Dignāga is expressing his own opinion by means of this quote. And cleverly, for the Vaiśeṣika remains no possibility to argue against this assumption as otherwise he would contradict his own scripture. Jinendrabuddhi:

By the words tathā hy āha Dignāga corroborates (saṃsyandayati) his own view with the other, i.e. Vaiśeṣika, treatise (śastraṇtara). Credible persons give the respective name only after having grasped the nature of things such as heaven by perception. «Name giving» is to be understood as a mere synecdoche (upalakṣaṇamātra), for they speak of everything only after having seen the object. Otherwise they would not be credible persons at all. Therefore each of their statements is non-belying. And thus their statement is inference. \(^{17}\)

Dignāga then concludes his refutation by advising his students to follow the procedure found in this entire section if they have to refute other pseudo-entities such as the primordial matter (pradhāna) assumed by the Sāṅkhya. For this, like «air» in the case of the Vaiśeṣika, is also known only from their scriptures.

\(^{16}\) āptavacanam grhītvetyādi. āptavacanam grhītvāvisāṃvādādhigama- hetum tasyānāmānatvam uktam. kasmāt punas tasyānāmānatvam arthāvisāṃvādatulyatvād iti vyākhya ādi. PSṬ 2 30,1–3.

\(^{17}\) tathā hy āhety anena svamataṃ śastraṇtareṇa saṃsyandayati. āptāḥ pratyakṣatahaḥ svarga-dīnāṃ svabhāvaṃ grhītvā saṃjñāṃ prayaṇanti. upalakṣaṇamātraṃ ca saṃjñākarma veditavam. sarvam eva hi te 'rthadarśanapūrva- vam eva vyāharanti. anyathāptā eva na syuḥ. tasmāt teśāṁ sarvam eva vaco 'avisāṃvādi. ataś caṇumānam āti. PSṬ 2 31,9–13.
Observations on the composition of the PSV

In the next part, I would like to make a few preliminary remarks on the composition of the PSV. These are only preliminary, because they are not based on an examination of the entire PSV, but only on bits and pieces that attracted my attention.

In Appendix 1, I have indicated two pādas of verses in the translation prepared by the team Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅrgyal which are translated as prose in the version of Kanakavaran and pā’i śes rab (PSV, 27b7–28a1/PSV, 59b5–6 and PSV, 28a3–4/PSV, 102a2); see below p. 176. To this we may add another pāda and a half from the Nyāya section of the second chapter which immediately follows pāda PS 2.28a:

'khrul ba’i phyir na ldan pa min // PS 2.28a (na matub vyabhicāritvāt PST 2 66.12)

ldan par byed pa ni rigs na // sīnar 'di ru yod do
žes 'bras bu sna ma daṅ ldan par byed na ni yul de šes pa yaṅ sna ma daṅ
ldan par 'gyur la / PSV, D32b6–7
%

ldan min 'khrul pa srid phyir ro // PS 2.28a
gal te ldan pa byed pa yin na 'bras bu 'di la sīnar rgyu yod do žes bya ba ni
sna ma daṅ ldan pa yin la / de’i yul can gyi šes par yaṅ sna ma daṅ ldan pa
yin no // PSV, 115a8–b1

Another case is from the Sāṃkhya section of the third chapter, where (an unidentified) verse is attributed to an unnamed teacher (ācārya, slob dpon) in the PSV. In Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary, this teacher is identified as Vasubandhu.

gāṇ du slob dpon gyis /

naṅ la 'das bsags ṣī ṣī ma yin // de bzin ḡzan don can ma yin ||
žes dogs pa bsu ste / PSV, D48a3
%
slob dpon gyis kyaṅ dogs ba bsus nas de ltar naṅ gi bdus pa rnams ḡzan don
byed par mi 'gyur ro žes brjod pa yin no // PSV, 134a6

yad āśāṅkyācāryavasubandhunā

saṅghātā āntarā evam tathā na syuḥ parārthakāḥ ||
Ity uktam. PSTₘₛ = 137a⁵

Other cases are reported in Katsura 2009: 159 n. 19

«V (D₄⁹a₂; P₅₂a₆) inserts one extra line between 3.29ab and 3.29cd: gcig la nges par zhugs pa dang // log pa min pa(‘ang) rtags su ‘gyur ///. K (1₃₅a₅) takes this portion as being prose: mtha’ gcig la rjes su ‘jug pa dang ldog pa’i shes pa gtan tshigs su ‘gyur te.»

and in Katsura 2009: 161 n. 21

«Here V inserts an extra pada: gcig gi tshig tu bstan pa’i phyir ///. K (1₃₅a₅) does not take it to be part of the verse, and this is supported by Jinendrabuddhi.»

While in this latter case Jinendrabuddhi’s exemplar (PSVₗₑ) of the PSV he was commenting upon supports «K» (Kanakavarman), during our work on the edition of PST 2 we have seen that PSVₗₑ although generally closer to K, is sometimes closer to PSVₓ. This has also been noted by Katsura in connection with PS 3.27:

«Generally I prefer to rely on K rather than V when I reconstruct or retranslate Dignāga, for Jinendrabuddhi normally supports K. However, as in the present case, he occasionally supports V, which clearly indicates the existence of more than two distinct recensions of the PS.» (Katsura 2009: 160)

That we are dealing with three quite different versions of the PSV is also supported by the fact that Jinendrabuddhi explains a passage of the PSV which, judged from the context, belongs to Dignāga’s comments on PS 2.27d, where the Nyāya pūrvavat inference is discussed. This passage cannot be found in either of the two Tibetan PSV versions.

pūrvavatya api ceti. pūrvavat ity atra vipakṣe viśānādiśiṣṭa gavārthānmāne samavāyaḥ sambandhāḥ. PST 2 69,6

sṇa ma dān ldan pa la yāḥ ātes pa sṇa ma vat ces pa ’di la ’dra ba’i phyogs la rva la sogs pa’i rtags kyi ba laṅ gi don rjes su dpog pa na / ’du (P: du D) ba’i ’brel pa yin žiṅ / PSTₕₑ D₁₀₈a₅–6/P₁₂₂a₆–7

———

¹⁸ On this verse, see Watanabe 2008: 64 and Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 156.

¹⁹ More differences between the two Tibetan translations are presented in Katsura 2009: 161.
The material presented so far not only points to three different versions of the PSV, but it also amply reveals that these differences cannot be easily accounted for as being mere errors that crept in during a transmission that started with a single exemplar. While it is clear that some variants in the Tibetan translations such as gyi/gyis, la/laš or even yin/ma yin (the latter possibly a misreading of yin and min, which look very similar in the Tibetan dbu med script) can be explained as transmission errors, differences such as verse versus prose cannot. It is hard to imagine that Kanakavarman could not distinguish between verse and prose. But how then can we explain these discrepancies? One possibility, and this is the one I consider the most plausible, certainly would be to assume that these errors were there from the beginning and that these manuscripts do not stem from the pen of Dignāga, but from the pens of different students who were taught pramāṇa by Dignāga. At least in the case of Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā and digressions (prasanga) in his Prajñāpradīpa, we have some evidence that these texts represent notes taken by students.  

And a paper in which I argue for the same in the case of Dharmakīrti’s Hetubindu and Vādanyāya is under preparation. Although nowhere in the PSV it is stated that we are dealing with notes by students, there is some evidence for such an assumption.

First we must ask for whom the PSV was composed. To answer this question we have to consider the purpose of this work. At the beginning of the PSV, Dignāga states that he composes this treatise in order to refute the means of knowledge taught by the opponents and to propagate the qualities of his own means of knowledge, because the proper cognition of knowable objects depends on these means of knowledge and because many people understand them incorrectly. While this is the direct purpose, at the end of the PSV

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21 First results of my study on the Hetubindu and the Vādanyāya have been presented in the lecture «On ur-texts and writing styles in Indian philosophy» at the IABS conference in Taipei, June 2011.

22 parapramāṇapratīṣedhāya svapramāṇaṇagunodbhāvanāya ca, yasmāt pra-
Dignāga formulates, according to the commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a second or indirect (vyavahita) purpose (prayojana) for having composed the work.\textsuperscript{23}

I composed this work in order to turn those who adhere to (ṣeṇa paṁnam) the assumptions of the non-Buddhist Tirthikas away from these ideas, because they are without essence as the valid cognitions (pramaṇa) and their objects (prameya), as taught by the Tirthikas, are not fixed properly. However, by doing as much (iṣṭa) I do not aim at their introduction into the teaching of the Tathāgata, because his dharma is not in the realm of logic. But those who have turned away from the assumptions of the Tirthikas can easily understand dharma after hearing it, since it is absent/remote from the Tirthikas’ teaching and present in/remote from the Tathāgata’s teaching.\textsuperscript{24}

Here we learn that the followers of non-Buddhist teachings should be converted to Buddhism. The non-Buddhist teachings that are refuted in the PSV are those of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, and Mīmāṁsā. Thus, their followers are the final addressees of the PSV. Among them may have been followers who were well versed in philosophy and philosophical argumentation. These may have included, besides the Brahmins representing these systems, wealthy persons — nobles, kings or wealthy merchants — but also people from the broad masses. We thus might imagine that Dignāga wrote his PSV in his monastery, whereupon he sent his work to a scriptorium to be copied. Then copies of the PSV were distributed (in a pre-modern bookshop?) to these non-Buddhists.

A quite unlikely scenario. The broad masses, being illiterate, can be excluded. And I think that we are on the safe side when we exclude

\begin{footnote}{\textit{māṇāyattā prameyapratipattir bahavaś cātra vipratipannāḥ} PS 1 1,11–13. Instead of \textit{pramāṇāyattā prameyapratipattir}, read \textit{pramāṇādhiṇaḥ prameyādhigamah}, according to a quotation of the passage later in \textit{PST}ms 243a2–3: \textit{tathā coktam} — yasmāt \textit{pramāṇādhiṇaḥ prameyādhigamasā [read: \textit{ādhigamā] iti.}}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{\textit{pramāṇaprameyadurvihitavényādinā śāstrārambhasya vyavahitaṃ prayojanaṃ darśayati} \textit{PST}ms 258b4.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{For the text and the context, see Krasser 2004: 131–135.}
\end{footnote}
the group of wealthy persons, even if they were educated. Who and how many of them would have been qualified to read such a cryptic text, which rarely expresses what it wants to communicate directly? At best it would have caused a headache for the reader. Thus, only a small group of people remains: Brahmins well versed in philosophical argumentation and their students. But if they purchased and read copies of the PSV and if, in turn, Buddhist intellectuals such as Dignāga read their essays, then it is quite certain that Dignāga didn’t achieve his aims. Indeed, no Brahmin author showed any indication that he was even slightly impressed by the PSV. On the contrary, the available texts of Dignāga’s opponents that react to his criticism dislike his teachings and refute them. Why should these Brahmins give up their home, their family, their religious affiliation, and their income merely because they read some of Dignāga’s arguments? And even if essays by contemporary opponents who reacted to Dignāga found their way into Dignāga’s hands, at the best this would have remained an intellectual game under elites, with the general public completely excluded.

Moreover, in such a way Dignāga’s statement at the end of the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika’s vāyu inference, «In this way also the inference with regard to things such as primordial matter is to be negated» (see above, p. 151), must be understood as being directed towards his Sāṅkhya opponents: «Friends! Destroy the pillar of your beliefs by yourself, as I have shown you with the example ‘air.’ Having done so, jump over into my camp!» But what about Dignāga’s aim of converting non-Buddhists? Was he a naïve intellectual with his head in the clouds; had he lost any or all contact with reality? I don’t think so; his works as summarized in the PSV do not give this impression. In this period, there was a lot of competition on the religious market and hostility between the various religious groups.25 Dignāga’s work fits into this socio-religious context very well.

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25 See, e.g., Eltschinger 2010. Bhāviveka (490/500–570), for example, introduces the Mīmāṃsakas to his students with the harsh words «Certain evil Tirthikas who cannot stand the rays of the maṇḍala of the immaculate ten powers of the Buddha to know everything, his unerring teaching that illuminates all places, like those suffering from eye
But if we assume — as is the case with Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā, the digressions in his Prajñāpradīpa, and with Dharmakīrti’s Hetubindu and Vādanyāya26 — that Dignāga’s teaching served the purpose of preparing students for debates27 with Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiśeṣikas, etc., then the indirect purpose for composing the PSV, namely to turn the followers of the Tīrthikas away from their erroneous beliefs, can be understood. Dignāga is teaching his students how to refute the main pillars of these non-Buddhist religious groups so that their followers might give up their beliefs and eventually follow the Buddha and his teachings, and join his community. Their introduction into

disease cannot stand the rays of the sun mandala, i.e. the disc of the sun, state ...» (Krasser 2011: 53) and teaches them that the Veda is the product of an evil human mind: «Moreover, one can infer this Veda to have been made by an evil human being, because it teaches deeds such as harming living beings and drinking wine like the book of the Magas» (Krasser 2012a: 539). The evil Tīrthikas (mu stegs can nān po) mentioned here is one group of Dignāga’s Tīrthikas. Bhāviveka’s accusation finds its counterpart in Kumārila’s Tantravārttika: «But such things that [you] teach seem attractive [only] to devotees. And we, not being devotees, seek reasoning. And these [teachings] which have flowed out of a wall, etc. cannot have been taught by a trustworthy person. And [we] won’t trust the [teachings], [because we have a doubt] ‘by whom have these [teachings] been uttered?’ [Are they] taught by the Buddha [himself]? Or [are they] taught by those who are playing to deceive brahmans by means of distant echoes? Or [are they] stated by an unseen evil-minded ghost and the like? — Therefore those who regard [themselves] as wise men should not trust these [teachings]» (Kataoka 2011: 372–373, nn. 431 and 433, and Krasser 2011: 214–215). And Dharmakīrti concludes his PVSV with a quite telling verse (PV 1.340): «[Believing in the] authority of the Veda, claiming something [permanent] to be an agent, seeking merit in ablutions, taking pride in one’s caste, and undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination» (Eltschinger et al. 2012: 77–78).

26 See above, note 20.

27 Such debates are known from reports of Chinese pilgrims, Tibetan historical accounts and a few inscriptions; see Bronkhorst 2007 and Cabezón 2008.
Buddhism, however, is not the aim of compositions like the PSV, «because his dharma is not in the realm of logic» (see above, p. 161).

If the assumption that Dignāga’s teachings were addressed to his students is correct, then texts like the PSV were never meant to end up in the hands of his opponents, although they finally did, of course. They even were to be kept out of their reach. Why, after all, would someone provide a rival the arguments with which he intends to refute him? According to my understanding, these texts were meant to be circulated only within an inner circle. Also, they do not provide an account of all the main topics of the opponents’ teachings, but only those that are predisposed to criticism. This goes together well with John Taber’s observations on Dharmakīrti’s arguments against the validity of the Veda:

«Thus, in the end, we arrive at the not very surprising result that, while Dharmakīrti exhibits broad knowledge of problems of Mimāṃsā exegesis in PV(SV) 1.312–340, he displays nothing like an expert’s command. It is possible he received some training in Mimāṃsā at an early stage, but it would have been an introductory course.» (Taber 2012: 148)

This statement is qualified a little later (2012: 149):

«It would have been surprising, however, if matters turned out any differently. Dharmakīrti, after all, is addressing his own community — other Buddhists. He is not trying to convince Mimāṃsakas or, it would appear, even get at the truth. In general, philosophical debate in classical India was characterized by jalpa, "disputation," not saṃvāda, "discussion." It was acceptable to raise prima facie objections to the views of one’s adversaries, as a means of protecting one’s own position, without necessarily having to represent those views sympathetically or completely accurately, placing the burden on one’s opponent to set the record straight ...»

While I agree with this completely, I am not sure whether one can conclude from Dharmakīrti’s arguments that «it is possible he received some training in Mimāṃsā at an early stage, but it would have been an introductory course.» It goes without saying that if one enters a discussion this should be done with solid arguments. We have at least one statement of his to this effect. In his Vādanyāya Dharmakīrti scolds one of his students for not being prepared:
Dignāga on air

*tayor abhedād adoṣa iti cet, anuttaraṁ bata, doṣasaṅkaṭam atrabhavān
dṛṣṭirāgena praveśyamāno ‘pi nātmānaṁ cetayati.* VN 12, 7–9

Dharmakīrti: *If you assume that there is no mistake, because these two are not different, alas, this is not an answer! Although His Worship enters the difficulties of that mistake due to his love of his own view, he himself does not understand it. (German transl. Much 1991: 30; modified slightly)*

Coming back now to Dignāga, we must ask how his teaching might have taken place. Did he first write the PSV in his cell or dictate it to a scribe, looking up various passages in his other texts and incorporating them, and then use this manuscript for his teaching? Or did he deliver his lectures without relying on a manuscript, quoting his other texts from memory? Although there are no clear indications for either assumption, I favour the latter.

First of all, this would allow us to explain the differences between the manuscripts, of which two were the basis for Tibetan translations. Another exemplar was used by Jinendrabuddhi. In addition, it better fits the purpose of the PSV as I understand it. Students were to be prepared for discussions with non-Buddhists: oral discussions, not written competitions. Thus, they had to learn to grasp the argument of a rival quickly, arguments that the latter has tried to formulate in a manner as complicated as possible, hoping that the former might not be able to follow. And they have to remember what the other has said, as well, of course, and to consider the context. This is something that must be practiced, either among themselves or under the supervision of an ācārya. At least in Dharmakīrti’s *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, where in the second part of the latter students had to show that they had memorized all the points of defeat (nigraha-sthāna) as taught in the *Nyāyasūtra*, in Pakṣilavāmin’s *Bhāṣya* and Uddyotakara’s *Vārttika*, we have samples of discussions between students and their teacher.28

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28 The following examples and others, e.g., from Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtти*, will be dealt with in another paper.
1) Student: ... Dharmakīrti: krīḍanaśīlo devānāṃpriyāḥ sukhaidhitāḥ kṛtam kṛtam punah kārayati. tathā hi bijādyupanyāse nirloṭhitam etat.
   HB 12.21–13.2, HBsar 10b2

Student: ... Dharmakīrti: The beloved of the gods,29 whose highest virtue consists in playing and who grew up under circumstances that were too easy (sukhaidhīta), asks to be done again what has been done and done / to state again what has been stated again and again (kṛtam kṛtam punah kārayati). For this has been explained already when discussing a sprout, etc. (4 pages earlier in the text; HB 8.16; German transl. Steinkellner 1967: 49) [How could an opponent who is not present know what Dharmakīrti has explained before?]

2) ... idam evāṃśābhir ucyamānāṃ kim atrabhavataḥ paruṣam ivābhāti. tasmāt tirādarśineva śakuninā dāraṅgatvāpi punar āgantavyam ity alam apratiśṭhānadiṃkṛatipattāyā. HB 26.1–4, HBsar 19a6–b1

Student: ... Dharmakīrti: Why does His Honor look nearly aggressive (paruṣam iva) inasmuch as we are saying exactly that which you now claim. Thus, like a bird that does not see a shore even if it has flown far away must return to a boat of the sailors, you have to return again to the starting point.30 Therefore, enough of going in a direction where there is no ground. (German transl. Steinkellner 1967: 66)

3) ... vismaṇaṇaśīlo devānāṃpriyāḥ prakaraṇaṃ na laksayati. VN 12.1–2

Student: ... Dharmakīrti: The beloved of the gods, whose highest virtue consists in forgetfulness, does not consider the context. (German transl. Much 1991: 30)

Although these passages do not prove anything about Dignāga’s PSV, in general they show that students might have been involved in the composition of such texts. And there is at least one passage in the PSV that gives the impression of Dignāga discussing with a student. This passage also clearly shows that the differences in the Tibetan translations can hardly be explained if we assume that at the beginning of the transmission there only was a single manuscript of the PSV.

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29 Arcaṭa explains devānāṃpriyāḥ as ‘simpleminded or silly one’ (devānāṃpriyāḥ rjuḥ mūrkho vā HBT 119,11). According to Karṇakagomin, when explaining devānāṃpriyo of PSV 104,25–26, the gods are the silly ones (devānāṃ mūrkhaṇāṃ priyo PSVT 380,29)

30 On this example, see Steinkellner 1967: 177 n. 63.
From verse 14 of the fifth chapter, which deals with anyāpoha, the exclusion from others, Dignāga explains how compounds such as niḥotpala, blue lotus, can refer to one and the same referent and have a qualifier-qualified relation under the assumption that this anyāpoha is the referent of a word. In the course of his explanation he states that if taken alone, the words niḥa and utpala do not have a referent, but together they do, just as the phonemes ni and la (of the word niḥa) alone are without a referent but when taken together as niḥa they have a referent. It is here that an opponent, my alleged student, disagrees with Dignāga’s example, stating that Dignāga has said that the word niḥa has a referent, whereas in a compound niḥa alone is without a referent. To the opponent this seems contradictory. This disagreement is expressed in quite different words in the two Tibetan translations.

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31 For the restored text and translation, see Pind 2009: A5f. and 86f.
Vasudhararakṣita

(V1) gal te kha dog brjod pa la ni dañ la yis cuñ žig kyañ don gyi rtog pa mi bskyed do žes pa ni brgal žiñ brtag pa spañ ba ste ||
kha dog gi don cuñ zad kyañ ||
min na’añ tshig gñis la de yis ||
brjod bya rtogs na de la yañ ||
yan gar ba de rtogs pa yin || PS 5.16

Kanakavārmaṇa

(K1) mi mtshuṇs pa bkod pa yin te / yi ge brjod pa na don ‘ga’ žig rtogs pa ma yin gyi / sion po žes bs dus pa na rtogs pa yin no ||
yig la don ‘ga’ med ce na /
dei brjod bya žes bya ha /
tshig gñis la rtogs de la yañ /
de ‘ba’ žig la rtogs par byed || PS 5.16

vaṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gadyate tu padadvaye /
tadvācyā iti tatrāpi kevalaṁ sa pratīyate || PS 5.16

% (V1) Opponent: If you say (gal te ... žes pa ni): «if the phonemes (kha dog, vañca) are stated alone, on account of ni and la no cognition of any referent whatsoever arises,» you have given up (spañ ba, *hani), what you have been questioning (brgal žiñ brtag pa,*paray- anuyuktai) in my position.

(K1) Opponent: What you say is incorrect (mi mtshuṇs pa bkod pa yin, viṣama upanyāsaḥ): «If the phonemes are stated alone, no referent whatsoever is known. But if they are stated together as nila, the referent is known.»

In the case of a phoneme (vañca) no referent whatsoever is known. However, in the case of the two words nila and utpāla the referent of nila is known. Answer: In the latter case, too (tatrāpi), only the referent (sa) that is known alone (kevalam) is to be denoted by that (tadvācyā iti). PS 5.16 (translation of the Sanskrit)
Vasudhararakṣita

(V2) ji itar ni’i sgra daň la’i sgra dag ni la’i sgras stoň pa de bźin du u tpa la daň sňon po’i sgra dag kyaň ’dus pa’i sgras stoň ste | (V3) ji skad du ni daň la’i sgra (read: sgras) cuň zad kyaň don gyi rtog pa mi bskyed do žes pa bźin no že na | (V4) de la yaň rigs sňon po ni sgra’i brjod bya’o žes yan gar ba rtogs par bya ste | (V5) yon tan de’i brjod bya daň ldan pa yin nam na ni (read: yin nam) rdzas ldan pa’i (read: pas) ldan pa yin yin pas (V6) kha dog don gyis stoň pa niď bźin du ’dus pa la (read: las?) yaň tha sňad de go bar bya ba yin no | (V7) sgra tha dad kyi brjod pa (read: brjod bya?) yin na ni don gyi šugs kyis don tha dad do žes brjod pa yin no | (V8) de’i phyir gěan sel ba’i sgra’i don la gěi mthun pa daň | khyad par du byed pa daň khyad par du bya ba dag ’thad pa yin no | PSv, D69a7–b4 / P73b4–8 (PSV 5 116–118)

Kanakavarman

(V2) ji itar ni’i sgra daň la’i sgra dag phyi rol gyi (read: brjod bya’i) don gyis stoň pa de bźin du u tpa la (add: daň) sňon po’i sgra dag bs dus pa (read: pa’i) don gyis stoň pa yin no | (K3) sňon po’i sgras don ’ga’ žig rtogs pa yin no žes gaň bšad pa (K4) de la yaň rigs ’ba’ žig sňon po’i sgras brjod pa’i (read: bya’i) phyir ’ba’ žig rtogs pa yin no | (K5) de’i yon tan daň ldan pa daň rdzas daň ldan par brjod bya yin par rigs pa’i phyir (K6) yi ge bźin du don gyis stoň pa’i bs dus pas kyaň rtogs par byed do | (K7) sgra tha dad pa’i brjod par bya ba’i don gyis thod tha daď pa žes brjod pa yin no | (K8) de’i phyir sgra’i don gěan sel ba la gěi mthun pa daň khyad par daň khyad par gyi gěi dhos po ’thad pa yin no | PSv, P159b3–8 (PSV 5 117–119)

(K2) Just as the words ni and la are empty of the word nǐla, in the same way also the two words nǐla and utpalal are empty of the two words combined (’dus pa’i sgra, *samuhaśabda). (V3) As has been said (ji skad du) in the introduction to PS 5.16: «by ni and la no cognition of any referent whatsoever arises.» (V4) In that case too, the blue genus (rigs sňon po, *nīlajāti) alone (yan gar ba, *kevalam) is known to be denoted by the word (sgra’i brjod bya’o žes, *śabdavācya iti).

(K2) Just as the words ni and la are empty of the referent to be denoted (brjod bya’i don, vācyārtha) by the word nǐla, in the same way the words utpalal and nǐla are empty of the referent of them combined. (K3) It has been said in the introduction to PS 5.16: «On account of the word blue no referent whatsoever is known.» (K4) In that case too, the genus (rigs, *jāti) alone (’ba’ žig, *kevalam) is known, because it is denoted by the word blue alone (’ba’ žig sňon po’i sgras brjod pa’i phyir).
(V5) Either the quality (yon tan, *guna) is connected with the genus that is denoted by the word blue, or (nam ... yani) the substance (rdzas) is connected with that quality that is connected with the genus (rdzas ladan pas ladan pa, *yuktama yuktam dravyam). (V6) Therefore (*tasmâ), as in the case of the phonemes (kha dog, *varna) that each alone lacks the referent of the two together, in the case of / on account of the compounded words niâla and utpala ('duś pa lā/laš), too, this expression (tha sñad de), i.e. nilotpala, is understood to denote the blue lotus (?). (V7) Words like nilotpala have been said in PS 5.14a to have referents different (don tha dad do žes brjod pa/bya yin) from words like niâla and utpala alone by implication (don gyi śūgs kyis) under the condition that ... (sgra tha dad kyi brjod bya yin na ni). (V8) Therefore, co-referentiality (gzi mthun pa, *sāmaṇādhikaranya) and qualifier-qualified relation (khyad par du byed pa dañ khyad par du bya ba dag) are justified ('thad pa) under the assumption that this anyāpoha is the referent of a word (gzan sel ba'i sgra'i don la).

(K5) It is correct that this genus is denoted (de'i ... brjod bya yin par rigs pa'i phyir, *tasya ... vācyatvopapattih) inasmuch as it is connected with its quality (de'i yon tan dañ ladan pa) and (dañ) with its substance (rdzas dañ ladan par). (K6) Therefore (*tasmâ), like in the case of the phonemes (yi ge, *varna), on account of the compounded words niâla and utpala ('duś pas), too, which are empty of the referent of the words alone, the blue lotus (?) is known. (K7) Words like nilotpala have been said in PS 5.14a to have referents different (don tha dad do žes brjod pa yin) from the referent that is denoted by the different words alone (sgra tha dad pa'i brjod par bya ba'i don gyis).

(K8) Therefore, co-referentiality (gzi mthun pa, *sāmaṇādhikaranya) and the qualifier-qualified relation (khyad par du byed pa dañ khyad par gyi gzi dños pa) are justified ('thad pa) under the assumption that this anyāpoha is the referent of a word (sgra'i don gzan sel ba la).

(1) — In the pūrvapakṣa, the opponent’s critique is formulated in quite different wordings, although the content is the same: If niâla in contrast to the phonemes ni and la has a referent, it is contradictory to say that niâla in the compound nilotpala does not have a referent. Jinendrabuddhi’s exemplar of the PSV is closer to (K1), but his identification of this mistake as abhyupetahāni, giving up one’s own assumption, might reflect brgal žiñ brtag pa span ba (*paryanyukta-
hāni) in (V1). cuñ žig kyañ of (V1) cannot be construed, but according to (K1) it should qualify the referent (don, *artha). The reason for the adduced example’s being incorrect is introduced, according to Jinen-
drabuddhi, with the words na hi. hi is not reflected in either of the two Tibetan translations. In verse 16, I understand, following Jinen-
drabuddhi, pādas 16ab as summarizing the opponent’s statement, and pādas 16cd as representing the answer. This understanding is not reflected in the Tibetan translations. Jinenrabuddhi’s explanation:

PSTₚₑₚ 201b1–2: visama upanyāsa iti drṣṭāntavaisanyam āha. kathaṁ visama ity āha — na hiyādi. etenābhupetahānim āha, nilaśabdasya kevalasyāpy arthavattvenābhuyupamāt.

varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye / PS 16ab
naṅśa doṣaḥ, yasmāt
tadvācyā iti tatrāpi kevalaṁ sa pratiyate // PS 16cd
tatrāpi nilaśabde yo ’ṛtho gamyate, sa nilaśabācya iti kevalaṁ pratiyate, na tu samudāyārtho nilaśabācayatvena pratiyata ity arthaḥ.

The phrase «what you say is incorrect» indicates the incorrectness of the example. The question why it is incorrect he answers with the words na hi. By this the opponent is stating that Dignāga gives up his assumption, because he assumes the word «blue» to have a referent also alone.

In the case of a phoneme no referent whatsoever is known. How-
ever, in the case of the two words nila and utpala the referent of nila is known.

Answer: This mistake does not apply, since

In this latter case too, it is only that referent that is known alone to be denoted by that word nila.

In that case too, i.e. in the case of the word blue, it is only that referent which is understood that is known alone to be denoted by the word blue. It is not, however, the referent of the two together (samudāyārtha) that is known to be denoted by the word blue. This is the meaning.

(2) — The prose explanation is introduced with yathaiva hi, according to Jinenrabuddhi (PST 201b3). eva and hi are not reflected in either (V2) or (K2). (K2), with the correction of phyi rol gyi to brjod
bya’i\textsuperscript{32} and two other minor corrections, seems to offer a proper beginning of the explanation of the answer in the verse. (V2) is meaningless in this context unless we understand it as a short note in which «the referent» has to be understood from the context. Then (V2) and (K2) cover the same meaning.

(3) (4) — (3) is introduced with the words yat tuk\textsuperscript{33}tam (ji skad du ... bžin V, gaṅ bṣad pa K) which, according to Jinendrabuddhi, repeat the opponent’s argument in the introduction to PS 5.16ab. The following sentence (4), beginning with tatrāpi (de la yañ KV), explains the second half of the verse, i.e., PS 5.16cd, beginning with tadvācyā iti\textsuperscript{34}. While in (V3) the first part of the pūrvapakṣa in (V1) is repeated (ni daṅ la’i sgras cuṅ zad kyaṅ don gyi rtog pa mi bskyed do), in (K3) it is the latter part (sion po’i sgras don ‘ga’ žig rtogs pa yin no) of (K1). In (K4), where the first ‘ba’ žig seems to be superfluous, we learn that it is only the genus alone that is known, because it is denoted by the word blue. The ablative clause brjod bya’i phyir seems to reflect K’s interpretation of tadvācyā iti of the verse. While (K4) tells us that the genus is known because it is denoted by the word «blue,» in (V4) we read that the blue genus is known to be denoted by a word. It must be understood from the context that the blue genus is denoted by the word «blue.»

(5) and (6) show, if we follow Jinendrabuddhi, that irrespective of whether the word «blue» refers to the quality blue that is connected to the genus to be denoted by the word «blue» — since the genus is inherent in the quality or refers to the substance that is connected with the quality, the latter being connected to the genus — none of

\textsuperscript{32} The Tibetan phyi rol gyi don reflects a Sanskrit bāhyārtha. I consider this to be the result of an erroneously transmitted or misread vācyārtha.

\textsuperscript{33} yat tuk\textsuperscript{34}tam ityādinā pūrvapakṣaṃ prayuccārya tatrāpītyādinā tadvācyā ityāder uttarārdhasyārtham ācāste PST\textsubscript{ms} 210b3.

\textsuperscript{34} «Genus,» so Jinendrabuddhi, is the blueness that inheres in the blue quality. The word «alone» (kevalam) indicates that the word blue lacks the referent of the two words nila and utpala together (jātīr nilagunasa-mavāyini nilatvam. kevalagrahaṇena samudāyārthasūnyatām āha PST\textsubscript{ms} 210b3–4).
the referents of the word «blue» is identical with the referent of the words \textit{ni\text{\`a}}la and \textit{utpala} together. Thus, the lack of the referent was stated in the example with regard to the referent of the two phonemes together. In the same way, the lack of a referent of \textit{ni\text{\`a}}la alone in the compound \textit{-nilotpala} was meant as the lack of the referent of \textit{nilotpala}, and therefore the example is not incorrect and Dignāga has not given up his position.\footnote{35} \textit{\`dus pa la} in (V6) might be a translation of \textit{samudāyaih}, the reading that was available to Jinendrabuddhi; see also \textit{bs\text{\`a}dus pas} in (K6). In this case, a correction to \textit{\`dus pa las} might be taken into account.

(7) and (8) finally show why a co-referentiality and qualified-qualifier relation is justified under the condition that the \textit{anyāpoha} is the referent of a word. This, however, is not my concern here. \textit{sgra tha dad kyi brjod pa}/\textit{brjod bya yin na ni don gyi śuṣgs kyis} of (V7) might reflect a Sanskrit \textit{bhinna\text{\`a}bdavāvācye \text{\`a}thena}, a corruption of an original \textit{bhinna\text{\`a}bdavāvācyeṇārthena}. If so, (V7) would have the same meaning as (K7).

\textit{samud\text{\`a}yair} (73) na \textit{bhinna\text{\`a}bdavāvācyeṇārthena}.

The material presented here in connection with the explanation of how co-referentiality is possible in the case of words such as \textit{nilotpala} clearly shows that the differences in the Tibetan translations cannot be explained if we assume that a single Sanskrit manuscript was the starting point of the Sanskrit transmission of the manuscripts used for the translations.\footnote{36} And using the phonemes \textit{nī} and \textit{la} as an example for illustrating that the words \textit{ni\text{\`a}}la and \textit{utpala} of the compound

\footnote{35} \textit{ni\text{\`a}sa\text{\`a}bdavāvācyāyā} jātyā \textit{yukto guṇo vā} yatra sā samavetā, jāt\textit{iyuktena} gunena \textit{yuktaṃ dravyaṃ vā} yatra ni\text{\`a}guṇaḥ samavetaḥ. \textit{sarvam cedam na samudāyaśyārthaḥ. tad evam ubhayatǎpi samudāyaśavāce- nārthenānarthakatvastvasābhisamhitattvān nāsti vaśamyaṃ upanyāsasya. nāpy upetababdha pratijñāyā iti. tasmād arthaśānyair iti} samudāya-
\textit{thaśānyaih. samudāyair iti} ni\text{\`a}diśabdaīḥ \textit{PST} \textit{me}, 210b4–6. \textit{tasmāt} seems to be reflected in \textit{yin pas} at the end of (V5) and \textit{rīgs pa\text{\`a}l phyir} at the end of (K5).

\footnote{36} A nice example for the fact that two quite different Tibetan translations might nevertheless go back to similar Sanskrit versions is presented in Lasic 2011.
nilotpala, when taken alone, do not have a referent indicates that this text served an educational purpose, at least in my understanding. I do not see any other meaningful explanation. If we assume that Dignāga sat in his cell and wrote a text about anyāpoha, he could simply have stated from the beginning that the example was meant with regard to the referent of the word nila. Then it would have been clear that individually nila and utpala do not refer to the same thing as the two words together. Or Dignāga could have used a different example. But it seems odd to suppose that Dignāga wrote this example and then realized that it might be misunderstood (which is really contrary to the purpose of an example), and then started a discussion about why it nevertheless is correct. This does not contribute anything to the understanding of anyāpoha, which is the topic of the chapter. If, on the other hand, this example was used in the process of Dignāga teaching students we can assume that it was intentionally formulated to be misleading. The student to whom we might attribute the pūrvapakṣa fell into Dignāga’s trap. In PS 5.16ab Dignāga recapitulated his mistake and then taught him a lesson: Be careful when you accuse an opponent of arguing in the wrong way. You yourself might be the loser!

If we accept that (at least parts of) works such as Dignāga’s PSV or Dharmakīrtī’s Hetubindu consist of notes taken by students during classes given by the respective teacher, notes that also include discussions between the teacher and his students, it is clear that these are not pure philosophical works structured according to philosophical needs. Sometimes the structure of certain discussions follows the — not always intelligent — questions of the student(s). Thus, not every theory of an opponent as presented in Buddhist works has necessarily to correspond to a theory that was really held by a follower of an opposing school. They might also be ad hoc ideas of students. Nonetheless, we still have the philosophical theories of the teachers, since I do consider these works as having been authored by them.37 But they are also documents that allow a fascinating glimpse

37 See the chapter «Methodological considerations» in Kellner 2010: 181–185, where she, among other problems, also considers the practices of textual production and transmission of Buddhist pramāṇa texts.
into Buddhist teaching classes during the fifth to sixth centuries, a
teaching the purpose of which seems to have been to introduce stu-
dents to the art of argumentation and rhetoric.

Appendix 1 — Vāyuprakaraṇa

Based on a quotation from the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (PSV, D28a5–6
on PS 2.3d = PSV, 110a5) in PVSV 14,20–21 (= PVin 2 97,8–9), in
connection with which Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin refer to the
Vāyuprakaraṇa, the section PS(V) 2.3c–5b dealing with air (vāyu)
as taught by the Vaiśeṣika has been identified by Steinkellner (1979:
130 n. 499) as being this Vāyuprakaraṇa. The relevant passage by
Dharmakīrti reads:

PVSV 14,20–15,1 (= PVin 2 97,8–9): yady adarśanamātreyena ḍṛṣṭebhyāḥ
pratiṣedhāḥ kriyate, na ca so ’pi yukta iti. This has been identified by
Gnoli in his edition as coming from the PSV.(1)

(1) ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis mthoṅ ba las log par grub pa’i phyir ro || de ltar yāṅ
rīgs pa ma yin te || PSV, D28a5–6 (on PS 2.3d) = gal te ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis ma
mthoṅ ba ’gag pa byed na de yāṅ mi rīgs te || PSV, 110a5

Karṇakagomin identifies this quotation as stemming from Dignāga
without giving the name of the source text:

... ity ukte vaiśeṣikena, tatrācaryadīnāgenoktam — yady adarśana-
mātreyena ḍṛṣṭebhyāḥ pratiṣedhāḥ kriyate, na ca so ’pi yukta iti. yad etad
uktam, tad virudhyata iti vārtīkakāro darśayam oha — ḍṛṣṭetvāyāti (=
PV 1.20). PVSVṬ 66,25–27

In his explanation, Karṇakagomin, following Śākyabuddhi, then re-
fers to the Vāyuprakaraṇa:

tad vācāste — yadyāyāti (PVSV 14,20). yad aḥācārya vāyuparakarane —
yady adarśanamātreyena ḍṛṣṭebhyāḥ prthivyādibhyāḥ sparśasya pratiṣed-
hāḥ kriyate vaiśeṣikena, na ca so ’pi yukta iti PVSVṬ 67,11–13 = de bstan
pa’i phyir gal te žes bya ba la sogs pa smos te || slob dpon gyis ruṅ gi rab
tu dbye ba las gal te bye brag pas ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis mthoṅ ba sa là

—

(38) The Vāyuprakaraṇa is also referred to by Vibhūtihāra (PVV 291) in
note 8 (continued from 290). There, Vibhūtihāra seems, in part, to
base himself on material coming from PVṬ/PVSVṬ.
sogs pa las reg pa 'gog par byed na de yañ rigs pa ma yin no ḏes bṣad pa gañ yin pa / PVT Je D34b1-2

The words prthivyādibhyāḥ sparśasya and vaiśeṣikeṇa (sa la sogs pa las reg pa, bye brag pas), which are neither found in Dharmakīrti's quotation nor in the PSV, might indicate that the Vāyuprakaraṇa is a work independent from this vāyu section in the PSV. We otherwise must interpret these additional words as explanatory glosses. The strange clause yadi ... na ca might indicate that the Vāyuprakaraṇa was a māraka text with na ca so ʹpi yuktaḥ being part of a verse and the yadi sentence being the introductory prose. This might be an example for what Lasic (2010: 515) calls Dignāga's «method of copy-and-paste.» Also, in one translation of the PSV we have parts of verses that are not considered as belonging to the PS. While on the one hand this reveals that the two Tibetan translations are based on quite different Sanskrit manuscripts, it might also indicate that these verses stem from another work by Dignāga, namely, the Vāyuprakaraṇa.

1) rañ gi mtshan ńid bstan bya min || ḏes byas pa na rtogs par bya ba'i don gyi bdag ńid mñon sum gyi yul yin źin spyi rjes su dpag pa'i yul ńid du mñon par brjod pas mñon par brjod do // PSV, 27b7-28a1
rañ gi mtshan ńid ni bstan par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir bdag ńid rtogs pa ńid kyi don du mñon sum yin la / rjes su dpag pa ni spyi'i yul can yin te de brjod par byed pa brjod bya'i phyir de ńid rnam pa gñis su phye ba yin no // PSV, 109b5-6

2) gal te kun gyi rjes thogs las // grub ste 'di ltar kun gyi rjes thogs las rluñ la sogs pa'i rañ bzin rjes su dpag par grub pa'o // PSV, 28a3-4
gal te yons su lhag pas grub pa yin te yons su lhag pa las rluñ la sogs pa'i rañ bzin rnamz la rjes su dpag pa 'di 'grub par 'gyur te / PSV, 102a2

In the Tibetan tradition, too, the Vāyuprakaraṇa is referred to as an independent work. Go rams pa bSod nam seng ge (1429–1489) lists a Vāyuprakaraṇa with Vṛtti among the works of Dignāga that were
translated into Tibetan and that Sa skya Paṇḍita studied with his teacher Śākyānirvāṇa.  

Also gTsaṅ Paṇḍita (1738–1780) treats the Vāyuprakaraṇa as though it were a work independent from the PSV. In his (rGyas pa'i bstan bcos) Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi raṅ don le'u daṅ gāṇ don le'u gnis kyi dka' ba'i gnad gsal bar byed pa chos kyi grags pa'i dgoös rgyan he distinguishes explicitly between two contradictions, one to the PSV (kun btus kyi raṅ 'grel) and the other to the Vāyuprakaraṇa (rluṅ gi rab byed): daṅ po luṅ drug daṅ 'gal tshul la gsum / rigs sgo daṅ 'gal tshul / kun btus kyi raṅ 'grel daṅ 'gal tshul / rluṅ gi rab byed daṅ 'gal tshul lo (11a1–2). In order to show a contradiction to the PSV, gTsaṅ Paṇḍita refers, among other things, to kun btus las / gaṅ yan gal te ma mthon ba tsam gyis mi snaṅ ba dag la 'gog bar byed na de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin no / Žes pa'i luṅ daṅ 'gal lo (21a5–6). And for a contradiction to the Vāyuprakaraṇa, he refers to rluṅ gi rab byed las / gal te ma mthon ba tsam gyis mthon ba dag la 'gog bar byed na de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin no / Žes pa'i luṅ luṅ tshad mar khas blaṅs pa daṅ 'gal lo (20b2–3). The difference between the two passages seems to be the perceptibility (Vāyuprakaraṇa) and imperceptibility (PSV) of the object in question. This, however, is not our concern here. That the Vāyuprakaraṇa is an independent work is also supported by dGe ba rgyal mtshan (1387–1462) who in his PS commentary Tshad ma kun las btus pa Žes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa'i rgyan tells us that the PS is a summary of the Nyāyamukha/Nyāyapravesa (rigs pa'i sgo), the Vāyuprakaraṇa and other works of Dignāga (rigs pa'i sgo daṅ rluṅ gi

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39 Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi dka' ba'i gnas rnam par bsad pa sde bdun rab gsal, in bSod nams rgya mtshan (compiled), The Complete Works of Go ram bSod nams seng ge (The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sāskya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, Vol. 12), Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1969, pp. 1–167: bod du 'gyur ba la yaṅ / rluṅ gi rab byed 'grel pa daṅ bcad pa / dmigs pa brtag pa 'grel pa daṅ bcas pa / dus gsum brtag pa ... rnam sod dō // 3a3; see also rluṅ gi rab byed rtsa 'grel sogs 5a2.

40 Cited from the ACIP version; Catalog Number: S0300; http://www.asianclassics.org/release6/flat/S0300N_T.TXT; last visited 2.3.2013.
Another quotation can be added to the one from the Vāyuprakāraṇa in PVT/PSVT treated above. At the beginning of the Sāṅkhyaaparikṣā of the PSV’s third chaper, parārthānunāna, Dignāga, when refuting the existence of primordial matter, refers to another statement of his. The passage reads in its two versions:

gal te gtso bo yod pa ēñī bsgrub bya yin na de ni mi bden te |

tshad ma'i yul ni mi ës phyir ||

spyi'i ntsshan ēñī kyi yul can ma yin pa'i rjes su dpag pa ni yod pa ma yin no ës bstan zin to || PSV 141b4–5

gal te 'dir gtso bo'i yod pa ēñī bsgrub bya yin no (yin no P : yin D) ëz na | de ma yin te |

tshad ma'i yul ma ës pa'i phyr ro ||

spyi'i ntsshan ëñī ma yin pa'i yul la (yul la D : yul P) rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin no ës bstan zin to // PSV, D54a5/P57b6–7

On the basis of Jinendrabuddhi’s Tīkā this passage can be reconstructed as follows.

yady atrāśītītvāṃ pradhānasya sādhyam, tad atasat,

pramāṇaviṣayājñānāt ||

na hy asāmānyaviṣayam anumānam astīty upapāditam.  (1)

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(1) PSTm, 153a1–2: yady astītītvāṃ pradhānasya sādhyam, tad atasat, ayuk-
tam. kuta ity īha — pramāṇaviṣayājñānād iti. pramāṇasaśaddenātānunānaṃ
vivāksitam. tasya viṣayāḥ sāmānyam. tadajñānāt. asāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam iti
svaśākṣaṇaviṣayam. upapāditam iti vāyuprakāraṇe pratipāditam.

Later, Jinendrabuddhi refers to this passage again and adds sākṣāt (PSTm, 157b7):
tatrāśī yadi sākṣāt pradhānāstītītvāṃ sādhyam, tad atsat, pramāṇaviṣayājñānāt. na
hy asāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam astīti.

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42 Whether Dharmakīrti’s phrase adṛṣṭārthe ’rthavikalpastrām (PSV 37,27), already identified by Gnoli as coming from the PSV, (1) has a counterpart in the Vāyuprakāraṇa, we cannot say.

(1) PSV 29a1 (on PS 2,5 ab): ma mthon ba'i don la ni rnam par rtog pa tsam 'ba' žig ste = PSV 111a2–3: ma mthon ba'i don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi
The wording *na hy asāṁyalyakṣaṇaviśayam anumānam asti* is not found in PS(V) 2.3c–5b, but its content is implicitly stated there as well.

**Abbreviations and primary sources**


HBT — Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jīnavijayājī (eds), *Hetubinduṭikā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miṣra*. Baroda 1949.


NSū — *Nyāyasūtra* — see NBh


PS 1 — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 1*. (April 2005) http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf (last visited: 2.3.2013)


PSTṁ — Manuscript B of Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇasamuccayoṭikā*. See the description by A. MacDonald in PST 1, Part II.


PSV 5 — Masaaki Hattori (ed.), *The Pramāṇasamuccayoṭrī of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary. Chapter five: Anyāpoha-parīkṣa. Tibetan text with Sanskrit fragments*. (Kyoto 1982) (Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters,
Kyoto University, 21).

PSVₜ — Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), Tibetan translation of PSV by Kanakavarman and (Mar thuṅ) Dad paʽ(i) śes rab. P vol. 130, no. 5702, Ce 93b4–177a7. No equivalent in D.

PSVₜ — Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), Tibetan translation of PSV by Vasudhararakṣita and (Za ma) Seṅ (ge) rgyal (mtshan). D Tshad ma vol. 1, no. 4204, Ce 14b1–85b7/P vol. 130, no. 5701, Če 13a6–93b4.


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Dignāga on air


Krasser 2011 — Helmut Krasser, How to teach a Buddhist monk to refute the outsiders – Text-critical remarks on some works by Bhāviveka. Dhiḥ 51 (2011) 49–76.


Lasic 2011 — Horst Lasic, Meditations on the retrieval of lost texts with special reference to the Sāṅkhya section of Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 2.


