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Towards a Critical Edition and Translation of the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya A Propos Two Recent Publications*

Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750-810?) is arguably the most important and most original Buddhist philosopher after Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and yet his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya (PVABh), remains hitherto almost completely ignored. The reasons for this regrettable state of affairs are well known. The daunting size of the work (more than 16,200 *ślokas*, almost one sixth of the size of the Mahābhārata, as Altekar states in the preface to Sāmkrītyāyana's edition¹), its notorious difficulty and above all the unreliability of its single Sanskrit edition would make anyone hesitate to undertake a translation or study of it. A new edition of the PVABh is therefore an urgent desideratum for the better understanding of the Buddhist epistemological tradition in the post-Dharmakīrti period, and Motoi Ono and Shigeaki Watanabe are to be warmly congratulated for making first steps in this direction. Ono's book presents us with Prajñākaragupta's extensive comments on Dharmakīrti's first seven verses of chapter two of the Pramāṇavārttika. Watanabe's edition is of a smaller portion of the same text. The two editions (abbreviated hereafter as "O." and "W.")

* Review of Motoi Ono, *Prajñākaraguptas Erklärung der Definition gültiger Erkenntnis. (Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra zu Pramāṇavārttika II 1-7)*. (Materialien zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis in der Tradition Dharmakīrtis 3). Teil I: *Sanskrit-Text und Materialien*. [Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Klasse der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 678 = Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 34]. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000. xxxix + 108p., together with Shigeaki Watanabe, Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam ad Pramāṇavārttikam 2.1.abc and 2.4.d-2.5.ab. Sanskrit and Tibetan Text with Tibetan-Sanskrit Index. *Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies* 23 (2000) 1-88. — As always, I have benefited from the extensive comments of my wife Karin Preisendanz.

¹ In the following, "S." refers to Sāmkrītyāyana's edition, *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṃkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. Patna 1953.

respectively) were published almost simultaneously with a few months apart from each other. They are identical to a surprising degree, and one wonders whether Watanabe did not have access to Ono's dissertation (University of Vienna 1993, bearing the same title as his book) which contains an edition and annotated German translation of the same text, all the more so as both scholars work at the same tertiary institution (Tsukuba University). While Watanabe keeps silent on Ono's work, Ono refers to Watanabe's Japanese translation of the same portion² where Watanabe has already suggested some textual emendations. If both editions were prepared independently of each other, their similarity would only testify to the objectivity of the editorial work; that is, we may have here a rare case of a repeated experiment which led to largely the same results.

Both editions are remarkably good. They are based on a careful reading of the photostatic reproduction of the original manuscript³ – Ono's more so than Watanabe's⁴ – as well as a meticulous comparison with the outstanding Tibetan translation by Blo ldan śes rab and others. Watanabe's edition has the considerable advantage of presenting the Tibetan translation opposite the Sanskrit text, but, as mentioned above, Ono's edition covers a significantly larger portion of the text. Stylistically, the two editions differ considerably inasmuch as Ono uses Western punctuation, whereas Watanabe employs *dandās*. Ono's punctuation is clearer and enables an easier understanding of the syntactic structure of the text, although, of course, the easier an editor attempts to make it for the reader, the higher the risk of leading him astray.⁵

² Cf. Sh. Watanabe, The Definition of *pramāṇam* in the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārah*. *Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies* 1 (1976) 367-400.

³ I speak of the manuscript in singular because only one manuscript is available for the portion edited by Ono and Watanabe. Cf. Ono's introduction, p. xiii.

⁴ It is evident that sometimes Watanabe simply copies Sāṃkṛityāyana's edition without checking the manuscript; cf. for instance O. p. 64.3-4: *tataḥ svarūpa-saṃvedanātmatvān na pratyekaṃ sambandhaparigrahaḥ*. Sāṃkṛityāyana (p. 25.8-9) puts the above sentence in brackets, thereby seemingly indicating that these words are missing in the manuscript; one would therefore tend to conclude that the above sentence represents Sāṃkṛityāyana's reconstruction on the basis of the Tibetan translation. Watanabe (p. 8, n. 20) explicitly claims that the sentence is omitted in the manuscript. However, it appears in the manuscript in fol. 10a4. Cf. *Sanskrit Manuscripts of Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam*. Facsimile Edition by Sh. Watanabe. Patna – Narita 1998.

⁵ Ono's punctuation is very helpful indeed; only on rare occasions do I find his interpretation of the syntax a bit too daring, cf. e.g., n. 18 below.

Watanabe takes the trouble to mark the individual members of a compound by inserting hyphens and circumflexes, which does not seem to be really necessary because Prajñākaragupta usually does not use long or ambiguous compounds and generally the divisions of the compounds are clear, although Altekar somewhat overstates the case when he says: “It may be observed at the outset that he [Prajñākaragupta] has a lucid, easy and graceful style, not overburdened with difficult words and long compounds.”⁶ A practical advantage of Watanabe’s edition over Ono’s are the line by line references to Sāṃkṛityāyāna’s edition.

Both scholars painstakingly note the cases where the Tibetan translation deviates from the Sanskrit text. Here Watanabe’s procedure is more user-friendly because he explains his understanding of such deviations by adding hypothetical Sanskrit equivalents which could have been the basis of the Tibetan translation. Ono, as a rule, never explains how he interprets deviations of the Tibetan translation; in fact, he does not even identify them as deviations, but simply quotes the Tibetan text in the footnotes without any comment. He also hardly ever explicates his choice of a specific reading, probably considering his choices self-evident; even standard considerations such as preferring a *lectio difficilior* are never mentioned.

The choice of readings is not always obvious, especially when one considers that the Tibetan translators certainly did not use the Sanskrit manuscript that is available to us. Thus, theoretically, one would have to decide whether one follows the evidence of the available Sanskrit manuscript or the virtual Sanskrit text which is reflected in the Tibetan translation, or whether one combines the evidence of the Sanskrit manuscript and reconstructed readings from the Tibetan translation in order to arrive at a Sanskrit text which is more satisfactory than the one available, assuming and hoping that this composite product comes closer to Prajñākaragupta’s original work than either of its component parts. Neither Ono nor Watanabe discuss their editorial principles, but both clearly, and as a matter of course, opt for the latter solution; however, Watanabe is more conservative and keeps closer to the transmitted Sanskrit text.

For better or for worse, the Sanskrit manuscript that was used by the Tibetan translators must have been extremely close to the Sanskrit manuscript photographed by Sāṃkṛityāyāna – in no way can one speak

⁶ Altekar, in S. p. viii.

of two recensions – so that the editorial process on the whole is relatively uncomplicated. Nevertheless, there are some discrepancies between the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, and these are not always noticed by Ono and Watanabe. For instance, O. p. 72.1-2 and W. p. 20.9-10: *tathā pūrvabhāvi tad eva kāraṇam*. This does not read smoothly and I would suggest to conjecture *tathā pūrvabhāvi yat, tad eva kāraṇam* in reliance on the Tibetan translation: *de lta na yañ sñar byuñ ba gañ yin pa de ni rgyu yin gyi*, and in analogy to the previous sentence which reads: *atha dṛṣṭam yat, tad vyāpakam sat kāraṇam*.

There are also a few cases where the discrepancies noted by Ono between the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts are imaginary. For instance, p. 66.1-2 (v. 198):

*tathā hi yadi mānatvam adhyakṣād anumānataḥ |
siddhim icchaty asaṃdehaṃ vyavahārapadaṃ vṛthā ||*

The Sanskrit manuscript reads *siddhim ṛcchati*, but Ono conjectures *siddhim icchati* on the basis of the Tibetan 'dod (*the tshom med par grub 'dod na*). However, the reading of the manuscript presents a perfectly correct idiom (“The fact of being a valid awareness attains establishment [i.e. is established]”)⁷ and Ono’s reconstructed text is at best awkward and at worst, I dare say, impossible. Another minor case where the discrepancy pointed out by Ono is imaginary involves *apī* expressing the completeness of number,⁸ p. 73, v. 209.

Many of the cases which Ono notes as deviations of the Tibetan translation from the Sanskrit text certainly do not indicate that the Tibetan translators used a different text. They are mostly trivial, for instance, when *tad apy asat* is translated by *de lta ma yin te* (p. 75, n. 9) or when *arthakriyānubhavana* is translated by *don byed myoñ ba las* (p. 75, n. 4). Further, Ono’s usage of the parallel passages in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhū) strikes me occasionally as problematic. Bhāsarvajña, more than any Nyāya author that we know of, was engaged in an intense disputation with Prajñākaragupta and in doing so often quoted, paraphrased or summarized the Pramānavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya. However, methodologically I would give more weight to the manuscript readings than Ono does and would not change them unless there are compelling reasons to do so. The parallel passages in the NBhū do *not*, at least not by

⁷ Cf., for instance, ŚV 2.80b: *saṃvādam ṛcchati*.

⁸ Cf. J.S. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*. Leiden 1886: § 298.

themselves, constitute such a compelling reason. Only if the reading of the manuscript itself is not acceptable should the evidence of the NBhū be used for emendations and conjectures. As long as the reading of the manuscript is acceptable, it should be retained because one cannot be sure whether the parallel passages in the NBhū are exact quotations or only close paraphrases (cf. e.g. n. 53). Of course, this methodological principle does not guarantee the choice of the “original” reading. If more manuscripts of the PVABh will be discovered, this or that reading in the NBhū may turn out to have preserved the better variant, but the adaption of a variant should be based on readings of manuscripts of the PVABh, not on the readings of the NBhū. As long as no further manuscripts of the PVABh are available, the evidence of the single available manuscript has to be used as a default, that is, considered as the most important testimony until proven otherwise. The situation is somewhat more complex when the reading of the NBhū is, or seems to be, confirmed by the Tibetan translation. Indeed, in many cases it seems that the manuscript used by Bhāsarvajña is closer to that used by the Tibetan translators than to the Sāṃkṛityāyana manuscript. To give just one trivial example, Ono (p. 64.4-5) changes *sāadhanārthakriyāgrahaṇayoh* to *sāadhanārthakriyājñānayoh* on the basis of NBhū 199.23.⁹ Watanabe (p. 8.13), however, keeps the reading *grahaṇayoh* and only points out the variant in n. 21. The Tibetan translation *śes pa* seems to confirm the NBhū reading, though not with absolute certainty, for *grahaṇa* is used here in the same meaning as *jñāna*. Should one follow the NBhū against the manuscript reading because it seems to be confirmed by the Tibetan? Or is *jñāna* the *lectio facillior* because it is the more common term? Or is it the *lectio difficilior* because *grahaṇa* is used more often in that context? It is in such cases that one wishes that the editors would discuss, even briefly, the choice of variant readings.

A more interesting and meaningful example occurs in O. p. 66.12-67.1: *tat katham anyadarśane ’nyaprāptyā prāmāṇyam*. The reading *tat*, which is omitted in the manuscript, is based on NBhū 200.23 and the Tibetan translation (*de ci ltar*); the manuscript reading *pramāṇam* is changed by Ono to *prāmāṇyam* on the basis of the manuscript of the NBhū (fol. 45b13). The editions of the Tibetan translation differ on this point: Peking reads *tshad ma*, whereas Derge reads *tshad ma ñid*. Sāṃkṛityāyana and Watanabe also conjecture (p. 12.8-9) *tat*, but keep

⁹ According to O. p. 64, n. 6 the reading is also adopted or suggested in Watanabe, op. cit. (n. *).

the manuscript reading *pramāṇam*. Obviously, the two conjectures cannot be considered separately. If one conjectures *tat*, the reading *pramāṇam* is preferable because *tat* most probably refers to *darśana* in the previous sentence (“how could this [visual cognition be] a *pramāṇa* ...”; the reading *prāmāṇyam*, under this interpretation, is meaningless). If, on the other hand, one follows the manuscript in omitting *tat*, then *pramāṇam* becomes problematic. It seems probable, therefore, that the reading *prāmāṇyam* has arisen either because in some manuscript tradition *tat* was omitted, or because it was misunderstood to be an adverb (“Therefore, how ...”).¹⁰ Consequently, I would not follow the NBhū in reading *prāmāṇyam*.

On the other hand, I think that Ono was probably right to change (p. 73.6) *avāntaraviśeṣaḥ* of the manuscript to *avāntaravibhāgaḥ* on the basis of the Tibetan *rnam par dbye pa* and the parallel passage in the NBhū. Here, the more common term *avāntaraviśeṣa* may have been introduced inadvertently.

Watanabe’s edition is not preceded by an introduction except for acknowledgments and a list of abbreviations. Ono, in the introduction to his edition (p. xi-xxv), briefly discusses the title of the work (known both as *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* and *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*; both seem to be abbreviations of the full title *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya*), the Sanskrit manuscripts, the Tibetan translations and other texts which quote or refer to Prajñākaragupta’s work (the most important of which are the *Aṣṭasahasrī* of Vidyānanda and the NBhū) as well as the commentaries on the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya* by Jayanta and Yamāri. The introduction is short, but informative; it is regrettable, however, that Ono is not always up to date with the secondary literature on the subject. For instance, he proves at great length (p. xix-xxi) that Prajñākaragupta’s commentator is called Jayanta and not Jina, but this has already been pointed out by van der Kuijp in his article “Fourteenth Century Tibetan History IV: The *Tshad ma’i byung tshul ‘chad nyan gyi rgyan*. A Tibetan History of Indian Buddhist *pramāṇavāda*” in *Festschrift Klaus Bruhn*, ed. N. Balbir – J.K. Bautze. Reinbek 1994, p. 387.¹¹ Ono corrects Stcherbatsky’s remark (made in 1932) that Ravi-

¹⁰ This interpretation of *tat* is not impossible, of course, but it renders the text less pregnant.

¹¹ Naudou has pointed out that the Mongolian index gives the form *Jaya*, but he misinterprets the designation as referring to *Jayaśrī*, a Kaśmīrī logician of the second half of the eleventh century. Cf. J. Naudou, *Buddhists of Kaśmīr*. Delhi

gupta's commentary is on the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya* rather than a direct commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, but this has already been pointed out several times, most recently in the standard work *Texte der Erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus* by Steinkellner and Much (Göttingen 1995, p. 77). Ono, in his turn, is probably mistaken to think that Ravigupta was a disciple ("ein direkter Schüler" [p. xvi]) of Prajñākaragupta. As I pointed out elsewhere, Ravigupta refers to Prajñākaragupta as his *kalyāṇamitra*.¹²

As is obvious from the above, my slight misgivings about Ono's and Watanabe's editions are mostly trivial and insubstantial. Whatever minor faults one may find in them should not obscure the fact that their work is solid, reliable and largely superior to Sāṃkṛityāyana's edition. On the whole, Ono's edition could be considered superior to Watanabe's, but since minor mistakes or uncertain readings occur here and there,¹³ one is advised to use both editions in tandem. Anyone interested in Prajñākaragupta's understanding and occasionally highly original interpretation of Dharmakīrti's doctrine of general validity of awarenesses, which forms the main topic of the two editions, will be deeply grateful to Ono and Watanabe for their very fine work.

The most interesting portion in Ono's and Watanabe's editions is a lengthy digression on the nature of causation in which Prajñākaragupta explains for the first time his revolutionary theory that a cause need not always precede the effect, but can also arise *after* the effect.¹⁴ The following is a first English translation with notes kept to the strict

1980, p. 124. Incidentally, Naudou counts Prajñākaragupta among the Kaśmīrian Buddhists, but I could not trace the source of this information. Stcherbatsky says that he was apparently a native of Bengal (*Buddhist Logic*, vol. I, p. 43), but I could not trace the source of this information either.

¹² Cf. The Tibetan Translations of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the Development of Translation Methods From Sanskrit to Tibetan. In: *Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995*, ed. H. Krasner et al. Wien 1997, p. 277-188, at p. 279, n. 9.

¹³ In all fairness to Ono, I have to add that I checked his edition only in the part which is also edited by Watanabe. This sample may not be representative for his work as a whole.

¹⁴ The discussion here has close parallels to Prajñākaragupta's comments on PV 2.49. Some of these will be pointed out in the notes below.

minimum, and offered here as a preliminary to Ono's German translation of the same passage; his translation of the entire commentary on PV 2.1-7 has been in the making for more than ten years and, one hopes, will eventually be published.¹⁵ The context of the discussion is PV 2.4d-5a: *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ || prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*. After rejecting several attempts, among others Dharmottara's, to establish the connection between a valid awareness (an awareness that is a means of realisation of the efficient action, *sādhana-jñāna*) and the efficient action itself that occurs at a later time, Prajñākaragupta offers his own solution.

TRANSLATION OF ONO 70.1-76,10 (≈ WATANABE 18.3-28.8)

Therefore, [the validity of an awareness] is demonstrated in a different manner.

205. The awareness is a means of knowledge because it reveals the own nature of efficient action, which is ascertained on the strength of [the relations consisting in] identity of nature and causation (*tadutpatti*).

Indeed, it is the awareness of efficient action that makes known the efficient action because it has the nature of an efficient action. Precisely that [awareness of efficient action] is the awareness which is the means of realisation (*sādhana-jñāna*)¹⁶ in respect to this efficient action.¹⁷ The previous awareness which is the means of realisation [of efficient action makes known the efficient action] if this [namely] the object has been determined as lasting at that time (i.e., at the time of

¹⁵ In a personal communication Professor Ono has kindly informed me that his translation will not be published in the near future.

¹⁶ I am not entirely certain how to translate this term. Prajñākaragupta seems to use it sometimes as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* (for a clear case cf. O. p. 64.4-5: *sādhana-rthakriyājñānayoḥ*; in this case *sādhana* refers to the object) and sometimes as a *karmadhāraya*. Further, the word *sādhana* in this compound seems to be used sometimes in the epistemological sense and sometimes in the ontological sense. I attempt to keep this ambiguity with the expression "means of realisation"; however, it seems to me that *sādhana* is intended here in the epistemological sense. Ono also understands in this manner and translates (Dissertation, p. 146): "die beweisende [d.i. gültige] Erkenntnis."

¹⁷ Contrary to the preceding discussion, and also contrary to the usual opinion as expressed by Dharmottara and others, Prajñākaragupta suggests that the later awareness, which arises when the previous awareness is confirmed, be called the *sādhana-jñāna*. I am not quite sure what the implications about the validity of the first awareness of an object are.

the previous awareness).¹⁸ For [in this case] the previous own-being necessarily manifests¹⁹ the future [own-being] at the time of [the latter's] attainment. Thus, there is attainment of it (i.e., of the future own-being already at that time). Thus, the posterior own-being is in reality nothing but the own-being of the previous one. Thus, in this case too [just as in the previous explanation] there is indeed identity of nature.

Or this [namely] an effect²⁰ which will necessarily arise is nothing but a cause because the cause is pervaded by it.²¹ And what[ever] is a different²² pervader is nothing but a cause because without it the [pervaded] is absent.

[Objection:] How [could something] which has not [yet] arisen be a cause?²³

¹⁸ Cf. O. p. 70.5-6: *pūrvakaṃ tu sādhanajñānam, yadi sthīratayāsāv avadhṛto 'rthaḥ, tadā*. This unusual punctuation reflects Ono's understanding of the syntax: he takes *tadā* and *pūrvakaṃ sādhanajñānam* as being parts of the same clause and translates accordingly (Dissertation, p. 146): "Die frühere beweisende Erkenntnis lässt nur dann (die Zweckerfüllung erkennen), wenn dieser Gegenstand (*artha*) als etwas Beständiges (*sthīratayā*) fest bestimmt ist (*avadhṛta*)."¹⁸ This interpretation is to some extent supported by the Tibetan translation (*sñar gyi sgrub par byed pa'i śes pa ni gal te don de brtan pa ñid du rtoḡ pa de'i tshe yin no*). One could also translate even more closely to the Tibetan and with a more natural interpretation of the Sanskrit word order: "The previous one is the awareness which is the means of realisation [of efficient action], if this [namely] the object has been determined as lasting; [only] then (i.e., only in such case)."¹⁹ Although such an interpretation is not impossible, parallel passages with *tadā* at the end of a sentence support my above translation; cf. S. p. 156.28-29: *sneheṇaiva hy asāv ātmany ātmāye ca pratikū-ladarśanād vidveṣavān eva hi tadā*, p. 185.20-21: *seyaṃ bhāvanā bhāvayitū vyāpāras tataś ca bhāvanākāla iti kāraṇakāle satteti syāt tadā*, and p. 330.22: *bhāvanābalād rasanam utpādyā yadi vedanam adosa eva tadā*.

¹⁹ As quoted by Ono (p. 70, n. 6), the Tibetan translation takes *bhāvayati* in the sense of making known (*śes par byed pa*), but the *pratīka* in Yamāri's commentary indicates the sense of giving rise to, bringing about (*skyed par byed pa*).

²⁰ The context of the discussion is whether the posterior awareness of an efficient thing/object (*arthakriyājñāna*) can be the cause for the validity of an awareness, but the discussion holds good for causation in general.

²¹ When the effect is necessary, there is a mutual pervasion between cause and effect. Thus, just as the effect is pervaded by the cause, the cause is also pervaded by the effect; consequently, the pervading future effect can be said to be the cause of its cause.

²² The qualification "different" is necessary in order to exclude a pervader in *tādātmya* relationship.

²³ Cf. S. p. 68.3f.

[Reply:] How [could something] which has [already] arisen [be a cause]? Thus, the fault is the same [in your position].

[Objection:] Ordinary people understand the relationship between cause and effect in the following manner: When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises;²⁴ this is active towards that; this is produced by that. And something future has neither existence nor arising nor activity, nor does it produce [anything],²⁵ because it does not exist at that time (i.e., at the time its effect arises).

[Reply:] On this [objection we] say:

206. Existence, arising, etc.,²⁶ are not of a nature different from the own-being²⁷ of the thing [itself]. [When one says] “when this is present,” [one] certainly [does] not [intend] the occurrence of an object different from this.²⁸

An arising, for its part,²⁹ is not different from the own-being of existence. If [you claim that] arising is existence which occurs immediately after the cause,³⁰ [we ask in return:] is arising nothing but existence that occurs immediately after [the cause]? If [you affirm that this is] so, [then] the conceptual constructions of a person who slept long and fi-

²⁴ At the risk of stating the obvious, it may be reminded that these two statements form the general formulation of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

²⁵ I follow O. (and S.) in reading *karāṇaṃ* against W.’s *kāraṇaṃ* because *tena* is better construed with the former.

²⁶ The text is not certain here; the Tibetan reads: *yod dan skyes gñis*. As Watanabe points out (p. 18, n. 67), this could correspond to **sattotpādāv ubhau ...*

²⁷ I follow the text in O. and S. which reads, *metri causa*, *-svabhāvān* instead of *-svabhāvatvān*. W.’s text of this half-verse has 17 syllables.

²⁸ If I understand correctly, in the phrase “when this is present,” the words “this” and “present” refer to the same thing, that is, the own nature of the thing (*bhāvasvabhāva*).

²⁹ Ono (p. 71, n. 3) is right to conjecture *api* instead of *hi* on the basis of Yamāri’s commentary. *Prima facie* one would indeed expect *hi* because this sentence may provide an explication of the statement in the verse. However, the rest of the paragraph makes it clear that Prajñākaragupta now begins to discuss a related, but new subject, namely, whether arising is different from existence, and not whether the two are different from the own nature of the thing which arises, which is the topic of the verse. The Tibetan translators seem to be mistaken at this point: *skyes pa dan yod pa ni ran gi no bo ñid las gzan ma yin no*, “Production and existence are not different from the own being [of a thing].” Watanabe’s attempt (p. 20.2) to combine the Sanskrit and the Tibetan ends up in nonsense: *utpādo hi na sattā svabhāvād aparāḥ*.

³⁰ Cf. S. p. 68.7f.

nally got up would not arise from previous repeated practice³¹ because [they] do not occur immediately after [this repeated practice]. And we shall show later on³² that the body, etc., are not the cause [of conceptual constructions]. Nor is activity something different from the own-being. Thus, it follows that an own-form is due to an own-form.³³ And the own-form of the preceding cause³⁴ is not [existing] at the time of the effect. However, a mere concomitance exists in the case of a future [thing] too, [to wit] also of a [future] cause whose [past] effect necessarily arises. Therefore, a future [thing] too is a cause.

[Objection:] What has been observed is a cause inasmuch as it pervades.³⁵ Thus, only something which has arisen before is a cause,³⁶ not a future [thing].

[Reply:] No.

207. It is not apprehended that an observed [thing] pervades [something else] with [its] own form. By means of a superimposed form³⁷ [on the other hand] a future [thing] too would do that (i.e., would pervade something else).

For something which is being observed is not [perceived as] a pervader by that much (i.e., by merely being observed) because the pervaded is not perceived at that time. And when the pervaded is perceived, then

³¹ Cf. S. p. 68.11. Prajñākaragupta maintains that an awareness occurring after a period of deep sleep without dreams arises from repeated awarenesses before the onset of sleep. Thus, one cannot say that the cause immediately precedes the effect. Bhāsarvajña (NBhū 295.22-25) quotes this statement and criticizes it. It is not clear to me how this assertion is compatible with the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*.

³² Cf. PVABh on PV 2.35f., 2.39f., etc.

³³ Because activity is identical to the own form of a thing, to say *vyāpārāt svabhāvaḥ* amounts to saying *svabhāvāt svabhāvaḥ* or *svarūpāt svarūpam*.

³⁴ I follow S. and O., supported by Tib. (*rgyu*); the manuscript reads *kāṇasya*, which Watanabe misreads as *kālasya*. The previous cause would be here a correct awareness and its effect would be either the efficient action or the awareness of the efficient action.

³⁵ The opponent attempts to exclude the possibility of a future cause by adding the qualification *dṛṣṭa* (“observed” or “has been observed”) which cannot be asserted of a future thing.

³⁶ Read against S., O., W. and the manuscript: *yad pūrvabhāvi tad eva kāraṇam*. Cf. Tib.: ... *sñar byuñ ba gañ yin pa*

³⁷ That is, if one superimposes at a later time the form of being a pervader on (the own form of?) something observed, a similar superimposition can be done for a future cause too.

this³⁸ [thing which has been observed] is [perceived as] a pervader with [its own] past and future forms.³⁹ Otherwise, if the future form is not apprehended, [that thing] would not be characterized by pervasion (i.e., would not pervade).

[Objection:] It is perceived that something is a pervader with exactly the same form with which that [thing] has been observed as existing before, not with [some] future form [of it].⁴⁰

[Reply:] That is not true.

208. If the future form is not perceived, [the thing's] being a pervader is not perceived. For a pervasion is not [merely] local (*prādeśikī*, i.e., limited to one place and time). In this manner (i.e., if it were only local), it would not be a pervasion.⁴¹

Indeed, a cause is being perceived as pervading at past and future time, not otherwise. And this pervasion is common to something observed before, as well as to something that will be observed.

[Objection:] How could something that will be observed be a cause?

[Reply:] The question “how” does not arise because something that has been observed too does not exist at that time (i.e., at the time when the effect arises).⁴² If [you say that the observed object can be a cause] because it exists, [we reply that] for something that will be observed too this (i.e., existence)⁴³ [applies]. The non-[existence] then (i.e., at the time of the effect) is the same in both cases (i.e., common to what has been observed and what will be observed).

[Objection:] Being earlier [makes the observed thing a cause].

³⁸ Or should one read *tad* referring to *vyāpyā*?

³⁹ That is, since pervasion is a universal relation, it (as well as its two terms, the pervader and the pervaded) is perceived as extending to past, present and future objects. For instance, the pervasion between smoke and fire applies to past, present and future instances of smoke and fire.

⁴⁰ Thus, there is no superimposition of some future or past form.

⁴¹ The Sanskrit text is uncertain here; cf. O. p. 72, n. 7 and W. p. 22, n. 78.

⁴² Cf. S. p. 68.26f.

⁴³ The feminine *sā* cannot refer to *sattva*. The only feminine noun in the present context to which it could refer is *vyāpti*, which does not seem to make good sense. Note also that the text is not entirely certain; *sā* seems to be confirmed by Derge (*de ñid do*), but has no equivalent in Peking and Narthang which read only *ñid do*, as pointed out in W. p. 23, n. 67 (cf. also O. p. 72, n. 11). Perhaps one should interpret *de ñid* as an equivalent to *tattvam*, “is that” (i.e., exists). However, I tentatively assume that the author had *sattā* in mind as a referent of the anaphoric pronoun, although the word itself does not appear in the immediate context.

[Reply:] What is the difference between the previous and the posterior regarding the own being? Both of them are perceived with a superimposed form, not with [any] other [form]. Therefore, there is no difference [between them].

[Objection:] The one is being superimposed as something which has [already] been observed as having the form of something previous,⁴⁴ but the other [is being superimposed] as having the form of something that will be observed and as having a form of something posterior. Therefore, it is not [the case that] both of them are a cause.

209. [Reply:] The mutual concomitance is common to both of them. Of what use is an inner distinction⁴⁵ for us⁴⁶ in that [matter⁴⁷]?⁴⁸

[Something] is the cause of that which does not arise without it, provided that it is different.⁴⁹ And just as an effect does not arise without the previous existence of a cause, in the same manner a cause whose effect will arise necessarily does not [come about] without the later existence of the effect. Thus, the connection⁵⁰ of cause and effect is common [to both of them]. Thus, both are cause and effect of each other.

210. Because the condition, [namely] pervasion and difference,⁵¹ is common [to both], both are cause and effect [of each other]. The inferential awareness of the other world⁵² too is [derived] from that.

⁴⁴ Or by having a previous form?

⁴⁵ I follow Ono's conjecture of *avāntaravibhāgaḥ*; cf. above, p. 156.

⁴⁶ I follow O. p. 73.6 and the manuscript in reading *nah*, against W. p. 22.15 and S. p. 28.20 which read *na*. Watanabe was probably misled by Tib. *der la 'gar yañ dgos pa med*, but Tib. probably only rephrases the rhetorical question "of what use?" with "of no use." It has to be noted, however, that Tib. has no equivalent for the first person pronoun.

⁴⁷ I.e., a distinction between having this or that superimposed form.

⁴⁸ Cf. S. p. 68.15.

⁴⁹ Again, this qualification is provided in order to exclude the relation of *tādātmya*.

⁵⁰ The manuscript reads *kāryakāraṇabhāvanibandhanam*, but I follow O. p. 73.10 which omits *bhāva* because of the parallel passage in NBhū 296.25. Tib. *rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i rgyu mtshan* also supports the deletion. W. p. 24.3-4 retains the reading of the manuscript.

⁵¹ I follow Tib. in the interpretation of the syntax: *khyab par dañ ni tha dad ñid* || *rgyu mtshan mtshuñs phyir gñi ga yañ* ||. Again, the difference is mentioned to exclude the pervasion in the case of *tādātmya* relation.

⁵² Cf. S. p. 67f., 69; cf. also p. 131, v. 701-704.

Indeed, having set aside pervasion and difference we do not perceive in this world [any] other connection⁵³ [to account for causation]. Therefore, we see correctly: Both an effect and a cause whose effect necessarily arises, are cause and effect of each other. Therefore,

211. if this⁵⁴ awareness is the cause of the arising of the purpose, or the own-being [of the efficient action], or [if it is its] effect, in any way the arising of an efficient action is made known by it.

If the awareness which is the means of realisation [of efficient action] is the cause of the efficient action, if it is [its] own nature, [or] if it is [its] effect, in any way (i.e., in all cases) [the efficient action] is made known by it because the relation is there.⁵⁵ And this pervasive⁵⁶ identity of nature and the [pervasive] relationship of cause and effect are well established by everyday practice. Thus, validity [says Dharmakīrti] is known by everyday practice.

[Objection:] As long as perception does not occur which proves the [concomitant] relation, there is no inference. For [only] when the relation is apprehended by means of perception, [can] inference establish the validity. Perception, [however] is capable of apprehending the rela-

⁵³ I follow W. p. 24.7 and the manuscript in reading *nibandhanam*; Ono (p. 74.4) emends to *nibandham* on the basis of the parallel passage in NBhū 296.28. Watanabe points out that *rgyu mtshan* corresponds to *nibandha* and not to *nibandhana*. However, I do not think that this can be determined. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case, as Lokesh Chandra, *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary*. New Delhi 1954, s.v. *rgyu mtshan*, mentions two references to *nibandhana* (both in the Nyāyabindu) and none to *nibandha*.

⁵⁴ I follow O. p. 74.8 in reading *taj jñānam* instead of *tajjñānam*, as preferred in W. p. 24.10.

⁵⁵ I would expect a stronger word here, namely, that the relation is necessary; perhaps: because a [concomitant] relation is possible.

⁵⁶ The text and the translation are somewhat problematic. If one interprets, as I do, *vyāpitādātmya* as a *karmadhāraya*, *vyāpi* may seem to be somewhat redundant; perhaps for this reason, Ono (Dissertation, p. 156) interprets it as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* (“Identität mit dem Umfassenden”) against Tib. Derge: *khyab pa ni de'i bdag ñid*, and Peking: *khyab pa de'i bdag ñid*. If one follows Derge (Peking is ambiguous), *vyāpi* would have to be taken outside the compound, for it would be the subject (and *tādātmyaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvaś ca* its predicates). According to my interpretation, *vyāpi* has to qualify *kāryakāraṇabhāva* too; cf. Speijer, op. cit. (n. 7), § 28: “the common predicate (attribute) agrees with but one [of the subjects] and must be supplied mentally with the others.” Normally the predicate *prasiddha* would have to appear in the neuter (cf. *ibid.* § 28b, p. 20), but the proximity to *-bhāvaḥ* may be responsible for the masculine (cf. *ibid.* § 27.2, p. 18).

tion [only] inasmuch as it is a means of knowledge. Thus, the fault of mutual dependence [arises].

[Objection to the Objection:] The validity [of a perception] is not proved by means of inference, but by means of the [direct] experience of efficient action, and this [experience] is established by means of self-apprehending perception.

[Reply by an opponent:]⁵⁷ In this case (1) it [can] not [be that] the awareness of the efficient action, inasmuch as it is perception, apprehends the validity of the previous [awareness] (i.e., the first apprehension of the object), and [that (2) the direct experience of an efficient action] does not make one infer [the validity] inasmuch as it is an inferential sign, (1) because it is not apprehended by means of perception that it is a means of knowledge, and (2)⁵⁸ because its individual (i.e., its object) is in the past. For without the individual it is impossible to apprehend the universal as an instrument of knowledge because the universal does not exist. Therefore, there is mere doubt about the validity, for the relation to the efficient action is doubtful. [However] owing to the appearance of the efficient action [in an awareness], the doubt about this (i.e., the relation of the first awareness to the efficient action) indeed ceases.

[Reply:] This, too, is not true, because

212. none becomes active owing to the cessation of mere doubt. Activity of [agents] having a purpose is observed to be due to perception or also to determination.

213. If you maintain that precisely this appearance of an efficient action is [the required] perception, [you] must admit that validity (or being a means of knowledge) is understood because of perception alone.

214. Doubt, too, ceases because of perception or inference. Without apprehension of [one of] the contradictory [elements], the other [alternative] does not cease.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ The opponent here is probably Dharmottara whose role in the discussion is like that of an *ekadeśin*. My interpretation of the text here differs from Ono, Dissertation, p. 157.

⁵⁸ (1) is the reason for (1), and (2) for (2).

⁵⁹ The text is uncertain; Tib. seems to presupposes a different text (**viruddharūpopalabdher vinā nānyanivartanam*). Here too my understanding differs from Ono's (p. 158).

215. If this [apprehension of one of the contradictory alternatives] were due to the arising of perception, it would stop doubt precisely then (i.e., at the time it arises). [Thus] absence of [doubt] should occur only then. How [could it occur] at a different time?

216. And by the cessation of this doubt, no purpose [is being served] here [in this world]. That [cessation of doubt] could be accepted for the sake of [establishing] an activity [and thus would serve a purpose], but this activity is [already] established [and need not be re-established by the cessation of doubt].

217. And for all awarenesses [it is true that] the relation to [their] object is not observed by the senses, and [that] inference determines [this] relation [only] generally (or: by a universal).

And there is no other valid awareness. Thus, how is doubt removed? For this reason it has been said: “validity [is determined] by everyday practice.”⁶⁰

Concerning the portion of the text which is edited by Ono alone, the most interesting passage is perhaps Prajñākaragupta’s comment on Dharmakīrti’s verse 6b-d:

*avijñāte svalakṣaṇe |
yaj jñānam ity abhīprāyāt svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ ||*

Prajñākaragupta provides two radically different interpretations of this verse. According to the first interpretation, which is basically the same as the one in Devendrabuddhi’s and Manorathanandin’s commentaries and which seems faithful to Dharmakīrti’s original intention, one can translate the verse as follows:

[The awareness of the universal which arises after, or as different from, the apprehension of the particular is not a means of knowledge] because [our] intention [here concerns that awareness] which is awareness in respect to the non-cognized particular, for the particular is examined [here].

The meaning of this verse has been discussed by modern scholars several times (most recently by Krasser in the 2002 issue of this journal) and need not detain us any further. The second interpretation, how-

⁶⁰ This does not seem to be a verse. In O. the text contains only half a verse; in S. the last line *tata uktam prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇeti* appears as the second, metrically faulty half of the verse.

ever, shows Prajñākaragupta at his most imaginative. It has been hitherto completely ignored, probably because the Sanskrit text is corrupt and Sāṃkṛityāyana's edition is unintelligible. It is only now, thanks to Ono's edition, that one can make sense of this passage. The crux of the matter is to read a double *j* in *avijñāte*, i.e. to read *avij jñāte*. Verse 6bc has to be translated accordingly: "An awareness in respect to a cognized particular is a 'non-knowledge' (*avid*)."⁶¹ Furthermore, *iti* should not be construed with *abhiprāyāt*; it marks the end of this statement.⁶¹ *abhiprāyāt*, in its turn, is interpreted as an answer to an implicit objection which is formulated only in Prajñākaragupta's commentary: If so, i.e., if *advaita* is correct and thus an awareness in respect to a cognized particular is a non-knowledge or an error, why did the Buddha teach the difference between perception and inference, between an awareness and an external object, etc.? The answer is: "Because [of the Buddha's⁶² didactic] intention,"⁶³ that is, because the Buddha's teaching intends [as addressees] people who need to be instructed (*vineyajanaḥ*). How is that? "Because of the examination of the particular [which leads in the final analysis to the disappearance of the external world]" (*svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ*).⁶⁴

TRANSLATION OF ONO 82.1-83.14

But when, on the other hand, there is non-duality (*advaita*), then this [object of the awareness which arises after, or as different from, the apprehension of the own form] is not a universal,⁶⁵ and [its awareness] is not designated as [being] posterior to or different from⁶⁶ the appre-

⁶¹ In O. p. 82.6 *iti* should be read as a part of the *pratīka* (and according to Ono's convention it should appear in bold), not as marking the end of the quotation; note that the other *pratīkas* in this passage are not followed by *iti*.

⁶² Note the change in the subject of *abhiprāya*; according to the previous interpretation it was Dharmakīrti.

⁶³ Prajñākaragupta adds another reason to Dharmakīrti's text: Also because the teaching does not belie (*avisamvādāt*), i.e., because even though it is false it leads to an efficient action.

⁶⁴ The adverb *svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ* may be understood at least in two different manners, that is, as answering different questions: 1) How is it known that the Bhagavat's teaching is not ultimately true but only for the sake of the *vineyajana*? 2) How does the Bhagavat teach the *vineyajana*? In the first case, we examine the *svalakṣaṇa*, in the second case the Bhagavat examines it in his instruction of the *vineyajana*.

⁶⁵ Cf. PV 2.5d-6a.

⁶⁶ These are the two possible meanings of *para* in v. 5d.

hension of the particular. “An awareness in respect to a cognized particular is a non-knowledge (*avid*). Because of the intention [of the Buddha].”

Non-knowledge is that which lacks knowledge. In respect to what [does such non-knowledge take place]? “An awareness in respect to a cognized particular.” Indeed, a means of knowledge does not [operate] in respect to a preceding or posterior thing, so that it would be apprehended [to occur] after the awareness of the particular or [that its] being different [from the apprehended be apprehended]. The particular alone is apprehended here [in our world?] in all awarenesses, and there is no difference [between the awareness and its object, the particular].

[Objection:] In this case (*tarhi*) why did the Bhagavat teach the difference between perception and inference,⁶⁷ and the difference between the external [object] and the awareness? And [why did he also teach the difference between] defilements and purification?⁶⁸

[Reply: On this Dharmakīrti] says: “Because of the [didactic] intention [of the Buddha].” And [also] because of [his] non-belying. [That is] because of [the Buddha’s didactic] intention towards the people to be trained (*vineyajana*) inasmuch as [his teachings] takes them into consideration.

Means of knowledge is only self-awareness, the single [type of] perception; there is no other, because the multiplicity (*prapañca*) [of the means of knowledge taught by the Buddha merely] follows [the needs of] the people to be trained.⁶⁹ In whatever way the entrance to the true path is possible for the people to be trained, in such a way the teachings of the Bhagavat [take shape]. Thus, there is no contradiction.

[Objection:] How is it [known that the multiplicity of the means of knowledge is meant for the sake of people to be trained]?

[Reply:] Because of the examination of the particular (v. 6d). For when being examined, everything without exception (*sakalam eva*) crumbles to pieces. There is no reality (*tattva*) other than non-duality (*advaita*). Precisely this is examined by the Bhagavat step by step, for it cannot be examined all at once (*akramena*).

⁶⁷ That is, thereby implying that the universal too is the object of a valid awareness.

⁶⁸ This seems to have been added as an afterthought.

⁶⁹ I would slightly emend the text (O. p. 83.3) to read: *prapañcasya vineyānurodhāt*.

[Objection: If so] how is it possible that [the awareness] which evolves outwards (i.e., assumes the form of an external object) is [nothing but] self-awareness?

[Reply:] This is not [as you think].

225. An awareness [takes the form] “outwards” [or] “inwards” in dependence on place, time, etc. [However] place and time are incoherent (i.e., logically impossible) over and above the own form [of the awareness].

And this will be explained later on.⁷⁰

To conclude, these two excellent editions by Ono and Watanabe are cause for optimism. They amply demonstrate that by relying on the single Sanskrit manuscript,⁷¹ whose testimony is now easily available in Watanabe’s facsimile edition,⁷² and on the excellent Tibetan translation by Blo ldan śes rab and others,⁷³ a critical edition of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārahāṣya* is within our reach. To be sure, the task is immense and probably cannot be accomplished by one person singlehandedly, but the results, as I have tried to show above, will be immensely rewarding.

⁷⁰ In his unpublished dissertation, Ono points out (p. 176, n. 1236) that this refers to PVABh p. 289.21-297.32 on PV 3.220-230.

⁷¹ A second manuscript is available only for a portion of the *pratyakṣa* chapter.

⁷² Mentioned above n. 4.

⁷³ Cf. Ono’s introduction, p. xiv-xv.

