

Further Remarks on the Compound *avinābhāvanīyama* in the Early Dharmakīrti*

Two fine recent publications, respectively, by Chizuko Yoshimizu and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu¹ are important for the history of post-systematic Indian philosophy in many respects. To pinpoint only their main focus: Ch forthc. and Ch 2007 examine the development of Dharmakīrti's proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*) and the notion of spatio-temporal restriction in effects as a key to the background of Dharmakīrti's conceptions of causality as visible in Vasubandhu. In both papers the concept of causal restriction (*niyama*) of an effect's nature is prominent, and Chizuko Yoshimizu's results are taken into consideration by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu in both of his papers as well. The term *avinābhāvanīyama* is dealt with in Ch forthc. (Appendix 1).

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu's two papers represent a major step towards a more comprehensive understanding of Kumāriḷa's logic and the development of his logical thought. In these papers, the logical fragments known from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* are thoroughly interpreted.² In K forthc., Kiyotaka Yoshimizu deals with the "*niyama* fragment" and demonstrates "that there is no necessity to assume Dharmakīrti's influence on Kumāriḷa's theory of *niyama* presented in his *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*" because "Kumāriḷa's idea of *niyama* as the foundation of a logical connection seems to have developed from his own theory of logic and the tradition of Mīmāṃsā exegesis" (K forthc., p. 13). His demonstration is clear and convincing. Frauwallner's assumption that the early Dharmakīrti's idea of an "essential connection" (*svabhāvatpratibandha*) as the foundation of the lo-

* I am much obliged to Vincent Eltschinger and Horst Lasic for their critical observations at an earlier stage of this paper.

¹ Ch forthc., 2007 and K forthc., 2007. To forestall irritation: both the 2007 papers were written after the forthcoming papers. For the sake of convenience and in consideration of our friendship over many years, I take the liberty of using the sigla Ch for Yoshimizu Chizuko, and K for Yoshimizu Kiyotaka respectively.

² These fragments are, in Kiyotaka Yoshimizu's phrasing: the "*niyama* fragment" of PVSVT 87,21-30 (K forthc.; cf. also Steinkellner 1997: 634), the "*avinābhāva* fragment" of PVSVT 87,12-17 (K 2007: 1080-1084; cf. also Steinkellner 1997: 631ff.), the "*anvaya* fragment" of PVSVT 18,2-7 (K 2007: 1084-1087), the "*vyāpti* fragment" of PVSVT 18,10-11 (K 2007: 1087), the "*anvayavyatireka* fragment" of PVSVT 18,19-26 (K 2007: 1087-1090), and the "*pakṣadharmatā* fragment" of PVSVT 10,9-18 (K 2007: 1091-1096).

gical connection (*vyāpti*) had motivated the late Kumāṛila to reformulate his ideas on the logical connection in the Bṛhaṭṭikā can therefore be abandoned.³

In K 2007, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu shows that in the other fragments that can be attributed to the Bṛhaṭṭikā, Kumāṛila “seems to be attempting to slough off Dignāga’s influence, which had earlier dominated his thoughts on logic” (K 2007: 1096). The term *avinābhāvaniyama*, finally, is the subject of an appendix (K 2007: 1096-1100). It is the interpretation of this term by both authors (K 2007 and Ch forthc., Appendix 1) that I call into question.⁴

According to Dharmakīrti, inference (*anumāna*) is the basis of all discriminating judgment,⁵ and the logical reason or evidence (*hetu*) is its basic element. The definition of this element and its corollaries can be

³ To my knowledge, Frauwallner drew this historical hypothesis from his interpretation of the first two stanzas of the “*niyama* fragment” (PVSVT 87,21-24; cf. Frauwallner 1962: 88). Frauwallner concluded (ibid., p. 89) that Kumāṛila, in the first stanza, after rejecting the proposals of other teachers for the “relation” (*sambandha*) which exists as the foundation of a logical connection, introduces a new term, namely “necessary connection (notwendige Verbindung)” (*niyama*). With this translation of the term Frauwallner expresses his understanding of the fact that Kumāṛila assumed the notion of necessity to be implied in the new term. In the second stanza, Frauwallner sees the rejected relations to be indicated by the examples of “the relationship between cause and effect, etc.” (*kāryakāraṇabhāvādi*), and interprets these as referring to the two types of relations proposed by Dharmakīrti, namely causality (*tadulpatti*) and real identity (*tādātmya*), an interpretation I followed in 1997: 634, n. 28, a. This interpretation is wrong. Kiyotaka Yoshimizu found at least one passage in the Tantravārttika where Kumāṛila mentions examples for types of relevant relationships, “such as causal relation, the relation between owner and possession, and the going together” (*avinābhāvo hy anekakāryakāraṇasvasvāmisahacarabhāvādi prabhedabhinnah*, TV II p. 43,16; cf. K 2007: 1098, n. 64). It is evidently these relationships as propounded in the logic of the Śaṣṭitantra (cf. Frauwallner 1958: 123 and 126) that Kumāṛila refers to, not Dharmakīrti’s. — This new historical aspect has no consequence for the more general question of the sequence of Kumāṛila’s works. In regard to the solution of this problem, recent contributions by Kataoka (cf. Kataoka 2003a, 2003b) and Yoshimizu Kiyotaka (K 2007a) are on the right track. According to their results, Frauwallner’s hypothesis that the Bṛhaṭṭikā follows the Ślokavārttika holds. Nevertheless, a comprehensive collection of all available fragments from the Bṛhaṭṭikā and their comparison with Kumāṛila’s other works, just as demonstrated in Kataoka 2003a for the “omniscience-fragments,” remains a serious desideratum.

⁴ Because of the limitation of my discussion to this compound there will accrue no other immediate consequence than the fact that I hold to the translation of PV 1.31 (= 33) as presented in Steinkellner 1997: 642 and to my understanding of the definition of the logical reason in PV 1.1. Other consequences for related ideas or interpretations by both Chizuko and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu cannot be touched upon in this short rejoinder focussed mainly on their appendices.

⁵ Cf. PVSV 1,8 (*arthānarthavivecanasyānumānāśrayatvāt*).

considered to be logic properly speaking. Dharmakīrti begins his earliest epistemological work, the *Hetuprakaraṇa,⁶ with a definition of the logical reason.⁷ There can be no doubt, then, that a correct understanding of this definition is of crucial importance for an interpretation of the logical system built upon it.⁸

Dharmakīrti's definition, when analyzed in a straight and natural way, as well as in accordance with the main commentators,⁹ comprises four statements, of which only the first three are actually dealt with in this work: (1) a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of the logical reason, (2) the restriction of its number (*saṅkhyāniyama*), (3) the cause for the restriction of its number (*saṅkhyāniyamakāraṇa*), and (4), in contrast, the absence (of the predicate "reason") in properties not so defined. The first three statements are also a dominant mark of the development in logical theory from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti in the sense that the first is based on Dignāga's definition, while the second and third introduce Dharmakīrti's new theory of the three kinds of reason together with the ontic foundation for their being only three in number. It is, therefore, necessary to unequivocally understand these three statements.

My present translation¹⁰ of PV 1.1 runs:

The (logical) reason is a property of the subject pervaded by a (another property as) part of this (subject). This (reason) is only of three kinds because the inseparable (logical) connection is restricted (to these three kinds of reason). (Reasons) other than this (threefold reason) are spurious reasons.¹¹

⁶ This hypothetical name is Frauwallner's proposal. The text was later incorporated into the *Pramānavārttika* as the first chapter, with its prose text considered as Dharmakīrti's own commentary on the stanzas. Frauwallner's explanation of the character and literary fate of this early work (cf. Frauwallner 1954) is now generally accepted.

⁷ PV 1.1. He repeats this beginning in the *Hetubindu*, the first work in the history of Indian philosophy with logic properly speaking as its main subject.

⁸ This opening stanza, moreover, serves as a summary of the following treatise (*śāstraśārīra*) which, roughly, develops by explaining the definition (PVSV 1,12-2,14), the three kinds of a logical reason in general (2,14-3,9) and in detail (3,9-10,12), and the restriction of the inseparable logical connection to these three kinds as being based on the two essential connections (*svabhāvapratibandha*) of causality and real identity (10,13-20,13), as well as their ascertainment (20,14ff.), before the first lengthy digression on the theory of concepts (24,12-93,5) creates the structural imbalances characteristic for this early work of Dharmakīrti.

⁹ Cf. PVT 7a6-7b1 = PVSVT 8,24-29. Cf. also HBT 9,25f. (and Steinkellner 1967: 82f., n. 4).

¹⁰ Only different in style from that in Steinkellner 1967: 33.

¹¹ *pakṣadharmas tadamśena vyāpto hetus tridhava sah | avinābhāvaniyamād dhetvābhāsāt tato 'pare ||* (PV 1.1). Cf. Mookerjee – Nagasaki 1964: 6 and Hayes – Gillon 1991: 2f. for basically concurrent translations.

According to my understanding, the term “inseparable connection” (*avinābhāva*) in PV 1.1 designates the logical nexus between two concepts or essences¹². This inseparable connection is based, with Dharmakīrti, on “essential connections” (*svabhāvapratibandha*), i.e., on either “causality” (*tadutpatti*) or “real identity” (*tādātmya*).¹³ Thus, the inseparable connection is not the same as its ontic foundation. But the ontic foundation “restricts” (*ni-√yam*) the inseparable connection (in the sense of “being inseparably connected”) only to such concepts that are related to instances of reality which are connected by essence or nature. And insofar as it is restricted by such an ontic foundation, the inseparable connection of these concepts is also a necessary one.¹⁴

¹² Cf. Steinkellner 1971: 201ff. In a German translation (under preparation) of the sections on logic in Dharmakīrti’s first work (PVSV 1,2-24,15 and 93,5-107,14), I try a single translation of the term *svabhāva*. Earlier, I translated the two main meanings in Dharmakīrti’s relevant usage by “essence” (“Wesen”) and “essential property” (“wesentliche Beschaffenheit”). Now I use only “essence” (“Wesen”). Since the different meanings of Dharmakīrti’s term in dependence on the context are nowadays widely accepted, there is no further need to identify the different meanings by way of different translation terms. A single translation may be a better way to mirror the semantic powers of Dharmakīrti’s term more appropriately in the future. For the sake of clarity, however, I add a superscript N or C (in German N or B) for “nature” or “concept” (“Natur” or “Begriff”) to indicate the ontological or logical meaning respectively. Where the term *svabhāva* does not occur in one of these specifically differentiated functions, it is not marked by these superscripts.

¹³ I also now prefer the translation “real identity” (“Realidentität”) for *tādātmya* and *tadātmatva*. The translation “identity” is sometimes mistaken to mean “formal, logical identity.” I therefore use the translation “real identity” to indicate the fact that two concepts refer to one and the same instance of reality.

¹⁴ E.g., in the conclusion of the first part (PVSV 6,22-8,15) of a section (PVSV 6,22-10,12) where he shows that there are only the above-mentioned three kinds of a correct logical reason (*hetu*) and subsequently explains how and why other reasons in use are either included or not included in one of these three kinds, Dharmakīrti says: “Therefore no other reason (than one of these three kinds) is conclusive (*gamaka*), because for an (inferential indicator) whose essence^N is not connected (with the indicated) there is no restriction of an inseparable connection (to one of these three)” (*tena nānyo hetur gamako ’sti, apratibaddhasvabhāvasyāvinābhāvavaniyamābhāvāt*) (PVSV 8,12f.). That means: if a proving property is not connected with a property to be proved by an “essential connection” (*svabhāvapratibandha*), i.e., a connection in reality, there is no restriction of an inseparable (logical) connection to the former, and therefore the presumed proving property is not conclusive. In other words, this conclusion gives a reason for the fact that only a logical reason of one of the three kinds can be considered as conclusive, namely that the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) cannot be restricted (*niyamābhāvāt*) to a property which is not essentially connected with another property (cf. also the argument in PV 1.32 below, and NB 2.20).

I am also of the opinion that the compound *avinābhāvaniyama* has the same meaning and purpose¹⁵ in its three occurrences in PV 1.1 and 31,¹⁶

¹⁵ This is denied for PV 1.31 in Dunne 2004: 150f., n. 16, on the grounds that it “would require us to carry forward (through *anuvṛtti*) the reference to only three reliable forms of evidence from PV 1.1, for the discussion surrounding PV 1.31 itself does not allow for even an implicit reference to the restriction (*niyama*) of *avinābhāva* to only three forms of evidence.” In my opinion, however, Dunne only fails to recognize the admittedly complex texture of Dharmakīrti’s preceding presentation: In fact, the *sāstraśarīra* stanza of PV 1.1 introduces the topics of the reason’s definition (treated in PVSV 1,12-2,14), its three kinds (treated in PVSV 3,9-10,12), as well as the cause for this restricted number (treated in PVSV 10,13-20,13). And it is the treatment of this third topic which is summarized in PV 1.31. There is, therefore, clearly a direct connection between this summary and the three kinds of reasons explained.

¹⁶ The two stanzas of PV 1.31f. are called *antaraśloka* in the sense of “stanzas carrying on,” because both, on the one hand, summarize the preceding presentation of the theory of the essential connection (PVSV 10,13-20,13), and on the other, introduce the following explanation of their restricting function and their ascertainment (PVSV 20,14ff.). PV 1.31: “The restriction of the inseparable (logical) connection [to its obtaining only in certain properties] is due to either a relation of cause and effect or an essence^x, (both) being of restrictive character [in the respective cases], but is due neither to the non-perception [of the logical reason in the dissimilar] nor to the [repeated] perception [of a concomitance between the logical reason and the consequence]” (*kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt | avinābhāvaniyamo ’darśanān na na darśanāt ||*; cf. Steinkellner 1997: 642). For the problem of Dharmakīrti’s usage of the term “essence^x” (*svabhāva*) in this stanza and its contextual position see my attempt to explain it in 1997: 627ff. In the following stanza PV 1.32, Dharmakīrti supports the assertion that the inseparable logical connection is restricted to certain kinds of properties applicable as logical reasons due to one of the two essential connections with a *prasaṅga*-like argument: if such an essential connection in the form of causality were not available (*anyathā*), there would be no necessary occurrence (*avaśyambhāva*) of some entirely different property such as an “effect” as the reason with likewise different properties in a cause (cf. PV 1.2a-c), or, if an essential connection were not available in the form of real identity, there would be no necessary occurrence of a property of something with other properties caused by a different cause. It is not possible, e.g., to infer the property “being of yellow colour” which is caused by the addition of saffron (cf. PVSV 89,9) from “being cloth.” PV 1.32: “Otherwise [i.e., if there were no essential connections of these two kinds], what would restrict the necessary occurrence of an (entirely) different (property) with (likewise) different (properties), or (what would restrict the necessary occurrence of a property) to a property caused by something else, as colour in clothing?” (*avaśyambhāvaniyamah kaḥ parasānyathā parāḥ | arthāntaranimittē vā dharme vāsasi vāgat ||*). Here again K 2007: 1098, n. 66 differs in interpretation accordingly, as well as Ch forthc., Appendix 1 in connection with Appendix 2. For other translations cf. Dunne 2004: 149, n. 14; Gillon – Hayes 2008: 351. I admit that the switch from *avinābhāva* in PV 1.31 to *avaśyambhāva* in PV.1.32 is cause for irritation, as noticed by the Yoshimizus. Chizuko Yoshimizu, therefore, proposes to take the word *bhāva* as “referring to a state or mode modified by the indeclinable *avinā* or the adverb *avaśyam*” (Ch forthc., Appendix 1). She thus understands *avaśyambhāva* as “necessity,” but is then forced to supply in her translation “the necessity [of being so] as subject”. Kiyotaka Yoshimizu seems to consider the term as a synonym of *avinābhāva* (K 2007: 1098f.). I would agree with the latter in a modified

as well as in PVSV 8,12f. (cf. n. 14). As for the analysis of the compound, I preferred in 1997 to follow Dharmakīrti's statement in his later *He-tubindu*¹⁷ (which I still understand as an explanation of the specific meaning of the terms *niyama* and *niyata* in this context) as well as the mainstream commentators' interpretation of it as a genitive-*tatpuruṣa*, and tried to indicate a motive for Karṇakagomin's divergent interpretation of the compound as a *karmadhāraya*.¹⁸

It is in an appendix to his second paper¹⁹ that Kiyotaka Yoshimizu proposes – as the basis for his “conjecture” (K 2007: 1098) regarding Dharmakīrti's intentions – another interpretation of the compound. He takes the compound to be a locative-*tatpuruṣa*, and accordingly proposes a new translation of the causal clause *avinābhāvaniyamāt* in PV 1.1:²⁰ “The (logical reason) is only of three kinds because of the restric-

way: Although “the necessary (*avaśyam*) occurrence (*bhāva*), i.e., of one with another,” is not exactly synonymous with “the non-occurrence (of one) without (the other)” (*avinābhāva*), the meaning of the former is certainly implied in the latter, with the difference that the notion of necessity is expressed.

¹⁷ HB 5,8f.: “This (inseparable connection) does not occur in a (property) other than the threefold reason [i.e., in one of the three kinds of reason respectively]. Thus it is said to be restricted only to this (threefold reason)” (*sa trividhād dhetor anyatra nāstīty atraiva niyata ucyate*). Cf. Steinkellner 1967: 99, n. I.62. This explanation of a restriction to something (*atraiva niyataḥ*) as equivalent to the exclusion of its occurrence elsewhere (*sa ... anyatra nāsti*) is also reflected in PVSV 8,12: ... *nānyaḥ ... asti* (cf. above n. 14). Moreover, although I could not find a passage in the mass of commentarial material collected in Iwata 1991 where the compound is analyzed, I think that Dharmakīrti's formulation of the logical reason *sahopalambhaniyamāt* (PVin 1.54ab) is exactly parallel to the present case, and in PVin 1. 40,2f. we find again a parallel explanation of the meaning of *niyama*: *na hi ... anyopalambho 'sti* (cf. Iwata 1991: I/104). While not being able to refer to a single traditional explanation of this compound as a genitive-*tatpuruṣa*, I find that throughout Iwata's comprehensive survey of the commentarial tradition I can only understand it as being used as such a compound. In all its occurrences the term *niyama* denotes the meaning of the particle *eva* in its exclusive function (*anyayogavyavaccheda*, cf. PV 4.190ff. = PVin 2.10ff.; Kajiyama 1998: 57f., n. 132; Gillon – Hayes 1982).

¹⁸ Cf. Steinkellner 1997: 629-634 (for other views on this compound cf. Dunne 2004: 150f., n. 16). While I agree with Kiyotaka Yoshimizu when he says “I hold Karṇakagomin's chronological assumption to coincide with the historical truth” (K 2007: 1097, n. 62) – the “chronological assumption” being the view that Dharmakīrti substitutes Kumāriḥ's *niyama* with his own *avinābhāva* –, as well as with his rejection of Karṇakagomin's *karmadhāraya*-explanation of the compound *avinābhāvaniyama*, I think the reasons given for the latter are wrong (cf. below).

¹⁹ K 2007: 1096-1100.

²⁰ K 2007: 1097, n. 62; and 1098, n. 65. Cf. also Ch forthc.: Appendix I. It is not clear to me which one of the two came up with the idea of this analysis first. Chizuko Yoshimizu proposes it still “by way of an experiment” for both compounds *avinābhāvaniyama* and *avaśyambhāvaniyama*, while Kiyotaka Yoshimizu seems to “propose” it in a more assured

tion [of the nature of a thing by other things] to the inseparable connection [of the former with the latter]" (my emphasis).

The kind of restriction he considers to be meant here is the "spatio-temporal restriction" (*deśakālanīyama*),²¹ the development of which has been treated in detail by Chizuko Yoshimizu with regard to Dharmakīrti's "Sautrāntika" background.²² As made particularly clear in AKBh 130,23f. (cf. Ch 2007: 1058), the spatio-temporal restrictions are factual features of all objects to be observed; on account of this restriction, an appropriate efficacy (*sāmarthyā*) of the causes can be recognized (*dṛṣṭa*), i.e., can be inferred, since no such restriction would be possible without a corresponding restricting cause.

According to Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, "*Avinābhāvanīyama* is the restriction (*nīyama*) of the nature of a particular thing by other things; on the basis of that restriction the former is proved inseparable (*a-vinā*) from the latter" (K 2007: 1097, n. 62). Thus, he dismisses the option of a genitive-*tatpuruṣa* "because that which is to be restricted is not the logical connection, but an instance of reality, the nature of which is determined by another instance" (ibid.). In Kiyotaka Yoshimizu's opinion, Dharmakīrti "thereby revises the restriction (*nīyama*) that Kumāriḷa found in two coexisting things and considered it to be the foundation of a logical connection" (K 2007: 1097). But while Kumāriḷa does not specify the type of relationship he names *nīyama*, Dharmakīrti "ontologically confines it to two kinds, namely, identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*)" (K 2007: 1098). In other words, according to Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, the relevant causes provide the restriction (*nīyama*) of the nature of an effect to its being inseparably connected with something else.

In my opinion, however, this kind of spatio-temporal restriction cannot be adduced in a semantic interpretation of the term *nīyama* in Dharmakīrti's compound. In Kumāriḷa's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, *nīyama* has been substituted as a synonym for *avinābhāva* and *vyāpti*, referring to the inseparable logical connection in the *Ślokavārttika*. In Dharmakīrti's compound, however, the term *nīyama* is used neither in Kumāriḷa's

manner. He finds Karṇakagomin's *karmadhāraya*-explanation "inappropriate" on the basis of his own *nīyama*-interpretation, but does not offer an explanation for Karṇakagomin's choice.

²¹ Dharmakīrti will extend the range of causal capacities also to the restrictions of "material" aspects (*dravya, vastu*) (cf. Ch 2007: 1060-1063).

²² Cf. Ch 2007 and forthc.

sense²³ nor in the specific sense of a “spatio-temporal restriction,” but in its general meaning of “restriction, limitation,” i.e., to indicate the formal cause or criterion (*nimitta*) for the application of the word “only” (*eva*) in regard to something.

The interpretation of *avinābhāvaniyama* as a genitive-*tatpuruṣa*²⁴ is supported by the mainstream commentators,²⁵ except for Kaṇṇakagomin and, possibly, Śāṅkaranandana. I still think that my understanding (cf. 1997: 632ff.) of Kaṇṇakagomin’s interpretation of the compound as a *karmadhāraya*²⁶ (PVSVT 87,18ff.) is correct. It is an attempt to counter Kumāriḷa’s usage of the word *niyama* for the logical nexus by indicating the *avinābhāva*, this time in its ontological sense, as the proper representative of this nexus.²⁷

In addition to the above attempt to understand the compound in a way consistent with Dharmakīrti’s basic ideas on the logical nexus, a methodological side-remark, not to be slighted as an argument, may not be out of place: It is always possible to propose an interpretation on the basis of an established historical context in contradiction to commentarial traditions. But in such cases one is obliged to indicate the reasons for the different explanations found in the commentaries. In the present case, it will not be an easy task to find a motive on the part of the mainstream commentators for their allegedly divergent interpretation of the compound as a genitive-*tatpuruṣa*.

As a matter of fact, no less than three different meanings of the term *niyama* seem to be used by the parties involved in the present discussion: (1) *niyama* as the restrictive activity of causes, (2) *niyama* as indicating

²³ As proposed by Kaṇṇakagomin when he interprets the compound as a *karmadhāraya*.

²⁴ Cf. Steinkellner 1997: 629-634.

²⁵ To Steinkellner 1997: 630, n. 16, further passages from Arcaṭa may now be added, e.g., HBT 10,1ff. (*kiṃ kāraṇam. avinābhāvaniyamāt. avinābhāvasya vyāptas trividha eva pakṣadharme niyamāt*), HBT 11,10-13 (*avinābhāvasyātraiva trividha eva trirūpa eva ca hetau niyamād anyatra ... avinābhāvābhāvād ity arthaḥ*), HBT 55,8ff. (*atraiva ... trividhahetāv avinābhāvasya niyamād iti trividhahetuvyatiriktēs artheṣv avinābhāvābhāvād ity arthaḥ*). Cf. also *tasya niyamaḥ* in NBT 100,10.

²⁶ Thereby, by the way, deviating from his own interpretation of it in PVSVT 8,28 as a genitive-*tatpuruṣa* (*triṣv evāvinābhāvasya niyatatvād ity arthaḥ*), which he may have copied, however, inattentively from Śākyabuddhi (PVT 7a8).

²⁷ Kaṇṇakagomin’s conjecture “that Dharmakīrti refutes the *niyama* fragment by devising the compound ‘*avinābhāvaniyama*’ to distinguish his own concept of *niyama* from that of Kumāriḷa” (K 2007: 1097, n. 62) cannot be taken as necessarily reflecting Dharmakīrti’s intentions with regard to the compound.

limitation, restriction to something, and (3) *niyama* as a term for the logical nexus, synonymous with *avinābhāva* or *vyāpti*.

(1) Dharmakīrti and his “Sautrāntika” background (cf. Ch 2007) make it obvious that the essence or nature (*svabhāva*) of something is an effect of its causes. The effect’s nature is conditioned in all its discernible aspects by the causes, but only some of its aspects are conditioned in such a way that they are also necessarily connected with something else, be it a different entity (or better: certain properties in a different entity) or a different property of the same entity. Further, it is also clear that the logical nexus, the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) of something with something else as based on real relationships in the form of causality or real identity is conditioned by its causes. In that sense I agree with the Yoshimizu that the causes “restrict” the nature of something to being inseparably connected with something else. In this sense an inseparable connection may be said to result from a restricting function of the causes. But it is at this point that the use of the causal function of the term “restriction” as elaborated in Ch forthc. ends: the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) is a fact created with restrictive force by the causes of those real entities in regard to which concepts can be correctly determined by means of inference.

(2) When Dharmakīrti defines the logical reason in PV 1.1 and determines this reason to be of three kinds only, he also states that the cause for this limited number of possible reasons is the fact that an inseparable connection is restricted to only these three (*avinābhāvanīyamāt*). Here the term “restriction” (*niyama*) is used in its formal meaning of expressing the limitation of something, the *avinābhāva*, in its occurrence to the three kinds of logical reasons.

(3) Kumāriila, in his *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, has yet another use for the term “restriction” (*niyama*). He substitutes it for the term *avinābhāva* which he had used in the *Śloka-vārttika*,²⁸ and understands this *niyama* to be the logical nexus between “two coexisting things”, without indicating whether this nexus is based on a particular kind of relationship in reality (K 2007: 1097).²⁹

²⁸ For possible reasons for this substitution cf. K forthc., with n. 43, and 2007: 1086f., 1097 with n. 94.

²⁹ In another context, however, Kumāriila seems to think of “relations” (*sambandha*) of the kind offered in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* as possible candidates (K 2007: 1098, n. 64). In addition, it is also possible that Kumāriila had these “relations” in mind when he says, in the second stanza of the “*niyama* fragment” (PVSVT 87,23; cf. Steinkellner 1997:

To sum up my understanding of the most creative period in the development of Indian logic after reading these remarkable and profound papers: In my opinion, for their ideas on the logical nexus, Indian logicians always had in mind a foundation in reality. Only when Dignāga concentrated on the formal aspects of the logical reason did this basic assumption recede into the background for some time; this is evident even in the Ślokavārttika when Kumāriila criticizes Dignāga's ways but keeps to the formal aspects of an "anvaya-vyatireka" logic. Soon, however, and perhaps initiated by Kumāriila's change from the term *avinābhāva* to *niyama*, and certainly by Īśvarasena's attempts to solve the induction problem by means of formal conditions alone, reality was brought forth again by Dharmakīrti when he founded the inseparable logical connection (*avinābhāva*) on the "essential connections" (*svabhāvavapratibandha*) of causality and real identity.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu</i> . Ed. P. Pradhan. Revised Second Edition with Introduction and Indices etc. by Aruna Haldar. [Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8]. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.
Ch 2007	see Yoshimizu Ch. 2007
Ch forthe.	see Yoshimizu Ch. forthe.
Dunne 2004	John D. Dunne, <i>Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy</i> . Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004.
Frauwallner 1954	Erich Frauwallner, Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrtis. In: <i>Asiatica</i> . Festschrift Friedrich Weller. Leipzig 1954, p. 142-154 (Neudruck in Frauwallner 1982: 677-689).
Frauwallner 1958	Id., Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems. <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens</i> 2 (1958) 84-139.
Frauwallner 1962	Id., Kumāriila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā. <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens</i> 6 (1962) 78-90.

634), that relations such as that between cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāvādi*) need to be examined as to whether they are a *niyama* or not. Cf. above n. 3. This use of the term *niyama* is also continued, e.g., by Śālikanātha with the compound *sambandhaniyama* in his definition of inference (PrP 116,2, 4; 117,9) which is derived from the definition of Śabara's Vṛttikāra (ŚBh 30,18f.). Śālikanātha's interpretation of the compound would then have to be taken as a *karmadhāraya* like Karṇakagomin's.

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- HB Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ*. Teil I: *Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Wien: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1967.
- HB† *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcāta with the Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. [*Gaekwad's Oriental Series* 113]. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1949.
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- JIPh* *Journal of Indian Philosophy*
- K 2007(a) see Yoshimizu K. 2007(a)
- K forthe. see Yoshimizu K. forthe.
- Kajiyama 1973 Yuichi Kajiyama, Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy. *WZKS* 17 (1973) 161-175.
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- NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti), cf. NB†

- NBṬ Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara), in: *Pañḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa*. Being a Sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu. Ed. Dalsukhbhai Malvania. [*Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2*]. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955.
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- PrP *Prakaraṇa Pañcīkā of Sri Śālikanātha Miśra with Nyāya-siddhi*. Ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri. [*Banaras Hindu University Darśana Series 4*]. Banaras: Banaras Hindu University, 1961.
- PV Pramānavārttika (Dharmakīrti), cf. PVV
- PV 1 Pramānavārttika (Dharmakīrti), chapter 1 (*svārthānumāna*),³⁰ cf. PVSV
- PVin 1 Pramānaviniścayaḥ (Dharmakīrti), Kapitel 1, in: *Dharmakīrti's Pramānaviniścaya. Chapters 1 and 2*. Critically ed. Ernst Steinkellner. [*Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 2*]. Beijing – Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House – Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2007.
- PVin 2 Pramānaviniścayaḥ (Dharmakīrti), Kapitel 2, cf. PVin 1
- PVSV Pramānavārttika(sva)vṛtti (Dharmakīrti); Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Text and Critical Notes. [*Serie Orientale Roma 23*]. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.
- PVSVṬ Pramānavārttika(sva)vṛttiṭīkā (Karnaḥagomin), in: *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ pramānavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛtṭyā karnakagomi-viracitayā taṭṭikayā ca sahitaḥ*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrṭyāyana. Allahabad 1943.
- PVṬ Pramānavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi): P 5718 (Tshad ma, Je, 1-402a8; Ñe, 1-348a8).
- PVV Pramānavārttikavṛtti (Manorathanandin), in: *Dharmakīrti's Pramānavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrṭyāyana. Appendix to *JBORS 24-26* (1938-1940).

³⁰ I do not continue my previous habit of counting the stanzas of PV 1 differently from Gnoli's edition by adding two numbers.

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