

3 Translation of the Apoahasiddhi

Om. Hommage to Śrīlokanātha!⁶³

§ 1. [Proponent:] Exclusion is declared the referent of words.⁶⁴

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§ 2. [Opponent:] Now, what⁶⁵ is this so-called exclusion? Is—
through a derivation [of the word *apoha*] such as “this is excluded

B.1

⁶³Tārā in P. The letters and numbers printed in the margins of this translation are those used in the analysis of the argument structure, section 4.2.

⁶⁴What is at stake in this definition is the kind of object that every conceptual state of cognition has. Cf. the explanations in section 5.3. The Sanskrit compound *śabdārtha* is expanded as *śabdānām arthaḥ* in l. 37, p. 49. The most common translations are: meaning, object, or referent of words, cf., e.g., “meaning of words” for “*śabdasya svārtha*” Ishida 2011b: 204 f., “objects ...of expressions” for *śabdārthasya* Dunne 2004: 359, “referent of the word” for “*śabdārthaḥ*” Pind 2015: II.65. As indicated by Patil (2003: 245, n. 6), *artha* covers all of these semantic possibilities, and more. Here *artha* shall be translated as “referent”, with the intention of expressing the object that words refer to. By not translating this *artha* as “meaning”, the suggestion that it might correspond to “sense” in a rigorously philosophical (Fregean) interpretation can be avoided. Ratnakīrti does not consider this interpretation in his following treatment of *apoha*. For some material on the Tibetan discussion of *śabdārtha*, cf. Dreyfus 1997: 220 ff.

⁶⁵Acc. to Patil (2003: 245, n. 7) this objection continues to 7. This is feasible not only because of the content, but also stylistically: all Buddhist viewpoints are introduced by *atha* (cf. § 4, § 5, § 6), and are embedded in a discussion led from the opponent’s point of view. For an example of this technique in another text, cf. also the notes on the *VjN*, 1.1.3. Another example is found in the opening section of the *SSD* (cf. the overview in Mimaki 1976: 11).

from another,” or “another is excluded from this,” or “another is excluded in this,”—only [something] external, differentiated from that of another genus meant [by exclusion]; or [is] the form of awareness [meant by it];⁶⁶ or else [is]—if [one analyses] “exclusion [is the act of] excluding”—the mere differentiation from something else [meant by exclusion]? Such are the three positions.⁶⁷

B.1.2 § 3 To begin with, the first two positions are not [correct], because by the name “exclusion” only a positive element⁶⁸ is meant. The last [position] is inconsistent as well, because it is invalidated by a cognition. For [it is] so: The verbal cognition “There is a fire on the upper part of the hill.” is observed as representing [something] with a positive nature, but not as making a mere rejection apparent,⁶⁹

⁶⁶This position is mentioned PVV 169,13 *ad* PV III 169 (cf. trl. on page 322, and appendix A.4.2.8). It is one of the theories about the word referent discussed in the *TSP*, cf. the detailed discussion in B.5. Generally, *buddhyākāra* will here be translated literally as “form of awareness”, meaning that the awareness has the form of its object. But in phrases where this would be misleading or sound strange, as in “the form of awareness of blue”, the term “cognitive form” will be used. At least for Ratnakīrti, the notion of an *ākāra* is not limited to the visual shape or figure of a thing: as evidenced by CAPV 129,22–24 (cf. section 1.1.3), this form that awareness has can be anything perceived by the six sense faculties—visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, somatic, and mental. See Kellner 2014 for a recent treatment of this term in Abhidharma and *pramāṇa* literature.

⁶⁷That is, the three main positions that were usually discussed by Buddhist philosophers as the candidates for *apoha*. Cf. section 4.1.1 for the background of this paragraph.

⁶⁸For the scope of the term *vidhi*, cf. 5.3.2.

⁶⁹In Patil 2011b: 5, as well as in the translation of this section’s model by McCrea and Patil (2010: 49–50), *nivṛtti* is treated as fully synonymous with *apohana* or *apoha*. Even though these terms do seem mostly synonymous within the *apoha* theory, a differentiation in this particular text nevertheless seems useful, because derivations of *ni-√vrt* are not used as equivalents of the corresponding *apa-√uh* derivatives (as *apoha* is one) in those passages of the *AS* where Ratnakīrti outlines his own theory, in contrast to derivatives from *vy-ā-√vrt*. If this is not a mere coincidence, the reason for it may be that the connotation of *ni-√vrt* was too close to the “negationist” position (*pratishedhavādīnām matam*, § 8) that Ratnakīrti explicitly rejects. A similar consideration might also have influenced the slight change in the

[like] “Non-fire does not exist.” And it is widely known⁷⁰ that there is no opportunity for a further proof for that invalidated by perception.⁷¹

§ 4 If [a Buddhist replies:] “Even though there is no conceptual cognition such as (*iti*) “I cognize a non-occurrence”, still, the representation of the non-occurrence is precisely the representation of the object that does not occur.⁷² For there certainly is no cognition of [something] that is qualified that does not contain the cognition of a qualifier.⁷³ Therefore, in the same way as a conceptual awareness is, for others,⁷⁴ an awareness of a universal because a common form appears, even though there is not the concept “I cognize a universal.”,

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formulation *nivṛtṭyapohavādinām matam* that is found in TBh_I 52,17, which uses much of the material here. These thoughts do not apply to passages where *nivṛtṭi* and related forms are used in a sense not related to *apoha*, see, e.g., § 58.

⁷⁰This argument is based on the idea that perception is more authoritative than inference. This position was held by all parties that Ratnakīrti is concerned with in this treatise: for Kumāriḷa, cf. Mimaki 1976: 16 and notes, and J. A. Taber 2005: 84–92. Acc. to J. A. Taber (2005: 198, n. 101), NSū 1.1.5, too, maintains that “...inference, at least, is dependent on perception” (J. A. Taber 2005: 198, n. 101) Cf. also Angot 2009: 280 f. Ratnakīrti himself invokes this rule below, § 45.

⁷¹This objection, that exclusion is refuted as the word referent by the mere experience of a verbal cognition, has been traced back to Kumāriḷa by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), based on the following passages: ŚV Av 38–39; TS_§ 909–910 (which he convincingly argues are verses from Kumāriḷa’s *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, being quoted as of Kumāriḷa in PVSVT 114,7–11); TS_§ 1012–1013a (cf. appendix B.10); PVSVT 114,7–17 (trl. appendix A.2.1). Cf. also Akamatsu 1981: 54 f.

⁷²Cf. DhAP 246,26 ff. for Dharmottara’s explanation of why this is not the way exclusion is cognized.

⁷³That the differentiation and that which is differentiated from others (i.e., that which is qualified by the differentiation) are only conceptually, but not really, separable is one of Dharmakīrti’s central arguments against Kumāriḷa’s and Uddyotakara’s critiques of Dignāga’s *apoha* theory, cf. Akamatsu 1986: 68–72 and Much 1997: 170 f. respectively. See also PV I 59 (cf. trl. on page 293) for more details on Dharmakīrti’s position. A similar point, namely that, if there is a difference between a property and its bearer, they cannot be known without each other, is made by Ratnakīrti in § 28. This argument is also used in an interjection against ŚV Av 88 after its quotation as TS_§ 947 (cf. appendix B.8, and footnote 77).

⁷⁴Since this passage is found also in the ĀTV₁, it is helpful to consult its commentaries. Acc. to ĀTVK 280,16 (*pareṣām naiyāyikānām*), the others in this passage

in that same way the awareness of a non-occurrence, which is implied by the apprehension of what does not occur, stretches out through [all] everyday treatment⁷⁵ [of conceptual cognition] as a cognition of exclusion.”,⁷⁶ [then we opponents say:] is it not so: if, when a common form appears [in a conceptual cognition], one classifies [this

are the Naiyāyikas. Acc. to ĀTVP 283,10 (*pareṣām naiyāyikādīnām*), the Naiyāyikas et al. are meant. Since this passage is not very specific, and its exact source is not known (cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., n. 333), the latter interpretation seems more likely. The others would thus be all those who think that a concept's object is a universal. This is the position, at least, of the Naiyāyika authors (cf., e.g., NSū 2.2.66, and Dravid 1972: chapter 2) and of the Mīmāṃsaka authors (cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3) that Ratnakīrti is engaging with in the AS₃.

⁷⁵The term *vyavahāra* has the broad connotation of “everyday activity.” Acc. to Schmithausen (1965: 268, n. 215) and Steinkellner (1967: 156, n. 3, section 1), a threefold and fourfold classification of “everyday activity” can be made: that into a cognitive, linguistic, and physical dealing with something, and that which adds causal efficacy to these three types. According to Steinkellner (1967: 156, note 3, section 1, subnote 3) this 4th sense of the term is already present in Dharmakīrti's writings. See Dreyfus 1997: 269 ff. and Dunne 2004: 258, n. 58 for *vyavahāra* as “convention.” Ratnakīrti uses the more common distinction into mental, verbal, and bodily activity, as can be gleaned from the beginning of Ratnakīrti's answer to the objection that conceptual cognition does not exist, since it does not refer to an external object in CAPV 139,17–19: *atrābhīdhīyate. ihāgnir atrety adhyavasāyo yathā kāyikīm vṛttim prasūte tathāgnir mayā pratīyata iti vācīkīm api prasūte, etadākārānuvyavasāyarūpām mānasīm api prasavati.* (To this it is said [by us]: Here, as the determination “Here's fire.” brings forth bodily activity, so [it] brings forth also the verbal [activity, which consists in saying] “I cognize fire.”, [and] also brings forth this mental [activity] that has the nature of a determination according to the form of awareness.) Note that Ratnakīrti treats all these activities as results of a conceptual determination, and that in this sense mental, verbal, and bodily activity are on an equal footing (though mental activity, unlike verbal or bodily activity, can itself have the nature of a determination.

⁷⁶McCrea and Patil (2010: 50) translate the last part of this comparison as: “In just the same way, the awareness of the exclusion implied by the awareness of the excluded thing makes it possible for us to be aware of and to talk about exclusion.” A difference may lie in the understanding of *ātanoti*. In the translation presented here, this verb is interpreted as alluding to the logical relation of pervasion: any case of a cognition of exclusion must, for this Buddhist, be a case of a cognition of a non-occurrence or absence. If one understands “makes possible” in this sense, as saying that a cognition of *nivṛtti* is the necessary precondition for treating any conceptual cognition as a cognition of exclusion, then there is no significant difference in the

conceptual cognition] as an awareness of a universal because [it] is of a positive form, then what is achieved by classifying a thought in which the form of non-existence does not [actually] appear as the cognition of a non-occurrence?⁷⁷ Therefore, if there should be an appearance of a form of non-occurrence, even though there is no form such as “I cognize a non-occurrence.”, who indeed would deny the existence of a cognition of a non-occurrence?⁷⁸ Otherwise, [if one were to deny this,] there would be the everyday usage of a cognition of something when there is no manifestation [of that thing], so that [the following] might be [the case]: even though a thought has the form “cow”, there is the awareness “horse”.

§ 5. If it is said [by the Buddhists] that a cognition of non-occurrence is contained [in the cognition of something qualified] due to being [its] qualifier, [then] nevertheless, if [there were] a concept having a form such as “excluded by non-cow”, then there may be an involvement of this [non-occurrence] due to being the qualifier [of the form]; but still the cognition [is] “cow.” And then, since a qualifier characterized as non-occurrence does not blossom forth in this [cognition], even though it [may] exist [there implicitly], how [can this cognition] be classified as a cognition of this [non-occurrence]?⁷⁹ B.2.3

§ 6. If this thought [is entertained by a Buddhist]: “For that, which appears in a positive form, there is also an exclusion from [that which is] different. Therefore [it] is called cognition of this B.2.5

translations. This passage also makes it useful to distinguish between “exclusion” as a translation of *apoha* and as a translation of *nivṛtti*: the latter refers to the process of excluding (*apohana*), or not occurring; this “not occurring” is how the former, more general case of exclusion could be analysed.

⁷⁷Akamatsu (1983: 168, n. 9) refers to ŚV Av 88 (as cited in TS_§ 947) for this position. Cf. appendix B.8.

⁷⁸Cf. ŚV Av 164, also discussed in PVSVT 114 f. (cf. appendix A.2.1).

⁷⁹Acc. to Akamatsu 1983: 169, n. 13, this objection corresponds to ŚV Av 41. Again, this is found in TS_§ 923, cf. appendix B.6.

[exclusion].”,⁸⁰ [then] nevertheless [there is only] a mere connection to exclusion. Only a positive element actually appears. And additionally, in this way it is unavoidable that exclusion [would be] the object also for perception, specifically, because [there would be] a concept for [a perceptual cognition] that, seeing what is different from all others, represents a single excluded thing.⁸¹ Therefore, because of the apprehension of a positive form, only a positive element is, as for perceptual cognition, the object of a conceptual [cognition] also; [but] the exclusion of others is not [its] object. So, how [is it that] exclusion [is] announced as the referent of words?⁸²

- c § 7. [Proponent:] To this [the following] is replied: By the word “exclusion” we do not mean a fully positive element alone, nor the mere differentiation from others; rather, a positive element qualified by exclusion from others⁸³ [is] the referent of words. And therefore, there

⁸⁰Akamatsu (1983: 170, n. 16) takes this to be the opinion expressed in the *TS*, and refers, in Akamatsu 1983: n. 4, p. 162, to *TS*_§ 1012–1013a as the central passage that supports this interpretation (cf. trl. on page 355). This seems to be the last, and weakest, option for someone endorsing exclusion as the word referent. The argument of the defender of *apoha* thus goes through four variations: exclusion, in the sense of mere differentiation from others, is the word referent (stated and attacked in § 2–§ 3); there is no representation of a pure exclusion in awareness, but the representation of an excluded object is the representation of the exclusion (discussed § 4); a cognition of exclusion is contained as a qualifier (§ 5); a positive representation possesses, or is connected to, an exclusion of others (§ 6).

⁸¹No precursor to this specific objection could be found in either PV I, *TSP*_§ or DhAP. Kamalaśīla, in commenting on *TS*_§ 1060–1062, explicitly states that exclusion, in the sense of the particular, is the object of sense perception: *tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva*. (*TSP*_§ 407,15, for a trl. cf. appendix B.11). Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 340–56 for Jñānaśrimitra’s position.

⁸²The introductory objection ends here, questioning the programmatic statement in § 1. See footnote 65.

⁸³As discussed in § 2, the compound “other-exclusion” (*anyāpoha*) can be analysed in various ways. Though it is not altogether clear which analysis Ratnakīrti himself endorses, or even if he thinks they are all possible, *anyāpoha* will here be rendered as “exclusion from others,” or simply “other-exclusion,” unless the context suggests another interpretation. Cf. also the comments in section 4.1.1.

is no possibility for the errors afflicting each individual position.⁸⁴

§ 8 But the idea of the affirmationists that, in the cognition of a cow, exclusion is ascertained subsequently because of the implication that “That of the nature of this [is] not of the nature of another.”, or the idea of the negationists that, in the cognition of an other-exclusion, that excluded from others is understood because of implication,⁸⁵ is incorrect, because not even a first time [learner of a word] observes a sequence in cognition. For neither does anyone, upon having cognized a positive element, understand exclusion later by implication, nor [does anyone], upon having cognized exclusion[, understand] that excluded from others. Therefore a cognition of a cow is called the cognition of that excluded from others.⁸⁶ And even if the non-representation of the words “excluded from others” [in conceptual cognition] has been maintained,⁸⁷ nevertheless there is no non-cognition at all of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word “cow” is founded only on that excluded from non-cow.⁸⁸ As the

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⁸⁴Cf. the three positions in § 2: An external thing, a form of awareness, and exclusion as such.

⁸⁵Acc. to Akamatsu 1986, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are the affirmationists (cf. especially the evidence in TS₅ 1013a, trl. on page 355), and Dharmottara is a negativist. This analysis by Ratnakīrti has been very influential on modern studies of the development of the *apoha* theory. Cf. footnote 344 for more comments on this passage and secondary literature.

⁸⁶This is a synthesis of the two positions mentioned: *goḥ pratipatti* and *anyāpōdhapratipatti*. So there is no temporal relation as primary and secondary between the positive and negative elements that the object of a verbal cognition is composed of, they are known simultaneously. For a further discussion, cf. section 5.3.4.

⁸⁷Apparently this refers back to § 4. AP 203,16 supports *anyāpōdhādisabdānullekhe* here, so we would have to understand that there is no “representation of the words ‘exclusion from others’ and so on”. But JN_A_{ms} 9a5, though it is hard to be certain, seems to read *anyāpōdhādisabdānullekhe*, so that the main difference to the AS₄ is the presence of *ādi*.

⁸⁸Immediately after this passage in AP, Jñānaśrīmitra cites PV I 124 (cf. a translation from the Tibetan in Frauwallner 1933: 58). Akamatsu 1983: 184 ff., n. 34 translates PV I 124–127, and then states that in these verses and the commentary Dharmakīrti presents the four points constituting his theory of *apoha*. Akamatsu

appearance of blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the cognition of a water lily that is blue because of the word “*indīvara*”⁸⁹ which is founded on a blue water lily, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment as there is the cognition of a cow from the word “cow” which is founded on that excluded from non-cow. As, for perception, the grasping of absence in a purely negating form⁹⁰ is only the capacity to generate the concept of absence, so also, for a conceptual cognition of the positive element, the grasping of absence [in a purely negating form] is considered [to be] only the capacity of granting activity in conformance to this [positive element].⁹¹ But the grasping of absence in an implicative form is the awareness

(1983: 185–6, n. 34) says:

1) Le mot exprime l’affirmation et la négation à la fois. ...2) C’est pourquoi, la désignation de l’objet affirmatif (A) et la différenciation-négation de non-A ne sont pas en relation réelle du “déterminé” et du “déterminant”. ...3) Par suite de la simultanéité de la désignation affirmative de A et de la négation de non-A, la critique de Bhāmaha contre Dignāga ne sera plus valable. ...4) ...un tel caractère différentiel ...est irréal.

⁸⁹The word *indīvara* is used for *Nymphaea stellata* and *cyanea* (acc. to PW I: 800), a water lily with blue flowers (cf. also Rau 1954). The point is that this name cannot be analysed into the units conveying “blue” and “water lily”, respectively, unlike *nīlotpala*, lit. “blue-water-lily”.

⁹⁰See footnote 332 for an explanation of this and the following type of negation.

⁹¹The parallel passage in AP 205,12–16 is preceded by a reference to a *Śāstric* source, i.e., Dharmakīrti. Akamatsu (1983: 195, n. 49) and Katsura (1986: 180, n. 20) trace it to a passage in the *anupalabdhihetu* discussion of the *HB*. The statement they are referring to is as follows (Jñānaśrīmitra’s reference ends in *ityādi*, and omits the subject of the sentence, so it is not clear how far this should go), *HB* 32,5–7: ...*kvacit pramāṇaṃ pravṛttaṃ tat paricchinnati, tato ’nyad vyavacchinatti, tṛtīyaprakārahāvam ca śūcyatīty ekapramāṇavyāpāra eṣaḥ*. (Trl., following the German one in Steinkellner 1967: 67 and McCrea and Patil 2010: 55 f.: “A means of valid cognition demarcates that[, i.e., its object], excludes what is other than that, and makes the absence of a third possibility known. This is the activity of a single means of valid cognition.”) The point of the argument is that a single means of valid cognition, in this case an inference using a logical reason of the type non-apprehension, may perform multiple functions, most importantly an

of [something] with a limited form particular [to this object], [and this awareness] is not different for either [perception or conceptual cognition]. Otherwise, if the exclusion of others were not formed at the time of the cognition of a referent because of a word, how could [there be] activity⁹² that avoids other [things]?⁹³ Consequently someone instructed “Tether the cow!” would also tether horses etc.⁹⁴

§ 9. Furthermore, what Vācaspati said: “Individual things qualified by a genus⁹⁵ are the range [of objects] for concepts and words. And

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affirmative one—defining its object—, and a negative one—excluding objects other than the one at hand. For Katsura (1986: 180, n. 20), the reference to this passage is an important factor in making the case that “...Jñānaśrīmitra’s idea of simultaneous understanding of affirmation and negation is not necessarily unique to him, for a similar idea is already found in the *Hetubindu*.” (Katsura 1986: 174) For a closer analysis of this comparison in the *AS*, see section 5.3.3.

⁹²See footnote 75.

⁹³AP 206,3 quotes PV I 96 in this context. Cf. Vetter 1964: 61 for an explanation of the context and a translation. Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., nn. 60 and 62) links the discussion in the *AP* to the objection in ŚV Av 143cd and the answers to it in PV I 122–123a, as well as in TS₈ 1159–1161.

⁹⁴Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 342 for a discussion of the model in the *AP* of these last two sentences.

⁹⁵For more on the history of this topic, see Hattori 1996. The notion of *jāti*, as held by the Naiyāyika authors with whom Ratnakīrti enters into debates, corresponds in several respects to core features that are often ascribed to universals in traditions of philosophy broadly following Aristotle: it is “eternal (*nitya*), unitary (*eka*), and present in many particulars (*anekavṛtti*).” (Halbfass 1992: 120) As such, a universal or genus is capable of entering into a one-to-many relation that causes the cognition of similarity between individual things and so founds the applicability of certain words to certain things. Even in early Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya texts, the capability of causing the same cognition is the central function of the *jāti* (cf. Halbfass 1992: 118; 120–1).

But below this superficial similarity, there are essential differentiating factors, the most important of which is clarified by Matilal (1985: 174) as follows:

The Naiyāyikas thought of this *jāti* as something real and indestructible, occurring in individuals (*vyakti*). It is as real as an ordinary particular object, say, a pot. [As any two material particulars can’t be in the same place at the same time—PMA], so also only one *jāti* can occur in one individual and no other *jāti* can occur in that individual,

thus, because of implicitly understanding this [exclusion by realizing that] the form of these [individuals] so qualified is distinguished from what is not of that genus, someone instructed “Tether the cow!” does not tether horses etc.”,⁹⁶ that also has been refuted exactly by this.⁹⁷ Because, if what is actually differentiated from that of another genus is the form of the individual things, even though an additional genus is thrown in, then how [should there be] an escape from the differentiation from what is not that for [those things, insofar as they] become the object of both word and concept only due to this form?⁹⁸

- D.3 § 10. Or, if the form of the individual things is not differentiated from that of a different genus or cognized in that way, then is this [differentiation or cognition] a gift of the genus?⁹⁹ So how could there

unless it is either included in, or is inclusive of, the former *jāti*.

Many of the following arguments will make little sense if this peculiarity, that a *jāti* is not in any way an abstract entity, is disregarded.

This translation will also differentiate between *jāti* and *sāmānya*, using “genus” for the former and “universal” for the latter, even though Halbfass (1992: 121) says that “...the uses of *jāti* and *sāmānya* tend to coincide in classical Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika”, and thus also for the *NVTT*.

⁹⁶Note the differences (marked by emphasis) of the quote found here from the text as it appears in *NVTT* 443,23–444,2: *tasmā jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānām ca sabdānām ca gocaraḥ, tāsām tadvatīnām rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam ity arthaḥ. atas tadavagater na gām badhāneti codito ’śvādīn badhnāti*. There is no reason to suppose that *arthatas*, supported also by AP 206,26, is a corruption of *arthaḥ | atas*.

⁹⁷This probably refers to the general point made in § 8, according to which exclusion and the positive element are cognized simultaneously, and not sequentially.

⁹⁸AP 207,3 reads *atadvyāvṛttipratītiparihāraḥ* instead of *atadvyāvṛttiparihāraḥ*. Ratnakīrti here reduces Vācaspati’s opinion to the point that exclusion from others is the only relevant factor in cognizing a particular as belonging to a genus. For, thus Ratnakīrti, the genus of a thing is irrelevant for the thing’s classification, since it is the particular’s form alone that its classification (and hence the cognition of its genus) depends on.

⁹⁹I.e., the genus makes it possible that particulars are differentiated from others and that they are cognized in such a way, thus facilitating correct activity. It is not very likely that *eṣa* refers to *parihāra* (“escape”), as that would not make good sense.

be a conception of this [form of the particulars] even implicitly? Thus most has been said.¹⁰⁰

§ 11 Or, if that differentiated from another [is so] only by virtue of the genus, [then] let it be differentiated from others either by virtue of the genus or by virtue of its uninterrupted series of causes. Given a cognition of that which is differentiated, [may it arise in] any of the two ways, there certainly is a cognition of differentiation. D.4

§ 12 And there is no error of mutual dependence when the positive element of the verbal convention of the word “cow” [is] that excluded from non-cow, because this error is possible even in the case of the conventional designation of a universal or that qualified by it.¹⁰¹ For the so-called universal is not meant [to be] a universal in general, D.5.1

In his translation of the corresponding passage in AP, Akamatsu 1983: 64 adds “connaissance de la différenciation des autres hétérogènes” in brackets, thus taking *eṣa* (analysed as *eṣā*) to refer to *atadvyāvṛttipratīti* (cf. footnote 98).

¹⁰⁰Lasic (2000a: 127) translates this phrase (together with a preceding *iti*) as “Damit ist das Wesentliche gesagt.”

McCrea and Patil (2010: 59) translate as “This has been effectively explained already.”, but do not note where this was done. However, if *uktaprāyam* were understood in this way, the subject would be unclear. If understood as referring to Ratnakīrti (“this was generally said by me”), it is not obvious which preceding passages he would be referring to here (the past participle, *ukta*, can hardly be taken as pointing to subsequent arguments). Since this passage is taken from AP, it could also be that *uktaprāyam* there had Jñānaśrīmitra as its subject, and was reused by Ratnakīrti somewhat imprecisely. But also in the AP the preceding discussions do not deal with this question in much depth (cf. the synopsis in Katsura 1986: 179, n. 15, acc. to which the section against *sāmānya* (and *jāti*) as the word referent is found later in the text).

It is also possible that this should be taken as a statement referring to previous authors: “It was generally said”, with no particular subject intended.

Furthermore, cf. the gloss of *uktaprāyam* at PVSVT 280,23 to PVSV 71,2: *prāyaśabdo bāhulyavacanah. prāyeṅoktam uktaprāyam*. (The word *prāya* expresses “abundance.” It was said for the largest part[, thus,] most has been said (*uktaprāyam*)). Karṇakagomin then states that the word *prāya* is at the end of the compound because it is to be analysed acc. to Pāṇ 2.2.31.

¹⁰¹That the cognition of “exclusion from non-cow” presupposes the cognition of “cow” was an objection to Dignāga by Kumārila (ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS_g 942–943,

since there is the unwanted consequence that even for a horse there is the verbal convention of the word “cow”;¹⁰² rather, [the universal is meant to be a particular one, like] cowness. And to this extent there is exactly this error [of mutual dependence], because without the cognition of a cow [there is] no cognition of the universal cowness, [and] because without the cognition of the universal cowness [there is] no cognition of what is to be denoted by the word “cow”. Therefore there is no error of mutual dependence when making the conventional designation “This is a cow.” for a form of conceptual awareness that, preceded by the observation of a single material object, is spread out externally as if common to all individual things. And if [this] application of the word “cow” is admitted, the denomination of all the rest by the word “non-cow” is accepted.

D.5.2 § 13. And there is also no contradiction between that excluded from others and the exclusion from others, nor damage to the relation of that qualified and the qualifier, because they are not [really] separate from each other, since for them there really is co-referentiality, as [there is] for a pot’s absence on the floor.¹⁰³ For there is a contradiction

and refuted in TS₅ 1063–1064, cf. appendix B.12) and Uddyotakara (NBhV 324,1–7). Dharmakīrti’s refutation is found in PV I 113cd–121 (cf. appendix A.1.9). An accessible version of this argument is found in NM *ΑΠΟΗΑ*: 14,7–15,4 (translated in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 48–49). Cf. also Akamatsu 1983: 187, n. 37 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84, and Much 1994: 361 for the context of Uddyotakara’s argument. See also section 5.5 for some comments on this argument.

The term *saṃketa* (“verbal convention”) is the act of establishing that a certain word refers to a certain object. Acc. to Dharmakīrti, there is convention only for exclusion, cf. PV I 72cd (trl. Dunne 2004: 343 f.), as well as PV I 110 (trl. appendix A.1.8). Cf. Hugon 2011 for a discussion of *saṃketa* and the problem of circularity as it appears in PV I (also discussed in Hugon 2009) and the *TSP*. See Arnold 2006 for some of the broader philosophical issues that are involved.

¹⁰²Cf. the similar argument at the end of § 35 (trl. on p. 110).

¹⁰³I.e., it is not the case that what is excluded from others, or the object that is qualified, and exclusion from others, or the qualifier, preclude or contradict each other. This is equivalent to Dharmakīrti’s solution to the problem of co-referentiality in the context of the *apoha* theory, see J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 264. Cf. section 5.5.

with its own absence, but not with the absence of another [object]. This is established [for everyone] down to children.¹⁰⁴

§ 14 Also here [in the sentence] “This road leads to Śrughna.”¹⁰⁵ D.6 exclusion is indeed cognized, because a distinction can easily be understood for each word: with respect to other roads that are under discussion, [one understands] only this,¹⁰⁶ with respect to the location

¹⁰⁴ It was Kumāriḷa who criticized the *apoha* theory for not being compatible with a relation of qualifier and qualified, and for not allowing any co-reference (cf. the references in Hattori 2006: 62, and see Ogawa 2017 and J. Taber and Kataoka 2017 for two recent contributions). *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, the co-referentiality that two words may have, was much debated in earlier texts on *apoha*, cf., e.g., Much 1997, and the passages referred to there in which Dharmakīrti discusses co-referentiality: PVSV 34,25–35,4; 42,12–43,18; 65,19–66,1 (cf. the translation of the second passage in Dunne 2004: 346 ff., as well as appendix A.1.6 for a translation of the first of these passages). The present passage is the only time Ratnakīrti explicitly mentions this issue. But, as Much (1997: 170) notes, already “Dharmakīrti does not repeat Dignāga’s treatment of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, but concentrates on discussing the preclusion (*apoha*, *vyāvṛtti*) and the precluded (*apodha*, *vyāvṛtta*.” So the problem of co-referentiality was apparently subsumed under the more general debate of qualifier and qualified, as is also suggested by such formulations as: PVSV 42,12–13: *jñānapratibhāsiny arthe sāmānyasāmānādhikarāṇyadharmadharmivavyavahārāḥ*, where Dharmakīrti says that universal, co-referentiality, as well as property and property bearer are used with regard to an object that appears in a cognition; or TS₅ 1100: *viśeṣanaviśeṣyatvasāmānādhikarāṇyayoḥ / tasmād apohe śabdārthe vyavasthā na virudhyate //* (cf. appendix B.13 for a trl.).

¹⁰⁵Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 57 f., n. 132 for the background of this example in the theory of three kinds of *vyavaccheda*. The problem of a sentence having exclusion as its object was already clearly seen by Kumāriḷa, cf. appendix B.9.

¹⁰⁶R. Herzberger claims that for Dignāga “...the *apoha*-operation is confined to names and does not apply to demonstratives.” (R. Herzberger 1986: 107 f.) If this is true, then this passage would show a very clear break that occurred at some point between Dignāga and Ratnakīrti. Acc. to Hattori 1968: 25, and 83–85, n. 1.27, Dignāga accepts proper names (*yadr̥cchā-*), genus words (*jāti-*), quality words (*guṇa-*), activity words (*kriyā-*), and substance words (*dravyaśabda*). This conclusion is also arrived at in Hayes 1988: 203, and accepted in Pind 2015: II.177, n. 600. Pind 2015: § 65 discusses Dignāga’s theory on the denotation of demonstrative pronouns. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation, as cited and translated in Pind 2015: II.184, n. 627, implies that demonstrative pronouns refer to exclusion: they are used in the same way as a general term, e.g., “tree”, might be used to refer to a particular tree.

of undesired [places] opposed to Śrughna, only Śrughna; because of not being cut off like a forest track, [the road is understood to] really lead to; through the distinction from a caravan or a messenger [on it], [one understands] only the road. Therefore, that supporting exclusion [and] possessing a positive form is understood from a word, as from the word *punḍarīka* a lotus characterized by white is understood.¹⁰⁷

- d.8 § 15. If [an opponent asks:] “If it is thus acceptable to call the positive element alone the referent of words, how is exclusion to be asserted?”, [then we answer that] to this it was said¹⁰⁸ that by the word “exclusion” a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others is meant. There, when a positive element is cognized, one simultaneously cognizes other-exclusion since [that] is [the positive element’s] qualifier. And the classification that for perception, too, the object is exclusion cannot be made, because there is no dispute about the real thing being the object of this [perception], like [there is about the real thing being the object] of verbal apprehension. And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature¹⁰⁹ is meant according to determination, and according to appearance a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular’s appearance, since there is no appearance of a manifest particular that is limited to a [certain] place, time and condition as [there is in the case of] perception. [This is] what the treatise [says, too]:

¹⁰⁷As traced by Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., n. 62), it was Kumāriḷa who objected that other-exclusion cannot be what a sentence expresses (cf. ŚV Av 143cd = TS₉ 977cd, trl. appendix B.9). For the difference between Dignāga and Śāntaraksita concerning whether a sentence makes exclusion known, cf. Hattori 1979. Patil (2009: 208 ff.) argues that Ratnakīrti’s argument in this passage makes it seem “...as if a compositional theory of semantics is assumed to explain how word-meanings are related to sentence-meaning and vice versa.” (Patil 2009: 210)

¹⁰⁸This paragraph repeats Ratnakīrti’s own theory of what the word referent is in broader lines than above (see § 7). Cf. section 5.2.2, footnote 382, and section 5.6 for further discussions of these descriptions.

¹⁰⁹Cf. PVin II 8 for a very prominent occurrence of the phrase *atadrūpaparāvṛtta*.

§ 16. Because an object does not appear due to a word in the awareness of [someone having] an inactive sense organ in the same way as [it does] in perception[, ...]¹¹⁰

§ 17. [Opponent:] There is a difference in the appearance of [what is in fact] a single object, because the ways [of apprehending an object, according] to the nature of a sense faculty [or] a word, are different.¹¹¹ [Proponent:] Also with regard to this it was said: D.11.2

§ 18. The basis of thoughts is certainly different [in each case. So] why would a real thing, which is in fact only one, have this nature that appears [to awareness] with different forms?¹¹²

§ 19. For a single thing does not have two forms, “distinct” and “indistinct”, [which are] contradictory to each other, so that [that single thing] would appear with one [form] to the cognition of the sense faculties, with another in a conceptual cognition, since, if it were so, [that single real] thing itself would obtain [this] difference.¹¹³ For the difference of a real thing is nothing but the difference of [its] D.11.3.1

¹¹⁰The full verse PVI 15 is:

*śabdenāvyaṅgīkṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt /
arthasya dṛṣṭāv iva tad anirdeśyasya vedakam / /*

Ratnakīrti only quotes the ablative clause giving the reason for the main sentence, i.e., for the fact that “this [perception] makes known [something] that cannot be designated [by words].” Cf. the notes to PVI 15 for other texts where this verse is found, as well as Vetter 1966: 55 for a translation of this verse’s context. For the fundamental difference between the objects of perception and conceptual awareness, cf., e.g., the expositions in Dunne 2004: 79–84 or J. A. Taber 2005: 31 ff., and see Krasser 1995: 252 ff. and McCrea and Patil 2006 for a study of the revisions that this strict distinction underwent with Dharmottara and Jñānaśrimitra, respectively.

¹¹¹This argument is also found in ĀTV₂ 237,8 ff. (ĀTV₁ 330,14 ff.). Concerning the parallel passage in AP 208,16–19, Akamatsu (1983: 206, n. 86) notes that the same discussion is found in PV III 233cd–234ab. Cf. appendix A.3.4 for a translation.

¹¹²This is PV III 235 (cf. appendix A.3.4 for the context). PV III 235a is also cited in Jñānaśrimitra’s SaSiŚa 396,10.

¹¹³This cannot be the case, because a real thing is a partless entity, the relation of property and property bearer being only conceptually constructed. Cf. footnote 136.

own form. And the difference of [its] own form is nothing but the difference of [its] appearance. Otherwise, the threefold world would be only one thing.¹¹⁴

D.11.4

§ 20. [Opponent:] There is no difference in a tree, even if there is, in the case of a tree in a single place, a difference in [its] appearance as “distinct” and “indistinct” to two people, [one] situated in a far away [and the other in a] nearby place.¹¹⁵ [Proponent:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is limited to different things, but rather that it is limited to it not being [the case] that there is the same object [for the two cognitions]. Therefore, there is a difference in the real thing when there is a difference in appearance that is accompanied by a

¹¹⁴A slightly clearer version of this consequence is found in SSD 118,4–7 (where it answers a Mīmāṃṣā objection, see Mimaki 1976: 120–123):

*viruddhāyora dharmayoḥ padmarāgād anyatve 'pi viruddhadharmayo-
gāt padmarāgasya bhedaḥ katham apahnūyate, trailokyaikatvaprasa-
ṅgasya durvāratvāt. na hi dharmadharmiṇor anyatve 'pi brāhmaṇa-
tvacaṅḍālatve ekādhāre bhavitum arhata iti padmarāgasya bhedo
duratikramah.*

Even if two contradictory properties[, e.g., here and there, or earlier and later,] are different from a ruby, how can a difference of the ruby [itself] be excluded since it is connected with [these] contradictory properties? For[, if that difference of the ruby could be excluded,] the unwanted consequence of the threefold world being one would be difficult to avoid. For even though property and property bearer are different, “being a Brahmin[, i.e., of the highest caste,]” and “being a *caṅḍāla*[, i.e., of the lowest caste,]” cannot exist in the same subject. So the difference of the ruby [due to having contradictory properties] is difficult to overcome.

The consequence in this passage seems to be that if two contradictory properties can qualify the same thing without that thing having to be recognized as being two different things, then all things in all worlds, though qualified at least by different times and places, would not have to be considered different. The same argument would apply to the case under discussion, a single thing having both a clear and unclear form.

¹¹⁵Akamatsu (1983: 207, n. 89) refers to PV III 407ab (cf. appendix A.3.5), where a similar statement is negated.

difference in causal effectiveness etc., as in the case of a pot.¹¹⁶ In the other case, however, [i.e., when there is a difference in appearance but none in causal effectiveness,] one appearance is wrong because it is certainly¹¹⁷ refuted that there is the same object.¹¹⁸

§ 21. Due to this, what Vācaspati said[, i.e.]: “[Even though]¹¹⁹ the two [types of cognition], word and perception, have a real thing as [their] object, the [two] apprehensions are not without a difference, because the difference between being imperceptible and being perceptible can arise due to a difference in the cause.”¹²⁰ is not relevant, because of the impossibility that a cognition of [something] imperceptible has a real thing as [its] object. Rather, the difference in causes, which is based on [the real thing’s] being imperceptible [or not], fulfills [its] aim simply by lacking any grasping of the object of the sense faculties. Thus, the particular does not appear in verbal apprehension. D.11.6

§ 22. Moreover, if a thing that has the nature of a particular [were] what is to be denoted, both affirmation¹²¹ and negation would be impossible, because [the thing] would be observed with its whole D.11.7.3

¹¹⁶In the corresponding passage of Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. section 4.1.3) the example is: “...like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to grasping a pot.”

¹¹⁷Instead of reading *niyamena* adverbially, it could also be understood that there is a refutation through the restriction mentioned, i.e., due to the the fact that a difference in appearances is restricted to there not being the same object.

¹¹⁸For a discussion of this paragraph and Jñānaśrī’s version of this argument, cf. section 4.1.3.

¹¹⁹This concessive construction is much clearer in NVTṬ 115,8–10 : *na ca śabda-pratyakṣayor vastugocaratve saty api pratyayābhedah, kāraṇabhedena pāroḥṣyāpāro-ḥṣyabhedopapatteh.*

¹²⁰The different causes referred to here are probably the two types of cognitions that, according to Vācaspati, apprehend the same real object, i.e., perception and conceptual cognitions.

¹²¹In the *dvandva* compound *vidhiniṣedha*, *vidhi* is not used in the technical sense of “positive element.” Cf. the argumentation in § 48, where *vidhiniṣedha* appears alongside *vidhi* in its technical sense.

nature.¹²² For if this [thing] really exists, [the expression] “it exists” is useless and [the expression] “it does not exist” is impossible. But if [it] does not really exist, [the expression] “it does not exist” is useless and [the expression] “it does exist” is impossible. But [there] is the usage of the words “is” etc. Therefore, the fact that the appearance of a verbal [cognition] is common to [both] the presence and absence of an external referent does not allow that this [external referent should] be the object [of verbal cognitions].¹²³

1.7.4.1 § 23. And what Vācaspati uttered, right after having announced the fact [that] that which is to be denoted is an individual thing possessing a genus¹²⁴ with his very own words, [namely]: “And that a genus, [which is] a word’s referent, is common to the presence and absence [of an external object] is not impossible, since this [genus], insofar as it, although permanent by its own nature, becomes common to presence and absence by being based on many individual things scattered in space and time, is fit for a connection [to] “it is” and “it is not”. For the connectedness to a present individual thing is the state “it is” for a genus, and the connectedness to past and future individual things is the state “it is not”. Thus, because [the reason’s] negative concomitance is doubtful, [the reason] “commonness to the presence and absence” [of an external object] is [either] ambiguous or established in a different way.”¹²⁵ that is not to the point. To the

¹²²I.e., if a word made a particular known (as perception does), every statement about a thing would be either impossible or superfluous: e.g. “A cow exists.” is a pointless statement if the word “cow” made a particular, and therefore existing, cow known. Conversely, the statement “A cow does not exist.” would be impossible (or at least nonsense), if the word “cow” here would refer to an existing, particular cow.

¹²³The obvious fact that words can refer to their objects irrespective of the objects’ existence was an important concern already for Bhartṛhari: cf. Houben 1995: 257 ff., and Ogawa 1999: 275 (esp. n. 17), where Bhartṛhari’s explanation of secondary or mental existence (*upacārasattā*) is given. As noted by Frauwallner (1937: 262, n. 2), the discussion here and in the following paragraph is very similar to DhAP 241,11–242,6 (trl. Frauwallner 1937: 262 f.).

¹²⁴Cf. § 9.

¹²⁵Cf. section 4.1.4 for the inference that Vācaspati is discussing here.

extent [of what has been said there is], first of all, no damage to what has been put forth [by us], because by laying (*nyasyat*) the burden on the genus [Vācaspati] has himself accepted the fact that the particular is not what is to be designated [by words]. Furthermore, in every case the state “it is” etc. of a word’s referent is considered only according to the nature proper to the particular. But [this statement]: “But the genus’s connection to present etc. individual things [is considered to be] the state “it is” etc.” [is] a trick for a child. In the same manner, there is an error also in [thinking a word] denotes an individual thing possessing a genus. If a cognition is established because of an individual thing, [then] an additional universal¹²⁶ may be cognized or not; but there is no liberation from the error [that there is] a cognition of an individual thing.

§ 24. Due to this [explanation], what is said by the Kumārīlites:¹²⁷ “It is only because of a thing’s having parts that there is no error in [a permanent universal] being common [to present and absent things]. For treeness, unspecified as to presence or absence, is understood from [some] word. It is connected with one or the other of these [properties, presence or absence, either of] which is understood through another word.”¹²⁸ is also false, because, when there is a cognition of a permanent universal, it is not possible that the state of [its] presence [or] absence is not specified. D.11.7.4-5

§ 25. And also this [statement by the opponent]: “But the way of words to cause the apprehension of referents is not like [the way] of perception, so that there would not be a requirement of the words ‘is’ etc. as in the case of an [object] observed by this [perception], because the means of valid cognition have different capacities.”, has D.11.8

¹²⁶This repeats the point of § 9.

¹²⁷Acc. to Kataoka 2009: 496, Kaumārīla refers to Sucaritamiśra. Cf. Biardeau 1964: 164 ff. for a consideration of Śabara’s ideas concerning the relationship between a thing, its parts, and the denotation of words.

¹²⁸Cf. section 4.1.5 for some material on this position.

been falsified by the falsification¹²⁹ of different appearances, when two appearances, perceptual and verbal, grasp one and the same nature. And [the requirement] that there are diverse capacities of the means of valid cognition is achieved even by direct perception and determination.¹³⁰ Therefore, if the object of perception were made known through verbal [cognition], there would be an appearance in exactly the same way [as for perception]. And something non-existing does not tolerate being made known as an object of this[, i.e., of perception].

D.11.11 § 26. If [an opponent asks:] “Is it not [the case that], when the part “treeness” has been indicated by the word “tree”, the words “is” etc. are applied for the purpose of ascertaining [other] parts, [like] existence etc.?”, then [we answer:] “What opportunity [could there be] for an affirmation or negation of another property through another word or another means of valid cognition for a particular that is, since it is partless, completely comprehended by perception?¹³¹ If [an opponent says:] “Even in [the case of] perception, the requirement of a different means of valid cognition is observed.”, [we answer that] that may be [the case] when a [thing’s] own form that has not been repeatedly experienced is the object, because this [perception] does not have the

¹²⁹Cf. the discussion in § 20.

¹³⁰Ratnakīrti is here rephrasing his model, *tad asyāpi vicitraśaktitvaṃ pramānānāṃ vastusvarūpānubhavādhyavasāyamātrakṛtam eva* (AP 213,7). McCrea and Patil (2010: 68) translate: “Thus even for him, the notion that the modes of valid awareness have different capacities is produced merely by the determination that one has experienced the form of a real thing.” This interpretation is not possible for Ratnakīrti’s text, which suggests that we should understand Jñānaśrīmitra to be saying that the difference in capacities is produced merely by an experience of the form of a real thing and determination. Akamatsu (1983: 90) understands the AP in a third way, translating: “...est produit par la seule [différence entre l’]expérience immédiate ...et la détermination conceptuelle ...par rapport à la nature propre de l’objet existant”

¹³¹As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 223 f., n. 119 this argument is found in PV I 43, cf. appendix A.1.2.

nature of ascertainment.¹³² But what [use] would another [means of valid cognition] be where a conceptual [cognition], itself of the nature of ascertainment, [is] grasping [a real, partless thing]? But there is a requirement for another word and a logical mark. Therefore, a real thing's own form is not grasped [by a conceptual cognition].

§ 27. [Opponent:] Are properties such as a genus etc. not different from each other and from the property bearers?¹³³ So in the case of a tree, although cognized by means of a single property that has the character of a genus, there is no cognition [of it] as possessing other properties. Therefore, why shouldn't [there be] a cognition-dependent

D.12.1

¹³²In the tradition following Dignāga, perception itself does not ascertain its object (cf., e.g., the programmatic statements in Hattori 1968: 25–27, p. 36 (III.Bc–1), and see McCrea and Patil 2006: 318 ff. for a concise review of research on this matter), insofar as “ascertainment” (*niścaya*) is synonymous with determination (*adhyavasāya*). Ratnakīrti is here referring to habituated perceptions, which are discussed in PVSV 27,15 ff. and PVSV 32,5–12, passages closely analysed in Kellner 2004: 11–29 (see especially Kellner 2004: 26 for a note on Jñānaśrīmitra's view of habituation and inference). So Ratnakīrti's statement must not be understood as implying that when an object *is* familiar, perception itself does ascertain it (which one might conclude from the translation by McCrea and Patil (2010: 69) of Jñānaśrīmitra's model for this statement: “...since even perception is not decisive in the case of an object whose form we are not accustomed to.”). It is only a conceptual awareness event that can ascertain something. This also finds support in the phrase “*svayam niścayātmako*”, qualifying conceptual cognition in the next sentence, because it suggests that it is opposed (*tu*) to perception in so far as it has the nature of ascertaining something of its own accord (*svayam*), i.e., without an additional (ascertaining) means of cognition. For the difference of this position to Kumāri's, cf. J. A. Taber 1998a: 96–101. The Naiyāyika's position is discussed in Matilal 1986: 330 ff. Vācaspatimiśra's discussion of perception as ascertaining its object is found in NVTṬ 107,8–117,6 (a passage translated, or at least paraphrased, in the pioneering work, Stcherbatsky 1994 2, 257–298). McAllister (forthcoming a) investigates Prajñākaragupta's treatment of the relation between inference, perception, and habituation.

¹³³As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 224, n. 121, cf. PVSV 29,7 ff. for a discussion of the same objection (appendix A.1.4). The opponents there are Naiyāyikas or Vaiśeṣikas or both (cf. footnote 453). The relation between the separated *dharma* and *dharmin* is called *samavāya*. Cf. Halbfass 1992: 147 ff. for a short characterization of this concept.

on different expressions—of another property [of a tree], like its being green, swaying, being quite tall etc.? [Proponent:] Precisely this is unsuitable, because a perceivable difference of property and property bearer is refuted by perception, since in perception a particular with an indivisible nature appears.¹³⁴ Otherwise there is the overreaching consequence that everything would be everywhere.¹³⁵ But that the everyday activity [concerned with] properties and property bearers has [its] basis in a conceptual difference, is well established in the treatise.¹³⁶

D.12.4 § 28. Alternatively, may the difference of property and property bearer be real, nevertheless [their] contact is to be assumed [by

¹³⁴Cf. PV I 43 (and Frauwallner 1932: 249 f., as well as the trl. on page 280).

¹³⁵This unwanted consequence is not clear. “Otherwise” can be taken as “if a particular separable into parts such as treeness, height, swaying, etc., appeared in perception.” In this case, where an instance of treeness appears as separated from an instance of height, etc., we could probably not say which particular tree these various properties belonged to, and so they might be said to occur everywhere. If, on the other hand, “otherwise” means that the refutation of a difference between property and property bearer by perception could be wrong, then it could be understood that anything that is cognized by perception could be wrong, so that a tree appearing to be in some place might as well be somewhere else. (This last explanation was suggested by Parimal Patil.) Finally, *anyathā* could just be referring to the general principle that if something refuted by perception could be true, anything could be said to be anywhere, since we would have lost a basic tool for verifying the truth of a statement against reality.

¹³⁶Cf. PVSV 2,21–3,1: *na. dharmabhedaparikalpanād iti vakṣyāmaḥ. tathā cāha—sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmibhedaneti.* (Trl.: “No, [the proving property and the property to be proven are not identical], because a difference of properties is conceptually constructed. We will explain this [below]. In the same way, [Dignāga] said: all this everyday activity [concerned with] inference and that to be inferred is due to a difference of property and property bearer which is founded [only] in awareness.”) This passage is also found in PVin II 56,12–57,1. As noted in Steinkellner 2007: n. to 56,13 f., Dharmakīrti is invoking Dignāga as the authority here: “*tathā cāha ...*”. For other translations of this passage, see Steinkellner 1979: 45 and Steinkellner 2013: I.7 f. Note also that acc. to Gnoli (1960: 189, n. to p. 2, l. 22), *iti vakṣyāmaḥ* refers to the *apoha* section. PVSV 32–35 is particularly relevant in this context, see below appendix A.1.5 and appendix A.1.6. Cf. also PVSVT 143,15–16 (see footnote 475).

you] only as one of assistance, because [other types of contact such as] inherence etc. between them have been falsified.¹³⁷ And so, in the same way as, when a property bearer is cognized through perception, a complete cognition of its properties [arises] through the [simultaneous] contact [of these properties] with the sense faculties, so, when a property bearer is cognized through a word or a logical mark, which are [both] connected [to their object] by a connection such as denoted and denoting etc.,¹³⁸ a complete cognition of its properties [would arise], because there is no difference in contact as such.

§ 29. What Vācaspati [said]: “But if that [real thing] is grasped [which is] qualified by [what a Buddhist opponent calls] a single D.12.4.3

¹³⁷Cf. the comments in section section 4.1.6. In § 38, Ratnakīrti says that inherence is not possible, and then reproduces KBhV 70,13–14 (corresponds to § 39).

As shown by Akamatsu (1983: 229 ff., n. 129), this and the following passage (§§ 27–29) closely follow the arguments in PV I 46 and PV I 52cd–55 (cf. trl. on page 283 and appendix A.1.4, respectively). PV I 52cd, where the unwanted consequence under discussion is introduced under the hypothetical assumption that there really is a difference between properties and their bearers, cf. the phrase that starts the auto-commentary on PV I 52cd, PVSV 29,12 ff.: *yady apy upādhayo bhinnā eva* (For a trl. of this passage, cf. appendix A.1.4). The opponent in Jñānaśrīmitra’s text argues that Dharmakīrti has stated that there is no difference between a capacity to support an attribute and the thing which has that capacity (probably PVSV 29,13–16, cf. appendix A.1.4 for a trl.). The opponent’s point is that there would be a contradiction to the hypothetical acceptance of a difference. But Jñānaśrīmitra simply says that this point is not touched on by this discussion.

¹³⁸In the case of the logical mark, the connection would be between a logical mark (*liṅga*), such as having smoke or being a *śiṃśapā*, and the *pakṣa* (or *liṅgin*), something qualified by the logical mark, such as a mountain or a tree. Note that this amounts to an equation of the relation of both *vācya-vācaka* and *liṅga-liṅgin* with the relation of *dharma-dharmin* in the following respect: knowledge of a denoter (*vācaka*) or a logical mark (*liṅga*), like that of a *dharma*, cannot be had without knowledge of the denoted (*vācya*) or that having the logical mark (*liṅgin*), which thus resemble the property bearer *dharmin*. This equation is, of course, an unwanted consequence (*prasāṅga*), because it is formulated under the unaccepted assumption that this relation is real, i.e., that the relata really exist as relata. It is only on the theory that a word and a logical mark do not refer to or designate any real thing that this consequence does not arise.

additional attribute,¹³⁹ [e.g.,] existence, then there is no grasping of it as qualified by other additional attributes. For the nature of a substance is characterized through additional attributes, but neither the additional attributes nor the state of being qualified [by them is] its nature.”, that, too, simply flows away. For the grasping of the other additional attributes does not follow from a non-difference, since a grasping of that which is assisted when that assisting [it] is grasped follows only after [their] difference has been presupposed. And it is not appropriate to imagine, as [it is] in the case of the cause and effect relation of fire and smoke, that a cognition is limited to a property and property bearer only due to [their] own nature, because neither is established by a means of valid cognition.¹⁴⁰ And the rule [is] that [only] when [something] is established by a means of valid cognition [is there] a depiction of [a thing’s] nature.¹⁴¹

.12.4.6 § 30. And what the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* said about this, [namely:] “If [such a thing as] the sun and so on is grasped, there is the consequence of grasping the multitude of all [other] things assisted by it[, i.e., the sun etc.]”¹⁴² that is the result of not fathoming the intent [of what was said by Dharmakīrti]. For it is so: in your opinion, [there is] a difference of property and property bearer, and [their] contact [is]

¹³⁹See section 4.1.7, page 147, for some explanations of the term *upādhi*, and the justification for the translation presented here.

¹⁴⁰For fire and smoke, the cause-effect relation is ultimately established to result from their nature. For the property and its bearer, this is not the case: they are just helpful constructions (insofar as they make everyday activity possible), but they do not reflect reality. The key to the argument presented here is *svabhāva*: the relation between property and its bearer does not follow from the nature of the things involved, but is only imagined. Even though what Vācaspatimiśra claims is true—namely that neither the additional attributes nor their qualifying a material thing constitute that thing’s nature—it is true only once one has admitted a difference between properties and their bearers. Thus, whereas the distinction of cause and effect holds in reality, this distinction does not.

¹⁴¹Cf. section 4.1.8, page 152.

¹⁴²In this unwanted consequence, the sun is what *assists* the cognition of all other objects, i.e., those *assisted* by the sun, because a person sees things by the light, or assistance, of the sun. Cf. the translation of the passage in section 4.1.9.

only characterized as assistance.¹⁴³ When the assisting [thing] is grasped, the grasping of the assisted [thing] at that time follows only [for an assisted thing that has] the same place and only [when it has] the nature of a property [of the assisting thing]. Therefore, how would the unwanted consequence ensue that one would grasp [everything that is] assisted by the sun, [everything, that is,] which, being either in a different place or being a different substance, has been observed to deviate [from being grasped when the sun is grasped]?¹⁴⁴

§ 31. Therefore, since [a thing] would be cognized with its whole nature if the nature of a real thing were apprehended, even by means of [only] one property, what opportunity of an affirmation or negation by another word [could there be]? But [there] is [this opportunity]. Therefore it is established that a particular does not appear because of a word, a concept, or a logical mark. D.13

§ 32. Neither does a universal appear in a verbal apprehension. Because of a word such as “cow” etc. in [the sentence] “Cows are grazing on the other side of the river.” there appear dewlap, horn, tail etc. [which are] accompanied by the forms of letters, [and which are] mostly lumped together because of the disregard for the differences between [things] of the same genus.¹⁴⁵ But exactly this is not a E.1

¹⁴³This was stated above, § 28.

¹⁴⁴Dharmakīrti’s argument, according to this interpretation, was only valid for *dharma* and *dharmin* relations, which have to fulfill two criteria: first, the relata must be in contact with each other. Second, they must be properties of the same substance. The relation between objects in daylight and the light of the sun is therefore not a proper relation of *upakāra* and *upakārya*, since the sun illuminates things at a great distance and these things are not properties of the sun.

¹⁴⁵What is cognized from the word “cow” would thus appear to contain an indistinct image of a cow, in the sense that all the parts that a speaker associates with cows appear in it but in a way that obfuscates the particular characteristics that these parts have in every instance. A related notion is already mentioned by Dharmakīrti: PV I 4.23–24: “yathā gaur ayam sāsñādisamudāyātmakatvād iti.” (Like [the inference] “This is a cow because it has the nature of an aggregate of dewlap and so on.”) See Steinkellner 2013: I.12 for a translation of this comparison in its context. PV III 225cd: “na hi gopratyayo drṣṭaḥ sāsñādīnām adarśane/” (For a cognition of a cow is not observed without observing a dewlap and so on.)

universal.

§ 33. For [the universal] “cowness” is proclaimed to be devoid of the forms of colour, shape, and letters.¹⁴⁶

E.1.3 § 34. And precisely this mere¹⁴⁷ dewlap, horn etc., in being identified with the particular, though completely different in every individual thing, is called a universal. Because such an external [object] is not obtained, this [is] only an error, like the appearance of hair.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, may [such an error] either be this unfolding¹⁴⁹ only of the mind itself, which has the nature of this [universal] by virtue of the impressions [left in the mind by previous experiences], or may [something] completely non-existent with the form of this [universal] appear, or may the individual things themselves appear in some other way through a disregard of the differences to that of the same genus, because [differences amongst things] are hidden from experience, or may [such an error] be considered a deprivation of memory.¹⁵⁰ In all [of these] ways, this cognition of a universal is truly without an object. [So] where [is there] news of a universal?

E.1.7 § 35. What is said [as an objection] again,¹⁵¹ [namely] that if a universal is non-existent, [then] the universal’s cognition is accidental, is wrong. For a causal complex, which, enriched by the assisting

¹⁴⁶Cf. section 4.1.10 for a discussion of this verse.

¹⁴⁷For the import of “mere” (*mātra*) here, cf. footnote 193.

¹⁴⁸This is one of the standard symptoms of a person suffering from an eye-disorder called *timira* that causes perceptual errors. Cf. Chu 2004: 131 ff. and MacDonald 2015: II, 111 f., n. 228 for further information on *timira*.

¹⁴⁹Cf. the characterization of this term in the context of the Vedāntin’s error theory, Schmithausen 1965: 102: “...d. h. der eine Geist nimmt die ihm fremde unwirkliche Gestalt einer Mannigfaltigkeit an, ohne dabei sein Wesen zu verlieren”

¹⁵⁰Cf. section 4.1.11 for more details on these forms of error.

¹⁵¹Cf. section 4.1.13 for who might have said this.

cause of recollecting an observation of an earlier material object,¹⁵² generates a particular apprehension,¹⁵³ gives rise to a conceptual [cognition] of a universal that is without a [real] object. In this way,

¹⁵²An observation of a material entity was stated to be a prerequisite for conventional agreement, cf. l. 73, p. 52 (trl. § 12). Here Ratnakīrti makes the point that it is on the basis of a complex of causes, supported by a recollection of such an observation, that a conceptual cognition of a “universal” (or non-difference, *abheda*, *aviśeṣa*) is produced.

Generally, a *sāmagrī* is a set of factors that causes a particular effect. The causal complex of perceptual cognitions has been treated very thoroughly by Steinkellner (1967: 45; 121–125, nn. 27, 28) (corresponding to HB b.12214), as well as by Kellner (1999: 197 ff.). The causal complex governing conceptual cognitions is less clear. Perceptual judgement, a conceptual cognition following a perception, is treated by Dharmakīrti in PVSV 31,26–32,12 (see Kellner 2004: 19–32 for an excellent interpretation).

Though not discussed in great detail by Ratnakīrti, the causal complex referred to here could consist in what appears on hearing the word “cow” in a sentence, as described in § 32: it conjures up a generalized shape of cows, and is accompanied by the sounds of the letters that make up the word “cow”.

This position is rather similar to Dharmakīrti’s explanations of the interplay of memory, convention, and real things: cf., e.g., the discussion following PV I 64 (trl. appendix A.1.6), PVSV 54,12–14 (translated and referred to in Akamatsu 1983: 247, n. 164 in this context), and see also PV I 72 and commentary (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 344 f.), PVSV 42,13–22 (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 346 f.), and PVSV 82,4–22 (trl. appendix A.1.11).

¹⁵³AS₁ and AS₂, as well as all the mss available to me, read °*mānāviśeṣa*°. °*mānaviśeṣa*° in AS₃ is therefore probably a misprint. There are three ways of analysing this compound: °*mānā vi*°, °*mānā ’vi*°, and °*māna-avi*°, respectively. This could be understood either as translated above, or as “a causal complex, which, enriched by the assisting cause ..., generates a non-specific apprehension,” or as “a causal complex, which generates a non-specific apprehension that is enriched by the assisting cause.” The differences concern two points: what is enriched by memory, the conceptual cognition or its set of causes, and what is engendered by the causal complex mentioned—a *viśeṣapratyaya* or an *aviśeṣapratyaya*?

The first option yields the best sense. Concerning point one, memory—as an additional cause (*sahakārin*)—is more likely to be one condition in the set responsible for a conceptual cognition than a part of conceptual cognition itself; and, concerning point two, *viśeṣapratyaya* (a certain/specific apprehension) seems to be the right option, since it is what Ratnakīrti is trying to prove here: that a cognition is not arbitrary, but specific insofar as it is bound to a certain set of causes and therefore is “of” only certain objects.

therefore, a genus appears neither in a verbal apprehension nor in perception.¹⁵⁴

E.2 § 36. Neither is [a genus] established inferentially, because a connected logical mark cannot be observed when [what is to be proven, the genus,] is unobservable.¹⁵⁵ Neither is this [genus] established like a sense faculty, because from the effect, which is a cognition, only an occasional, other reason is established.¹⁵⁶ Even if [someone] pointed out that, in [the case of] another material object or an intermediate space [between cows], the cognition of a cow is absent, then how should the absence of the cognition of a cow, [insofar as it] arises from the absence only of all material cow entities, such as flecked ones etc., depend on another object[, i.e., a genus]?¹⁵⁷ [Opponent:] Now, [it is] only because of cowness [that there is] a material cow entity, otherwise even a horse would be a material cow entity. [Proponent:] If so, [then it is] only because of the material cow entity [that there is] cowness, otherwise even horseness would be cowness. Therefore

¹⁵⁴ Cf. the notes in section 4.1.13.

¹⁵⁵ The inference considered here aims to prove a genus (*sādhya*). Neither the reason (*hetu*) nor the locus (*pakṣa*) of the inference are specified. The counter-argument is that if a genus is not observable, it cannot be proven that it is connected to the *hetu* in the first place. Given that an effect of the genus is used as a reason, as supposed in the next sentence, this argument would appeal to the impossibility of establishing the cause-effect relation between a genus and a cognition (or all its other effects). Cf. Mimaki 1976: 292, n. 321 for a concise summary of Ratnakīrti's opinion in this matter. As Patil (2011b: 24, n. 101) notes, "...the inference of other minds (*santānāntara*) and of the functioning of our sense faculties (*indriya*) ..." are instances where Ratnakīrti accepts that even though that which should be established is invisible, a *vyāpti* can be established.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. section 4.1.12 for some remarks on this argument.

¹⁵⁷ The problem of whether a genus is omnipresent (*sarvagata*), so that it might occur both in the space between its manifestations and also in other entities, is also discussed in NBhV 303,6–10 (cf. Potter 1977: 325 for a summary), and ŚV Āv 25. Both of these passages are quoted by Karṇakagomin, *ad* PVSV 76,25–77,4 (cf. the references in section 4.1.13). See also Potter 1977: 139–140 for a short sketch of the various positions held by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors in this matter, and below footnote 280.

the material cow entity [is due] solely to a succession of causes.¹⁵⁸ Cowness, however, may exist or not.

§ 37. [Opponent:] Is it not [the case that], if the capacity to generate a universal's apprehension is not different from one material entity, then another material entity, which is [also] excluded from that of another genus, [would be] incapable [of generating that cognition]? But [if this capacity is] different [from the material entity], then this is the universal, [and there is] at most a dispute concerning the name. [Proponent:] This capacity is certainly not different to the real thing. But what kind of error should arise if there is a [being] that is also like another being [in terms of] having a [certain] capable nature? In the way that for you one genus is the cause of creating a term common [to multiple individual things], as well as another [genus], is [such a cause] just by its nature, independently of other genera, in that way, for us, an individual thing too, [insofar as it is also] independent of genera [and] differentiated [from other particulars] only through its own form, [is] the cause [of such a common term].¹⁵⁹

E.2.2

¹⁵⁸Cf. ll. 65 ff. in § 11, where a causal chain such as this is also mentioned as a reason for a thing's differentiation from other things.

¹⁵⁹This paragraph, giving only a very general argument, draws on many of the central ideas of the *apoha* theory as developed by Dharmakīrti:

- that a capacity is not different from the particular having that capacity is argued for in PV I 54 (cf. the trl. on page 289);
- that many particulars have a non-different capacity *śakti*, one of which is to cause the same cognition, is discussed in PV I 73 ff. (cf. Dunne 2004: 343 ff.), PV I 109 (referred to and translated by Akamatsu (1983: 248, n. 170); cf. the trl. on page 302), and PV III 163cd–164 (cf. the trl. on page 321);
- that particulars are essentially different from each other is introduced at the beginning of Dharmakīrti's discussion of *apoha* in PV I 40–42 (cf. appendix A.1.1).

The two beliefs that are ascribed to the opponent are the Nyāya positions that the genus is the cause of what is the same (see footnote 286) and that it does so independently of any other *jāti*. This latter notion might be linked to the fact that universals cannot qualify each other (cf. Halbfass 1970: 143): this implies that any

E.2.4 § 38. But what Trilocana¹⁶⁰ [said is this]: “Inherence of specific universals like horseness, cowness etc. in [their] own [respective] bases [is] the cause for both an appellation and apprehension as ‘A universal, a universal.’”¹⁶¹ [Proponent:] If in such a way this very cause for such appellations and cognitions exists in the particulars too, [then] what [use is your] obsession with [making us] admit a universal? Moreover, inherence is not possible [either]:

§ 39. Inherence should be established because of the awareness “[something is] in here”, and the thought “in here” [should exist] when one observes two [things, where one is in the other].

But in no object of that [cognition] is there a perception of a pair. Therefore an agreement [to inherence] is merely [one’s] personal fancy.¹⁶²

E.2.7 § 40. Through this [verse, this following] speculation¹⁶³ of his¹⁶⁴ is cognition of sameness which is dependent on a universal is dependent on only one universal.

¹⁶⁰Trilocana’s texts have been lost. For more information about this Naiyāyika author, who was a teacher of Vācaspatimīśra, cf. Potter 1977: 396 ff., Solomon 1980, and Aklujkar 1999.

¹⁶¹Oberhammer reads according to JNĀ and ms. P, translating: “Das Inhären der besonderen Gemeinsamkeiten wie Pferdum, Kuhtum etc. in dem jeweiligen Substrat ist die Ursache für das Benennen und Erkennen der Gemeinsamkeit.” (Oberhammer 1964: 144, n. 47) He makes no comment about the reading “*sāmānyam sāmānyam iti*”. The repetition is in all likelihood the correct reading: the skipping of a repeated word is an error that can easily be repeated by independent scribes, and is the cause for the readings found in P and AP. In the AP 223,18–19, the repeated word is even found in a subsequent reuse of this phrase in Jñānaśrīmitra’s answer. The argument also makes good sense: Cowness, horseness, and so on are each a cause for a corresponding cognition. The resulting cognitions are, according to Trilocana, repeated cognitions in the sense that they have the inherence of the same universal in (at least two) particular things as their cause. So for both things the same judgement arises: “This is the universal cowness, that is the universal cowness.”

¹⁶²This verse is in the *upendravajrā* metre (as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 4), and in all likelihood originally from Jñānaśrī. For inherence as assumed by Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika authors, cf. the explanations in Dravid 1972: 19 ff., and the notes in section 4.1.6.

rejected: “How can this consistency of apprehensions, which accords to a consistent thing, exist where there are completely different individual things that [would] concur [only] with the presence of apprehensions of objects differentiated [from each other]?”¹⁶⁵ because [a] consistent apprehension deviates [also] in the case of the genera themselves, [insofar as they] are particularised due to being differentiated from each other.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³The masculine form *ūha* in AP 222,24 does not correspond to JNĀ_{ms} 17a5, which reads *ūhā*. This feminine form exists according to PW I: 1036, so a text emendation seems unnecessary here.

¹⁶⁴Since no new opponent has been introduced following § 38, this passage is most likely taken from one of Trilocana’s texts as well.

¹⁶⁵The formulation here differs from that in the corresponding passage in AP 222,24, *vyāvrttapratyayaviśayabhāvānupātiniṣu*, which McCrea and Patil 2010: 83 translate (in context) as: “...in individuals, which are absolutely distinct and fall within the scope of differentiated awarenesses.” In this case, the awarenesses are differentiated, whereas for Ratnakīrti the objects are what is primarily differentiated. The argument does not appear to change much, since different objects will cause different cognitions.

This passage is strongly reminiscent of NBh on NSū_{Th} 2.2.69 (*samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ*. Trl.: “A genus has the nature of producing the same.”), NBh: *yā samānām buddhiṃ prasūte bhinneṣu adhikaraṇeṣu, yayā ca bahūnītaretarato na vyāvartante, yo ’rtho ’nekatra pratyayānūvrttinimittam tat sāmānyam. yac ca keṣāñcid abhedaṃ karoti, kutaścid bhedaṃ, tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātir iti*. (“Which [genus] produces the same awareness for different foundations, [and] by which [genus] multiple [things] differentiate [themselves] from each other, [and] which object is the cause of a consistency of cognitions for more than one [thing], that is the universal. And what causes a non-difference of some [things], [and their] difference from some [things], that is the specific universal, the genus.”) Cf. also the explanations in Halfass 1992: 120 ff.

¹⁶⁶The logical error seems to be as follows (see also Akamatsu 1983: 248 f., n. 175): Trilocana thinks that the repeated occurrence of the same cognition for multiple particulars of the same genus cannot occur without a thing that in some way consists as the same, i.e., without a universal or the different individual and temporally extended things with the same universal inhering in them. Since the cognition is dependent on these particulars as its cause, it establishes them. In other words, they are the *sādhya* of the inference in the background of this passage. But, as Ratnakīrti suggests, even the genera themselves are differentiated from each other, since they are “particularized” or, literally, “enter into the manifestations”. Therefore the logical reason that Trilocana professes, the consistency of certain cognitions, goes

E.2.9 § 41. What is again formulated as a [valid cognition] falsifying [the consistency of cognition] in the opposite case by him,¹⁶⁷ [i.e.,] “A consistency of appellation and apprehension, [insofar as] it exists only in some [cases] whilst being absent from some [others], has a cause, but there is no other cause [except a consistent real thing].” and so on, is not correct, since, even without a consistent [thing], it has been established¹⁶⁸ that the consistency of appellations and cognitions is [to be] necessarily accepted because of the specificity of [a thing’s] own nature, which is differentiated from that of another form. Therefore:

astray or deviates: even in Trilocana’s theory, a repetition of cognitions is not a sure sign of a genus that remains the same throughout all cognitive events, because a genus in fact becomes differentiated when it enters into multiple particulars. And, the unspoken conclusion is, if differentiated things can thus cause similar cognitions, why not the particulars too, without any intermediary genera?

The interpretation of *anuvṛtti* and *anuvṛtta* here is not without its problems. Patil (2011b: 14), as well as McCrea and Patil (2010: 83) (translating AP 222,23–25), use recurrence. Another interpretation, that as “conformity”, is suggested by Akamatsu 1983: 124 f., and has the advantage of highlighting the fact that the recurrence follows or corresponds to the presence of the genus.

¹⁶⁷Presumably this is still Trilocana. The full formulation of the logical error Ratnakīrti is defending against here is *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*. Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 116 f. for more information, and Akamatsu 1983: 248 f., n. 175 for a lucid assessment of the logical structure based on Jñānaśrīmitra’s model for this passage. Acc. to Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 116 f., n. 310, it is supposed to establish the pervasion of a separate inference by disproving other possibilities. Trilocana, as mentioned above (footnote 166), wishes to prove that a cognition of sameness is caused by, and so can prove, the sameness of its objects. Here he argues that, in the case opposite to the one he wants to prove, i.e., in the case that there are no things that stay the same due to a genus, the reason of his inference, the consistency of cognition, is not possible (or is eliminated). In this way, the fact that cognitions conform to their objects is a valid reason for inferring its only cause, a conforming thing.

¹⁶⁸Ratnakīrti has argued that the non-existence of a universal does not mean that cognitions of a universal are random (§ 35), and that particulars differentiated by their own nature are able to cause a cognition of sameness (§ 37). Together, these arguments might account for the present statement that the conformity of appellations and cognitions must be accepted on the basis of the specific characteristics of particulars alone.

§ 42. By which contact a genus spreads out into something, when [there is] the same difference [of things], but not into others, that [contact] alone should be the cause of both words and cognitions.¹⁶⁹

§ 43. Furthermore, what is said about this [verse]¹⁷⁰ in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: “[What the verse says is wrong,] because it is not like this: by which contact [such things as] a stick, a string etc. extend somewhere [but] not elsewhere, that contact alone [instead of the stick, string, etc.] should be the cause of the everyday activity [concerned with] ‘something with a stick’, ‘something on a string’ etc. in cases of a man [carrying a stick], crystals [on a string] etc. [So] what use is the [actual] stick, string etc.?” is wrong, because the intention [of this verse, correctly given as follows,] was not understood [in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa]: “For it is not denied that both a stick and a string, connected to a man and a crystal, [and] observed [as such], are the reason for the apprehension of [something] having a stick or being on a string. But a universal is not observed even in a dream. Therefore, if this [universal] is [in any case only] to be imagined, then preferably only contact should be imagined as the reason for the apprehension of a universal. [But] what is the use of a fraught assumption [like this]?”

E.2.11

§ 44. [Opponent:] Now this inference demonstrating a universal is set forth: That, which is a cognition of [something] that is qualified, [is] inseparable from the grasping of the qualifier, such as the cognition of “having a stick” [in the case of someone carrying a stick]. And this is a cognition of [something] that is qualified: “This is a cow”. In fact, [this is] an effect-reason. For the cognition of [something] qualified, which is established in the example, is an effect

E.2.13

¹⁶⁹This verse is PV I 162 (cf. the trl. on page 316), where it also follows a discussion about the causes of cognitions and designations.

¹⁷⁰NBhūṣ 261,5–7, quoted here, is a direct reply to PV I 162, which is quoted at NBhūṣ 261,3–4.

of the experience of the qualifier.¹⁷¹ [Proponent:] With regard to this [inference, there is] a question: should it prove that an awareness of what is qualified is inseparable from the grasping of a qualifier that is different [from what it qualifies], or [should it prove] that [this awareness] is inseparable from the experience of a qualifier as such?

2.14.3 § 45. In the first case, the falsification of the instance [that the inference is about] through perception does not provide an opportunity for attention towards the proving [element, the reason], because there is no appearance of the two[, i.e., a qualified thing and that qualifying it,] in a perception grasping a real thing.¹⁷² And that there is an awareness of [something] qualified is common [to various cases of cognition]. [So] the reason is ambiguous, because [a cognition of something qualified is] observed also without grasping a differentiated qualifier, as “A pot has its own form.”, or “Cowness [is] a universal.”¹⁷³

¹⁷¹The elements used in this inference are as follows: The *pakṣa*, or locus of the inference, is cognition. The *hetu*, reason, is that the cognition is of something that is qualified, which simply means that the object that is known in a cognition is specified in some way. The *sādhya*, which is what is to be proven, is that this cognition of something qualified implies an apprehension of that which qualifies its object—on a realist account, a universal. The example, *dr̥ṣṭānta*, is the cognition of a person carrying a stick, which implies that there be the cognition of the stick. The reason used in this inference is a so-called effect reason, *kāryahetu*, i.e., the reason (cognition of something qualified) is an effect of what is to be established (grasping of a qualifier). This is one of three types of reasons that are admissible according to Buddhist logicians in the tradition of Dharmakīrti (cf. the explanations in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 72 ff.).

¹⁷²Meaning we do not apprehend the universal cowness in the perception of a specific cow. And since there is no cognition of both a qualified thing and its qualifier, it is no use paying any attention to the reason. For the exemplary inference from “smoke on a mountain” to “fire on a mountain”, the corresponding argument would be that the “mountain qualified by smoke” is shown not to exist, so that the inference becomes futile. For Ratnakīrti’s stance on the relation of qualifier and qualified, cf. the argument in § 27.

¹⁷³These examples show that it is possible to have a cognition of something that is qualified without grasping a qualifier that is different from the thing: a pot is not different from its own form, and cowness is not different from the universal that it is. Since it is therefore possible that a qualified cognition (*hetu*) can occur independently of a separate qualifier (*sādhya*), the reason is ambiguous, *anaikāntika*.

§ 46. But in the second case [there is an] establishing of what is [already] established, because, in accepting a difference imagined as “A material entity possesses the genus cowness.” in the same way as [one thinks] “A pot has its own form.”, a relation of qualifier and qualified is postulated [even by us],¹⁷⁴ since everyday activity [such as] “This is a cow.” comes about due to an experience of that differentiated from non-cow. E.2.14.4

§ 47. Thus, a universal is not established in this way. And the [valid cognition] falsifying the circle of additional attributes like universal, property, action etc.,¹⁷⁵ [is] a sharpened perception grasping a bare particular, or the fully established non-apprehension of what is [usually] observable.¹⁷⁶ E.2.15

§ 48. Thus, in this way,¹⁷⁷ only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [positive element] is meant [to be] the external object and the form in awareness.¹⁷⁸ Amongst these, the form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated, neither in reality nor conventionally, because [this form] is to be cognized [only] through the perception self-awareness¹⁷⁹ and is not determined. The external object is not affirmed or negated in reality either, because it does not appear in verbal apprehensions. Precisely for this [reason], all things F.1

¹⁷⁴Cf. § 27 (trl. page 104) for this argument.

¹⁷⁵I.e., all things that can be understood as qualifying a particular. Ratnakīrti here hints at the entities that, according to the ontology of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors, can inhere in substances (*dravya*). Cf. the summary in Halbfass 1992: 70 ff.

¹⁷⁶Ratnakīrti here summarizes his two main lines of attack on entities that exist separately from a particular, but nevertheless are capable of qualifying it: a particular qualified by a universal is not observed as having a separate qualifier, and there is no perceptual evidence for this qualifier by itself. This corresponds to the two main lines of argumentation for refuting real universals, §§ 9–31 and §§ 32–46 respectively.

¹⁷⁷Cf. section 5.3 for explanations of the issues mentioned in this paragraph.

¹⁷⁸Cf. the same statement in § 15.

¹⁷⁹For a discussion of Ratnakīrti’s ideas about self-awareness as relevant for conceptual cognition, cf. section 5.4.

are in reality inexpressible, for neither do they appear nor are they determined. Therefore the external object alone is conventionally affirmed and negated, because otherwise it would result that all everyday activity is given up.¹⁸⁰

F.1.2 § 49. Thus, in this way,

in reality no affirmation of either a form [in awareness] or an external [object] is established.

For [the affirmation of an object] only as external [is established] conventionally, but [the affirmation] of the form not even conventionally.¹⁸¹

G.1 § 50. Through this [verse], what Dharmottara says uncommonly, against scripture, and illogically: “[There is] affirmation and negation [concerning the fact] that the superimposed [thing] is external.”¹⁸² is rejected.

G.3 § 51. If it [is objected:] “If the real thing, which is to be determined, does not appear in [its] determination,¹⁸³ then what is the meaning of

¹⁸⁰Cf. footnote 200 and references given there for this unwanted consequence.

¹⁸¹Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 338 f. for more on this verse’s context in the *AP*. Their translation of the verse is as follows: “There is no way of really affirming either the mental image or the external object. Conventionally [there is affirmation] only of externals, whereas even conventionally there is no [affirmation] of the mental image.” (McCrea and Patil 2006: 338, and cf. McCrea and Patil 2010: 92)

¹⁸²Cf. DhAP 244,3-4: “*sgrub pa dang dgag pa dag ni sgro bdag gang zhig phyi rol nyid du nges par byas pa de dang ’brel pa yin te.*” (Translation acc. to Frauwallner 1937: 266: “Dagegen wird eine Bejahung oder Verneinung mit dem Übertragenen verbunden, das als außen bestimmt wird.”) Note that in Ratnakīrti’s quote a Sanskrit equivalent for *nges par byas pa* is missing. This position is illustrated by Dharmottara with the example of a rope that is mistaken for a snake: it is with regard to the superimposed snake, which is determined as external, that there is affirmation and negation. Cf. section 4.1.14 for a translation of that example, and see McAllister 2017a for a discussion of it in its context.

¹⁸³This criticism is expressed also in CAPV 133,23–24.

[saying] ‘this [thing] is determined?’¹⁸⁴ If [you say] the meaning [is] that [something is] made an object of activity, even though it does not appear,¹⁸⁵ [then] how [could], as this non-appearance is not specific [to the cognized object], activity with a restricted object [proceed] by avoiding other objects?’¹⁸⁶ [Then] it is said [in answer]: even though every [real thing] is [equally] ungrasped, still there is activity only towards a restricted [object], such as water etc., because a conceptual [cognition], since [it] has a restricted form due to being produced by a restricted complex of causes, has a capacity that is restricted [to

¹⁸⁴If *tadadhyavasitam* is interpreted as a compound, one could understand “...what is the meaning of [saying] that [it is] determined through this [determination]?”

¹⁸⁵This opinion is expressed, e.g., KBhSA 73,9–12 (cf. section 5.4 for a translation of the latter passage, as well as Woo 1999: 187). In CAPV 140,4–7, Ratnakīrti makes it clear that an object can be determined regardless of its ontological status and independently of its appearance in the determination of it:

*tasmād vastu vā ghaṭapaṭādi sandigdhavastu vā sādhakabādha-
kātikrāntam avastu vātmadikkālākṣaṇikādīkam adhyavasitam iti,
apratibhāse ’pi pravṛttiviśayīkṛtam ity arthaḥ. ayam eva cāropaikīka-
raṇādhyavasāyābhedagrahādīnām arthaḥ sarvatra śāstre boddhavyaḥ.*

Therefore, [the statement] that a real thing, like a pot, a cloth etc., or a doubtful thing, which goes beyond an establishing or falsifying [means of valid cognition], or an unreal thing, like a soul, space-time, a thing that is not momentary, etc., is determined, means that, even though there is no appearance [of any of these], [each of these things] is made the object of activity.

And exactly this is the meaning of [terms] such as imposition, equation, determination, grasping as non-different etc., which should be heeded everywhere in the *Śāstra*.

¹⁸⁶I.e., since the absence of an appearance of a horse cannot be distinguished from that of a cow, any activity based on this absence would be unable to differentiate between objects. Above (§ 15), the restriction of a thing was said to be one in its place, time, and condition: any successful activity needs an object that must be concrete in these three respects, and only the particular fulfills these requirements according to the ontology that Ratnakīrti follows.

prompting only a certain activity],¹⁸⁷ like smoke generates [only] the cognition of a fire [currently] beyond the senses.¹⁸⁸

g.7 § 52. For entities [which] have restricted capacities¹⁸⁹ possess natures completely ascertained by means of valid cognition, [but] are not liable to be questioned as to a mixing of [their] capacities. Therefore, the state of determining this [object] is, because of a relation to a specific form, the state of being generative of the activity towards this [object]. But we do not speak of activity due to a superimposition because of similarity, so that there would be the possibility of falsification by means of superimposition [either] of an external object on a form [of awareness] or of a form [of awareness] on an external object,¹⁹⁰ rather[, we say], an awareness–arising only in virtue of the ripening of one’s own remaining impressions—even though not seeing

¹⁸⁷Cf. the notes to § 35 (especially footnote 152) for Ratnakīrti’s idea about how a concept is causally linked to things.

¹⁸⁸The variants of this example in mss K and P are as follows:

K: “...like in the case of something that doesn’t exist. Even if the three worlds [including] smoke did not exist when there is a fire, from that [fire] only smoke will arise, but nothing else.” It is not obvious how *dhūmaśya trailokyasyābhāvas* should be construed. Perhaps an emendation to *dhūmaśya trailokyābhāvas* (understood as “absence of smoke in the three worlds”) would be a good idea. For a similar idea, that from a seed only a certain sprout arises, see AP 226,5-6 (translated in McCrea and Patil 2010: 88), a passage that Ratnakīrti reused for CAPV 138,5–11.

P: “...like, even though there is no [such thing as] smoke, pot, etc. when there is fire, smoke alone is created [by fire, but] not a pot etc.”

¹⁸⁹Apart from the similar passages quoted in the critical edition, an emendation of *niyataviśaya* to *niyataśakti* is suggested also by the context: things don’t have objects, but they can have capacities.

¹⁹⁰This paragraph builds on Ratnakīrti’s discussions in CAPV, see in particular CAPV 133,23–135,4 and CAPV 138,12–16. The relevant differences between Dharmottara’s and Ratnakīrti’s opinions of how conceptual cognition works are investigated in McAllister 2017a. Ratnakīrti’s stance in this matter (like that of his teacher) here accords with that of Prajñākaragupta, which was developed in response to Dharmottara (cf. McAllister forthcoming a).

an external object, is active towards an external object. Thus (*iti*), [this awareness] is simply confused.¹⁹¹

§ 53 Thus, in this way, a positive element is the referent, which, qualified by the absence of others, is differentiated from that of another genus. And only this [positive element which is] to be denoted by the word “exclusion” is the referent of words, and the object of activity and inactivity. So it is settled. H

§ 54 Here [there is the formulation of] a proof.¹⁹² All that denotes [something] has as [its] object a mere thing¹⁹³ that is determined [and] distinguished from that of another form, as the expression “Water [is] here in a well.”¹⁹⁴ And this [expression] having the form of a word like “cow” etc. does denote [something].¹⁹⁵ [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property. This [reason] is I.1

¹⁹¹Following the passage on which Ratnakīrti based himself for the current discussion, the Jñānaśrīmitra (AP 226,14–15) quotes PV III 13b-c. Ratnakīrti quotes that verse in CAPV 138,17–18.

¹⁹²Cf. section 5.2 for a discussion of this proof.

¹⁹³Patil (2009: 239) translates *vastumātra* as “thing-in-general”, which he takes to be the same “as ‘similarity classes’ and ‘constructed universals’.” (Patil 2009: 240) The term *vastu* is, however, used by Ratnakīrti strictly in the sense of a real thing (cf., e.g., l. 92, or the argument in § 19). So here it would have to be the word “*mātra*” by which the import of *vastu* is altered to such an extent that Ratnakīrti is not claiming that a real thing is the object of words. Below (section 5.4), an argument will be made that he does indeed mean the real thing here.

Ratnakīrti uses the word “*mātra*” like this also when describing the object of a word: in § 32, for example, he maintains that upon hearing the word “cow” no universal, but a particular image combining certain parts of cows appears, disregarding the specific differences of any cow to any other cow.

¹⁹⁴For this example, cf. Krasser 1991: 55 f., n. 91. Perhaps the point is that the water in the well is not visible and is known to be there only through a conceptual cognition.

¹⁹⁵Patil (2009: 239) points out that the *pakṣa* of this inference be understood as “the inferential/verbal awareness-event produced in the mind of a competent speaker of a language upon hearing a token utterance of an expression in that language.” See also the explanations in section 5.3.1 aimed at illustrating the equivalence of “expression” to any conceptual state of awareness.

not unestablished, because, even though there is no real relation of a denotable and denoting [according to] the rule stated earlier,¹⁹⁶ [this relation], made by determination, is necessarily to be accepted by all [those] engaged in everyday activity, for otherwise [there is] the unwanted consequence of the extermination of all everyday activity.¹⁹⁷ Neither is that [reason] contradictory, for it is present in the similar instance.¹⁹⁸ Nor is [that reason] ambiguous.¹⁹⁹ For [it is] like this: according to the others, who are averse to [our theory that] the object of words is the mere thing which is determined [and] excluded from that of a different genus, in reality

§ 55. that denoted must be a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to an additional attribute, [something] possessing an additional attribute, or (*yadi vā*) must be a form of awareness,

1.6.3.2 § 56. because there is no other way [for a word to have an object], and because, if there is no object [for a word], it is not possible that [a word] denotes. Regarding this [group of options],

§ 57. there is no convention for either the first [possibility, the particular or] the last [possibility, the form of awareness] because the capacity of [giving] a result

¹⁹⁶This could be referring back to l. 167–l. 168, p. 58 (cf. also the notes on Ratnakīrti's usage of *nyāya* in section 4.1.8), or the statements at the end of § 29. Patil (2009: 241, n. 111) carefully says that “[t]his seems to be referring to what precedes ‘*iti sthitam*,’ RNĀ (AS 66.06-66.07)”, corresponding to l. 302, p. 69–l. 303. But, in this translation, *iti sthitam* is understood rather as marking the end of Ratnakīrti's presentation of his final position (§§ 50–52), and not expressing a position about the relata of denotation.

¹⁹⁷The same consequence resulted in § 48.

¹⁹⁸A reason is contradictory to that which it is supposed to establish when it only occurs in instances where the property to be proven is absent.

¹⁹⁹See footnote 173 for what this means.

would be given up .²⁰⁰ Even to the middle triad [of options, convention is] not bound because of the lack of an additional attribute.²⁰¹

§ 58. Thus in this way, the [property] of [having] an object that is determined [and] external[, the property that is to be established,] pervades [the reason property, which consists in] denoting [something], insofar as [this reason property] is excluded from the counter-instances [in which a different object is denoted], given that the pervading [property, generally] marked by having an object, is excluded [from those counter-instances], because, [apart from other-exclusion], no other [object] that can be denoted exists.²⁰² Thus, pervasion is established. 1.6.3.5

§ 59. To begin with, it is the referent that is principally expressed through words. Where that [is the case], exclusion [is] to be understood, due to being a quality of that [referent].

Furthermore, one referent[, the external object, is] posited due to determination, the other [referent, the form of awareness,] due to appearance. [But] In reality, nothing at all [is] to be expressed.²⁰³

§ 60. The Proof of Exclusion is completed. This [is the] work of the venerable Mahāpaṇḍita Ratnakīrti. K

²⁰⁰ A particular and the mental construct itself cannot be made an object of everyday activity, because that would not have the desired result for this activity: the particular is strictly unique, and the mental construct is private, as well as a particular. Cf. the arguments above, in § 48 (trl. page 118), and § 54 (trl. page 122): without the affirmation or negation of a temporally extended external object, everyday activity would be impossible.

²⁰¹Cf. section 4.1.15 for some notes on this verse.

²⁰²By this, the ambiguity under discussion is shown not to apply to the reason. All instances of denoting are instances where the object is one that is determined and excluded. For denoting cannot occur without this sort of object, since all the other possible objects, i.e., those that the opponent is trying to promote as the word

§ 61. May²⁰⁴ there be a long explanation of exclusion for clever people. But the vulnerable point is that a real thing's own nature does not appear.

There, if [that fact is] not firmly settled, everything is shattered without effort; but, if [this fact] is firmly settled, [then] is [exclusion] not well grounded to the fullest extent?

§ 62. In a full night and two watches [Ratna]kīrti's [proof of] exclusion was joyfully copied²⁰⁵ by Trailokyadatta from effort grounded in the highest being. Therefore this [text] is to be protected.

referent, have been shown to be unsuitable for denotation.

²⁰³This verse is taken from the opening section of Jñānaśrīmitra's AP. Its main elements have here been translated in line with Ratnakīrti's explanations, given above. The referent is thus said to have two aspects: the first is the externally constructed object, and the second is the form of awareness, cf. § 15 (trl. page 96). What Jñānaśrīmitra calls *artha* here is therefore equal to Ratnakīrti's *vidhi*. This is also supported by Jñānaśrīmitra's explanation of his own verse, since he uses the term *vidhi* in glossing *tatra*, AP 203,11–12: ...*tatrāpoḥa iti. vidhau hi mukhyatayā pratipādyamāne* ... (“**In this case, exclusion.** For, when the positive element is understood as being primary,”)

The translations and interpretations by McCrea and Patil (2006: 341 ff.) (as well as by McCrea and Patil 2010: 51 f.) differ somewhat from the one presented here. They understand the term *artha* in the first line as referring to the external object, and thus not to the *vidhi*, which includes the notions both of an external object and of a form of awareness. In the light of Ratnakīrti's explanations in § 15, however, the *artha* here must refer to the *vidhi*, in both of its aspects. If not, Ratnakīrti would be contradicting himself. Note that Akamatsu 1983: 48 interprets *artha* as corresponding to *vidhi* even in the context of Jñānaśrīmitra's work.

For the ultimate inexpressibility of any referent, cf. the argument in § 48 (trl. page 118)

²⁰⁴Cf. the translations of this verse in Patil 2011b: n. 146 and in McCrea and Patil 2010: 97.

²⁰⁵See the remarks on page 4 and in footnote 8 for this interpretation.