

4 Additional comments on the Apohasiddhi

4.1 NOTES ON INDIVIDUAL PASSAGES OF THE APOHASIDDHI

4.1.1 Analysis of *anyāpoha* (ad § 2)

Ratnakīrti offers four interpretations for the term *anyāpoha*, the first three of which he explicitly calls analytical derivations (*vyutpatti*) of the term:

1. *idam anyasmād apohyate*. (This is excluded from another.)
2. *asmād anyad apohyate*. (Another is excluded from this.)
3. *asminn anyad apohyate*. (In this another is excluded.)
4. *apohanam apohaḥ*. (Exclusion is excluding.)

These four ways of understanding *apoha* are stated to be the reasons for calling three things *apoha*:

1. *vi jātivya vṛtta bāhya*, the external object excluded from what is not of its kind.
2. *buddhyākāra*, the form of awareness.
3. *anyavyāvṛttimātra*, the mere differentiation from others.

The last element here, the mere differentiation from others, is explained by the fourth understanding of *apoha*, that is *apohana*, the act or process of excluding, and is not related to the three derivations of *anyāpoha*.

The question is, therefore, how *anyāpoha* as the external object and as the form of awareness should be aligned with the three analytical derivations. To answer this question, it is helpful to recall the main stages in the development of this threefold distinction.²⁰⁶

The earliest known version of these three forms of *anyāpoha* is found in the *PVṬ*. It is found, in various forms, also in the *TSP*, the *PVSVṬ*, the *AP*, and the *TBh*.

The situation presented by Śākyabuddhi in his comment on PV I 179 is rather straightforward: The external particular, excluded from everything else, corresponds to understanding *anyāpoha* as “*anyo ’pohyate ’sminn iti*” (PVT_{F2} 207,1–2). Simple other-exclusion follows from understanding “*anyāpohanam anyāpoha iti*” (PVT_{F2} 207,5). Lastly, an understanding of *anyāpoha* as “*anyo ’pohyate ’neneti*” (PVT_{F2} 207,7) corresponds to exclusion as an appearance in awareness.

In the *TSP*, the situation is less clear.²⁰⁷ As noted by Ishida (2011b: 202, n. 12), a statement of an analysis supporting one of the three forms of exclusion is given in TSP_§ 391,12–22. Kamalaśīla there appends it to the explanation that the name exclusion is applied to the object’s reflection in awareness, because the reflection is different from other reflections.²⁰⁸ The other two things that can be called exclusion, an external thing and mere exclusion, are also upheld, but no analytical explanations corresponding to those given

²⁰⁶Akamatsu (1983: 171, n. 22) provides ample material for tracing this distinction back to Dharmakīrti, as well as a sketch of its development. Other studies on this topic include Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 122, n. 333 (but see Akamatsu 1983: 173 ff. for a criticism of some of these points), Dunne 2004: 131 f., Ishida 2011b, and Okada 2017. Cf. table 4.1 for an overview of the various positions taken by Buddhist authors.

²⁰⁷Ishida (2011b: 206) concludes that “it has become clear that Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita adopt almost the same structure to classify the *anyāpoha*, but Śāntarakṣita has a more developed understanding concerning the meaning of words.” This is contested by Okada (2017: 188; 198), who maintains that all elements that Śāntarakṣita considers are present already in Śākyabuddhi, though in a somewhat different alignment. For the purpose of deciding whether the various ways of analysing *anyāpoha* relate to which object it signifies, this debate need not be decided.

²⁰⁸Cf. appendix B.10.1.

Table 4.1 – Threefold classifications of *apoha*

Text	vyāvṛttasvalakṣaṇa	anyavyavacchedamātra	buddhipratibhāsa/ākāra
PVT _{F2}	anyo 'pohyate 'sminn iti (207.1–2)	anyāpohanam anyāpoha iti (207.5)	anyo 'pohyate 'neneti (207.7)
PVT _D	'di las gzhan dang gzhan sel bar byed pa	gzhan gcod pa	'dis gzhan sel bar byed pa
TS _§	paryudāsa (1003b) / anya-visleṣabhāvataḥ (1008cd)	prasajyapratisedha (1009a)	paryudāsa (1003c)
TSP _§	anyasmād vijāṭiyād visleṣo vyāvṛttis tasya bhāvāt (392.8–9)		apohyata iti apoho 'nyasmād apoho 'nyāpoha iti (391.14)
PVSV _Ṭ	apohyate 'sminn iti (114.21)	apohanam apoha ity (114.20)	apohyate 'neneti (114.19)
TBh _ṭ	apohyate 'smād anyad vijāṭiyam iti (52.9)	apohanam apoha iti (52.12)	apohyate pṛthak kriyate 'smin buddhyākāre vijāṭiyam (52.10–11)

by Śākyabuddhi are offered.²⁰⁹ It would thus appear that in the *TSP*, whilst a form of threefold other-exclusion is maintained, it is not systematically linked to an analysis in such a way that it would help understand the intent of Ratnakīrti’s introductory paragraph (§ 2).

Karṇakagomin also refers to three types of exclusion, but, unlike Śākyabuddhi, he does so in his comment on PV I 41 (cf. appendix A.2.1).²¹⁰ His classification corresponds to that of Śākyabuddhi: the form of awareness is called exclusion because “by it [another] is excluded”, mere negation is called exclusion because “[the act of] excluding is exclusion”, and a particular is called exclusion because “in it [another] is excluded”.²¹¹

Jñānaśrīmitra explains:

AP 202,12-14: *yat punar anyasmād apohyate, apohyate ’nyad asmin veti vijātivyāvṛtṭam bāhyam eva buddhyākāro vānyāpoha*²¹² *iti gīyate. tena na kaścīd upayogaḥ, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt, na ca nāmāntarakaraṇe vastunaḥ svarūpaparāvṛtṭiḥ.*

Furthermore, because of [the expressions] “it is excluded from another, another is excluded, or in this [another is excluded]”,²¹³ either the external [object] itself, differentiated from that of another kind, or the form of awareness

²⁰⁹Cf. the assessments and translated passages in Ishida 2011b: 202–203.

²¹⁰Śākyabuddhi, however, cites PV I 40cd in his explanation, cf. PVT_{F2} 207,3. For the gist of Karṇakagomin’s commentary on PV I 179, cf. Ishida 2011b: 205, n. 21: Karṇakagomin refers only to two forms of exclusion, the particular and exclusion itself, and does not give any analytical derivations. Therefore, this passage is of little relevance for the discussion here.

²¹¹PVSṬ 114,19–21: *kalpitaś cākāro ’pohāśritavād apoha ucyate. apohyate ’neneti vā. anyanivṛttimātraṃ tv arthād ākṣiptam apohanam apoha ity ucyate(.) svalakṣaṇaṃ tv apohyate ’sminn ity apoha ucyate.* (Trl. appendix A.2.1.)

²¹²JNĀ_{ms} 8b6 reads *buddhyākāro vā ’nyā°* (i.e., supporting *vānyā°*) against *buddhyākāro ’nyā°* AP 202,13.

²¹³I thank Hisataka Ishida for discussing this passage with me. He had the good idea of putting a lot of emphasis on the fact that *vā* is in a position that indicates three rather than two alternatives. If only two alternatives had been intended by Jñānaśrīmitra here, the placement of *vā* would be expected to be after the first word of the second alternative, perhaps resulting in something like this: ...*anyasmād*

is called other-exclusion. This [explanation] is useless, since through the designation “exclusion” only a positive element is expressed, and, if a thing is called by another name, there is no change of [its] own nature.²¹⁴

Here, obviously, the three analytical derivations are not as clearly differentiated as in the interpretations of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin. Basically there is the same problem as for the passage in Ratnakīrti. Both the external object and the form of awareness are understood as derived from three ways of analysing exclusion. The fourth, purely negative interpretation of exclusion, is apparently not mentioned in the *AP*.

In the *TBh*, the relevant passage runs:

[TBh_I 52,7–14] *nanu ko 'yam apoho nāma? yathādhyavasāyam*²¹⁵ *bāhya eva ghaṭādir artho 'poha ity abhidhīyate,*

apohyate, apohyate vānyad asminn iti. And if understood as expressing the same three alternatives, Ratnakīrti’s corresponding passage can be understood as a clearer restatement of the same point, rather than as offering a different kind of classification. The parallels would then be as follows (AP = AS₃): *anyasmād apohyate = anyasmād apohyate, apohyate 'nyad = asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin = asmin vānyad apohyate.*

²¹⁴Cf. also Katsura 2011: 125, and the references given there: Dunne 2004, and to a Japanese article by Toru Funayama (an English summary can be found in Funayama 2000). Also see Ishida 2011b, as well as Patil 2011b: n. 15, p. 19:

This grammatical analysis of exclusion (*apoha*) seems to have begun with Śākyabuddhi, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika*, the *Pramāṇavārttika-ṭīkā* (See PVT ad *Pramāṇavārttika* [PV 1, ed. Gnoli] and *Svāsthānumāna* v. 169). Karṇakagomin, another commentator on Dharmakīrti’s text, also mentions it in his *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti-ṭīkā* (PVSVT), as do Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla in their independent works the *Tattvasamgraha* and *Tattvasamgraha-pañjikā* (TS and TSP). For a parallel passage in the work of Ratnakīrti’s teacher, Jñānaśrimitra, see JNĀ (202.12-212.14).

²¹⁵Read *yathādhyavasāyam*, instead of *yathāvuyavasāyam* in TBh_K 28,25 and *yathādhyavasāyam* in TBh_I 52,8.

*apohyate 'smād anyad vijātīyam iti kṛtvā. yathāpratibhāsam buddhyākāro*²¹⁶ *'pohaḥ, apohyate prthakkriyate 'smin buddhyākāre vijātīyam iti kṛtvā. yathātattvaṃ nivr̥ttimātraṃ prasajyarūpo 'pohaḥ, apohanam apoha iti kṛtvā. nanu yathādhyavasāyaṃ vidhir eva, tarhi kevalo viṣaya ity āgatam. na[,] anyāpohaviśiṣṭo*²¹⁷ *vidhir abhipretaḥ.*

[Opponent:] Now, what is this called exclusion? According to determination, only an external object like a pot etc. is designated as “exclusion”, by thinking “Another, which is of a different class, is excluded from this.” According to appearance, a form of cognition is [designated as] exclusion, by thinking “That of another class is excluded, [i.e.,] singled out, in this form of awareness.” According to reality, mere absence is the exclusion which has the nature of absolute negation, by thinking “exclusion [is the act of] excluding.” Now, if according to determination [exclusion is] only a positive element, then [the position] that [exclusion] is simply the object is arrived at.

[Proponent:] No[, none of these is correct]. A positive element qualified by other-exclusion is meant.²¹⁸

²¹⁶TBh_I 52,10 f. reads *buddhyākāro vā ...prasajyarūpo vā ...*. Since the position of the second *vā* is somewhat awkward (one would expect *nivr̥ttimātraṃ vā*), the reading without these *vā*-s, as attested in TBh_K 28,27 f., is preferable.

²¹⁷Read *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo* acc. to TBh_K against *apohaviśiṣṭo* TBh_I.

²¹⁸Cf. the translation by Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 122 f.), as well as that by Akamatsu (1983: 171 ff., n. 22) for valuable notes. Amongst other things, Akamatsu (1983) notes that Yuichi Kajiyama (1966) did not translate the qualifier “according to reality”. Akamatsu (1983: 174 f.) then argues that Mokṣākaragupta’s position reflects that of Jñānaśrīmitra, and not that of Ratnakīrti, because the three qualifiers, i.e., “according to appearance, determination, and reality” are essential to the *AP*: “Pour Jñānaśrīmitra, les trois possibilités de l’interprétation de l’apoha ont été les trois éléments les plus importants pour composer sa théorie sur l’Apoa. ...C’est pourquoi, ces trois sortes d’interprétation de l’apoha ne peuvent être pas fausses.” (Akamatsu 1983: 175) On closer inspection, this interpretation seems unlikely. Like Ratnakīrti, neither Jñānaśrīmitra nor Mokṣākaragupta consider any one of these options to be correct. In the *AP*, the passage is stated by an opponent (cf. Akamatsu 1983: 172 and McCrea and Patil 2010: 51). Also, in the *AS* this is part of an objection, and is

What, then, is the conclusion that can be drawn from these passages for § 2? The first thing to note is that Ratnakīrti clarified Jñānaśrīmitra’s analysis, saying “...*asmād vānyad apohyate* ...”, l. 4 in § 2, instead of AP 202,12 *apohyate ’nyad*.²¹⁹

The main question is still not answered, though: what is the relation between the analytical derivations and exclusion as an external thing or a form of awareness?

In the *TBh* there is a clear difference to all analytical interpretations other than those of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. It associates the locative construction (*apohyate ...’smin buddhyākāre vijāṭīyam*, “...in this form of awareness that of another genus is excluded”) with the form of awareness, and not, as PVT_{F2} and PVSVT do, with the

answered by a clear no and Ratnakīrti’s definition of what exclusion is (cf. l. 36, p. 49). So it is difficult to see how Mokṣākaragupta could have taken any one of these three interpretations to be correct. Whether this passage owes more to the *AP* than to the *AS* is also questionable: Mokṣākaragupta does not employ the first of Jñānaśrīmitra’s (or Ratnakīrti’s) alternatives, “*anyasmād apohyate*” (AP 202,12). Instead, he adduces the analysis “*apohyate ’smād anyad*” (*TBh* 52,9) in order to show how an external object is meant by exclusion, which is stated in this explicit form only by Ratnakīrti. Also, the three qualifiers are not without a basis in the *AS* (cf. section 5.4 for the two qualifiers “according to appearance and determination”, and § 48 for what words really refer to acc. to Ratnakīrti).

²¹⁹Cf. footnote 213. Given that this passage is an objection, it could of course be that another text, where these variations are originally to be found, is being cited. But this passage is quite closely related to AP 202,12–13, which is a part of the introductory objection in that text. And it is unclear where that objection comes from. Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 122 f., n. 333) concludes that “...Jñānaśrīmitra ...must have cited these [passages–PMA] from an author unknown to us.” Akamatsu (1983: n. 22, p. 175), on the other hand, surmises: “...mais il [le *pūrvapakṣa* de l’*AP*–PMA] est ...l’objection imaginaire produite par Jñānaśrīmitra lui-même, et nous ne pouvons pas le considérer comme une citation de quelque auteur.” This is also the view of Patil (2003: 245, n. 7). The character of the *AS*’s textual dependence on the *AP* in this passage supports, it seems to me, Akamatsu’s and Patil’s conclusions: Ratnakīrti obviously feels free to rearrange the arguments found in the *AP*, whereas most of the other objections shared by the *AP* and the *AS* are actually quite clearly attributed to their authors, and, at least in the cases where the source texts can be identified, quoted very faithfully.

external object.²²⁰ Considering how much the *TBh* is indebted to the writings of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti,²²¹ it seems probable that Mokṣākaragupta saw his interpretation as fully compatible with their statements. If that is the case, then one could understand Ratnakīrti (and perforce Jñānaśrīmitra) as follows: *anyasmād apohyate* and *asmād vānyad apohyate*²²² lead to an understanding of the external object as exclusion, and *asmin vānyad apohyate* to an understanding of the form of awareness as exclusion.²²³ This would follow Mokṣākaragupta’s understanding, and ignore the problem that he only uses two of the three possible derivations.

The alternative is this: to give Mokṣākaragupta’s formulation less weight, and take the three forms of analytical derivation as summing up the tradition up to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti concerning the external object and the form of awareness. This last option seems preferable, because the positions in the *TSP* on the one hand, and in the *PVT* and the *PVSVT* on the other, could thus be seen as loosely summarized in Ratnakīrti’s statement, as follows: in whichever way one analyses *anyāpoha*—either as “exclusion from another”²²⁴

²²⁰*TSP* is of little help here, since no derivation using the locative formulation is used. In the *TSP* the interpretation as *buddhyākāra* is associated with the ablative construction.

²²¹Cf. the argument in footnote 309.

²²²The only reason for grouping these two options together is that they share ablative constructions. This is of course not a very good reason, but if one takes the *TBh* seriously on this point, there is no viable alternative. For there must be a division into two groups, and the ablative construction is associated with the external object in *TBh*, and the locative one with the form of awareness.

²²³This is also the understanding reflected in the translation of Jñānaśrīmitra’s passage in Akamatsu 1983: 171, n. 22. A second possibility is that the interpretation in the *TBh* is simply not correct. It could be imagined that, Mokṣākaragupta, facing the same problem of how to understand these two explanations of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, decided to drop the first alternative, *anyasmād apohyate*, and assign the remaining two, *asmād vānyad apohyate asmin vānyad apohyate*, to the external object and the form of awareness, respectively. But I believe that the premiss, that Mokṣākaragupta misinterpreted the very two writers he drew much of his material from for the *TBh*, is very unlikely.

²²⁴Cf. the corresponding rows in table 4.1, and Ishida 2011b: 202, n. 12.

with the *TSP* or as “in this another is excluded.” with *PVT* and the *PVSVT*—only an external thing or the form of awareness is meant by other-exclusion. The second of Ratnakīrti’s alternatives, “another is excluded from this”, could well have been endorsed in a text not known to us.

4.1.2 *Three candidates for exclusion (ad § 3)*

In this paragraph, the three positions on what it means to say that exclusion is the referent of words are refuted. The discussion of the “negative” position is rather clear, but the short and unspecific reduction, before that, of the two other options to a merely “positive” position might need some elucidation.

4.1.2.1 ONLY A POSITIVE THING

The first two positions are refuted only by pointing out that, if other-exclusion is either an external thing that is differentiated from that of another kind, or a form of awareness, then it is only a positive element, i.e., a real entity, that is meant by “exclusion.”

The passage is too succinct to allow any precise determination of whose (or if anyone’s) positions are meant here. But a few pointers might be in order nevertheless. That something external, excluded from what is of another kind, is the word referent, could refer to any of the external-realist theories about the word referent.²²⁵ All three elements of the word referent as adopted in the Nyāya school of thought, the individual thing (*vyakti*), the genus (*jāti*), and the form (*ākṛti*), are external to the cognizing subject and real. For the Vaiśeṣika, the very categories of reality, “...padārthas [...] are the sum total of all that ‘supports’ the meaning of words and guarantees that words are not mere words, but that they have a denotative value.” (Halbfass 1970: 138) Amongst the various categories recognized by Vaiśeṣikas, universals play the central role for the existence and cognition of similarity amongst things, Halbfass 1992: 71:

²²⁵For a clear and general overview of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā theories, cf. J. A. Taber 1998b. The classification of these views as external-realist here is based on the discussion in Dravid 1972: chapters 2 and 3.

Universals (*sāmānyā*), such as “substanceness,” “quality-ness,” “horseness,” “whiteness,” and so on, are recurrent generic properties in substances, qualities, and motions. They account for the fact that numerically different individual entities can be associated with an identical concept, referred to by a common term, identified as members of the same class, and distinguished from members of other classes.

Within the various strands of Mīmāṃsā, the form (*ākṛti*), interpreted as a universal, was taken to be the primary word referent.²²⁶ But none of these views seems to be a clean fit for the option that *apoha*, and thus the word referent, is only “something external.”²²⁷ That the form of awareness is the referent of a word is probably Bhartṛhari’s view.²²⁸

Additionally, there are some precursors in *apoha*-treatises to the problem that *apoha* can be reduced to something external or the form of awareness:

Dharmottara makes it an important point to show that *apoha* is neither external nor internal.²²⁹

The position that the referent of a word is the form of awareness is discussed in the *TSP ad TS*₅ 890 (cf. trl. in appendix B.5), where it becomes clear that this view is very similar to Bhartṛhari’s position (or one of his positions).²³⁰

²²⁶Cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3, J. A. Taber 1998b, and Hattori 1979: 72, n. 21.

²²⁷The very similar passage in the *TBh* reads “...*bāhya eva ghaṭādyarthaḥ apoha iti abhidhīyate*” (*TBh* 52,8), unequivocal in understanding “external” as common-sense objects, such as a pot etc.

²²⁸Cf. Ogawa 1999, as well as Hattori 1993, and Kataoka 2009: 489. If Ogawa 1999 is correct, then also the previous view, that an external thing is the word referent, could be attributed to Bhartṛhari. Moreover, in the *TSP ad TS*₅ 882, Kamalaśīla ascribes the view that a substance (*dravya*) is the referent of words to Vyāḍi, cf. also R. Herzberger 1986: 73 f.

²²⁹Cf. the programmatic statement in the introductory verse to the DhAP (see DhAP, Steinkellner 1976, Hattori 2006: 63 f., and Ishida’s translation cited in Kataoka 2009: 486, n. 17).

²³⁰Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f., and Kataoka 2009: 488.

According to the exposition of the *apoha* theories as found in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM *ΑΡΟΗΑ*: 19–30), it could also be that a reduction to an external thing and a form of awareness was how Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s positions were, respectively, interpreted by their opponents. In the introductory essay in Kataoka 2009, the analysis of Jayanta’s exposition leads to this statement: “It is evident that Jayanta makes clear the difference of the three views by distinguishing the three phases: external → internal → neither external nor internal.” (Kataoka 2009: 483). The first phase is commonly attributed to Dignāga, the second to Dharmakīrti, and the third to Dharmottara (Watson and Kataoka 2017: 35).

Ratnakīrti’s answer to the objection as a whole (§ 7) will be to the effect that none of these elements taken individually—neither an external thing, nor a form of awareness, nor exclusion—can be the word referent. In consequence, he adopts what can be seen as a combination of the three (*kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ*, l. 36 in § 7).

4.1.3 *pratibhāsabheda and vastubheda (ad § 20 and § 21)*

Ratnakīrti’s point here is that the difference between two objects is founded on the difference of their two natures, and this difference is founded on the difference of the objects’ appearance. Akamatsu (1983: 71 f.) adds the following explanation to his translation of the corresponding passage, AP 208,25:

Donc, les objets qui ont les manifestations des images différentes dans la connaissance doivent avoir les natures propres différentes, et donc ils ne peuvent être une seule et même chose.

So, if there are different appearances, these appearances necessarily are of different objects.

Concerning the relation between the difference of appearances and the difference of real things, AP 209,4–209,14 gives the following inference:

[AP 209,2–209,14:] *nanu dūrāsannadeśavartinor ekatra śākhini spaṣṭāspaṣṭapratibhāsabhede 'pi na [śākhī]bhedah, arthakriyābhedābhāvād ity arthakriyābhedopakṛta eva pratibhāsabhedo bhedakah. na cehārthakriyābheda iti katham indriyaśabdābhyāṃ janitajñānaviśayo gavādir bhedabhāg iti cet? na brūmaḥ pratibhāsabhedo bhinnavastuniyataḥ, kiṃ tu ekaviśayatvābhāvāniyata iti. tathā hi, yo yaḥ kvacid vastuni pratyakṣapratibhāsād viparītaḥ pratibhāso nāsau tenaikaviśayaḥ, yathā ghaṭagrāhakāt paṭapratibhāsaḥ, yathā vā śāṅkhagrāhakāt pītapratibhāsaḥ. tathā ca gavi pratyakṣapratibhāsād viparītaḥ pratibhāso vikalpakāle iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ. ekaviśayatvaṃ hi pratibhāsābhedena vyāptam, savyetarānayanadr̥ṣṭavad dr̥ṣṭam. avyāptis²³¹ tu yadi pratyakṣāntaram api viparītapratibhāsaṃ syāt, vastu vā²³² dvirūpaṃ bhavet. tac ca dvayam api nāstīti vyāptir eva. āśrayābhedabhāvini ca jñāne pakṣīkr̥te tadviruddhaḥ pratibhāsabhedaḥ siddhaḥ. tato yatrārthakriyābhedādisacivaḥ pratibhāsābhedaḥ tatra vastubhedāḥ ghaṭapaṭavat. taṃ punaḥ sahāyaṃ vihāya pravṛtto niyamenaikaviśayatāṃ pariharatīty eko 'tra bhrānta eva pratibhāsaḥ, śāṅkhe pītapratibhāsavat.*

[Opponent:] But surely there is no difference in a tree even in the case where one and the same tree has a difference in the appearance as clear and unclear to two [people], one close by and the other in a distant place, because there is no difference in the causal efficacy [of the tree]. [For,] the difference in appearance that is really assisted by a difference in causal efficacy is [that which] differentiates [one thing from another]. And in this case there is no difference in the causal efficacy. So how should the object of a cognition generated by the sense faculties

²³¹Read *avyāptis tu* acc. to JNĀ_{ms} 11b1 against *avyāptitas tu* AP 209,10.

²³²Read *vā* acc. to JNĀ_{ms} 11b2 against *ca* AP 209,11.

[or] words [i.e. verbal cognition], like a cow etc., involve a difference?

[Proponent:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances]. For it is so: Any appearance that, with regard to some real thing, is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual cognition does not have the same object as this [appearance in a perceptual cognition], like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to a [perceptual] grasping of a pot, or like the appearance of yellow [is contrary] to grasping a conch shell. And in the same way, with respect to a cow, the appearance at the time of a conceptual cognition is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual cognition. This (*iti*) [is a case of] perceiving [something] opposed to the pervading element. For, the fact of there being the same object [for both types of cognitions] is pervaded by the non-difference of appearances, observed [here] as [something] is observed by the left eye and the other [eye]. But if there were no pervasion, there would be another perception, having an opposed appearance, or there would be a real thing having two natures. And none of these two is [the case]. Therefore, there is indeed pervasion. And when a cognition, which is different according to [its] basis [that is either in the sense faculties or in concepts,] is made the locus [of pervasion], a difference of appearance is established. Therefore, where there is a difference of appearance accompanied by a difference of causal efficacy etc., there there is a difference of the real thing, as in the case of pot and cloth. Moreover, [a difference in appearance] occurring without this companion by definition refutes the fact of there being the same object. Thus here one appearance is only erroneous, like the appearance of yellow in the case of a conch shell.

4.1.3.1 ANALYSIS

Jñānaśrīmitra's argument here is that the fact that perceptual and conceptual awareness do not have the same object can be ascertained through *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*, the apprehension of that opposed to the pervading element. This is one of the ways in which a person can correctly infer the absence of something, in this case, the absence of the property of "having the same object". The explanation of this type of non-perception in TBh_I 30,9–11 is as follows:²³³

vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā-nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dahanāt. pratiśedhyasya tuṣārasparśasya vyāpakaṃ sītam, tasya viruddho dahanaviśeṣaḥ [...] tasyehopalabdhīḥ.

The perception of that opposed to the pervading element [is] like this: There is no feeling of cold here, because of a fire. Coldness is the pervader of the feeling of cold, which is to be negated; that contradictory to this [coldness] is a particular fire; of that there is a perception in this place.

A comparison of the elements involved is given in table 4.2. Accordingly, Jñānaśrīmitra's argument can be paraphrased as follows: In a perceptual and a conceptual awareness, two different appearances are observed (*hetu*). The fact that there are two different appearances is, obviously, contradictory to the fact that there are not different appearances. And since all cases in which there is the same object for two cognitions imply that there are no differences in the respective appearances, these two cognitions cannot have the same object.

So what do Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti mean by this statement: "We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances]"? The main intention is to state that different appearances prove the absence of

²³³See Kellner 1997a: 103 ff. and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 151 ff., Appendix 1 for more background on non-perception, and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 83, n. 220 for this specific type.

4.1. Notes on individual passages of the *Apohasiddhi*

Table 4.2 – Structure of *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*

logical role	TBh _I	AP
hetu	dahana	pratibhāsa-bheda
sādhya	a-tuṣārasparṣa	ekaviṣayatva-a-bhāva
pakṣa	iha	jñāna
vyāpaka	śīta	pratibhāsa-a-bheda
vyāpya	tuṣārasparṣa	ekaviṣayatva
vyāpakaviruddha	dahana	pratibhāsa-bheda

the same object, but not the presence of two different objects.²³⁴ This restriction has, as spelled out by Ratnakīrti in the last two sentences of § 20, consequences as to what can be known from the fact that two cognitions have different appearances of their objects: depending on whether there is causal efficacy of the appearing objects or not, the two cognitions either have different real things as their objects, as in the case of a pot and a cloth, or one of the appearances is wrong (i.e., has no real thing as its object), as the appearance of yellow in the case of the white conch. For Ratnakīrti, this differentiation will allow the argument (in § 21) that a conceptual cognition can have an object which is both different from the object of perception and not a real thing.

4.1.4 *Common to existence and non-existence* (*bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇya ad § 21–§ 23*)

About the argument that a word applies to its objects irrespective of the existence or non-existence of this object, Katsura (1986: 174 f.) wrote:²³⁵

²³⁴For if there were two different objects, a realist can be imagined to argue that one is the particular, the other the universal. This would obviously be a very unwelcome consequence for an Apohavādin.

²³⁵The problem, but not the exact same argument, is also found in Kumāriḷa's writings, cf. ŚV Vāk 310 (trl. section 4.1.5). See also J. Taber and Kataoka 2017 and Ogawa 2017 for recent examinations of this topic in the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

This argument also stems from Dharmakīrti.... Dharmottara utilized it in a skillful and systematic way in his *Apohaprakaraṇa*.... Then he was severely criticized by Vācaspatimiśra,... who in turn was criticized by Jñānaśrī-mitra.

In this context, Katsura (1986: 180, n. 23) refers to PV_M IV 223–236 (which is very similar to PVI_n II 15–28).²³⁶ Akamatsu 1983: 211, n. 103 refers explicitly to PV_M IV 228, and Ogawa 1999: 275, n. 17 to PV_M IV 226 and 228. The most relevant passage in Dharmottara's *DhAP* is, approximately,²³⁷ DhAP 241,11–244,16. The arguments found there were criticised by Vācaspatimiśra, esp. NVTṬ 444,2–6, and the particular problem of a word's object being common to existence and non-existence is mentioned also by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, NM *ΑΡΟΗΑ*: 24,4–5 (trl. Watson and Kataoka 2017: 63–64).

Akamatsu (1983: 211 ff., n. 103), traces the origin of the inference in the background of the discussion found in § 21 and § 23 to DhAP 244,10–16.²³⁸

The argument as given by Dharmottara is as follows:

[DhAP 244,10–24] *gang zhig dngos po dang dngos po med pa thun mong du zhen pas nges par 'dzin pa de ni gcig las ldog pa nges pa lhur byed pa yin te / dper na bum pa ma yin par shes pas bum pa ma yin par nges par 'dzin pa na yod dam med ces dngos po dang dngos po med pa thun mong du nges par 'dzin par byed pa bzhin no // rnam par rtog pa thams cad kyis kyang dngos po dang*

²³⁶These verses are translated and discussed in Steinkellner 1979: 41 ff.

²³⁷Katsura 1986: 180, n. 24 refers to DhAP 244,10 ff. Akamatsu 1983: 212 ff., n. 103 draws on various passages from DhAP 241,22–244,16.

²³⁸Akamatsu (1983: 215) says that this inference is cited in NVTṬ 442,16–18. He supports this claim by saying that Frauwallner 1937: 267 indicates this dependency, but there is no such indication there. Nevertheless, the inference found in NVTṬ 442,16–18 is indeed quite similar to Dharmottara's, but is not, as far as can be judged on the basis of the Tibetan translation of Dharmottara's inference, a faithful quotation. Cf. the trl. in section 4.1.4.

*dn̄gos po med pa dag gi rang bzhin thun mong du nges
 par 'dzin par byed do // gtan tshigs 'di ma grub pa ni ma
 yin te /rnam par rtog pa gnyis ka'i thun mong gi rang
 bzhin du dmigs par nyams su myong bas grub pa'i phyir
 ro // sngar bshad pa'i tshul gyis thun mong du 'dzin pa'i
 rgyu mtshan ni gcig las ldog pa lhur nges pa nyid yin
 te /de ni rgyu mtshan med pa ma yin la /rgyu mtshan
 gzhan yang mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro // de la mi mthun pa'i
 phyogs la 'jug na khyab par byed pa rgyu mtshan dang
 ldan pa nyid med par 'gyur ba'i phyir khyab par byed pa
 mi dmigs pas mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa na thun
 mong du 'dzin pa ldog pa gcig gi mthar thug pa la gnas
 pa'i phyir khyab pa grub po /*

What ascertains [something] by grasping [it] as common to existence and non-existence, that only determines the differentiation from some [other thing], like a cognition [of something] as not-a-pot ascertains [something], in ascertaining [it] as not-a-pot, as common to existence and non-existence [since one can say]“It exists or does not exist.” And all conceptual cognitions ascertain [something] as having a nature common to both existence and non-existence. This logical reason is not unestablished, because a conceptual cognition is established by direct perception as apprehending [something] that has a nature common to these two. In the manner previously explained, the cause for grasping [something] as common [to both] is the ascertainment as only different from something [else], because this [ascertainment] is not without a cause, and another cause is not apprehended. In this regard, when there is a differentiation [of the pervaded element] from the counter-instance—due to not apprehending the pervading element, because the pervading element[, i.e.,] the state of having a cause, does not exist

in²³⁹ the counter-instance—the grasping as common [to existence and non-existence] occurs [only] for that based on some differentiation. Therefore, the pervasion [of an ascertaining cognition by the property of ascertaining only other-exclusion] is established.

The inference given at NVTṬ 442,16–20, which is referred to in NVTṬ 444,2–6, the passage quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 23, runs like this (in the voice of an opponent, most likely Dharmottara):

*tathā hi–yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇam tad anyavyāvṛtti-rūpam*²⁴⁰ *eva, yathā amūrtatvam. tat khalu vijñāne ca śaśaviṣāṇe ca sādharmaṇam. tathā ca vivādādhyāsītā vikalpaviśayā ghaṭapaṭādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ. gaur asti gaur nāstīti hi bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇo gāvādir vikalpaviśayo vidhirūpasvalakṣaṇavad bhāvāsādhāraṇye nāstīty anena na sambadhyate virodhāt.*

For [it is] so: What is common to existence and nonexistence, that has only the nature of exclusion from others, like incorporeality. That [incorporeality] indeed is common to cognition[, which exists,] and a hare’s horn[, which does not exist]. And the objects of conceptual cognitions, which are subject to discussion, like pot, cloth, etc., are like this. So the logical reason [of the type] “essential property” [is used here]. For [in the sentences] “a cow is, a cow isn’t”, cow etc., the object of conceptual cognition, could not be connected with this [predicate], “is not”, if it were specific [only] to existence, like a particular that has a positive nature, because of a contradiction.

The logical elements used here are: the reason, *hetu*, is “common to existence and nonexistence;” what is to be proven, the *sādhya*, is

²³⁹The import of the phrase ‘*jug na*, as Frauwallner 1937: p. 266, n. 2 notes, is not clear here.

²⁴⁰Read °*rūpam eva* acc. to NVTṬ_D 476,9 instead of °*rūpayeva* in NVTṬ 442,16.

“having the nature of exclusion from others;” and the site of the inference, the *pakṣa*, is “objects of conceptual cognition.” Dharmottara’s inference is basically the same: cognizing something as common to the referent’s existence and non-existence can only work for exclusion from others, not for a real positive entity.

In the passage quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 23, Vācaspatimiśra criticizes this inference by showing that it is possible for a genus to be the object of conceptual cognitions. For, even though it is by its nature eternal and hence exclusively existent, it can be predicated to exist or to not exist through its connection to particulars that currently exist or not. What he has thus shown is that the reason, being common to existence and non-existence, can occur in the counter-instances, i.e., when something—in this case the genus—does not have the nature of exclusion from others. The reason that Dharmottara uses to prove that exclusion must be the object of any ascertaining cognition thus becomes inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), because one cannot be certain that it does not also qualify things, in particular the objects of conceptual cognition, that do not have other-exclusion as their nature. The alternative²⁴¹ is that the reason is “established in another way,” i.e., that being common to both existence and non-existence can be shown to pertain even when exclusion is not the nature of conceptual objects.²⁴²

4.1.5 *The position of Kumārila’s followers (ad § 24)*

As Akamatsu (1983: 218, n. 112) has pointed out, the position that words apply to parts of their referent is found in ŚV Āv 64ab:

²⁴¹If one accepts the reading *veti* (l. 134, p. 56) instead of *ceti* in NVTṬ 444,6.

²⁴²Glossing on NBhV 62,4–5 *ad* NSū 1.1.10, NVTṬ 276,7–8 notes the following about *anyathāsiddha*: ***asiddhārthatā anyathāsiddhārthatā hetoḥ hetuvacanasyety arthaḥ***. (The aim of the reason[, i.e.,] of the statement of the reason, is unestablished[, i.e., its] aim is established in another way. That is the meaning.) For Vācaspati, therefore, this problem is one where the reason is not established. Cf. Gokhale 1992: 83 f. for a helpful example of this fallacious reason. He also gives this definition: “The *hetu* is called *anyathāsiddha* when the existence of *hetu* is capable of full explanation without reference to *sādhya*.” (Gokhale 1992: 84)

sāmānyāmśān apoddhṛtya padaṃ sarvaṃ pravartate /
Every word applies [to its object] in extracting the parts
[that are] the universals.

Cf. also these arguments in the ŚV, where it is quite obvious that there is an awareness of a closely related problem:

ŚV Av 125: *nirbhāgo 'pi hi vastvātmā śabdair bhāgena gamyate /*
na hi sacchabdavijñānād ghaṭādyarthaḥ pratīyate //
For [something] having the nature of a real thing is partially understood through words, even though it has no parts. For there is no cognition of an object such as a pot etc. from a cognition [of an object's existence] through the word "existing."

ŚV Vāk 309cd–311: *na ca śabdena sadbhāvas tasya cārthasya bodhitaḥ //*
astitvādyanapekṣaṃ hi sāmānyam tena gamyate /
astiśabdaprayogo 'pi tenaivātropapadyate //
jāter astitvanāstitve na ca kaś cid vivakṣati /
nityatvāl lakṣyamāṇāyā vyaktes te hi viśeṣaṇe //
Neither is the actual existence also of this object understood through a word. For a universal, which is independent of the state "it is" etc., is understood through this [word]. Exactly for this [reason], also the usage of the word "it is"²⁴³ is applicable here[, i.e., to this pot]. No one wishes to express [either] the state "it is" [or] the state "it is not" of a genus, because [it] is permanent. For these two [states] are qualifiers of the individual thing that is characterized [by that genus].

In the commentary on ŚV Vāk 309cd–310ab, Pārthasarāthimiśra explicitly addresses the problem of a word being *sadasattvasādhāraṇa* (which is assumed to refer to the same problem as *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*):

²⁴³"It is" translates the single Sanskrit third person present verb of existence *asti*, lit. "he, she, or it is."

NRĀ 657,5–8: *syād evaṃ yadi ghaṭaśabdena ghaṭasya sattvaṃ bodhitam syāt. sa tu sadasattvasādhāraṇaṃ ghaṭasvarūpamātram abhidhatte. tatsvarūpaṃ hi prādeśikatvād anityatvāc ca kvacit kadācic ca sat, kvacit kadācic cāsad iti sādharmaṇaṃ sāmānyam iti, sadasattvasādhāraṇam ity arthaḥ.*

It would be so[, i.e., there would be a problem about being common to existence and non-existence,] if the existence of a pot were cognized through the word “pot”; but this [word] denotes a pot’s own form alone, common to the state of being and non-being. For the own form of this [pot] exists in some places and at some times, and does not exist in some [other] places and at some [other] times because [this pot] has its proper place and is not permanent. In this sense a universal is common, which means “common to being and non-being.”

4.1.6 *Properties and their bearers in an upakāra relation (ad § 28)*

In general, *upakāra* means assistance or support (cf. PW I: 237.1; see also below, section 4.1.9). Dharmakīrti discusses the relationship of property and property-bearer under the heading of an *upakāra* relation in PVSV 29,6–31,5 (trl. pages 287–292), and in PVin II 67,4–68,2 (trl. on the basis of the Tibetan text in Steinkellner 1979: 66–69).²⁴⁴

In § 28, it is “close contact” (*pratyāsatti*) that is characterized as *upakāra*. Ratnakīrti says that the other options, such as inherence (*samavāya*) etc., for what this contact could be, have been refuted. The question is what he means by “etc.” Various forms of contact between a property bearer and a property (one case of such a contact being that of a particular with the universal qualifying it) were assumed by the realist schools: *samavāya* and *saṃyoga* by the Naiyāyikas

²⁴⁴Steinkellner (1979: 68, n. 213) notes that *upakāra* was also used in a similar sense by Kumāriḥ, and the interpretation of *upakārāt* in VP_R 3.3.5 by Houben (1995: 170, and 173 f.) is strikingly similar. See also PS(V) 5 5cd for a similar employment (*guṇopakārāt*).

and Vaiśeṣikas, and non-difference or a form of inherence by the Mīmāṃsakas.²⁴⁵ Since Ratnakīrti does not discuss the Mīmāṃsakas' opinions in the following paragraphs, I take “*samavāyāder*” (l. 170, p. 58) to mean *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*, i.e., the two relations accepted by Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

The relation called *samavāya*, explicitly mentioned by Ratnakīrti, is the sixth category in the Vaiśeṣika system (cf. Halbfass 1992: 70–75). There, it “[...] is the relationship between entities that cannot occur separately. It is the one omnipresent principle [...] that integrates parts and wholes, particulars and universals, substances, qualities, and motions.” (Halbfass 1992: 72) It was also endorsed by Naiyāyika thinkers, and in the context of the *Apoahasiddhi* it is relevant specifically as the relation that a universal, that which inheres, has to the particular, in which it inheres. Cf., e.g., NBhV 305,15–17:

*katham tarhi gotvaṃ goṣu vartate? āśrayāśrayibhāvena.
kaḥ punar āśrayāśrayibhāvah? samavāyah. tatra vṛtti-
mad gotvam, vṛtтиḥ samavāya itīhapratyayahetutvād ity
uktam.*

[Opponent:] How then²⁴⁶ does cowness occur in cows?

[Proponent:] Through the relation of supporter and sup-

²⁴⁵For the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā idea that properties and their bearers are different aspects of the same entity (e.g., *sthitam naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi naḥ*, ŚV Ps 141cd), cf. J. A. Taber 2005: 106–12. Cf. D'Sa 1980: chap. 12, and J. A. Taber 2005: 217 f., n. 40 for clear summaries of the ŚV Āv's main points, where the specific relation of a class to its particulars is discussed in the same terms. Cf. also Dravid 1972: 64–66 for some notes regarding the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā stance that the universal and that qualified by it are really distinct and related by a non-eternal *samavāya*.

²⁴⁶NSū 2.2.64, which Uddyotakara is discussing here, is one of a row of *sūtras* refuting that either *ākṛti*, *vyakti*, or *jāti* alone is the word referent (cf. Biarreau 1964: 229–240, Much 1994: 351–352). Here, Uddyotakara has just repeated his argument from NBhV 206,21–22 that the relation of a whole to its parts cannot be understood in terms of a unitary thing (such as a genus) existing in manifold things (such as its manifestations, *vyakti*-s). So the opponent wonders what their relationship might be. Parts of this passage are also quoted in PVSVT 277,3–4, and 305,6–11.

ported. [Opponent:] What then is [this] relation of supporter and supported? [Proponent:] Inherence (*samavāya*). Here, cowness is what occurs [in the particulars], [and] the occurrence is inherence. Therefore “because [inherence] is the reason for the cognition ‘[cowness is] here [in a cow]’” was said.

The relation called *saṃyoga* is a form of contact that is different from *samavāya* and was first assumed in Vaiśeṣika ontology. It is a quality (*guṇa*), the second category in all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. It had a rather broad scope of application,²⁴⁷ but the main difference to the category of inherence was that contact exists between two things that can exist separately from each other (mainly substances, as in the example of the stick and the stick-bearer).

For a criticism of *saṃyoga* and *samavāya* as the relation between a property and its bearer in the *TS*, cf. appendix B.2.

4.1.7 True genera or additional attributes: *upādhi* (ad § 29)

Ratnakīrti, as well as Vācaspatimiśra in the passage quoted in § 29, uses the term *upādhi* in a way strikingly different from that commonly ascribed to Naiyāyika authors. In the following, I would like to inquire what, if any, cause this term’s different employment has for the two different schools of thought, and whether any particularly important issues are attached to it.

4.1.7.1 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

An *upādhi* is usually described as a non-essential universal: “Other general characteristics such as ‘cookness’, ‘tallness’, ‘blindness’, etc., which are adventitious features, are recognised not as universals (*jāti*) but as *upādhis*.” (Dravid 1972: 25; cf. also Potter 1977: 135 ff. and references given there.)

The term *upādhi*, in the context of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, is variously translated as “nominal’ properties”, “superimposed

²⁴⁷Cf. Frauwallner 1956: 127 ff., Halbfass 1992: 122 f., 147.

condition”, “imposed properties”, or “limiting condition”.²⁴⁸ Acc. to Halbfass (1970: 148), “Udayana was the first Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author who took into full account all the difficulties involved in the jāti-upādhi problem, and the jātibhādaka doctrine in his Kiraṇāvalī became fundamental for all subsequent considerations,...for the period following the conflict with the Buddhists.” This implies that before Udayana, and so also at Ratnakīrti’s time, there were no fixed and conclusive criteria for what differentiated a universal proper from an imposed universal.

But it seems that, at least since Trilocana (cf. Potter 1977: 202 ff.), *upādhi* had important implications also for the Nyāya analysis of *svabhāva* inferences (cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 101, n. 271 and the reference there to RNĀ₁ 42,20–23²⁴⁹). The central point is, acc. to Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 100 f., nn. 270–271), that smoke always implies fire (*svābhāvikasambandha*), whereas fire only implies smoke when a specific additional attribute of fire, i.e., wet fuel, is present (“*aupādhika-* or *sopādhika-sambandha*”).

As Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101, n. 271) points out, Ratnakīrti’s and Mokṣākaragupta’s definition of *upādhi* as “...*arthāntaram kiṃcid apekṣaṇīyam* is based on this explanation of Vācaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in NVT.” (NVT = *NVTṬ*) The passage containing this definition in the *TBh* is translated by Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101) as “...for by the word *upādhi* is meant some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if *x* needs *z* in order to be related with *y*, this *z* is called *upādhi*].”

Buddhist logicians, on the other hand, called all universals supposed by realist schools *upādhi*.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Cf., respectively, Matilal 1986: 382, Halbfass 1992: 252, Halbfass 1970: 148, and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 101.

²⁴⁹ This corresponds to ĪSD 47,6–10. Cf. section 4.1.7.1 and Patil 2009: 123 f. for translations, as well as Patil 2009: 174 ff. for a discussion of the role of *upādhi* in inferential cognitions.

²⁵⁰ Akamatsu (1983: 225, n. 121) is of the same opinion. I was not able to trace the term *upādhi* in either PS(V) 5 or Hattori 1968. Dharmakīrti employs it in much

To these observations, the following two comments based on the material in the *AS* might be added:

Comment 1. In the argument of § 47 Ratnakīrti subsumes all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories except substance (*dravya*) under the heading of *upādhi*. The phrase indicating this equivocation is “for the circle of additional attributes like universal, property, action etc.” (*sāmānyaguṇakarmādyupādhicakrasya*). This would also concur with the following explanation, *ĪSD* 47,4–10, where Ratnakīrti is attacking the “natural relation” that, for his opponent, makes inferences possible:²⁵¹

tathā hi svābhāvikas tu dhūmādīnām vahnyādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ tadupādher anupalabhyamānatvāt, kvacid vyabhicārasyādarśanād iti tvayaivāsya lakṣaṇam uktam. etac cāsiddham, yata upādhiśabdena svato ’rthāntaram evāpekṣaṇīyam abhidhātavyam. na cārthāntaram dṛśyatāniyatam, adṛśyasyāpi deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya sambhavāt. tataś ca dhūmasyāpi hutāśena saha sambandhe syād upādhiḥ, na copalakṣyata iti katham adarśanān nāsty eva yataḥ svābhāvikasambandhasiddhiḥ.

For it is so: “But the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc. is natural, because an additional attribute in this [relation] is not cognized, [and] a deviation [of smoke from fire] is nowhere observed.”²⁵² This definition of that [natural relation] was given by you yourself[, an

the same sense as Ratnakīrti, cf. *PV* I 52–55 (trl. appendix A.1.4, cf. also footnote 454). Śāntarakṣita subsumes all categories under the term *upādhi* in *TS*₈ 2ab: *guṇadravyakriyājāṭisamāvādyupādhibhiḥ* (cf. appendix B.1 for a translation).

²⁵¹Cf. Patil 2009: 117–127 for a deeper analysis of this passage in its context.

²⁵²I follow the translation of this passage in Patil 2009: 123 f., and understand the two justifications to be in the same relation to the main sentence, adding an “and” to reflect this. So smoke is a sure sign of fire, because a) no additional attribute of smoke that might otherwise cause its relation to fire is perceived, and b) smoke is never seen where there is no fire. It is the first point that Ratnakīrti attacks in the next sentences.

opponent, at ĪSD 46,8–9]. But this is not established, since what is meant by the word[s] “additional attribute” is [some] required thing other than [the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc.] itself. But another thing is not limited to visible [things], because an invisible [thing], distant in location, time or essence, is possible. And therefore, there may be an additional attribute in the relation even of smoke with fire (*hutāśa*), but it is not seen. So how does [this additional attribute] not exist at all [only] because [it is] not observed, so that [you believe] there is an establishment of a natural relation?²⁵³

In the explication of what the word “additional attribute” means, Ratnakīrti here makes two points: it is another thing, and it is required. This can be expected to include all categories except the first, substance, since that would hardly be what is dependent on another object, whereas all other categories are dependent on substances.²⁵⁴

The example in the background of this passage²⁵⁵ is that smoke is a correct reason for inferring the presence of fire. It is correct because, amongst other reasons, no additional attribute is involved in the relation between the two that causes the connection of smoke with fire.²⁵⁶ This means that there is no thing, other than the relation of the two terms, which makes the inference from smoke to fire valid.

²⁵³For the broader context of this passage, cf. Patil 2009: 105 ff., and see Patil 2009: 123 f. for another translation.

²⁵⁴Acc. to Ratnakīrti, the only way any kind of *dravya* (as *dharmin*) can be qualified by *sāmānyaguṇakarmādi* (as *dharma*) is in fact *upakāra*, cf. § 28.

²⁵⁵Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 100 f., n. 270 and Patil 2009: 105.

²⁵⁶It is important to note that here “relation of smoke with fire” is not the same as “relation of fire with smoke”: in the first case, an inference from the relation’s first term, smoke, to its second term, fire, is valid, but in the second case it is not. Cf. ĪSD 46,7–8: *tathā hi dhūmādīnām vahnyādibhiḥ saha sambandhaḥ svābhāviko na tu vahnyādīnām dhūmādibhiḥ*. (“For it is so: the connection of smoke and so on with fire and so on belongs to the nature [of smoke and so on]; but [the connection] of fire and so on with smoke and so on does not.” See also the translation in Patil 2009: 105) Fire is not a correct reason for inferring smoke, since smoke depends on the “additional attribute” of wet fuel.

This also finds support in Ratnakīrti's somewhat ironic conclusion that “in the relation even of smoke with fire”, a standard example of a correct pervasion, an additional attribute could be present if all that is required is that it not be observed.

The second point is that this additional attribute is “required”. As noted above, Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101) translates a similar passage: “...some other thing by the dependence on which [the *probans* is related to the *probandum*, i.e. if *x* needs *z* in order to be related with *y*, this *z* is called *upādhi*].” This highlights the import of the second point very nicely: there is no relation of fire with smoke without the additional element “wet fuel.”

Comment 2. In § 29, Vācaspati's phrase *ekopādhinā sattvena viśiṣṭe tasmīn* suggests that he himself accepts that *sattva* is an *upādhi*. This usage of the term *upādhi* at this point is perhaps not as decisive as it looks at first sight.

The passage that Ratnakīrti quotes addresses one of the points made by Vācaspati in NVTṬ 110,2 ff. (=PV I 52; 53ab; 55), exemplified by the following objection:²⁵⁷

NVTṬ 109,14–17: *api ca vastuniveśe jātyādīnām upādhīnām ekasya vastunaḥ sattvaṃ ca dravyatvaṃ ca pārthivatvaṃ ca vrkṣatvaṃ ca śiṃśapātvaṃ copādhaya iti dūrād ekopādhiviśiṣṭasya grahe sarvopādhiviśiṣṭagrahaprasaṅgaḥ.*

Moreover, if additional attributes such as a genus etc. rest in a real thing, then—because a single real thing has [these] additional attributes[, i.e.,] existence, substantiality, treeness, and *śiṃśapā*ness—there is the unwanted consequence that, when that [thing] qualified by a single additional attribute is grasped from a distance, it is grasped as qualified by all additional attributes.

²⁵⁷NVTP 274,1 explains: *yasyāpīyādivārttikārtham dūṣayati-na caikeneti*. (With the words “Not by a single [additional attribute]” [Vācaspatimīśra] falsifies the aim of the *Vārttika* stated by the words “For whom” etc.) “*Vārttika*” here refers to PV I 52, which was quoted in NVTṬ 110,3–4.

Vācaspati's answer can be read as simply repeating the formulation of this objection very closely.²⁵⁸ It does therefore not have to be taken as endorsing that *sattva* really is an additional attribute and not a proper *jāti*.

In conclusion, we can say with certainty that the term “*upādhi*” was used by Buddhists as a term for universals in a quite unspecific manner, as well as for other shareable attributes or features of things. It is possible that this term was used with the intention of denigrating the status accorded to proper universals in the realist system of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

4.1.8 *svabhāvopavarṇana* (ad § 29)

The rule mentioned in this argument is invoked in various passages of Ratnakīrti's works. Two passages give more details, PABhP 103,6 f. and KBhSA 77,10 f.:²⁵⁹

PABhP 103,1–7: *naiyāyikaparikalpitopamānanirākara-
nārtham apy ayam eva prayogo draṣṭavyaḥ, tasyāpi ni-
rviṣayatvāt. tathā hi samākhyāsambandhas tasya viṣayo
varṇyate. sa ca paramārthato nāsti. sa hi sambandhaḥ
sambandhibhyām bhinno 'bhinno vā. yadi bhinnas tadā
taylor iti kutaḥ. na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktavyam,
tad api kathaṃ teṣām iti cintāyām anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ.
na ca yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśāntaram antareṇa prakāśate
tathā sambandho 'pi sambandhāntareṇa sambaddho bha-
viṣyatīti vaktum ucitam. pramāṇasiddhe hi vasturūpe
'yam asya svabhāva iti varṇyate, yathā pradīpasyaiva.
sambandhas tu na pramāṇapratītaḥ.*

²⁵⁸Vācaspati's answer is quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 29.

²⁵⁹Probably VyN 14*.2–3 (VyN₂ 111,17 f.) should also be considered here: *pramā-
nasiddhe hi rūpe svabhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvalambanenaiva vastusva-
rūpavyavasthā.* Trl. by Lasic (2000b: 71): “Wenn nämlich ein Ding (*rūpa*) durch
eine gültige Erkenntnis erwiesen ist, stützen wir uns (bei der Erklärung) auf das
Wesen. Nur kraft dessen, daß man sich auf das Wesen stützt, ergibt sich aber keine
Feststellung eines realen Dinges.”

Exactly this inference²⁶⁰ is to be observed also in order to reject comparison[, a means of valid cognition] imagined by the Naiyāyikas,²⁶¹ because that too does not have an object. For it is so: the connection with a name is described as the object of this [comparison]. But that connection does not really exist. For this connection is either different from the two [things] that have a connection, or not different. If different, then why [is it a connection] “of these two”? Neither can one say [in answer to this question] that [these two are connected] because of another connection, as, when one considers: “Also this [other connection], how [could it belong] to these?”, an infinite regress would follow. Nor can it be said that, in the same way that a lamp illuminates without another illumination, so also a connection becomes connected without another connection. For if the form of a real thing has been established by a means of valid cognition, it is explained: “That [is] the nature of that.”, as it indeed is for a lamp. But a connection is not known through a means of valid cognition.

KBhSA 77,10–13 *sthiratve ’py eṣa eva svabhāvas tasya yad uttarakṣaṇa eva karotīti cet. hatedānīm pramāṇapratyāśā, dhūmād atrāgnir ity atrāpi svabhāva evāsya yad idānīm atra nirāgnir api dhūma iti vaktuṃ śakyatvāt.*

²⁶⁰I.e., the inference in PABhP 102,10–11:

ihāpi prayogaḥ — yasya na viśayavattvaṃ na tasya prāmāṇyam. yathā keśoṅḍukajñānasya. na siddham ca viśayavattvam upamānājñānasyeti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. That which has no object[, hetu,] is not a means of valid cognition[, sādhyā], as the cognition of a net of hair [has no object and is therefore not valid, dṛṣṭānta]. And that a cognition through resemblance has an object is not established. This [is an inference by the reason] non-apprehension of the pervader[, i.e., of being a means of valid cognition].

²⁶¹Cf. NSū 1.1.3.

tasmāt pramāṇasiddhe svabhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvalambanena pramāṇavyālopaḥ.

[Opponent:] Even though persisting [through time], this [thing] has precisely this nature, [namely] that it produces [an effect] only at a later moment.²⁶² [Propo- nent:] Now confidence in means of valid cognition is destroyed, because it is possible to say that even in this [in- ference], “[There is] fire here, because [there is] smoke.”, this [smoke] has just the nature that now there is smoke here even without fire.²⁶³ Therefore a reliance on a [thing’s] nature [is justified] when [that thing] is estab- lished by a means of valid cognition. But there is no disintegration of a means of valid cognition by reliance on a nature.

Both passages, as § 29, involve the argument that when something is cognized by a means of valid cognition, its nature is made known.

The point, in both cases, is that the nature of a thing is known only after it has been established by a means of valid cognition. A merely assumed, imagined, or otherwise unestablished nature cannot be used to establish something, since that would undermine the authority of any means of valid cognition. The force of the invocation of this rule by Ratnakīrti in § 29 is that Vācaspati cannot simply posit a matter of fact, like the ontological difference of properties and their bearers, and then pretend that what results from this assumption is true (even if it is validly deduced from it). Perception, a means

²⁶²I.e., *uttarakāryotpādanasvabhāva*, the nature of producing a later effect. The question is how a thing that remains identically the same during a given period of time produces an effect at a certain time (such as its last effect in its last moment), but not at others. The opponent (Bhāsarvajña in the previous two paragraphs acc. to Woo 1999: 211) thinks that a nature such as “producing an effect at a later time” could help explain how this is achieved.

²⁶³Here Ratnakīrti is saying that we cannot simply posit a nature at will, as the opponent does in saying that a thing simply produces an effect only at a later time, but not always. If that were possible, we could just as well posit that smoke has the nature of existing without fire in a certain case, a move by which we would end even the most basic of inferences.

of valid cognition, does not show a real thing to have a structure of property and property bearer. One cannot discard this fact merely by presupposing that things do have that internal structure.

Ratnakīrti refers to this description of a thing's nature as a rule, *nyāya*. A formulation such as this would usually appeal to a text of the highest authority, cf., e.g., SJS 21,32–22,1: ...*iti nyāyaḥ. yad vārttikam...*, which is then followed by a quote of PV III 532b–d (see Bühnemann 1980: 63 for a translation of, and notes on, this passage), or ĪSD 44,10–11. But an exact source for this particular rule could not be found.

4.1.9 Grasping all that the sun is shining on (ad § 30)

The discussion found in the *NBhūṣ* about the supporter (*upakāraka*) and the supported (*upakārya*),²⁶⁴ quoted in part by Ratnakīrti in § 30, is directed against Dharmakīrti's analysis of this problem in PVSV 29,7–31,1 (cf. the trl. in appendix A.1.4). After having fully quoted the passage, Bhāsarvajña says:

NBhūṣ 246,30-247,5: *sarvopadrśye sūryādau grhyamāṇe 'pi na sarvatra draṣṭṛdarśanagrahaṇam asti. anenaitad api nirākṛtam — na hy anya evānyopakārako yo na grhītaḥ syāt. na cāpy upakārake tathāgrhīte upakāryāgrahaṇam tasyāpy agrahaṇaprasaṅgāt, svasvāmitvavad iti. evaṃ hi sūryagrahane tadupakāryasya trailokyasyāpi grahaṇam syāt. na hy upakāratvena grhītād anya eva trailokyopakārako bhānur yo na grhītaḥ syāt. upakārakagrahaṇe copakāryāgrahaṇam nāsti svasvāmitvavad ity evaṃvādinah sūryopakāryatrailokyagrahaṇam durnivāraṃ syāt.*

Even if that [which is] visible everywhere, the sun etc., is grasped, there is no grasping of observers [and their] observations everywhere. By this [statement] also this [following one]²⁶⁵ is refuted: [Opponent:] “For there is no

²⁶⁴See also section 4.1.6.

²⁶⁵This corresponds to PVSV 29,24–26.

really different supporter of something else that would not be grasped. Nor is there, when a supporter is grasped as such, no grasping of that which is supported, because of the unwanted consequence of not grasping that [supporter] either, as in the case of being property and owner.” [Proponent:] For, in this way, if the sun is grasped, the threefold world too, which is that supported by the sun, would be grasped. For since [the sun] is grasped as being the supporter, there is no truly different light supporting the threefold world which would not be grasped. And if the supporter is grasped, that which is supported would not be ungrasped, as in the case of being property and owner. For [those] believing [that it is] so, the grasping of the threefold world supported by the sun is hard to avoid.

4.1.10 *varṇākṛtyakṣarākāra ... (ad § 33, PV III 147)*

PV III 147²⁶⁶ poses two problems: Whose opinion is expressed here, and what exactly is a universal free of?

Dharmakīrti does not say who holds the opinion that the universal is empty of colour, form, etc. Manorathanandin simply identifies them as Sāmānyavādins, people teaching universals (PVV 161,17, cf. appendix A.4.1). Kamalaśīla attributes the same position to the Naiyāyika Bhāvivikta (cf. its presentation in TSP_§ ad TS_§ 715–717, and its criticism in TSP_§ ad TS_§ 738, trl. appendix B.3).

As Akamatsu (1983: 245, n. 158) notes, a very similar thought is also to be found in PVSV 55,9–10 (cf. trl. in appendix A.1.7). In his commentary on this passage, Kārṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 223,14–28) discusses two options: a universal can be separated or unseparated from colour (*varṇa*) and shape (*saṃsthāna*). The first argument, that it is separated, uses an argument suitable against anyone endorsing a Vaiśeṣika ontology: what appears in a conceptual cognition has colour and shape; these are qualities, and universals are distinct from them; hence, what appears in conceptual cognitions cannot be a universal.

²⁶⁶Cf. appendix A.3.1 for a translation.

4.1. Notes on individual passages of the *Apoḥasiddhi*

The second argument, against universals as not separated from those qualities, is directed against *ākṛtisāmānyavādin*-s: *ākṛti* (form) is Kumārila's preferred term for a universal,²⁶⁷ and the position argued against here also corresponds to his theory that this "form" is something that cannot be fully separated from the individual things. As an alternative, Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 223,22) says that the Sāṃkhya is in the habit of saying this. This fits in well with our general knowledge of those theories (see Frauwallner 1956: 154, and Vetter 1964: 43 f.).

Note that Karṇakagomin ends his explanation of this passage as follows, PVSVT 223,26–28:

*tad evam udyotakarādyabhihitam abhinnaṅpratiḥāsam
abhyupagāmya vyatirikṭasyāvyatirikṭasya ca sāmānya-
syāyogād bhrāntir evāyaṃ vyaktiṣv ekākārapratibhāsa ity
uktam.*

Thus, having assumed in this way an undifferentiated appearance [of different individual things to cognition], as proposed by Uddyotakara etc., a universal [either] separated [or] unseparated [from particulars] is not possible; therefore it was said that this appearance of a single form for individual things is only an error.

Karṇakagomin, then, is best understood here as saying that Dharmakīrti is arguing against "everyone who endorsed a universal,

²⁶⁷Cf. ŚV Āv 3–4ab:

*jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā
sāmānyam tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam
tannimittam ca yatkiñcit sāmānyam śabdagocaram* D'Sa 1980: 151:
"[It is] the *jātiḥ* [that] they call *ākṛtiḥ* [namely that] through which an individual [of a class] is form-ed. And this commonality is the source of a unified cognition of [all] individuals [of a class]. And this source, whatever it may be, is the common object (=denotation) of a word."

See J. A. Taber 2005: 217 f., n. 40 for a short characterization of the distinctive features of Kumārila's theory of universals. For the present purpose, the main point is this: "...all entities have a dual nature: from one point of view they are particular, from another universal" (J. A. Taber 2005: 217, n. 40)

be it separate from qualities or not” in this passage. With “Uddyotakara etc.” Karṇakagomin, therefore, refers to all these persons, and not just the Naiyāyikas.

For the context in which Ratnakīrti quotes PV III 147, then, one should take Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas as being the target, the only ones in the various groups who clearly say a universal cannot have the qualities with which it does, according to Ratnakīrti, appear in a conceptual awareness.

The second difficulty is this: it is not clear whether Dharmakīrti’s intention here is that a *sāmānya* is said to be free of the forms of colour, form, and letter, or whether it is that it is said to be free of colour, shape, and the form of a letter. Ratnakīrti uses the phrase “*akṣarākāraparikaritāḥ*” later on (l. 196, p. 60), suggesting that he understands *akṣarākāra* as a unit. But still, one could analyse the compound in Dharmakīrti’s verse either as “colour, shape, and the form of letters” or “the form of colour, shape, and letters”. While Kamalaśīla explains that in Bhāvivikta’s position by *akṣara*-s the individual letters are meant that make up a word (“C-o-w”), he does not say how he understands the compound as a whole. Manorathanandin is clear (cf. appendix A.4.1): he interprets Dharmakīrti as saying that a universal is free of the appearances or forms (*ābhāsa* or *ākāra*, PVV 161,13 *ad* PV III 147ab) of colour, shape, and letters.²⁶⁸ One thus has slightly better support for the understanding “the form of colour, shape, and letters”.

4.1.11 *Forms of khyāti (ad § 34)*

In § 34, Ratnakīrti gives four explanations for the error that might account for the cognition of a universal. These four explanations are apparently closely linked to four theories of *khyāti*, appearance or false appearance, the equivalences being as follows:²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸Karṇakagomin, glossing the similar passage in PVSV 55,9–10, mentions an opponent who tries to escape by saying that “a universal certainly has the form of colour etc.” (PVSVṬ 223,17–18: *varṇādyākāram eva sāmānyam iti ced ...*) This also suggests an understanding of the compound as “forms of colour, shape, and letters.”

²⁶⁹In general, see Schmithausen 1965: 141 ff. for a systematic discussion of the following (and other) error theories. Glossing over many of the finer specifics, the

1. *ātmakhyāti* (appearance of a self): that a cognition of a false universal is nothing but the unfolding of awareness itself due to mnemonic impressions (*vāsanāvaśād ...vivarto 'yam astu*, starting l. 203, p. 61).
2. *asatkhyāti* (appearance of a non-existent thing): that that which appears as a universal has no real existence at all (*asad eva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu*, starting l. 203, p. 61).
3. *anyathākhyāti* (appearance in another way): that it is only the particulars that appear other than they are, due to their differences being concealed (*vyaktaya eva ...°vyavadhānāt*, starting l. 204, p. 61).
4. *smṛtipramoṣa* (deprivation of memory): that memory interferes with the correct cognition, but does not come to awareness as memory (*smṛtipramoṣo*, starting l. 205, p. 61).

These theories are endorsed, respectively, by authors belonging to the Yogācāra, the Madhyamaka and Vedānta, the Nyāya and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā schools.²⁷⁰

Ratnakīrti himself, even though he says here that it does not matter which of the error theories is the right one,²⁷¹ explains the

main ideas are as follows: *ātmakhyāti* means that the content (or object appearing) in an erroneous cognition is only that cognition itself, not an external object. *asatkhyāti* means that there is an appearance of a non-existing object in erroneous cognition. According to *anyathākhyāti*, something real appears differently than it is. *smṛtipramoṣa*, usually associated with the *akhyāti* (non-appearance) theory, means that the memory involved (according to this theory) in erroneous cognition does not come to awareness: “The fifth theory [of the 8 different theories of erroneous cognition discussed in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*–PMA] is held by the Prābhākaras. They maintain that the perceptual error expressed as ‘this is a snake’ is, in fact, partly confused with the memory of the snake, but the perceiver is not aware at that moment that it is a memory.” (Potter 1977: p. 412, cf. also Schmithausen 1965: 206 f.).

²⁷⁰This is how the VV presents the matter, acc. to the analysis in Schmithausen 1965: 92–106. Note that Bhaṭṭa Jayanta classifies Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s theories of conceptual cognition as, respectively, *ātmakhyāti* and *asatkhyāti*. See Kataoka 2017a: 26, and the translation of that passage in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 67. For a discussion of the broader implications, see Kataoka 2017b and McAllister 2017a.

²⁷¹This is only a preliminary statement, and is meant to support only the main point of this paragraph: that cognition of a real universal is entirely wrong (*bhrāntir eva āsau*, § 34).

appearance of a universal as an erroneous cognition in a way that commits him to the *ātmakhyāti* position as described in the VV.²⁷² This becomes fairly clear from an argument in § 52:

kiṃ tarhi svavāsanāvīpākavaśād upajāyamānaiva buddhir apaśyanty api bāhyaṃ bāhye pravṛttim ātanotīti viplutaiva. (Trl. page 120)

Ratnakīrti here makes two points that are important in the *khyāti* context. First, an awareness event does not “see” an external object, and so nothing other than itself appears in it.²⁷³ Second, an awareness comes about only by force of the ripening of its own mnemonic impressions (*vāsana*-s). These two statements, in addition to the usage of *adhyavasāya* that, based on an internal form of awareness, externalizes the object of cognition (cf. section 5.4), undoubtedly support his endorsement of *ātmakhyāti* to explain the erroneous cognition of a similarity between particulars.

Kataoka (2009: 484–482) has made it clear that, at least for Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, these error theories were of importance for describing the differences between the *apoha* theories of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, who explained the erroneous cognition of universals according to the *ātmakhyāti* and *asatkhyāti* theories, respectively.²⁷⁴

4.1.12 *Proving a universal like a sense faculty (ad ll. 214–218 in § 35)*

Ratnakīrti here presupposes an opponent who wishes to prove a universal in the same way as a sense faculty is proven.²⁷⁵ The

²⁷²Acc. to Schmithausen 1965: 233 f., this is also Dignāga’s, Dharmakīrti’s, and Jñānaśrī’s position. For Dharmakīrti’s position, also cf. PV I 68–70 (translated in Dunne 2004: 339).

²⁷³Cf. also the discussion of Ratnakīrti’s position in § 15.

²⁷⁴Jayanta’s views are translated and discussed in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 54–57; 67. Kataoka 2017b discusses the consequences for Dharmottara’s epistemological framework, and McAllister 2017a investigates Ratnakīrti’s evaluation of this difference in the epistemological frameworks of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara.

²⁷⁵Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 74 for a reference to such a proof of a sense faculty.

opponent is not named in this passage. This sort of proof is already referred to in PVSV 16,12–14, where an opponent wishes to show that the self or the soul (*ātman*) is inferable, like a sense faculty. The argument there is as follows:

PVSV 16,12–14: *indriyādīnām tu vijñānakāryasya kādācitkatvāt sāpekṣyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate — kim apy asya kāraṇam astīti. na tv evambhūtam iti.*

But²⁷⁶ the general acceptance of the sense faculties etc., which [is] due to an establishment of [their] dependency based on [their] effect[, i.e.,] a cognition, being occasional, is stated as “This [cognition] has some sort of cause.”,²⁷⁷ but not as “[This cause is] just so.”

Karṇakagomin’s commentary on this passage is as follows:

[PVSVṬ 73,8–16]: *yathā nityaparokṣāṇām apīndriyādīnām anumānaṃ tathātmano bhaviṣyatīti ced āha— indriyāṇām ityādi. ādiśabdāt smṛtibijādīnām. vijñānam eva kāryaṃ tasya kādācitkatvāt. tathā hi satsv api rūpālokamanaskāreṣu nimīlitalocanādyavasthāsu vijñānasyābhāvāt, punaś conmīlitalocanāvasthāsu bhāvāt, vijñānakāryaṃ kāraṇāntaraṃ sāpekṣaṃ sidhyati, tato ‘sya sāpekṣyasiddhyā indriyādīnām prasiddhir ucyate. etad uktam bhavati—yat sāpekṣam idaṃ kādācitkaṃ vijñānam, tat kim apy asya vijñānasya kāraṇam astīty anumīyate. tad eva cendriyam iti vyavahriyate. na tv evambhūtam iti na rūpavīśeṣeṇa mūrttatvādīnā yuktam indriyam anumīyata ity arthaḥ.*²⁷⁸

[Opponent:] There should be [an inference] of the self in the same way as there is an inference even of what is permanently beyond the senses, such as the sense faculties

²⁷⁶This passage is also translated in Gillon and Hayes 2008: 347, and in Steinkellner 2013: I.40.

²⁷⁷This sentence seems to have been skipped in Gillon and Hayes 2008: 347.

²⁷⁸I have changed the text’s punctuation in part according to handwritten marks in Frauwallner’s copy of Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1943.

etc.. [Proponent:] [So Dharmakīrti] said: **Of the sense faculties** etc. From the word **etc.** [one understands also] “the seeds of memory etc.” **Because** this, **a cognition**, which alone is **the effect, is occasional**. For it is so: because, even when form, light, [and] cognitive activity exist, [that] cognition does not exist in [certain] conditions, such as when the eyes are closed etc., and because, furthermore, it exists in [certain other] conditions[, such as when] the eyes are opened, the effect, [namely] cognition, is established as having a dependency on another [hidden] cause; therefore, **the general acceptance** of sense faculties etc. **through an establishment of its**[, i.e., the effect’s, cognition’s,] **dependency is stated**. [By this] the [following] is said: that, which is this dependent, occasional cognition, is inferred as “**This cognition has some kind of cause**.” And only this [cause] is conventionally treated as “sense faculty.” **But not** [as] “[This cause is] **just so**.” meaning that a sense faculty is not inferred as connected with being corporeal etc.

According to Kaṛṇakagomin’s interpretation, sense faculties are inferred from the fact that perceptions, dependent on the sense faculties, do not occur when the sense faculties are not active. But what cannot be inferred from their non-occurrence is of what nature those faculties are: the cause is just called, or thought of as, “sense faculty”, without any indication of what kind of thing this is.

In Dharmakīrti’s argument it is the self (*ātman*) that is permanently beyond perception. In Ratnakīrti’s passage it is the universal that, so the opponent, is permanently beyond perception (or at least not perceivable apart from its manifestation). The following points can be made about Ratnakīrti’s appeal to the argument as found in the *PVI*:

The argument of Ratnakīrti’s opponent seems to be: that which is imperceivable can be known by its effect. A universal is not perceivable as such, but there is the effect of a cognition of sameness

between things. This must be the effect of the universal, which proves that it exists.²⁷⁹

Ratnakīrti then counters: what is established is only an occasionally active cause in general. When the cognition “cow” occurs, that cause, a universal according to the opponent, is active, but is inactive when the cognition does not occur. But since the absence of the cognition “cow” can be explained also by the absence of all particular cows,²⁸⁰ there is no justification for assuming that the actual, yet hidden, cause is a permanent and real universal.

At first sight, however, it might seem that there is an important difference between Dharmakīrti’s and Ratnakīrti’s arguments. For

²⁷⁹How this last sentence follows from the previous one is very unclear, mainly since the opponent and the exact theory supporting this relation of a hidden cause and the effect are unknown.

²⁸⁰See Halbfass 1970: 146–147 for an overview of the positions that Naiyāyikas held regarding the difficulty how a single real entity, the universal, can be spread out over its particular manifestations. Essentially, there were two positions: the *jāti* is held to be either *svaviśayasarvagatva* (present only in the individual things that count as instances of this genus), or *sarvasarvagatva* (truly omnipresent, occurring also in things and places that do not belong to the class it defines). On the former view, the unity of the universal becomes problematic, and on the latter view it is difficult to explain why a universal is not constantly cognized, even though it is present everywhere. The latter is endorsed, for example, by Vācaspati, as is mentioned in Potter 1977: 139, and also in the summary by Matilal (1977: 474 f.). The passage referred to by them might be this one, where he explains how a universal co-existent with everything is limited only to certain instances:

NVTT 353,13–15: *tathā sāmānyam api sarvāsambaddham api sarvaiḥ sahāvatiṣṭhate. yās tu asya vyaktayas tābhiḥ paraṃ sambadhyate. tathā ca yatra jāyante vyaktayas tatrāsambaddhāv api staḥ sāmānyasamavāyāv iti. tāsāṃ janmaiva sāmānyasamavāyāvacchedaḥ.*

In that way also a universal, even though not connected with everything, exists together with everything; but later (*param*) [it] is connected with its manifestations. And in such a way, a universal and inherence exist in that [place], even though [previously] not connected [to that place], where a manifestation is generated. The very generation of these [manifestations is] the limitation of universal and inherence [to a particular place].

the former, the effect is occasional, but for the latter it is the cause that is occasional.²⁸¹ But Ratnakīrti makes it clear in the next sentence (*yadā hi ...*), which is an explication of the reason “by the effect cognition” (*jñānakāryatas*), that the cognition is occasional too.

For Ratnakīrti, the inference to the existence of sense faculties is important also in the context of the discussion of *īśvara*, the god who, according to some Naiyāyikas, constructs the world out of its atomic parts. In one variant of the argument the opponent claims that, like particular properties of the visual sense faculty—that it discerns form and colour—can be inferred from visual perceptions, the specific properties of a construing agent—being omniscient—can be inferred from the specific properties of the world.²⁸²

4.1.13 *Chance cognitions (ad § 35)*

In JNĀ 221,11–16, a more detailed variant of this argument is found:

yat punar ākasmikatvam uktam tad ayuktam, janakasāmagrībhedasya bhavatāpy avasīyasvīkaraṇīyativāt. katham anyathā indriyārthau nirvikalpakajñānanajananiyatau dṛṣṭau vikalpam utpādayataḥ? tasmāt pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasmarāṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānasāmarthyeyam sāmagrī vikalpam utpādayatīti nirviṣayam jñānam utpādayatīty evārthaḥ,²⁸³ nirviṣayatāniṣṭhatvād vikalpatāyās tadamśena. tad varam vijātīyavikalpavad vispaṣṭapratibhāsād anubhavād bhinna eva sajātīyavikalpo 'pīty eva sādhu, tasmān na jātisiddhir adhyakṣāt.

²⁸¹In a similar discussion in TS_g 1400–1, it is also the effect, the cognition, which is occasional, and not the cause. Cf. Kunst 1939: 40 ff. for a translation of and comments on that discussion.

²⁸²The opponent’s position in this matter is described in ĪSD 33,32–34,13, and Ratnakīrti responds in ĪSD 50,7–50,14. See Patil 2009: 3.1.2 for an examination of this argument.

²⁸³Corrected from the manuscript against *utpādayaty evārthaḥ* acc. to McCrea and Patil 2010: 177, n. 77.

The²⁸⁴ accidentality [of a universal's cognition,] which was stated [by you], is not correct, because even you necessarily have to admit a difference of the producing collection [of causes]. How else can sense faculty and object, both observed as restricted to generating non-conceptual cognitions, produce a conceptual cognition? Therefore, that this collection [of causes], possessing a capacity enriched by the assisting cause of a memory of an earlier observation of a material thing, produces the conceptual cognition, only means that it produces a cognition without an object, because [the fact] that there is a conceptual cognition [in accordance to] a part of that [object] is based on not having a [real, and thus partless,] object. So [it would be] better that also a conceptual cognition of that of the same genus, like a conceptual cognition of that of another genus, is completely differentiated from experience[, i.e., perception,] which [alone] has a distinct appearance [of an object].²⁸⁵ That alone is right. Therefore there is no proof of a genus from perception.

Note that Ratnakīrti's argument ends on a slightly different note: a genus does not appear either in perception or in verbal apprehension (cf. l. 211, p. 62).

This could simply be Ratnakīrti's explication of the intent of Jñānaśrīmitra's argument as he saw it: both verbal apprehension and perception have an aspect of direct appearance. In neither is any evidence for a real universal found.

²⁸⁴Cf. also the translations in Akamatsu 1983: 119 f., and McCrea and Patil 2010: 81.

²⁸⁵Cf. the explanations of this argument by McCrea and Patil (2010: 166, n. 174). Apparently, the opponent here would accept that a conceptual cognition like "This is not a horse." cannot be generated from the experience of a universal, unlike the cognition "This is a cow."

That a genus is the cause for words and cognitions is argued for both by Kumārila and by Naiyāyika authors.²⁸⁶ In the *Apoḥasiddhi*, this position is explicitly ascribed to Trilocana in § 41, and is involved in the effect-reason (*kāryahetu*) used in the inference of § 44. It is therefore very likely that Ratnakīrti is here generalizing the views of opponents who postulate real universals as causes of cognitions.

Nevertheless, a lead to a historical person might be found in NBhV 303,11 ff., where a position is presented (and argued against) that appeals to cognitions of individual things not being accidental as a proof for the genus being the word referent (*viśeṣapratyayānām anākasmikatvācca* NBhV 303,11). This passage is also quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 301,19–25) as an exemplification of the position that a universal is imagined as existing only in its proper substrates, even though it is different from them (cf. PVSV 76,25–77,4, trl. appendix A.1.10). Whoever endorsed that particular position might be expected to argue that there is the result of the accidentality of conceptual cognitions, because the genus responsible for the correctness of these cognitions is missing. Also note the similar discussion in PVSV 82,4–25 (cf. trl. appendix A.1.11), where Dharmakīrti defends himself against the objection that, without a universal, cognitions and denotations are without cause. Acc. to Frauwallner

²⁸⁶ For an argument of Kumārila's, cf. ŚV Āv 37–38, a passage also quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 320,12–15) in the context of PV I 162 (trl. appendix A.1.11).

As regards the Naiyāyika positions, this point is typically made in commenting on NSū 2.2.70: *samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ* (Trl.: “A genus has the nature of producing the same.”). The question is what it is that is called “the same”. Halbfass (1970: 145) underlines the realistic (as opposed to cognitive) role, translating: “It is the essence of jāti to produce common attributes.” Cf. also NVT 450,15–17:

prasūta iti prasavaḥ. samānabuddher bhinneṣu prasotrī jātiḥ. atra ca yā jātiḥ, sāvaśyam samānapratyayaṃ prasūte. na punar yā samānapratyayaṃ prasūte sā jātiḥ, pācakādiṣu vyabhicārād iti.

It produces, so **production**. A **genus** is productive of the **same** awareness for different things. And here the genus is that which necessarily produces the same apprehension. But that which does not [necessarily] produce the same apprehension is not the genus, because of the deviation in such cases as cook etc.

(1933: 69, and p. 83), Dharmakīrti is arguing against Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas in these passages.

4.1.14 *Dharmottara's argument (ad § 50)*

DhAP 243,27–244,9:²⁸⁷

gal te dgag pa'i shes pa phyi rol la ni ma yin te, de mi snang ba'i phyir ro. blo dang gzung ba'i rnam pa la yang ma yin te, de gnyis ni nyams su myong bar bya ba nyid yin pa'i phyir ro. sgro btags pa la yang ma yin te, de yang de'i tshe sgro btags kyi rang bzhin du gzung ba dgag par mi nus pa'i phyir ro. de bzhin du sgrub pa'i shes pa yang phyi rol la ni ma yin te, mi snang ba'i phyir ro. blo la sogs pa rnam kyang yod pa la 'khrul pa med pa'i phyir 'di dag la mi rigs ma yin nam zhe na bden te, phyi rol dang blo dang rnam pa dang sgro btags pa la yang dgag pa dang sgrub par rtog pa ma yin no. sgrub pa dang dgag pa dag ni sgro btags gang zhig phyi rol nyid du nges par byas pa de dang 'brel pa yin te, dper na sbrul sgrub pa dang dgag pa'i shes pa thag pa'i rdzas la ni ma yin te, mi snang ba'i phyir ro. sbrul gyi blo dang gzung ba'i rnam pa dang²⁸⁸ sgro btags kyi sbrul la yang ma yin te, de dag ni rang gi rang bzhin du yod pa la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir ro. 'on kyang sgro btags kyi sbrul gang zhig phyi rol gyi sbrul nyid du nges par byas pa de ni sgrub pa dang dgag par nges pa bzhin no.

[Opponent:] There is no negating cognition for an external [thing], because that [thing] does not appear [in any negating, and hence conceptual, cognition]. Neither is there [a negating cognition] for an awareness and a grasped form, because these two are perceived. Nor is

²⁸⁷Also cf. the translation in Frauwallner 1937: 265 f.

²⁸⁸Frauwallner places a *shad* after this *dang*, DhAP 244,6. It is probably only a misprint, since the *dang* has a dash affixed to it which indicates that it was not to be separated from the following word.

there [a negating cognition] for a superimposed [object], because it too—being grasped at that time with its own nature of superimposition—cannot be negated. In the same way, there is no affirming cognition for an external [object], because [it] does not appear. And because awareness and so on do not go astray with regard to what exists, [an affirming cognition] is not incorrect with regard to these[, i.e., awareness and so on].²⁸⁹ [Propo-
nent:] True. For an external [object], awareness, a form, and a superimposed [thing] there is no negating or affirming conceptual cognition. Affirming and negating are connected with some superimposed [thing] that is ascertained as being external. Like there is no cognition affirming and negating a snake for the material entity rope, since [that rope] does not appear [to that cognition]. [Such a cognition] also does not exist for the awareness of snake, the grasped form of “snake”, and the snake that is superimposed, because they do not go astray with regard to what exists as their own proper nature. However, some superimposed snake that is ascertained as an external snake is ascertained as established or negated.

The main differences between Dharmottara’s model, exemplified in the passage just quoted, and Ratnakīrti’s model of the object everyday activity concern how determination works. While Dharmottara maintains a form of *asatkhyāti*, according to which something unreal or “fabricated” (see Kataoka 2017b) features in conceptual cognition

²⁸⁹This interpretation is not the same as that in Frauwallner 1937: 266: “Und da auch die Erkenntnis usw. mit dem Sein fest verbunden ist (*avya|bhicārah*), ist sie auch bei diesen nicht am Platz.” The idea is here understood as follows: awareness, a grasped form, and a superimposed object cannot deceive a person with regard to something that exists. As Dharmottara explains in his answer (DhAP 244,7–8: *de dag ni rang gi rang bzhin du yod pa la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir ro.*), this means they cannot be deceiving with regard to what exists in their own form. But if these objects of an affirming cognition must exist when and as they are cognized, an affirmation of them is useless.

and is conventionally affirmed or negated, Ratnakīrti subscribes to an *ātmakhyāti* model, in which it is the erroneous grasping of the form that awareness has which produces conventional activity that is directed at external things.

The full background of this passage, and why it is that Ratnakīrti sees a difference between his and Dharmottara’s positions, presuppose a deeper examination of Ratnakīrti’s CAPV, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study.²⁹⁰

4.1.15 *Five candidates for śabdārtha (ad § 55–§ 57)*

The verse, spread over § 55 and § 57 and interspersed with a prose sentence, is in the *vasantatilakā* metre (as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 7). Frauwallner (1931: 234) doubts whether this verse was written by Jñānaśrī. It is not found in the *JNĀ*, so one should assume that it was composed by Ratnakīrti himself, who is not basing himself on Jñānaśrīmitra in his formulation of the inference establishing exclusion (starting § 54).

In § 55, Ratnakīrti lists five opinions on what a word referent is if it is not *anyāpoha*: a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to that additional attribute, something qualified by an additional attribute, and, lastly, a form that appears to awareness.

The verse in which he says this has thematic equivalents throughout *apoha* treatises. PS(V) 5 says that a word for a genus does not denote either particulars, a connection with a genus, a genus, or that having the genus:

PS(V) 5 2: *na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyād vyabhicāra-
taḥ /
vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair aprthakśruteḥ //* ²⁹¹

²⁹⁰Preliminary answers to these questions can be found in McAllister 2014, on what “mental content” is for these two authors, and in McAllister 2017a, on which cognitive functions are involved in conceptual cognitions. See also Kataoka 2017b for a close analysis of Dharmottara’s discussion of determination.

²⁹¹Following Pind 2015: II.8–14, we might paraphrase (a translation is difficult to give here, because the construction of the verse is heavily dependent on the surrounding prose): “A general term does not [denote] particulars, because they are

PS(V) 5 4ab: *tadvato nāsvatantratvād upacārād asamhāvāt* /²⁹²

The same point, but with the addition that a form of awareness is not the referent of a word, is made in TS_§ 870 (cf. trl. appendix B.4):²⁹³

TS_§ 870 *yataḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogo jātīmāṃs ta-thā /
buddhyākāro na śabdārthe ghaṭāmañcati tattvataḥ / /*

4.2 THE ARGUMENT STRUCTURE OF THE *APOHASIDDHI*

4.2.1 Overview

The paragraph numbers refer to the paragraphs in the critical edition (chapter 2).

- A. § 1: Statement of the basic thesis: exclusion is the referent of words.
- B. §§ 2–6: Introductory objections and replies concerning this thesis.
- C. §§ 7–8: Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: the referent of words is a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others.
- D. §§ 9–31: Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a genus can be the referent of words.

infinite, [and] because [the term] is ambiguous. [It denotes] neither the general property nor the inherence relation, because it is not ‘heard apart’ from [words] whose referents are particular general properties.” Cf. Hayes 1988: 255 ff., Hattori 2000: 140 f., and Pind 2015: II.8–14 for actual translations, and Hattori 1996: 387 ff. for an overview of Dignāga’s arguments in this section.

²⁹²Following Pind 2015: II.21–27, we can paraphrase: “A word does not [denote] the [general property] possessor, because it is not self-dependent, because of transfer, [and] because [resemblance] is impossible.” For translations, cf. Hayes 1988: 261 f., Hattori 2000: 142, and Pind 2015: II.21–27.

²⁹³The refutation of these positions is found in TS_§ 871–884.

4.2. The argument structure of the *Apoahasiddhi*

- E. §§ 32–47: Arguments showing that a universal, or genus, cannot be the referent of words.
- F. §§ 48–49: Further refinement of the thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others.
- G. §§ 50–52: Refutation of Dharmottara’s view on the object of conceptual cognition.
- H. § 53: Final restatement of thesis
- I. §§ 54–58: A formal proof establishing the thesis.
- J. § 59: Verse summarizing the main points.
- K. § 60: End of text.

4.2.2 Detailed analysis

In the following, a detailed analysis of the AS’s argument structure is given. The numbers in the margin again refer to the paragraphs in the critical edition (chapter 2).

- A [Proponent:] General statement of thesis: Exclusion is the referent of words. § 1
- B Introductory objections and answers concerning the thesis. §§ 2–6
 - B.1 [Opponent:] Three explanations of exclusion are presented and refuted: § 2
 - B.1.1 [Proponent:] Exclusion is either
 - B.1.1.1 the external object itself (*bāhya*),
 - B.1.1.2 the form of awareness (*buddhyākāra*), or
 - B.1.1.3 mere exclusion of others.
 - B.1.2 [Opponent:] The first two alternatives (B.1.1.1, B.1.1.2) are wrong, because the word referent would only be a positive element. § 3
 - B.1.3 The third (B.1.1.3) alternative is wrong,
 - B.1.3.1 because conceptual cognition is perceived to have the form of a positive element, and does not make non-existence known, and
 - B.1.3.2 because what is so faulted by perception cannot be saved by another proof.

- §§ 4–6 B.2 Discussion of theories that the cognition of a non-existent object implies, or is somehow connected to, the cognition of non-existence.
- § 4 B.2.1 [Proponent:] A conceptual cognition does not cognize non-existence itself, but only what is non-existent.
- B.2.1.1 But the cognition of a qualifier (non-existence, B.1.3.1) is implied by the cognition of that qualified by it (that which is non-existent).
- B.2.1.1.1 This is an instance of the qualifier-qualified relationship.
- B.2.1.2 For realists, a conceptual cognition’s object is not the universal as such, but the universal as the qualifier of some instance,
- B.2.1.2.1 because of the appearance of a common form in awareness.
- B.2.1.3 In the same way, the cognition of what is non-existent, which implies the cognition of non-existence, justifies the everyday notion of “cognition of exclusion”.
- § 4 B.2.2 [Opponent:] Why call a cognition which has a positive form (B.1.3.1) and results from the appearance of a common form in awareness (B.2.1.2.1) a cognition with a non-appearing (B.2.1), non-existent (B.2.1) form in awareness?
- B.2.2.1 If a cognitive form of non-existence appeared, nobody would deny that there is a cognition of non-existence.
- B.2.2.2 Otherwise, a cognitive form of one thing could be taken for the cognitive form of another.
- § 5 B.2.3 [Proponent:] Due to the qualifier-qualified relation (B.2.1.1.1), a cognition of non-existence is contained in the cognition of what is non-existent.
- B.2.4 [Opponent:] Non-Existence as a qualifier is only an addition to the cognition of some positive element, so how should such a cognition be defined as a cognition of non-existence? For the qualifier “non-existence” does not appear.
- § 6 B.2.5 [Proponent:] What actually appears has a positive form (B.1.3.1), but there is also an exclusion of others for it. Therefore it is called cognition of non-existence.

4.2. The argument structure of the *Apoahasiddhi*

b.2.6 [Opponent:] Still, exclusion is only connected, and it is only a positive element that is actually cognized.

b.2.6.1 Otherwise also direct perception would have exclusion of others for its object,

b.2.6.1.1 because it also has a single thing excluded from all others as an object.

b.3 Conceptual cognitions therefore have a positive element as object, just like perception.

c [Proponent:] Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: A word's referent is §§ 7–8

c.1 a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others. § 7

c.2 It is not the positive element as such

c.3 nor the exclusion as such.

c.4 Affirmationists/negationists think that a positive element/exclusion (c.2/c.3) is the primary object of a conceptual cognition, and that negation/an excluded thing (c.3/c.2) is understood by implication. § 8

c.5 This is wrong, since there is no sequentiality in conceptual cognitions. Cognition of the positive element *is* the cognition of that excluded from others.

c.5.1 Even though a verbal expression does not represent its object as that excluded from others (b.1.3.1), exclusion is cognized, since it is a qualifier of the conceptual cognition (b.2.1.1),

c.5.1.1 because a word is based on what is excluded from others.

c.5.2 Therefore, a conceptual cognition of a positive element is necessarily simultaneous with a cognition of exclusion.

c.5.3 Absence can be grasped in a non-implicative or implicative way both by perception and conceptual cognition.

c.5.3.1 As for perception,

c.5.3.1.1 the non-implicative form is a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence, and

c.5.3.1.2 the implicative form is an awareness of a thing itself,

c.5.3.2 so for conceptual cognition

c.5.3.2.1 the non-implicative form is a capacity to impart activity in conformance to what appears in it, and

c.5.3.2.2 the implicative form is a consciousness of the thing itself, as it is for perception (c.5.3.1.2).

c.6 So if the exclusion of others were not formed simultaneously with the cognition of an object, no differentiation between objects would be possible in everyday activity.

§ 9–31 D Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a universal/genus can be a referent of words.

§ 9 D.1 Vācaspati says: The objects of a conceptual cognition are particulars qualified by a genus.

D.1.1 Since they are differentiated from that which is not of the same genus,

D.1.2 there is activity avoiding wrong objects (c.6).

D.2 [Proponent:] If it is the form of a particular that is excluded from that of another genus, then, even if it possesses a genus, how should there not be a cognition of other-exclusion?

D.2.1 For if it is only due to the particulars themselves that they are differentiated from other particulars, the genus doesn't matter.

§ 10 D.3 If the particular is not cognized as differentiated, then how could we successfully act upon particulars?

§ 11 D.4 If one cognizes a differentiated particular, then there is, in any case, a cognition of differentiation.

D.4.1 It does not matter whether the reason for the differentiation is the genus or only the particular's causal sequence (E.1.8, E.2.1.1.3),

D.5 Logical problems of exclusion being a qualifier dismissed:

§ 12 D.5.1 There is no error of mutual dependency in the theory that the positive element, which the convention of the word "x" is made for, is what is excluded from non-x,

D.5.1.1 because this error also pertains to the theory that a convention is made for a universal or that qualified by it.

D.5.1.1.1 The word "universal" does not mean a universal as such, but a specific universal. So there is the following circular dependency.

4.2. The argument structure of the *Apoahasiddhi*

d.5.1.1.1 Any cognition of a universal x-hood depends on the cognition of one of its instances, yet

d.5.1.1.2 any cognition of an instance of x-hood depends on the cognition of x-hood.

d.5.1.2 Therefore there is no error of mutual dependency if the conventional designation is made for a form of conceptual awareness which, preceded by a perception of a single particular, is generalized and externalized as if common to all real things of that class.

d.5.1.3 And if this manner of using a word is accepted, then it is also accepted that everything else can be designated by this word's negation.

d.5.2 Neither is there a contradiction between excluded and exclusion, nor any damage to the qualifier-qualified relationship pertaining between them, § 13

d.5.2.1 because an excluded thing and exclusion are not actually distinct entities.

d.5.2.2 For a thing contradicts its own absence, not another thing's absence.

d.6 Also a sentence is understood due to exclusion only. § 14

d.7 Therefore a positive element characterized by exclusion is understood from a word (c.1).

d.8 [Opponent:] If a positive element alone is the referent of words in this way, why is exclusion asserted (A)? § 15

d.9 [Proponent:] By the word exclusion a positive element qualified by exclusion of others (c.1) is meant.

d.9.1 This means, exclusion is simultaneously (c.5.2) understood as the qualifier in understanding a positive element.

d.9.2 Exclusion cannot be taken as the object of perception (B.2.6.1) in the same way, because there is no dispute as there is for conceptual cognition.

d.10 And by "positive element"

d.10.1 the external referent excluding others is meant according to determination, and

d.10.2 the form of awareness is meant according to appearance.

d.11 The external referent is what is to be denoted by a word because of determination only, not because an external thing appears as in perception

§ 16 d.11.1 Scriptural evidence: from a word, an object does not appear to someone as it would because of perception.

§ 17 d.11.2 [Opponent:] Even the same thing appears differently, depending on whether it is known through a sense faculty or through a word.

§ 18 d.11.3 [Proponent:] Different cognitions have their basis in different real things. So how should a single thing appear with different forms?

§ 19 d.11.3.1 For there are no two contradictory forms of a single thing, so that one could appear to perception, the other to conceptual cognition.

d.11.3.2 For there is no difference of a thing apart from the difference of its own nature.

d.11.3.3 And there is no difference of its own nature apart from the difference of appearance.

§ 20 d.11.4 [Opponent:] But there evidently are different appearances of one and the same thing, even in perception.

d.11.5 [Proponent:] A difference of appearances is not a sure sign for different things, but it is a sure sign for there not being the same object for the two cognitive faculties.

d.11.5.1 Therefore a difference of appearances accompanied by a difference of causal effectiveness etc. means a difference of the thing, and

d.11.5.2 a difference of appearances alone means that one appearance is wrong.

§ 21 d.11.6 Vācaspati: Even if both faculties have the real thing for an object, still they would apprehend it differently

d.11.6.1 because the difference between perceivable and imperceivable results from different causes.

d.11.7 [Proponent:] That's wrong, because there is no thing that is an object of the apprehension of something beyond the senses.

d.11.7.1 The difference of causes (d.11.6.1) is fulfilled by the fact that an apprehension of an imperceivable thing (e.g., an inference) does not grasp a perceptual object.

d.11.7.2 Therefore a particular does not appear in conceptual cognition.

d.11.7.3 Moreover, if words made a real thing known, negation and affirmation of properties would be either § 22

d.11.7.3.1 superfluous, as when “it exists” or “it does not exist” is said of an existent or non-existent thing, respectively, or

d.11.7.3.2 meaningless, as in the opposite case,

d.11.7.3.3 because a thing would be completely known on hearing the word alone.

d.11.7.4 Therefore, the fact that what appears in conceptual cognition is indifferent to the existence and nonexistence of an external referent excludes the possibility that a real thing could be the object of conceptual cognitions.

d.11.7.4.1 Vācaspati: This commonness (d.11.7.4) is possible also for a really existing universal, because § 23

d.11.7.4.1.1 a universal can be qualified by existence and nonexistence in so far as it is connected to present or past and future spatio-temporal things, respectively.

d.11.7.4.2 [Proponent:] This is not the point, and there is no harm to what we say,

d.11.7.4.2.1 insofar as it makes clear that Vācaspati also accepts that particulars are not denoted by words.

d.11.7.4.3 Additionally, the existential qualifications are cognized according to the nature of the particulars.

d.11.7.4.3.1 But to say that a universal is so qualified because of a connection to a particular is foolish.

d.11.7.4.4 There is the same error for a particular qualified by a genus (d.1).

d.11.7.4.4.1 For, if the cognition is established because of a particular, there is always the error of this cognition, may an additional genus (d.2) be cognized or not.

d.11.7.4.5 Kumārila’s followers: This commonness (d.11.7.4) § 24

is not erroneous because a thing has parts.

d.11.7.4.5.1 By one word one aspect is made known, e.g., a thing's treeness, independently of the thing's existence.

That is another other aspect made known by another word.

d.11.7.4.6 [Proponent:] Cognition of a permanent universal independently of its existential status is not possible.

§ 25 d.11.8 [Opponent:] A word presents its object in a different way than perception because they have different capacities.

d.11.9 [Proponent:] This was proven wrong by the error of two appearances when a single nature is grasped by perception and conceptual cognition (d.11.5).

d.11.10 The difference between the capacities of these two means of valid cognition is achieved by perception directly perceiving its object, whereas conceptual cognition determines it.

d.11.10.1 So, without the same appearance, conceptual and perceptual cognition do not have the same objects.

d.11.10.2 And absence cannot be the object of perception.

§ 26 d.11.11 [Opponent:] The word "tree" refers to the part treeness, and the word "is" refers to the part existence (d.11.7.4.5).

d.11.12 [Proponent:] For a particular completely comprehended by perception, there is no possibility of affirmation or negation of another property through either another word or another means of valid cognition.

d.11.12.1 [Opponent:] The need of a different means of knowledge is observed even in perception.

d.11.12.2 [Proponent:] That need exists only when perception has an object that one is not habituated to,

d.11.12.2.1 because perception has no ascertaining nature.

d.11.12.3 But how would another means of valid cognition help in the case of conceptual cognition, which is itself of an ascertaining nature?

d.11.12.4 But the need for other words and logical marks is a fact.

d.11.13 Consequently, the nature of a real thing is not grasped by conceptual cognition.

- d.12 Discussion about properties and property bearers (d.5.2).
- d.12.1 [Opponent:] Properties are different from each other, and different from the property bearer. § 27
- d.12.2 So, in conceptual cognitions, different properties are cognized through different expressions.
- d.12.3 [Proponent:] This is wrong,
- d.12.3.1 since perception refutes a distinction between property and property bearer, and
- d.12.3.2 since otherwise everything would be everywhere.
- d.12.3.2.1 Scriptural evidence: the appellations “property” and “property bearer” are only based on a conceptual difference.
- d.12.4 And even if this difference were real, § 28
- d.12.4.1 the only possible relation between property and its bearer is that of proximity qualified as assistance,
- d.12.4.1.1 because other relations like inherence etc. have been refuted.
- d.12.4.2 And in that case (d.12.4.1), conceptual cognition would work in the same way as perception, because
- d.12.4.2.1 as perception grasps all properties when grasping the property bearer due to their proximity to the sense faculties,
- d.12.4.2.2 so a cognition by a word or logical mark, which are both connected to their objects in a relation such as denoting and denoted etc., would cognize all properties,
- d.12.4.2.3 because there is no difference in the proximity as such.
- d.12.4.3 Vācaspati: But grasping a nature as qualified by an additional attribute, like existence, does not imply grasping all the other additional attributes also qualifying that nature, because § 29
- d.12.4.3.1 the nature of a substance is qualified by additional attributes,
- d.12.4.3.2 but is not identical with either the additional attributes or being that qualified by them (d.12.1).

d.12.4.4 [Proponent:] Bad argument, because grasping the other additional attributes (d.12.4.3) does not follow from non-difference (d.12.3.1),

d.12.4.4.1 since grasping the assisted where the assisting is grasped (d.12.4.1) follows only after their difference has been assumed (d.12.4).

d.12.4.5 Additionally, a cognition of a property and property bearer is not dependent on a real property and property bearer, because they are not established by a means of valid cognition, and the rule is:

d.12.4.5.1 when established by a means of valid cognition, the thing's nature is exactly described.

§ 30 d.12.4.6 *NBhūṣ*: Then there would be the cognition of all assisted things as soon as there is the cognition of an assisting thing like the sun etc.

d.12.4.7 [Proponent:] This is the result of misunderstanding our explanation.

d.12.4.7.1 In your view, if there is a difference between property and property bearer (d.12.1) and proximity is only assistance (d.12.4.1),

d.12.4.7.2 then only an assisted that is in the same place and has the property's form can be grasped when the assisting is grasped (d.12.4.4.1).

d.12.4.7.3 So it does not follow that that is grasped which is

d.12.4.7.3.1 an assisted in a different place and

d.12.4.7.3.2 another substance deviating from the observed.

§ 31 d.13 Therefore, whenever a thing's own nature is cognized, it is cognized as a whole.

d.14 So it is settled that a particular does not appear due to a word, a concept, or a logical mark (d.11).

32–47 E Arguments showing that a universal, or genus, cannot by itself be the referent of words.

§ 32 E.1 Neither does a universal appear in conceptual cognition.

E.1.1 On hearing a word the generalized constituent parts of an object appear which

4.2. The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

- e.1.1.1 are accompanied by letters, and
- e.1.1.2 are mixed together because the differences of things of the same genus are disregarded.
- e.1.2 This appearance is not a universal,
 - e.1.2.1 Scriptural Evidence: since a universal is said to be free of colour, form, and the form of letters. § 33
- e.1.3 So a universal is only an agglomeration of an object's generalized constituent parts which, § 34
 - e.1.3.1 although completely different for each particular,
 - e.1.3.2 are identified with the particular.
- e.1.4 This identification is only an error,
 - e.1.4.1 because such an exterior object is not attainable.
- e.1.5 Therefore the cognition of a universal has no object, no matter if this false cognition is due to
 - e.1.5.1 the external object being a transformation of the mind itself, or
 - e.1.5.2 the form being completely non-existent, or
 - e.1.5.3 the particulars themselves appearing so that the differences between them are obscured, or
 - e.1.5.4 a deprivation of memory that causes differences to be overlooked.
- e.1.6 So, there is no indication of a universal whatsoever.
- e.1.7 [Opponent:] If there is no universal, cognitions of things as being the same would be accidental. § 35
- e.1.8 [Proponent:] Wrong. A causal complex, aided by memory, generates a cognition that overrides specific differences, and so produces the conceptual cognition of a universal.
- e.1.9 So a genus appears neither in conceptual cognition (e.1) nor in perception.
- e.2 A genus is not established by inference, because a logical mark connected to the universal cannot be seen. § 36
 - e.2.1 A genus is not established like a sense faculty, because by the effect, cognition, only occasional other causes are established,
 - e.2.1.1 because the absence of the genus cognition depends solely on the absence of all the particulars of that genus, not on the absence of the genus itself.

E.2.1.1.1 [Opponent:] A cow is a cow only because of its cow-ness. If not, also a horse could be the material object cow.

E.2.1.1.2 [Proponent:] We could just as well say that cowness is cowness only because of the material object cow. If not, horseness would also be cowness.

E.2.1.1.3 Therefore a material object such as a cow exists only because of its particular sequence of causes (D.4.1), but cowness is irrelevant to the thing's existence.

§ 37 E.2.2 [Opponent:] The capacity to cause a cognition of a universal can be either

E.2.2.1 identical with a singular material object,

E.2.2.1.1 but then it is impossible that another object could make the same universal known;

E.2.2.2 or different from such an object,

E.2.2.2.1 but then this is a universal and we are only arguing about the name.

E.2.3 [Proponent:] The capacity is indeed not different for each thing.

E.2.3.1 But two things with the same capacity are no problem (E.2.2.1.1).

E.2.3.2 As for you a genus is

E.2.3.2.1 the cause of a common term, and

E.2.3.2.2 independent of all other genera,

E.2.3.3 so for us a particular is

E.2.3.3.1 independent of genera and differentiated by its own nature, and so

E.2.3.3.2 the cause of a common term.

§ 38 E.2.4 Trilocana: The cause for the cognition and appellation of universals is the inherence (D.12.4.1.1) of specific universals (D.5.1.1.1) in their respective basis.

E.2.5 [Proponent:] If only inherence in the particulars is the reason for these cognitions, what are the universals good for?

E.2.6 And even inherence (D.12.4.1.1) is not possible.

§ 39 E.2.6.1 Inherence is proven by the cognition "here in this that

inheres.” And the cognition “here” results from observing two different objects, one inhering in the other.

E.2.6.2 But genus and individual are never perceived as such in any object of a conceptual cognition.

E.2.6.3 So inherence is a conceptual construct.

E.2.7 Trilocana: The consistency of cognitions is then impossible, § 40 because it depends on a consistent object. But if the particulars are completely different, how can there be a basis for such a cognition?

E.2.8 [Proponent:] That is a bad argument,

E.2.8.1 because the reason used by Trilocana, a consistent cognition, is invalid also when it is supposed to prove genera, as they are always only instantiated in particulars.

E.2.9 Trilocana: Apart from a consistent object, there is no reason § 41 for the occurrence of consistent cognitions in specific cases.

E.2.10 [Proponent:] This refutation of the opposite case is wrong, because it has been proven (E.1.8–E.2.3) that one must accept the consistency (E.2.7) of appellations and apprehensions (E.2.4) due to the specificity of a thing’s own nature which is excluded from that of another nature.

E.2.10.1 Only the proximity (D.12.4.1) according to which a § 42 genus extends to some but not to other particulars is the basis for cognition.

E.2.11 *NBhūṣ*: In the Buddhist view then, the proximity of the § 43 thing x to the thing y is the basis of the common usage “y has x.” So what use is the x then (E.2.5)?

E.2.12 [Proponent:] That argument is wrong, since what is meant is this:

E.2.12.1 that the observation of x in proximity to y is the reason for the cognition “y has x” is not denied.

E.2.12.2 But no universal is ever observed to be in proximity to an individual thing.

E.2.12.3 Therefore it is better, if one wants to imagine a universal at all, to only imagine proximity as the cause of consistent cognitions.

- § 44 e.2.13 [Opponent:] The following inference proves universals.
 e.2.13.1 The reason property: being a cognition of something qualified by x.
 e.2.13.2 The property to be proven: necessarily involving the cognition of a qualifier (x).
 e.2.13.3 The instance that the inference is about: the cognition “This is qualified by x.”
 e.2.13.4 The supporting example: “This is qualified by a stick.”
 e.2.13.5 The type of logical reason: effect reason.
- e.2.14 [Proponent:] What are you trying to prove:
 e.2.14.1 the necessary involvement of the cognition of a separate qualifier, or
 e.2.14.2 the necessary involvement of the cognition of a qualifier in general?
- § 45 e.2.14.3 In the first case (e.2.14.1):
 e.2.14.3.1 perception refutes the *pakṣa* (e.2.13.3), because a perception does not grasp both a particular and the universal (e.2.6.2).
 e.2.14.3.2 Additionally, the cognition of something qualified is an ambiguous reason for a universal, because it occurs also without a qualifier that is separate from the thing it qualifies.
- § 46 e.2.14.4 In the second case (e.2.14.2) there is proof of what has already been proven,
 e.2.14.4.1 because, due to a difference between an individual thing and a universal as in the cognition “This individual thing possesses that universal.”, we accept a qualifier-qualified relation (D.12.3.2.1),
 e.2.14.4.1.1 because the common expression “This is qualified by x.” is really due to an experience of that differentiated from non-x (D.5.1.2, D.5.1).
- § 47 e.2.15 So there is no proof of a universal.
 e.2.15.1 The reason that refutes all the additional attributes like a universal, property, action etc. is

4.2. The argument structure of the *Apoahasiddhi*

- e.2.15.1.1 a clear perception that grasps a whole particular (discussion under d.11, d.13, e.2.6.2, e.2.14.3.1),
e.2.15.1.2 or the non-perception of something principally observable (discussion under point e).
- F Restatement of thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by exclusion of others, and further explanations. §§ 48–49
- F.1 Thus only the positive element is the referent of a word. (c.1, d.10) § 48
- F.1.1 And this referent is the external object (d.10.1) and the form of awareness (d.10.2).
- F.1.1.1 The form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated in reality or conventionally, because
- F.1.1.1.1 it is directly understood through self-awareness,
F.1.1.1.2 and is not determined.
- F.1.1.2 And the external object is neither affirmed nor negated in reality,
- F.1.1.2.1 because it does not appear in a conceptual cognition.
- F.1.1.3 In reality, all entities are inexpressible because
- F.1.1.3.1 they are not determined, and
F.1.1.3.2 do not appear.
- F.1.1.4 Conventionally, external things are affirmed or negated,
F.1.1.4.1 because otherwise there would not be everyday activity.
- F.1.2 Therefore, neither an external object nor a form in awareness can be affirmed in reality, § 49
- F.1.3 for only an external object can be conventionally proven to exist.
- F.1.4 But a form in awareness is not affirmed even conventionally.
- G Refutation of Dharmottara. §§ 50–52
- g.1 Dharmottara: [Opponent:] There is affirmation and negation of a superimposed external thing. § 50
- g.2 [Proponent:] This is also rejected by this (F).
- g.3 [Opponent:] If no determinable thing appears in determination, then what does it mean to say “It is determined?” § 51

g.4 [Proponent:] It means that, even though it does not appear, it is made an object of activity.

g.5 [Opponent:] There is no difference between two things that do not appear (g.4). So how does activity, which is directed at a certain object, avoid other objects (c.6)?

g.6 [Proponent:] Even if no object is grasped, still there is only activity restricted to certain objects,

g.6.1 because the capacity of a conceptual cognition to promote activity is limited according to the form of awareness, and

g.6.1.1 because that form of awareness is limited by its specific set of producing factors (e.1.8).

§ 52 g.7 For objects that have particular capacities are

g.7.1 well established through means of valid cognition, and

g.7.2 are beyond doubt as to a mixing of their capacities.

g.8 Therefore a concept's being determined is its being productive of activity only with regard to certain objects (g.3),

g.8.1 because it is connected to a specific form of awareness.

g.9 There is no activity through superimposition (g.1) because of similarity, since there is the

g.9.1 possibility of an error through superimposition of an external object on an image or

g.9.2 vice versa.

g.10 Rather, a cognition arises due to remaining impressions and extends activity towards an external object without being able to see it.

g.11 So it actually always errs.

§ 53 H Statement of thesis in its final form:

H.1 So in this sense a positive element is the referent of words, which is

H.1.1 specified by the absence of other things, and

H.1.2 differentiated from that of another genus.

H.2 Exactly this (H.1), which is intended by the word "exclusion", is

H.2.1 the referent of words, and

H.2.2 the object of everyday activity.

54-58 I Inference establishing the thesis (A,C.1, F.1,H.1):

- 1.1 The reason property: denoting something
- 1.2 The property to be proven: necessarily having as an object something that is § 54
 - 1.2.1 determined and
 - 1.2.2 differentiated from that of another form as its object.
- 1.3 The supporting example: “There is water in the well here.”
- 1.4 The instance that the inference is about: an expression having the form of the word “cow” etc.
- 1.5 This is the logical reason of the type “essential property”.
- 1.6 Defence of the reason’s validity:
 - 1.6.1 The reason, denoting, is not unestablished because
 - 1.6.1.1 even if there is no real denoted-denoting relation (D.12.3.1, D.12.4.2.2),
 - 1.6.1.2 the acceptance of this relationship, as it is constructed through determination, is a necessary condition for everyday activity (F.1.1.4.1).
 - 1.6.2 Neither is the reason contradictory
 - 1.6.2.1 as it exists in the similar instance.
 - 1.6.3 Neither is the reason ambiguous, for the following reason:
 - 1.6.3.1 [Opponent:] The denoted must be either a particular (D), § 55 an additional attribute (D.12.4.3), a connection to an additional attribute (D.12.4.1, E.2.4), something possessing an additional attribute (D.1, D.12.1), or must be a form of awareness (B.1.1.2),
 - 1.6.3.2 because these are all possible options for what the referent could be, and everyone agrees that there must be a referent. § 56
 - 1.6.3.3 [Proponent:] There is no convention for the particular and the form of awareness, because they are useless for convention (F.1.1.2, F.1.1.1). § 57
 - 1.6.3.4 For the other three there is no convention, because no additional attribute like a universal and so on (E.2.15.1) exists.
 - 1.6.3.5 So the reason property—to denote something (1.1)—is § 58 pervaded by the property to be proven—to have as its object something that is determined and excluded from others

(i.2)—because “denoting” cannot exist where that is not the object,

 i.6.3.5.1 as there is no other pervading property with the quality of having an object,

 i.6.3.5.1.1 because nothing else that could be denoted exists.

 i.7 Thus, this pervasion is established.

§ 59 j Summary:

 j.1 Words express an object, and exclusion is understood as that object’s quality (A,C.1, F.1,H.1).

 j.2 One object is explained as determined (D.10.1,F.1.1.2), the other as appearing (D.10.2, F.1.1.1) directly to awareness.

 j.3 But in reality nothing at all is expressed (F.1.1.3).

§ 60 κ End of Ratnakīrti’s *Apoḥasiddhi*.