

5 *The apoha theory in Ratnakīrti's Apohasiddhi*

The term “*apoha* theory”, as used in these pages, is intended as the equivalent to the historically attested Sanskrit term “*apohavāda*”.²⁹⁴ Other translations of this term could be “the teaching of *apoha*”, or “the *apoha* doctrine”.

This theory has been the subject of modern academic study since the early twentieth century, starting with the pioneering explorations by Stcherbatsky (1932) and Mookerjee (1935). The latter discusses several passages of Ratnakīrti's *AS*, based on the *editio princeps* in Shāstri 1910, though their presentation is somewhat inadequate due to the highly condensed arguments of Ratnakīrti and comparatively little knowledge of their background at the time. Major early insights are due also to Frauwallner's series of articles on the theory of *apoha* (1932,1933,1935), where the main tenets of the *apoha* theory were first outlined, at least as developed by Dharmakīrti.²⁹⁵ From the 1960s

²⁹⁴This term, often also encountered in the form of “someone teaching exclusion”, an *apohavādin*, is easily found in historical sources. Cf., e.g., NC 674,1; 680,1 (where we also find references to *anyāpohika*-s); PVT_{F1} A Pramānavārttikaṭīkā, verso, line 6.

²⁹⁵Of course, Frauwallner 1937 should also be mentioned here. There, the *apoha* theory of Dharmottara was presented through a translation and discussion of the Tibetan translation of the *DhAP*. As noted by Akamatsu (1986: 75 f.), however, this translation suffers from a systematic misinterpretation, translating *ma yin dgag* and *med dgag* as *prasajyapratishedha* and *paryudāsa*, respectively. Frauwallner notes this, but does not really justify it (cf. Frauwallner 1937: 263, n. 1).

onward, there has been a steady increase in ever more specialised studies on the topic.²⁹⁶ It thus would seem that yet another general introduction to this theory of *apoha* is not necessary here. For one thing, plenty of the very insightful studies that have been published in recent years are certainly not to be challenged in general, even though it will be necessary to discuss some elements of these interpretations in the light of the *AS*.²⁹⁷ For as we shall see below, it is on two points that the interpretation offered here differs from at least some of the previous ones: first, *apoha* is essentially an ontological concept, linked to epistemological issues such as concept formation only insofar as

²⁹⁶Some examples, by no means comprehensive: Vetter 1964, Katsura 1979, Akamatsu 1983, Katsura 1986, Hayes 1988, Katsura 1991, Dreyfus 1997, Bronkhorst 1999, Ogawa 1999, Pind 1999, Siderits 1999, Dunne 2004, Saito 2004, Hattori 2006, McCrea and Patil 2006, Kataoka 2009, McCrea and Patil 2010, Tillemans 2011a, Tillemans 2011b, Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011, McAllister 2017b.

²⁹⁷The best place to start studying the *apoha* theory from a philosophical perspective is currently Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011. It contains several essays that present the general outline of the *apoha* theory in a way that is mostly compatible with what is said in the *AS*. General, clear, and accessible accounts of the theory as formulated by Dharmakīrti are found in Tillemans 2011b and Dunne 2011; an equally useful account that is closer to Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratnakīrti's works is given by Patil 2011a. Reformulations of the theory that aim to appeal to a more philosophically (rather than historically or philologically) interested reader are found in Siderits 2011, Ganeri 2011, and Hale 2011, all in the same volume.

For readers more interested in the historical perspective, the last years have likewise added important studies on this topic. For Dignāga's formulation of the *apoha* theory, and Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of it, Pind 2015 is an invaluable resource. Immensely useful for Dharmakīrti's formulation of the theory is Eltschinger et al. 2018, a richly annotated translation of the first part of the *apoha* section in the *PVS*. The authors of this study aim to translate the whole section in the next years, and this work will surely provide an opportunity for deeper insights than are possible now (most of the present monograph had, however, already been finalized before this important contribution had been published). Also the historical opponents of the *apoha* theory have become more accessible in recent years. In this regard one should mention at least the contributions in McAllister 2017b which deal with Bhaṭṭā Jayanta's criticism of the theory, mainly from the perspective of Kumārila, and the Buddhists' defense against this criticism. Another rich source, summarized in Kataoka 2018, is Sucaritamīśra's *Kāśikā* on the ŚV Av, which is becoming available starting with Kataoka 2014.

Ratnakīrti, in line with his predecessors, takes it as the object of these kinds of awareness events; second, the relation of non-conceptual and conceptual cognitions as explained by Dharmottara has somewhat clouded the issues in Ratnakīrti's writings, whereas their relation should better be seen in terms of Prajñākaragupta's theory about this relation.

A further methodological problem is that, although *anyāpohavāda* is a term used by ancient proponents and opponents of the theory alike, it does not seem to point to a unified theory. To Pind (2015: xlix), "[...] it is obvious that the expression "*apoha* theory" does not designate a uniform theory with an invariable set of theoretical presuppositions."

Apart from this, it is often not quite clear what the scope of the term "*apoha* theory" is when used by modern scholars. Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti (2011: 1) succinctly formulate the following consensus:

The *apoha* theory is first and foremost an approach to the problem of universals—the problem of the one over many. [...] The *apoha* theory is a distinctive Buddhist approach to being a nominalist.

Whilst modern scholarship never denies this assessment, there are several instances where the boundaries of the theory are blurred and discussions extend to topics in which this theory of universals is clearly involved, but which one might hesitate to characterize as being part of the *apoha* theory. For example, Katsura (1986: 172) calls the *apoha* theory a "working hypothesis",²⁹⁸ which provides a substitute for universals as really existing entities in whichever context these universals might be invoked to explain something. Yet Katsura (1986: 172) introduces this characterization with the observation that

²⁹⁸Katsura (1986: 178, n. 10) credits Prof. Steinkellner with having the idea of a "working hypothesis". Ogawa (1999) lets an insightful examination culminate in the following assessment, implying that *apoha* is an element in a linguistic theory: "...I cannot refrain from saying that there is nothing original to be found in Buddhist epistemologists' linguistic theory, other than the theory of *apoha*." (Ogawa 1999: 284, with a typo corrected)

Dharmakīrti freely applied the principle of *anyāpoha* to the various problems related to conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*), such as the object, the essence, the origin, and the function of conceptual knowledge. Thus, to Dharmakīrti, the *apoha* theory was not merely the theory of meaning but “*Problem des Begriffs*” as named by Professor Vetter.

The *apoha* theory is thus described both as a theory for replacing real universals and as a full theory of meaning and concept formation.

The Buddhist epistemological tradition did indeed employ the notion of *apoha* in a large variety of contexts. Famously, the *apoha* theory is involved in the Buddhist epistemologists’ “theory of language”,²⁹⁹ so that Pind (2015: xv), for example, characterizes PS(V) 5, the earliest available systematic account of the *apoha* theory, as presenting “the fundamental tenets of his [Dignāga’s–PMA] philosophy of language”. At the same time, Pind (2015: xi) states that “...the aim of PSV V, which presents the essentials of the *apoha* thesis, is to supplement previous statements [in the same work–PMA] about exclusion or preclusion with an exposition of the *apoha* doctrine itself.”

Dreyfus (2011: 207), basing himself on Dharmakīrti’s views of the *apoha* theory, maintains that “...the gist of the *apoha* or exclusion theory is ...that thought and language do not relate to real things by capturing real properties but by excluding particulars from contradictory classes.” Dunne 2011: 90 considers the *apoha* theory to be a solution to “Dharmakīrti’s problem [...] how concepts can provide useful information without any ontological commitment to the existence of universals [...]”, and considers “the notion of particulars having the same effect and the role of ‘imprints’ (*vāsanā*)” to be “details” of the *apoha* theory. Tillemans (2011b: 56–60) gives the following characterization:

Apoḥa theory, as time goes on, has ever-expanding uses:
for example, it provides a Buddhist account of concept

²⁹⁹I have not been able to find a historical Sanskrit term corresponding to this notion.

formation, of the transition from perception to conceptualization, and gives an attempt at a solution to logical problems like substitutivity of identicals for identicals in opaque contexts.

...

Fortunately, *apoha* qua ingenious double negation is only at most a limited part of Dharmakīrti's account of how scheme and world link and is not, I would maintain, the main theme at all. Indeed, from Dharmakīrti and his commentators on, *apoha* theory expands its concerns, all the while taking on considerable hybridness due to holdovers from previous authors. This is, alas, what makes later *apoha* theories often impossible to summarize in an easily digestible form.

All of these estimates suggest that the *apoha* theory contains a theory about the formation and application of concepts, above and beyond saying what the objects of concepts are.

The argumentative setting of the *apoha* theory is often less general, especially if it is discussed within the frame of a larger work, rather than in a treatise dedicated to it. For example, in Dharmakīrti's oeuvre, effectively more important than Dignāga for all following *pramāṇavādin*-s, the *apoha* theory makes its first appearance within a strictly logical context, as a means to prove that an inference based on a *svabhāvahetu* is not a tautology since it makes known different properties, or parts, of the object that the inference is about. This sparks a long discussion of *apoha* ranging from the ontological issue of the substantial reality of universals to the grammatical question of how adjectives and nouns (or words for properties and substrates) relate to the same object.

Another prominent example is Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the place of *apoha* within the work he is commenting upon, Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha*. In Kamalaśīla's analysis, Śāntarakṣita's ostensible reason for discussing the *apoha* theory is to show why, and to what extent, the Buddha's teachings on "dependent arising" in

everyday language can be considered true.³⁰⁰ The chapter in which Śāntarakṣita establishes *apoha* is in fact a rich source for the history of the *apoha* theory, as it discusses, and refutes, many historical positions that reject or (in Śāntarakṣita's view) misrepresent the *apoha* theory. It is easy to lose sight of what Kamalaśīla sees as its overall aim.

These admittedly incomplete considerations of modern assessments of what the *apoha* theory was and of the contexts in which it appears are not intended to cast doubt on the adequacy of these assessments. Indeed, all instances referred to here do have their justifications, derived from careful and detailed studies of primary sources, and are thus not to be taken lightly. The point is, rather, that care should be taken to distinguish the *apoha* theory from the many different fields in which it appears: it surfaces in the philosophy of language and that of mind, in treatises on epistemology, in purely logical contexts, as well as in grammatical discussions. But it is not helpful to conclude that all, or any, of these fields are therefore part of the *apoha* theory. Here, following Ratnakīrti's exposition, we will carefully limit the problems that should be solved by the *apoha* theory, and differentiate them from other areas in which the theory is employed.

This way of approaching the AS also has consequences for the construction of the history of the *apoha* theory, because it is precisely the AS that has sparked what is the most persistent account of this history. In a seminal article, Akamatsu (1986) reads Ratnakīrti as presenting a short history of *apoha* along the following lines: after its initial conception by Dignāga and reformulation by Dharmakīrti, the theory bifurcated into two strands, a "positivist" one and a "negativist" one, subscribed to, respectively, by certain *vidhivādin*-s ("affirmationists") and *pratiṣedhavādin*-s ("negationists"); these two variants of the theory were reconciled by Jñānaśrīmitra, who formed a new version of the theory which is found also in the AS. The interpretation by Akamatsu (1986) of the theory's development in this

³⁰⁰See appendix B.1.

way is mainly caused by Ratnakīrti's statements at the beginning of the AS, especially in § 8.

The basic hypothesis formulated in Akamatsu 1986, where the “affirmationists” were identified with Śāntarakṣita and the “negationists” with Dharmottara, has been modified in some important respects. Ishida (2011b) and Okada (2017) have both shown that the main criterion that Ratnakīrti uses for differentiating the two strands—whether the aspect of exclusion, or negation of others, is the main or the subsidiary element in the object of words—has been a topic for structuring discussions of *apoha* from the earliest commentators onward, with some evidence that Uddyotakara, a Naiyāyika critic of Dignāga preceding Dharmakīrti, had already argued using these categories.³⁰¹ The distinction of the two strands is thus not as neat as it would have initially seemed. Another important support for the hypothesis in Akamatsu 1986 is that Jñānaśrīmitra objects to Dharmottara on account of the latter's overly negativist interpretation of *apoha*. Whilst this is indeed the case, the accounts of *apoha* theories by two non-Buddhist authors that follow Dharmakīrti and precede Jñānaśrīmitra, Sucaritamiśra and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, force us to reevaluate what this opposition means. Both of these authors see the main difference between Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's accounts of *apoha* as lying in the fact that the former assumes that cognition has the form of its object (*sākāra*), whereas the latter denies that cognition has that form (*nirākāra*); both Sucaritamiśra and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta claim that the specifics of what *apoha* is and how *apoha* can be the object of a word differ between Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara

³⁰¹ Both articles reveal strong similarities between the presentations of *apoha* by Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita. Ishida (2011b) suggests that Śākyabuddhi's understanding is deepened and systematized by (the time of) Śāntarakṣita. Okada (2017: 198–200) shows that all elements of the positive and negative interpretation of *apoha* are essentially inherited by Śāntarakṣita from Śākyabuddhi, or at least common to both authors. See Okada 2017: 189–191 for Śākyabuddhi's discussion of an argument in which Uddyotakara distinguishes the affirmative and negative content of *anyāpoha*.

on account of these theories concerning the form of cognition.³⁰² So what initially looked like a bifurcation and reunification of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theories to Akamatsu (1986) should, in the light of current sources, be seen as a result from a debate concerning the nature of awareness and its central functions. Since, on the one hand, both these non-Buddhist, intermediary sources oppose Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, and, on the other hand, several Buddhist sources suggest a continuity rather than a break between Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, there is little reason to assume that Śāntarakṣita, in his encyclopedic work, was endorsing anything but Dharmakīrti's position, even if in a somewhat simplified form. The essentially two different accounts of *apoha* that were advanced in the development of this theory before Jñānaśrīmitra thus appear now as reflections of differences in epistemological questions that do not, primarily, concern *apoha*. Ratnakīrti, true to his analytic and systematic approach, does shortly refer to these questions, but for the largest part of his essay on *apoha* does not enter into the details of this discussion.³⁰³ It is possible that this is also the reason that the main section of the *AP* in which Jñānaśrīmitra criticises Dharmottara is removed by Ratnakīrti and inserted in the treatise that is mainly concerned with the nature of conceptual cognitions and what the forms (*ākāra*) that appear in them are, the *CAPV*. Though it can be nothing more than an argument from silence, the absence of such discussions in the *AS* could indicate that they were not, for Ratnakīrti, particularly relevant to the discussion of *apoha*.³⁰⁴

³⁰²See Kataoka 2017b (with references to Watson and Kataoka 2017), and Kataoka 2018: 26–34. The first article investigates the situation in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, and the second in Sucaritamiśra. Both make it clear that Dharmottara is was interpreted as differing from Dharmakīrti. It is unclear how these authors relate to Śāntarakṣita, who must be counted as belonging to the group of Dharmakīrti on this issue. See also McAllister 2017a, where an attempt is made to read a section of the *CAPV* in the light of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's comments.

³⁰³Apart from the introductory paragraphs, it is only in § 50 that he directly addresses Dharmottara. The topics are also hinted at in his own restatements of his central thesis (see section 4.2 for an indication of the relevant paragraphs).

³⁰⁴The mention of Dharmottara's position in § 50 is followed by only two short

For these reasons, the present study of the late and concise *AS* is not the place to attempt a full exposition of the historical and intellectual development of the *apoha* theories. It is probable that the texts talking of *apoha* were shaped by concerns and considerations that do not directly concern what the *AS* is about. The following explanation of an *apoha* theory will thus base itself on the main statements that are found in the *AS*, exploring their historical and argumentative background only where it is necessary to remove doubts and uncertainty. It is intended to serve as an interpretation of the main aspects of the *apoha* theory as it appears in the *AS*, with “*apoha* theory” defined primarily in terms of what is discussed in the *AS*, and hopefully to work towards a better understanding of the development of the *apoha* theory by showing its state in the middle of the eleventh century.

5.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF APOHA: THE PURPOSE OF THE APOHASIDDHI

The title of the *AS* can be translated as “establishment of exclusion”, or “proof of exclusion”. Even a short glance at the analysis of the arguments given in this text (cf. section 4.2) shows that this is an adequate name for the text: After the presentation of various versions of *apoha* theories and their possible criticisms, there follows a fairly short exposition of Ratnakīrti’s own opinion. This, in turn, is followed by discussions and refutations of various positions arguing for the existence of a real universal (*sāmānya*, *jāti*, or *ākṛti*) above and beyond the real particular, interspersed with ever more refined reformulations of Ratnakīrti’s own position. At the end of this section, Ratnakīrti also distances himself and criticises an aspect

paragraphs (§§ 51–52) that deal with determination in rather generic terms, using formulations that are found also in others of Ratnakīrti’s writings (see the second apparatus to the mentioned paragraphs in the edition above). Most of the materials in the *AP* that correspond to these passages, and which one might have expected Ratnakīrti to use here, appear in CAPV 137,25–139,27.

of Dharmottara's (ca. eighth century) theory of *apoha*. There then follows a formal proof (*prayoga*) establishing that every word has as its object a thing as such (*vastumātra*) that is determined and excluded from others. This proof is closely knit into the preceding arguments of the text, in that they are here adduced to show that none of the typical logical fallacies applies to this inference.³⁰⁵

In this final inference, *anyāpoha* (or, more precisely, *atadrūpaparāvṛtta*, the quality of being "distinguished from that of another form") is established as an essential part of that thing that anything that names anything refers to or has as its object. It is in this sense that the establishment mentioned in the title can, at first, be understood: establishment of the exclusion which is a part of the word referent.³⁰⁶

This inference is what was called the 'guiding inference' above (see section 1.1.3), and will be used as a guide to the structure of the rest of the AS. As for many other works by Ratnakīrti, the AS is constructed along the lines of this formal proof. At first, this inference will be analysed, and then the various points in the AS that are needed to fully appreciate the inference will be examined in more detail.³⁰⁷

Before this, a methodological caution might not be out of place. There are two groups of problems that have to be dealt with when

³⁰⁵From this, it can also be seen that the AS is a carefully composed and well structured text, even though much of it is taken essentially verbatim from the AP of Jñānaśrīmitra.

³⁰⁶The other property of the word referent is *adhyavasita* (that it is determined). The substrate of the two properties, "determined" and "differentiated from others", is the *vastumātra*, the real thing as such, which is said to be what a word has as its object (see footnote 193). That this is the object of words is the *sādhya*, the property (or rather, in this case, the fact) which is to be established in this inference.

³⁰⁷Another, and more practical, reason for proceeding in this way is that the more obvious explicatory approach, the one that follows the order of explanation in the text fairly closely, has already been very successfully taken in both Patil 2003, and, in a broader fashion, in Patil 2009: Chapter 4, p. 197 ff., although there it is observed that "[Ratnakīrti's] decision to conclude his essay [by providing an inferential reason to support his view] is important, because it brings together the various subarguments used throughout his essay and does so in a more 'formal' context." (Patil 2009: 239) It is of course obvious that the results of both expositions will, if correct, be the same (or both wrong in the same way).

explaining the *AS* in this way. First, what the precise import is of each of the elements of the inference, with special interest perhaps attaching to the complex quality that this supposedly central inference is supposed to prove (i.e., what this inference *means*). Second, why it is logically coherent to state that the inferential reason leads only to this consequence (i.e., why this inference is *valid*). After all, as will be seen, it is not directly a matter of logic as to why it should be the case that a word is expressive and therefore must not have any other sort of object than the one proven in Ratnakīrti's inference.

Moreover, it is difficult to explain these two groups of problems separately. On the one hand, it will not be possible to make it completely clear why the inference is valid without understanding its components and their relations, mainly because these facts are ascertained in separate, mostly ontological or epistemological, considerations of how everyday activity based on concepts works (e.g., what it means that a word refers to something). The pervasion³⁰⁸ at work in this inference is one that is a matter of fact. On the other hand, and if the idea is correct that the preceding parts of the *AS* build towards this inference, an explanation of all its components and their relations should be expected to go only so far as is useful for correctly understanding the inference. This means that any analysis of a component needed for establishing any of the concerned matters of fact (the nature of words, their objects, etc.) needs to proceed only up to the point at which it is sufficient to make the inference valid. This is important for understanding the scope of the analysis, or the explanatory strategy, of the *AS*: much of it is a preparation that gives the inference its quantificational force, that *all* that is expressive has that sort of object. Thus, it could happen that, without having the inference in mind, it might be difficult to understand certain elements of the discussion of the *AS*. A second consequence to keep in mind is that the content of the discussions is limited by the form of the inference that the discussion is supposed to support. Even though unexplored philosophical alleys may branch out in many directions

³⁰⁸For more information about this technical term, cf. section 5.2.

from Ratnakīrti's arguments, he need not follow their invitation if he deems them irrelevant with respect to the validity of the central inference. Simultaneously, it need not be that all of the preceding passages in the *AS* are directly dedicated to this aim, but it should be the case that these passages somehow have a bearing on the inference, or are superfluous (which, of course, is not a problem as such, and just means that the explanatory approach used here does not take all details into account). So as not to overstate the importance of this inference for the *AS*, it will be important to remember that its role in this text is a hypothesis. There is good reason to have it, judging from Ratnakīrti's general style, but it does not mean that any passage that does not fit the picture is somehow out of place. Each of the arguments will have to be scrutinized also for its own value, and in the immediate context in which it appears. Only then should it be decided how or whether it serves this inference.

Moreover, if the supposition formulated with regard to the structure of the *AS* should prove wrong, none of the passages preceding the inference would have the aim ascribed to them at all. But even then the interpretation of the individual passages should not suffer much, and it should be more a matter of rearrangement than reassessment that will allow one to more adequately discern Ratnakīrti's ideas.

5.2 THE CENTRAL INFERENCE

The inference that the *AS* is built around runs as follows (see § 54):

All that denotes [something] has as [its] object a mere thing that is determined [and] distinguished from that of another form, as the expression "Water [is] here in a well." And this [expression] having the form of a word like "cow" etc. does denote [something]. [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property.

The formal elements at work here are as follows:³⁰⁹

³⁰⁹A detailed exposition of the Buddhist theory of inference is not within the scope of this study. Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: §§ 9–10.2 for an overview of this theory,

1. *hetu*, the property used as a reason in the inference (of the type “essential property”): denoting. (This *hetu* will be abbreviated as *H*.)
2. *pakṣa*, the instance³¹⁰ qualified by *H*: that which has the nature of words like “cow” etc. (This *pakṣa* will be abbreviated as *p*.)
3. *sādhya*, the property whose presence in *p* the inference purports to prove: having as an object a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form. (This *sādhya* will be abbreviated as *S*.)³¹¹
4. *dr̥ṣṭānta*, example: Water here in a well. (This *dr̥ṣṭānta* will be abbreviated as *d*.)

and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: § 12 “Logical mark of essential identity” for a succinct discussion of inference based on a thing’s nature. The *TBh* will, in the following arguments, be used as a fairly normative text for interpreting some of Ratnakīrti’s terms, based on the arguments given in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 3–5. The model used there is, in all points that will be relevant in the following analysis, the same as “the orthodox scenario” described in Tillemans 1999a: 90–92. Additionally, in most cases it was possible to find passages in Ratnakīrti’s texts that shed light on the logical terminology employed in this inference. But if it is true for Jñānaśrīmitra that he rarely enters into lengthy explanations of topics he presumes his audience well acquainted with (cf. Lasic 2000a: 19 f., Franco 2002: 192), the same is certainly true for Ratnakīrti, writing in a manner “more concise and logical, though not as poetical and elaborate as that of his spiritual father.” (Thakur 1975a: 12) Other texts taken into consideration in the following are the *NPSū*, *NB_M*, and its commentary, the *NBT*.

³¹⁰In this context, *pakṣa* is variously translated as “locus of inference” (e.g., Matilal 1985: 50 f.), “subject” (e.g., Tillemans 1999a), or “site of the inference” (e.g., Patil 2009: 60 f.). For the context that the argument under discussion works in, *pakṣa* will be translated as “instance”, mainly because it fits the translations of “similar instance” for *sapakṣa* and “counter-instance” for *vipakṣa*, but not because something very different from what the other translations suggest is intended. Another consideration is that it is easier to understand the two other elements, the reason and the property which is to be established, as co-occurring in an “instance” (of something, like awareness or conceptual cognition) rather than in a subject, site, or locus of inference. “Similar instances” and “counter-instances” are cases where the property to be proven is, respectively, present and absent.

³¹¹Various formulations of this are used by Ratnakīrti. For the time being (until the explanation below, page 210) only this first formulation will be used.

The pervasion (*vyāpti*) governing this inference is expressible as the implication of the property “having as its object a mere thing, which is determined and distinguished from that of another form” by the property “something denotes”.

The *pakṣa*, the locus of the *hetu* and consequently of the *sādhya*, is said to be what has the form or nature of “words like ‘cow’ etc.”, a statement that seems to elicit little controversy.³¹² The gist of the inference thus is that any word must, by its very nature of being something that denotes, have as its object a mere thing that is a) determined and b) differentiated from that which has a form other than its own.

This is only a part of the inference. Its validity depends on the truth of the pervasion of the property that is the reason by the property that is to be inferred. “Because *p* is qualified by *H*, it is qualified by *S*.” is true of *p* if everything that is qualified by *H* is also qualified by *S*, or every instance of *H* is also an instance of *S*. Among the various factors that have an influence on the truth of this pervasion, Ratnakīrti discusses three: that the reason is not unestablished, that the reason is not contradictory, and that the reason is not ambiguous. These are the three common types of fallacious reasons or pseudo-reasons (*hetvābhāsa*).³¹³

³¹²To which group of things the quality “denotes” in fact applies according to Ratnakīrti, and what this means, is discussed in section 5.3.1. For the moment, it is enough to take it for granted that words like “cow” etc. denote.

³¹³The term “*hetvābhāsa*” is translated as “pseudo-reason” in Matilal 1985: 42. The *hetvābhāsa* is generally considered to be threefold, cf., e.g., NPSū 400,18 (*asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhā hetvābhāsāḥ*), NB_M 3.109 (*evam eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇāṃ ekaikasya dvaḥ dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandeḥ vā yathāyogam asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ*), Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: § 10 (and the notes for some secondary literature), and Oetke 1994: 33 ff. Ratnakīrti himself regularly uses these distinctions to discuss the validity of inferences, e.g., SJS 29,19–20 (in an objection): *kiṃ ca sarvajñasattāsādhane sarvo hetuḥ trayiṃ doṣajātiṃ nātivartate asiddhatvaṃ viruddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ceti* (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 89 for a translation), or KBhSA 67,10: *hetvābhāsāś ca asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikabhedena trividhāḥ*. Cf. Patil 2009: 70, n. 102 for a detailed list of the pseudo-reasons that the Naiyāyikas defend themselves against in the *ĪSD*.

5.2.1 *The reason is not unestablished (asiddha)*

In lines 308–310 in § 54, Ratnakīrti shows that *H* is not unestablished (*asiddha*). A *hetu* is considered unestablished when it is not certain that it actually qualifies, or is a property of, the *pakṣa*, so that the premiss in this inference, “*H* qualifies *p* .”, becomes false. Ratnakīrti thus has to defend the statement “An expression, having the form of a word like ‘cow’ etc., denotes.”

His argument here draws on various points in the AS:

1. A statement widely proven in an authoritative text (line 167 in § 27).
2. A statement about the denoted-denoting relation (line 173 in § 28)

The statement proven in the *sāstra* is the reason for the concessive subclause in this argument: that the distinction between properties and their substrates is a conceptual one, and thus is not true about real things. According to this rule and its consequence, it could be argued that “*p* is qualified by *H*.” is not, in fact, a true statement.

But that *H* qualifies *p* is true in a “conventional” sense. Ratnakīrti’s argument is that the relation of denoting word and denoted referent is made by determination, a function of conceptual cognition which allows it to produce both a classification of its object and activity that treats the object as an external thing (cf. section 5.4). So, whereas this conceptual construction of the relation does not reflect reality, it is to be endorsed by all people who engage in worldly activity (*vyavahāra*). Two important positions are implied in this statement: first, worldly activity presupposes a distinction of denoted and denoting (as of substance and quality) in order to work. And, second, this distinction is only conceptually constructed. Accordingly, the proposition that *H* qualifies *p* must be endorsed by all people on pain of not being able to engage in normal activity, even though it is not a true statement when taken to be about reality.

In this way, Ratnakīrti can show that any conceptual cognition must be taken to have an object. Accordingly, that *H* qualifies *p*, that words denote, must be accepted by everyone. Consequently, no one can reasonably argue that *H* is unestablished, or that expressions do not denote anything at all.

5.2.2 *The reason is not contradictory (viruddha)*

Ratnakīrti's defence against this type of logical error is quite short, l. 310 in § 54:

Neither is that [reason] contradictory, because it exists in a similar instance.

This type of error consists in the reason proving something opposite to that which someone intends to prove by an inference using it, usually the complete absence instead of presence of the intended property. If *H* were contradictory, then *H* would be a sign for what is not qualified by *S*, so that instead of the statement “Because *H* qualifies *p*, *S* qualifies *p*.” being true, its opposite would be true: “Because *H* qualifies *p*, *S* does not qualify *p*.”, i.e., if something denotes it never has the sort of object that Ratnakīrti describes (*S*).

Others of Ratnakīrti's explanations for why a reason is contradictory are as follows, clearer in stating why the respective *hetu* is contradictory:

1. SJS 13,8: *tathā ca sati sādhyaviparyayavyāpter viruddhatā hetoḥ.*
2. SJS 29,21–22: *asarvajñe dharmiṇi na sarvajñasiddhiḥ, hetoḥ sarvajñaviparītasādhanatvena viruddhatvāt.*
3. ĪSD 33,21–23: *nāpi viruddhaḥ. tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva vartate sa khalu sādhyaviparyayavyāpteḥ sādhyaviruddham sādhyam viruddho 'bhidhīyate. yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti. na cāyam tathā, prasiddhakartṛkeṣu sapakṣeṣu sadbhāvarśanāt.*³¹⁴

³¹⁴For translations of the first two of these passages, cf. Bühnemann 1980: 35, and p. 84 (approximately: “And if it is so, the reason is contradictory because it pervades the opposite of what is to be proven.”, and, “If a non-omniscient being is the property bearer [that is qualified by the reason property], there is no proof of being omniscient, because a reason is contradictory on account of establishing what is opposite to an omniscient one.”). Patil (2009: 71) translates the last, spoken in the voice of “Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas” (Patil 2009: 71), as follows:

It is well know that a [reason property] that exists in only dissimilar cases proves what is opposed to the target property, through its being

In view of these formulations, the problem Ratnakīrti is facing should be understood like this: in the inference “Because *H* qualifies *p*, *S* qualifies *p*,” *H* would be contradictory because *H* is pervaded by the absence of *S*, i.e., by “not having as an object a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form.” So the basic charge is that the reason “to be what denotes” is contradictory because it actually occurs only in the counter-instance, i.e., in instances of denotation that have something else, like a real universal, as their object.

A logically sufficient defence against this would be to show that *H* does indeed coincide with *S*, i.e., that there is at least one instance beside *p* that has both the *H* and *S*. In this passage, Ratnakīrti merely states this to be the case. But why does he see himself entitled to do so?

To begin with, the problem of knowing what pervades what is not a problem of logic (at least not always), but is a problem of knowing a matter of fact. For example, a logical error of the same type is discussed at some length in the answer to an objection starting at KBhSA 67,20. There the matter is resolved through a *prasāṅga* and *prasāṅgaviparyaya* which show that both the *hetu* “existing” and the *sādhya* “momentary” are true of one *sapakṣa* instance, namely a pot (which is the example in the inference, KBhSA 67,7–8).³¹⁵ In *ĪSD* 33,21–23, quoted above (page 204), this kind of error is argued against by an appeal to a generally acknowledged matter of fact. The question must therefore be what other statements in the AS allow Ratnakīrti to make the claim at this point that *H* occurs at least once in that which is similar to *p*.

An answer must consist of two parts:

pervaded by the absence of the target property, and that it is named “opposed” (*viruddha*). ...But this [reason property, “being an effect”] is not like that, since it is observed to really exist in similar cases such as a pot, for which a maker is well known.

³¹⁵Cf. the assessment in Woo 1999: 163.

1. Ratnakīrti has to believe that he has already shown that it is possible that words denote this kind of object.
2. No one engaged in the discussions of the AS believes that words do not denote anything at all.³¹⁶

The second requirement is fairly easy to locate. None of the opponents in the AS argues that there is no referent or object of words at all; Vācaspati, as quoted in § 9 (page 51), expressly states that “Particulars qualified by a class are the objects for concepts and words.” Nor do the other objections contain any statements that would be to this effect. This requirement defends against the possibility of the opposite of *S* being “having no object at all.”

The first requirement amounts to the claim that *S* is at least a possible way in which words can denote. This possibility is explained, in a general fashion, in the various presentations of his own view of what the word referent is: it is first given in paragraphs §§ 7–8, and repeated in § 15 (the answer to the objection that *apoha* is not the referent of a word because it is only the positive element that is called the word referent). An explicit argument that exclusion is understood also for every word in a sentence is made in § 14.

So Ratnakīrti's claim at this point is: if an expression like “There is water here in the well.” denotes (is qualified by *H*), it is the case that it “has an object that is a mere thing which is determined and distinguished from that of another form” (is qualified by *S*). This defence of the inference ensures the possibility of its claim: it is the case at least in this one instance. That it is always the case is the overall aim of the next step in defending the inference.³¹⁷

³¹⁶For Ratnakīrti, it is only conventionally true that words denote something. Cf. § 48 and references in the translation.

³¹⁷This is not an uncommon tactic in Ratnakīrti's writings, cf., e.g., the objection in CAPV 130,5–6 (punctuation and paragraphs modified): *tad ayaṃ sādhyasūnyo dṛṣṭānto hetuś ca vipakṣe paridṛśyamānaḥ. yadi tatraiva niyatas tadā viruddhaḥ, tatrāpi sambhave 'naikānta iti cet.* (Therefore this example is free of the [property] to be proven[, i.e., oneness], and the reason is observed in the counter-instance. If the [reason] is limited to this [counter-instance] alone, [it is] contradictory, [and if] limited to this [counter-instance] also, it is inconclusive.) This refers back to the

5.2.3 *The reason is not ambiguous (anaikāntika)*

The third error that could afflict *H* is that it could be ambiguous (*anaikāntika*). Put simply, a logical reason that is ambiguous is one that is at least doubtful as to the terms of its presence or absence in both similar instances and counter-instances.³¹⁸ Again, Ratnakīrti's defence against this error (see lines 311–319, p. 69) does not detail which variety of this logical error it is against. Ratnakīrti uses the three common variants of an ambiguous reason in the *RNĀ*.³¹⁹ The situation for *H* would be, respectively, as follows:

1. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*: “*H* qualifies neither *v* nor *s*.” would be true.

inference in CAPV 129,22–24, where the reason was “it appears”, and the example was “the form blue amid other forms” (cf. section 1.1.3). Here the opponent states that if the faulty reason is ascertained only for the counter-instances, then the reason is contradictory, and if it is ascertained for the counter-instances as well as for the similar instances, then the reason is ambiguous. A similar link is presupposed in the argument in SJS 3,30–4,2 (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 9, and p. 102, n. 64).

³¹⁸In practice, there are, however, several ways in which a reason can be “ambiguous”. While earlier texts, such as the NPSū, distinguish six ways in which a reason can be so, the TBh₁ 47,19–48,1 distinguishes three: *vyāptyanīścāye hetor anaikāntiko doṣaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ—asādhāraṇānaikāntikaḥ sādharmaṇānaikāntikaḥ sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikaś ceti* (If [there is] no ascertainment of pervasion, the reason's error is “ambiguous.” And this [error] is threefold: ambiguous due to non-commonness, ambiguous due to commonness, and having a doubtful exclusion from the counter-instance.) Ratnakīrti uses these three variants to classify this type of error: *sādhāraṇānaikāntika* (e.g., KBhSA 68,25, SSD 114,16–7), *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* (e.g., KBhSA 80,8), and *sandigdhavatireka-hetvābhāsa* (e.g., SAD 147,4, SSD 124,23–24).

³¹⁹See TBh₁ 47,19–48,1 for a short characterization that is applicable also to Ratnakīrti. Sample passages in the *RNĀ* are:

1. *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*, e.g., KBhSA 68,25, SSD 114,16–7
2. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, e.g., KBhSA 80,8
3. *sandigdhavatireka*, e.g., SAD 147,4, or, in a formulation as reason and consequence, e.g., *ataḥ sandigdhavatirekitvād anaikāntikatvam eva prameyatvam.* (SSD 124,23–24)

2. *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*: “*H* qualifies both *v* and *s*.” would be true.
3. *sandigdavyatirekānaikāntika*: “*H* does not qualify *v*.” would not be certain.

So which of these positions most closely resembles the situation in the passage under discussion?

The first candidate, ambiguity of *H* due to not being common to both *s* and *v*, is not acceptable, because then the opponent would have to admit that “to denote” is a quality neither of the similar nor of the counter-instances — a consequence which surely is to be avoided, since the counter-instances include all the options for the word referent endorsed by the opponent.³²⁰

The second candidate, ambiguity of *H* due to being common to both *s* and *v*, entails no such consequence, and this understanding thus seems suitable. First, the opponent is not arguing that *v* is not specified by *H*, but rather that “what denotes” must have one of a range of things as its proper object, none of which agrees with *S*. Second, Ratnakīrti’s defence against this error consists in showing that none of the other options are viable alternatives to *S*, implying that the important thing to do is to show that *v* is not qualified by *S*, which is the fault defined in the typical case of the reason’s ambiguity due to commonness.

This does not yet decide whether *H* is being criticised, because it is doubtful as to its negative concomitance with the counter-instance. But it is quite plainly not what the opponent is arguing for, since he is not criticising the way the reason’s absence in all the counter-instances is shown, but rather claiming that the counter-instances are indeed also qualified by *H*. This argument should thus be interpreted as concerning *H*’s ambiguity due to its being common to both *s* and *v*.

Once this is settled, the structure of the argument in this passage can be analysed as follows. There is an objection by an adversary, making three claims:

³²⁰This, in itself, is not a particularly strong argument, as it is rather hypothetical. But from the discussion of the other options it will emerge that it is strong enough.

1. *H*, “to be denoting”, can also be said of the counter-instance, i.e., instances that denote something and are qualified by having as their object either a particular, an additional attribute, a combination of these two elements, or a form of awareness.
2. These options are all the options there are.
3. If these counter-instances have no object at all, they cannot be said to be “denoting”.

Ratnakīrti’s answer is that all options suggested by the opponent are wrong. Neither the external particular as such nor the form of awareness can be the object of denoting instances, because no convention can be made with regard to either: they are both particulars, and any denotative convention based on them would lead to useless results.³²¹ All the remaining options involve an additional attribute. They are precluded because additional attributes do not exist.

In consequence of this, the pervasion of *H* by *S* is established:

1. There are no options other than *S* for how a denoting instance could have an object.
2. Therefore, a pervader of *H* qualified by having an object other than *S* is excluded.
3. Due to this, *H*, “to be what denotes”, is excluded from the counter-instances.
4. Therefore, *H* is pervaded by *S*, so that “Because *H* qualifies *p*, *S* qualifies *p*.” is true.

With this, the inference is shown to be formally valid and factually true: the pervasion of the reason property by the property to be proven is established, so that the inference—that the instance under discussion is qualified by the property to be proven because it is qualified by the reason property—is true.

³²¹For the referent agreed on in such a convention would be unrepeatable. This would mean that convention, and thus any everyday activity based on it, would become impossible. Cf. footnote 200.

5.2.4 Claims made in the inference

The above discussion of the inference's structure has, for the reasons stated in section 5.1, only superficially touched on the various claims and positions that are involved in the inference. To recapitulate, and to begin deciding on a strategy for explaining the various elements, an overview might be in order:

1. *H* is "to be denoting". Its characteristics are as follows:
 - a) It depends on there being an object (acc. to the opponent at least, cf. l. 315, p. 69); that there is no object at all is apparently not considered a tenable position by anyone, neither Ratnakīrti nor his opponents.
 - b) It is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between denoting and denoted (l. 308, p. 69).
2. *p*: The instance under discussion that is claimed to be
 - a) qualified by *H*,
 - b) qualified by *S*,
 - c) dissimilar from *v*, i.e., not qualified by anything opposed to *S*, and
 - d) similar to *s*, i.e., qualified by *S*.
3. *S*:
 - a) It is variously formulated as:
 - i. *adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocara* (l. 306, p. 69).
 - ii. *vācya* (l. 308, 69, and, by the opponent, l. 314, p. 69.)
 - iii. *adhyavasitavijātivyāvṛttavastumātraviṣayatva* (l. 311, p. 69).
 - iv. *adhyavasitabāhyaviṣayatva* (l. 318, p. 70).
 - b) Its characteristics are:
 - i. It is what denoting instances have as their object, or, simply, it is what is denoted.
 - ii. It is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between denoting and denoted (l. 308, p. 69).

- iii. It is capable of supporting a linguistic convention (l. 316, p. 70).
- iv. It is a mere thing that is:
 - A. determined,
 - B. differentiated from what is not the same, or, in other words, differentiated from that of another kind,
 - C. external.
- 4. *s*: All instances qualified by *S*.
- 5. *v*: All instances not qualified by *S*. The alternative options discussed³²² are that what is denoted is either
 - a) a particular,
 - b) an additional attribute,
 - c) a connection to an additional attribute,
 - d) what has the same additional attribute, or
 - e) a form of awareness.

Ratnakīrti does not argue for any of these claims in much detail.³²³ The relevant arguments and justifications of the claims made in the inference must therefore be supplied from the passages of the *AS* that precede the inference. As stated above (section 5.1), the various elements appearing here will be interpreted as giving the *AS* its structure. A schematic overview of the relevant passages is given in table 5.1.

5.3 THE REFERENT OF WORDS

Ratnakīrti discusses what the referent of a word is in various places. A first sense of what differentiates words as objects of cognitions

³²²There must be options, since the possibility of not having any object is not accepted. Cf. l. 315, p. 69, as well as page 209.

³²³Cf. the observation about the impossibility of a denoting instance having a particular or universal as its object: “We know this to be the case since, as Ratnakīrti has shown earlier in his essay, inferential/verbal awareness-events cannot have either particulars or real universals as their objects.” (Patil 2009: 243)

Table 5.1 – Concordance between claims made in the inference and previous discussions in the *AS*

Item	Claim (line)	Discussed in paragraph(s)
<i>H</i>	<i>aviṣayate vācaktvāyoga</i> (315)	§ 48
	<i>vācyavācakahāvasyābhāve 'pi adhyavasāyākṛta</i> (308)	§ 27–§ 31
<i>p</i>	qualified by <i>H</i> (308–310)	§ 48
	qualified by <i>S</i> (310–319)	§ 7–§ 8, § 48, § 52
<i>S/s</i>	<i>vācyā</i> (= object of <i>vācaka</i>) (308, 314)	cf. <i>p</i> 's being qualified by <i>S</i>
	<i>samaya / samketa</i> (316)	§ 12
	<i>vastumātra</i> (306, 311), which is	§ 15, § 48, § 50–§ 52
	<i>adhyavasita</i> (306, 311, 318)	§ 1, § 7–§ 8, § 12–§ 14, § 15, § 37, § 40–§ 41,
	<i>atadrūpaparāvṛtta</i> (306, 311)	§ 48–§ 49
	<i>bāhya</i> (318)	§ 15, § 34, § 48–§ 49
<i>v</i>	<i>śvalakṣaṇa</i> (314)	§ 9–§ 23, § 29 (Vācaspati); § 24–§ 28 (Kumārīla's school); § 30 (<i>Nyāyabhūṣana</i>)
	<i>upādhi</i> (314)	§ 32–§ 37; § 38–§ 42 (<i>Trilocana</i>); § 43 (<i>Nyāyabhūṣana</i>); § 44–§ 47; also cf. § 23;
	<i>upādhiyoga</i> (314)	also § 9, § 23, § 29;
	<i>sopādhi</i> (314)	§ 4, § 4, § 15, § 48, § 49
	<i>buddhyākṛti</i> (314)	

from the objects of other cognitions can be gleaned from the following passage in his PABhP, where he is refuting the Mīmāṃsā contention that Vedic injunctions (*codanā*) are means of valid cognition because they “are connected to” (*pratibaddha*) real things:

PABhP 99,20–23: *nibandhanam cāsyās tādātmyatadutpattibhyām anyam nopalabhyate, atatsvabhāvasyātadutpattes ca tatrāpratibaddhasvabhāvatvāt. na hi śabdānām bahirarthasvabhāvatāsti bhinnapratibhāsāvabodhaviṣayatvāt. nāpi śabdā bahirarthād upajāyante, artham antareṇāpi puruṣasyecchāpratibaddhavṛtteḥ śabdasyotpādadarśanāt.*

But no other connection of this [Vedic injunction to a real thing] apart from being identical with something or being caused by something is grasped, because [something that] does not have the nature of some [thing] and [something that] is not produced by some [thing] are not [such that their] nature is connected to that [thing]. For words do not have the nature of external objects, because they are the object of an awareness that has a different appearance [than an awareness of an external object]. Nor do words arise from an external object, because one observes that a word arises even without an object [being present] due to being connected to a person’s intention.

Ratnakīrti is here saying that no verbal statement, including Vedic injunctions, can possibly have a connection to a real thing such that one could infer the object from the word. To have that kind of connection would require the word to satisfy one of two conditions: that it have the nature of an external object or that it be caused by such an object. But evidently it is not the case that being “Indian Rosewood” can have the same relation to being a real tree as being an Indian Rosewood (no quotes) can have to being a real tree; the actual reason that Ratnakīrti gives for this is interesting: the cognition arising from the word “fire” does not appear to our mind like the perception arising from a fire. As we shall see, it is

an internal feature of cognition (its image or form) that allows us to differentiate perceptions and verbal cognitions. The other possible type of connection required for this Mīmāṃsā position to survive would be that “smoke” relates to fire as smoke relates to fire: however, it is evident from everyday experience that the word “smoke” can occur in the absence of an actual fire.

The most concise definition in the *AS* is that the referent (*artha*) of words³²⁴ is an affirmation or positive element qualified by exclusion from others (*anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ*, l. 36 in § 7). Since this definition does not have a direct equivalent in Jñānaśrīmitra's *AP*,³²⁵ it is likely that it represents Ratnakīrti's own point of view on the subject in a form clearer than he considered it expressed in Jñānaśrīmitra's writings. But it is not the only definition that Ratnakīrti gives of the word referent. Some of his other explanations are collected in table 5.2. Only those have been included that use formulations significantly different from those that have been used in the passages preceding each occurrence.

Patil (2003: 230) has already presented “[...] Ratnakīrti's analysis of this complex entity [i.e., the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭavidhi* — PMA,] by describing each of its analytically separable components [...]”, and here too this tactic will be followed in explaining the sense of this definition.

One thus comes to ask these four questions, one for each part of the definition *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ* (l. 36 in § 7):

1. What is meant by “referent of words” (“...*śabdānam arthaḥ*”)?
2. What is this *vidhi* or positive element?
3. What is this *vidhi*'s property, *anyāpoha*?
4. How does this property qualify its substrate, or what is the relation of *anyāpoha* and *vidhi*?

³²⁴This translation of *śabdārtha* has been preferred to a possible “meaning of a word”, because the latter does not make good sense in the context of section 5.3.1 and section 5.6.

³²⁵Cf. the apparatus to the passage just cited, as well as the table in Akamatsu 1986: Appendice A, which shows no correspondence in column “RNA (AS)” for 59,4–6.

Table 5.2 – Definitions of *śabdārtha* found in the *Apoahasiddhi* (without repetitions)

Formulation	Line in edition
<i>apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate.</i>	2
<i>...anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ.</i>	36
<i>...apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ ...</i>	85
<i>tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ.</i>	276
<i>...anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyāvṛtto 'rtho vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpośabdavācyāḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, pravṛttinivṛtti-viṣayaś ceti ...</i>	302
<i>yad vācakam, tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛtta-vastumātragocaram ...</i>	306

Apart from this analysis of the definition's content, it is also important to see how far Ratnakīrti must let the explanation go: it has to be made clear that this thing is capable of being the word referent, in order to fulfil its role as *S* in the inference establishing *apoha*.³²⁶ The passages that deal directly with Ratnakīrti's idea of this word referent are: §§ 7–8, §§ 48–49, and § 53.

5.3.1 What is meant with “referent of words”

What has to be understood by the expression “referent of a word” (*śabdārtha*) is not explicitly discussed in the *AS*. But several passages clearly show that Ratnakīrti follows the standard account of Dharmakīrti,³²⁷ namely that the word referent is the same as the object of all conceptual cognitions. Thus, the discussion about the word referent is of great consequence for an understanding of what

³²⁶See the arguments above, section 5.1. For the abbreviations like *S*, see page 200.

³²⁷See, e.g., PV III 183ab (cf. appendix A.3.3). There is no scholarly disagreement on this topic, cf., e.g., Steinkellner 1967: 92, n. 25, or McCrea and Patil 2006: 305 f. for a concise discussion of the two means of cognition and their objects, and of the problems involved. Dharmottara subverted this clear distinction, cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 325, n. 64. To what extent this subversion is upheld in Ratnakīrti's texts will become apparent in the course of the next sections, especially section 5.4.

conceptual awareness is, and how it operates. The following two examples show that Ratnakīrti shares Dharmakīrti's assumption:

One passage appears in the answer to Vācaspatimiśra's contention that a particular qualified by a class is what a word refers to (cf. § 9). Ratnakīrti there effectively endorses that verbal and conceptual cognitions have the same objects by using the phrase: "...those that become the object of words and concepts ..." (*śabdavikalpayor viṣayībhavantīnām*, l. 61, p. 51). It seems highly improbable that he would use such an expression without any qualification and not touch on the subject anywhere in the following if he did not accept it.

Another clear indication of this tacit equation is found at the end of the section discussing the possibility of the word referent being some sort of particular (qualified by a universal). He there says: "Therefore it is settled that a particular does not appear because of a word, a concept, or a logical mark." (cf. § 31) This statement suggests that there is an equivalence amongst verbal, conceptual, and inferential cognitions in that they do not have a particular as their object.

These two instances should suffice to show that Ratnakīrti assumes that any kind of conceptual cognition, not only one produced from words, has what he calls "*anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ*" for its object.

5.3.2 *vidhi*—The positive element

The term "*vidhi*" is explained by Ratnakīrti in various statements that, taken together, suggest it would either best be left untranslated, or can only be rendered by a very loose approximation, as the "positive" or "affirmative" element or aspect of the word referent, as opposed to its negative aspect, exclusion of others.³²⁸ The first step in understanding

³²⁸Udayana, a Naiyāyika scholar who knew Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratnakīrti's works intimately, defines *astitva* in terms of being the object of a cognition that is directed at such a "*vidhi*" (Kir: 27). Halbfass (1970: 144) elaborates:

The following explanation is to be found in Udayana's commentary: *astitvaṃ vidhimukhapratyayaviṣayatvam/ pratiyogyanapekṣanirūpanātvaṃ iti yāvat*. Consequently, *astitva* is the character of all that is capable of determining our notions in a positive way, that

what could be meant by *vidhi* certainly must be to collect Ratnakīrti's explanations of this term and to consider what results from these. To this end, a close look at the following two passages is helpful:

ll. 93–97, § 15: And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to appearance a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular's appearance, since there is no appearance of a manifest particular that is limited as to space, time and condition, as there is in the case of perception.

ll. 276–282, § 48: Thus, in this way, only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [positive element] is meant [to be] the external object and the form of awareness. Amongst these, the form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated, neither in reality nor conventionally, because [this form] is to be cognized [only] through the perception self-awareness and is not determined. The external object is not affirmed or negated in reality either, because it does not appear in verbal apprehensions. Precisely for this [reason] all things are in reality inexpressible, for neither do they appear nor are they determined. Therefore the external object alone is conventionally affirmed and negated, because otherwise it would result that all everyday activity is given up.

has a content of its own, and can be grasped without reference to a counter-positive. ...Thus the field of *astitva*, of positiveness and determinateness, is the field of fixed meanings of words, of word-correlates. To such a position, the Buddhists oppose their doctrine of *apoha*; they do not accept any immanent positivity: Determination shall be explained as mere negation and exclusion.

The main points these two passages make about the affirmative element are:

1. by *vidhi* a twofold object is meant — a form of awareness and an external object,
2. two modes of awareness are indexed to these two aspects of it — appearance and determination,
3. the *vidhi* as a determined, external object is the object of practical activities.³²⁹

5.3.2.1 VIDHI AS A TWOFOLD OBJECT

In ll. 93–97, § 15, Ratnakīrti defines what is meant by the word *vidhi*: an external object according to determination and a form of awareness according to appearance. The phrasing of the passage, *yathādhyavasāyam ...yathāpratibhāsam*, suggests that the *vidhi* is either the external object or the form of awareness, depending on the way in which a person becomes aware of it. A natural question at this point might be to ask whether this *vidhi* should be understood as a single thing that one can cognize in two ways, or whether each of these two modes of cognition has a separate “positive element” as a part of its object. In the meantime, the best answer that can be given is that they are (ontologically) different entities. However, this answer cannot be understood correctly without the points made below (section 5.4) concerning the logic of determination (*adhyavasāya*): for while this cognitive function construes the external positive object on the basis of the appearing form of awareness, it does not show it in

³²⁹It is through this property that the “positive element” is connected to a notion of true and false cognitions, because it allows a cognition to direct activity at an external particular that is able to fulfill a desired aim. Cf., e.g., the succinct formulation in Krasser 1995: 247:

Following Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara defines correct or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as reliable cognition (*avisamvādam jñānam*). *Avisamvā-daka* is explained as causing a person to obtain (*prāpaka*) the indicated (*pradarśita*) object (*vastu*), which itself is capable of producing an effect or of fulfilling one’s purpose (*arthakriyāsamartha*).

any way. Similarly to the perception of an absence of other things, determination facilitates activity towards an external object that, though conceived of in an affirmative way, is not present to awareness other than as the way or the direction in which one might direct one's activity.³³⁰

In the passage currently under consideration, the *vidhi* as external object is then explained as not being a particular that appears in a conceptual awareness, but as being a result of determination alone. And it is to this external object that the qualification *atadrūpaparāvṛtta*, differentiated from that of another form, is applied. This should be noted as one way in which the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭa* of the central definition in ll. 36–37 (§ 7) can be predicated of the *vidhi*. Taking into account that this *vidhi* is the one that is brought to awareness in the form of determination, a first main line of understanding the central definition comes into focus: an external object qualified by other-exclusion is the referent of words, speaking in terms of determination. In terms of appearance, it is the form that awareness has.

5.3.3 *Qualified by other-exclusion (anyāpohaviśiṣṭa)*

So, presupposing the above two sides of *vidhi*, the positive element, what can be said about its quality, the exclusion from others?

As already analysed by Patil (2003: 231 ff.), exclusion is presented by Ratnakīrti both as a quality of the positive element, and as a capacity of conceptual awareness.

That it is a quality (or property) of the positive element is clear from the definition *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ* (ll. 36–37 in § 7).

³³⁰In addition, it is unclear whether the “external object” mentioned here is the external particular that might be achieved through an activity, or the continuum (*santāna*) of momentary states that constitutes an external common-sense object (like a cow). The latter is the analysis suggested, on the basis of several passages in Ratnakīrti's work, in Patil 2009: 257–258, but we also find passages in which Ratnakīrti seems to be endorsing the former option (cf., e.g., footnote 352, 252, 240). In those statements, he calls this external object the object of activity in the context of inference, and hence it must be a particular that becomes attainable through this means of valid cognition.

In ll. 49–53 in § 8, grasping exclusion as a quality of the form of awareness is stated to be a capacity (*śakti*) that conceptual awareness has. These two aspects, being the qualifier of something and being a capacity, are presented alongside a comparison of two types of negation that can be brought to bear on perceptual as well as conceptual cognition of absence.³³¹ The structure of the example is the following:

1. *prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in a non-implicatively negating form.³³²

³³¹While the perceptual grasping of an absence is a special case of perception, the conceptual grasping of absence is not a special case of conceptual cognition. For the object of conceptual cognition is always qualified by, or contains, *anyāpoha*, cf. section 5.3.1.

³³²A useful general account of the terms *prasajya*- and *paryudāsapratishedha* is Staal 1962. Cardona 1967 discusses this distinction in the grammatical literature, where it probably originated. Cf. Kellner 1997a: 92, n. 135 for further literature on the topic. Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 3 f.) draws attention to the fact that Mokṣākaragupta, like Ratnakīrti, uses the difference between the two types to differentiate types of *apoha*. Whether this is faithful to the actual development of the *apoha* theory is, however, not clear (see footnote 344). Here, *paryudāsa*- and *prasajyapratishedha* will be rendered as “implicative” and “non-implicative negation”, respectively, following Patil (2009). One way of making sense of this distinction is: “This is a non-red apple.”, which implies that the subject is an apple, and “This is not a red apple.”, not implying that the subject is an apple. The distinction between these two types of negation has also been employed in philosophical restatements of the *apoha* theory such that the two negations in “not a non-cow” would be analysed as non-implicative and implicative negation, respectively. The aim was to resolve the problem that the application of two negations of the same type would be redundant. See Siderits 2011 for the latest version of this theory, and Siderits 1986, Siderits 1999, and H. G. Herzberger 1975 for earlier formulations. Earlier claims that this theory was held by ancient Buddhist authors (Siderits 1999: 347 attributed it to Śāntarakṣita), have been softened, Siderits (2011: 295): “I know of no smoking gun that proves the *apoha* theorists modeled their ‘exclusion of the other’ on what happens when we combine two styles of negation. It does still strike me as plausible that they may have had some such idea in mind.” Recent studies on Śāntarakṣita’s usage of the two types of negation do not indicate that he used these types of negation to explain the double negation in *anyāpoha* (see Ishida 2011b and Okada 2017); its merit in saving this kind of nominalism has recently been discussed by Hale 2011: 260–262 and Gillon 2011.

- a) For perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) this is the capacity to produce a concept of absence (*abhāvavikalpotpādanaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by “perception of non-x” is the capacity to produce the conceptual cognition “There is no x here.”
 - b) For the conceptual cognition of a positive element (*vidhivikalpa*) this is the capacity of leading to activity in conformance with the grasped absence (*tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by “conceptual cognition of non-x” is the capacity that a conceptual cognition of the positive element has for making determinate activity directed at external objects possible.³³³
2. *paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in an implicatively negating form:
- a) the awareness of something with a concrete form particular to it, *niyatasvarūpasamvedanam*, for both perception and the conceptual awareness of a positive element.

This comparison is not easy to make sense of.³³⁴ The following arguments support a schema as shown in table 5.3.

Before analysing the example, it will be helpful to review the scholarly discussions of its model in the AP 205,12–16, which is as follows:

yathā vā vidhivṛtter agrahaṇam nāma prasajyapakṣe niyatarūpānubhavād abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir eva, tathā vidhivikalpānām api tantre ’nurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśaktir

³³³The relevant example (l. 55) is that someone is told “Tether the cow!”, and tethers a cow, but not a horse. “Tether the cow!” generates a conceptual cognition of cow, which in turn is the awareness of the absence of non-cows that makes activity with regard to *any* cow possible. In the translation of this example, it is assumed that there is only one cow present, so that the “the”, without an actual Sanskrit equivalent, is justified.

³³⁴It seems that both in Patil 2003: 232 and Patil 2009: 213 only the first part of the example (*prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*) is translated and discussed.

Table 5.3 – The cognition of absence

	<i>prasajya</i>	<i>paryudāsa</i>
object of <i>abhāvapratyakṣa</i>	<i>ghaṭābhāva</i>	<i>bhūta</i>
object of <i>vikalpa</i>	<i>agavāpoḍha</i> (not non-cow)	<i>buddhyākāra</i>
cognitive function	<i>adhyavasāya</i>	<i>pratibhāsa</i>
classification	<i>śakti</i>	<i>niyatasvarūpa-saṃvedana</i>

eva niṣedhagrahaṇam agnir mayā pratīta ity anuvyavasāyaprasavaśaktiś ca. paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpa-saṃvedanam evobhayatra niṣedhagrahaṇam.

Or, as the non-grasping of an occurrence of a positive element is, on the position [that the negation in this non-grasping] is a non-implicative negation, simply the capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of an absence based on the [direct] experience of a [particular] having a well-defined form, so for conceptual cognitions of a positive element, too, the grasping of a negation is simply the capacity to bestow an incitement [to an activity] that conforms to a general norm, and the capacity to produce a determination conforming to [a statements like] “I perceive a fire.” And, on the position of implicative negation, the grasping of a negation is simply the apprehension of a well-defined, particular form in both cases.

The first translation and detailed scholarly discussion of this passage is found in Akamatsu 1983: 56–7, with its annotations.³³⁵ It

³³⁵ Additionally, Katsura (1986: 174) notes that the context in which this comparison appears in the *AP* is based on the discussion of the *anupalabdhihetuḥ* in the *HB* (HB 26,1 ff.). The reason he gives there is that Jñānaśrīmitra cites a *HB* passage in the same context (cf. Katsura 1986: 174 and p. 180, n. 20, and footnote 91), apart from the fact that clearly the grasping of absence is a topic that would be discussed in the context of *anupalabdhi*.

corresponds largely to how the passage in the AS was interpreted above.

McCrea and Patil (2010: 55; 153, nn. 41,42) give a rather different interpretation of this passage. Whilst they also emphasize that Jñānaśrīmitra is here maintaining that the positive and negative elements of any verbal or inferential awareness are simultaneously known, their interpretations of the positive and negative elements, and of how the latter is linked to the two types of negation, diverge strongly from the earlier interpretation. Perhaps the basis for their interpretation is their slight emendation (against Thakur's edition) at the end of the passage under discussion: instead of the single sentence "*paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpasamvedanam evobhayatra niṣedhagrahaṇam.*" (AP 205,15–16), they read "*paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpasamvedanam eva. ubhayatra niṣedhagrahaṇam.*" (McCrea and Patil 2010: 103; 174, n. 20) The main difference that arises from this concerns the interpretation of what *ubhayatra* refers to.

Akamatsu (1983: 57) takes the expression as referring to perception and conceptual cognition. The sentence then says that in both those cases the grasping of a negation, in the sense of an implicative negation, is the awareness of the present object's own form. McCrea and Patil (2010: 55), however, translate: "And in the case of implicative negation, there is, of course, the awareness of a definite form (*niyata-svarūpa*). In both cases, there is the incorporation of negation." The phrase "In both cases" refers, in all likelihood, to the cases of implicative and non-implicative negation (as *ubhayam* does in the following sentence, *ubhayam caitad abhīmatam śāstrakāraṣya*. AP 205,16). If this were indeed what is meant, Jñānaśrīmitra would here be explaining that these two types of negation, commonly distinguished in Sanskrit literature of this genre, each contain a negation. This would be a somewhat redundant statement on Jñānaśrīmitra's part, and one might want to consider other possibilities.

In an alternative understanding, "In both cases" might refer to two different types of conceptual cognition, that of present things and that of absent things. This interpretation rests on McCrea and

Patil 2010: 153, n. 42, where attention is drawn to the context, i.e., that Jñānaśrīmitra is here explaining why it seems to us that we have “positive” and “negative” content in cognitions, in answer to an earlier objection that all inferences would have the same type of reason, *anupalabdhihetu*, McCrea and Patil 2010: 153, n. 42:

A conceptual awareness is considered to have positive content when the activity pursued on the basis of it and the reflective awareness that we form regarding it are taken to involve a positive object. It is considered to have negative content when the activity pursued on the basis of it and the reflective awareness that we form regarding it are taken to involve an absence.”

This interpretation seems possible, as far as the text of the AP is concerned, and preferable in comparison to the redundant first option.

However, Ratnakīrti's reformulation of the passage would then be very unfaithful: first, his reformulation clarifies that the comparison is between perception and conceptual cognition, and not between “the nonincorporation of the role of the positive entity” (McCrea and Patil 2010: 56) and conceptual cognition; second, the term *ubhayor*, the equivalent to Jñānaśrī's *ubhayatra*, here certainly refers to perception and conceptual cognition, thus suggesting that the point is that, for an implicative negation, the “incorporation of a negation” is “the awareness of a definite form” (McCrea and Patil 2010: 56) in both cases—perception and conceptual cognition. In light of Ratnakīrti's reformulation, we should therefore not emend as suggested by McCrea and Patil 2010: 103; 174, n. 20, but rather construe Jñānaśrīmitra's sentence in line with Ratnakīrti's reformulation and understand that, both for non-apprehension and conceptual cognition, the grasping of an absence in an implicative form consists in the direct awareness of what appears to each of the cognitions.

If this interpretation of the model of Ratnakīrti's passage is accepted, we can focus fully on the two main problems that need to be solved for Ratnakīrti's presentation. They are as follows:

1. How is the absence in the two cases relevantly similar — how is it useful to compare the perceptually cognizable absence of a pot on a perceived stretch of floor with the conceptually cognizable absence of something’s not being that, i.e., its quality “the exclusion from others”?
2. What is the relationship between the non-implicative and implicative negation? Is each just possible, so that sometimes the one and at other times the other will have to be applied in the analysis of these cognitions, or are they somehow interdependent?

What seems clear is that the absence which is grasped both by perception and conceptual cognition can be grasped in two forms: as non-implicative and implicative negation, cognized by means of that which is present to each cognition, i.e., an empty piece of floor or the form of awareness.³³⁶ In the case of conceptual cognition, the absence which is so cognized is *anyāpoha*, exclusion from others, e.g., non-cows. In the case of perception, it is the non-existence of something in a specific, perceptually cognized place, e.g., on a stretch of floor here and now.

There seem to be two ways of interpreting these statements: either both forms of negation can occur or both must occur so that a perceptual and conceptual cognition of absence is such a cognition of absence.³³⁷ Here the latter option will be argued for: both in a perception of absence and in conceptual awareness, which always

³³⁶The absence of the pot in some place is the standard example of non-perception, used, e.g., in HB 28,16–17, as well as in § 13. That it is the form of awareness, *buddhyākāra*, that is present in conceptual awareness, is apparent from the argument that a form of awareness is not affirmed or negated because of being comprehended through self-awareness, l. 278 in 48.

³³⁷This grasping of absence should not be confused with a full cognition of absence. The latter is a conceptual cognition that follows a perception. It has a particular negated object, while the perception preceding it has the potential to generate a myriad of such conceptual judgements. It is this perception that Ratnakīrti is using in his comparison to conceptual cognition. The reason that Ratnakīrti can view a conceptual cognition as a case of “grasping absence” and so assign it the same potential as the perception of an empty surface, is that it is, essentially, a

has other-exclusion (*anyāpoha*, cf. section 5.3.1) as its object and thus involves the grasping of an absence, a dual absence, one in the non-implicatively negating form and the other in the implicatively negating form, is involved.

In the perception of an empty floor, for example, the absence (*abhāva*) of *all* things which are not on the floor becomes known in a non-implicatively, or absolutely, negating way. It is not actually all things that are cognized as absent (which would require a judgement like “There is no pot, no cloth, no chair, ...here on the floor.”), but the absence itself of all these things (so that any judgement like “There is no pot here on the floor.” or “There is no chair here on the floor” becomes *possible*). Correspondingly, in the conceptual awareness “cow”, the non-implicatively negating absence (*abhāva*) of *all* things that are not cows is cognized through the appearing form of awareness (*ākāra*). In both cases this is a non-implicative negation, i.e., a negation that, upon perception, can potentially be expressed as “It is not the case that anything is here on the floor.”, and, upon its conceptual cognition, can lead to activity directed towards anything of which it is true that it is not a non-cow: in the case of the perception of the empty floor, this grasping of a non-implicative absence or negative constituent, which explains the adjective “empty” (i.e., the absence of a pot on the floor, *bhūtalaghaṭābhāva*, mentioned in § 13), is analysed only as a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence: “There is no pot, chair, etc. on the floor.” In the case of conceptual cognition, the grasping of a non-implicatively negating element, the *anyāpoha*, becomes apparent only in the cognition’s capacity to lead

self-perception of awareness with an indistinct image.

For a careful examination of a cognition of absence, as described in HB 30,13–31,2, see McCrea and Patil 2006: 322–324. For critical editions of Jñānaśrīmitra’s main texts on the subject, the *Anupalabdhirahasya* and the *Sarvaśabdābhāvavarcā*, see Kellner 2007. Kellner 1997b discusses the difference between Dharmottara’s and Jñānaśrīmitra’s positions on how inference and perception are involved in a cognition of absence.

to an act with regard to what is in accordance with this negation, for example, any cow.³³⁸

According to Ratnakīrti's comparison, one also grasps an absence in the form of an implicative negation. The result of this is the same for perception and conceptual cognition: the awareness of something with its own fixed form, *niyatasvarūpasamvedana*, meaning a particular. In the case of the perception of an absence, the awareness of absence is identical with the awareness of the presence of another thing: the potential to conceptually cognize absence of a certain object, or anything, is precisely the perception of the floor. It is implicative negation or absence in that it is the affirmation or presence of some other positive thing, in this case a particular piece of floor. In the case of conceptual cognition, which always has absence or the exclusion from others as its object, it is the *buddhyākāra* that is qualified by absence in an implicatively negating manner, the form of awareness which is a particular that is present in any given awareness event.

The absence in a non-implicatively negating form is determined, and the absence in an implicatively negating form is grasped — both in the perception of absence and in conceptual awareness. For it is a particular that is manifest and grasped in perceptual awareness,³³⁹ and it is a form of awareness that is directly manifest and grasped in conceptual awareness.³⁴⁰ The latter is one of the two aspects of the *vidhi* in the definition of the word referent from the side of determination. However, it is a particular that is determined in perception, and thus makes activity possible with regard to it (one

³³⁸Actually, it depends somewhat on the situation: the speaker could be referring to a particular cow that she wishes to be tethered. In that case, the proper other-exclusion would be “what is not not that cow”, instead of “what is not a non-cow.”

³³⁹About this there is no dispute, so it is not expressly proven. This seems to be the argument in ll. 91 f., § 15.

³⁴⁰This is implied in the argument given in l. 278: there is no activity with regard to the form of awareness, because it is known through the form of perception that is self-awareness. This presupposes that Ratnakīrti held a notion of self-awareness very similar to that described in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 47: self-awareness is “[a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring”

activity being the formation of the concept “No pot here.”),³⁴¹ and it is an external object, likewise a particular, that is determined on the grounds of the appearing form of awareness in the case of conceptual cognition. The latter is the second aspect of the *vidhi* in Ratnakīrti's definition of the word referent.

Consequently, the exclusion from others that qualifies the positive or affirmative element is

1. a quality that the form of awareness has (insofar as this form is directly perceived, it is perceived with all its attributes, including this absential qualifier), and
2. the capacity that this state of awareness has (because it has a form with that quality) to make activity that accords to expectation possible

This interpretation thus suggests that, for Ratnakīrti, it is primarily an ontological, and not an epistemological, affair to say that the positive element has the quality “exclusion”. A form of awareness, a particular, is qualified by *anyāpoḥa* just like any other particular would be qualified by it. Exclusion is literally a quality of such an image: the exclusion shared by the class of cows, that is, by all particular point-instants of every continuum that constitutes a cow, is the same as that which any cognitive form has that can be classified as constituting a cognition of “cow”. It is thus not, or at least not primarily, a form of presentation of something, or a matter of knowing something, that Ratnakīrti is here concerned with.

This makes it possible for Ratnakīrti to maintain that the reason one cognizes the (conventionally correct) exclusion when a word is understood is that that word has been learned as referring to something, a certain cow particular or set thereof, insofar as it or

³⁴¹The question of what is determined in perception is answered differently in Patil 2009; there, it is a commonness as a “genericized-particular” (Patil 2009: 259, n. 32) that is determined by perception. This interpretation will be discussed below, section 5.4. Briefly, Ratnakīrti considers determination to be a non-representing state of awareness; its object is a “particular as such”, a particular that is not directly presented with its specific place, time, or shape, but only indirectly through its exclusions. It is thus a future particular, much like Prajñākaragupta held it to be (see Kobayashi 2011, McAllister forthcoming a).

they are differentiated from non-cows (cf. § 8). Ratnakīrti wants us to believe that, on hearing two particular instances of words, like “cow” and “cow”, we are disposed to judge that they mean the same, just as looking at the same stretch of floor at two different times each time disposes us to say “The floor is empty.” The identity of “the same” judgements is nothing but the fact that they each dispose a person to endorse each of them as expressing the same state of affairs. And they dispose a person to such a judgement not because of what they are known to show, but because of the quality that they have. On Ratnakīrti’s explanation,³⁴² this way of founding reference does not present more problems than the opponent’s foundation of reference on a substantially existing universal. For in that case too, the word referent is supposed to be a *specific* universal, not a particular or a universal as such (one that is not cow-hood, horse-hood, etc.). The particular is not general enough for a convention regarding it to be of any use, and so the criticism against the *apoha* theory on these grounds would equally apply to the opponent; the universal as such is not useful either: that cow-hood qualifies a lump of matter means, for the opponent, that that material entity is a cow, but not that it is a universal as such or a concrete universal like “cow-hood”. For Ratnakīrti, a universal cannot be known wholly independently of any instantiation.³⁴³

The question remains of how Ratnakīrti’s definition of the referent of a word as “positive element characterized by the exclusion of others” should be understood as a whole. It is with regard to the relation of the positive and negative aspect involved in this definition that the above differentiation between the capacity aspect and the quality aspect of “exclusion from others” comes into meaningful perspective.

³⁴²Cf. § 12. The point of the arguments given there is to show that *anyāpoha* does not lead to any worse logical problems than the assumption of a really existing universal.

³⁴³The present author was unable to find passages in Ratnakīrti’s work where universals that cannot be instantiated are discussed. It is unclear whether Ratnakīrti (or his opponents) thought this might be possible.

5.3.4 *Relation between anyāpoha and vidhi*

A distinctive feature of Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratnakīrti's version of the *apoha* theory is the stress they lay on the simultaneous cognition of the two parts of the word referent, exclusion and the positive or affirmative element.³⁴⁴

ll. 43–49 in § 8:

Therefore a cognition of a cow is called the cognition of that excluded from others. And even if the non-representation of the words “excluded from others” [in conceptual cognition] has been maintained, nevertheless there is no non-cognition at all of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word “cow” is founded only on that excluded from non-cow. As the appearance of blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the cognition of a water lily that is blue because of the word “*indīvara*” which is founded on a blue water lily, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment as there is the cognition of a cow from the word “cow” which is founded on that excluded from non-cow.

From this passage it follows that the cognition “cow” is equivalent to the cognition of that excluded from non-cows. In other words, the positive element, *vidhi*, is that excluded from others, *anyāpoḍha*, due to having exclusion, *anyāpoha*, as its qualifier. The example illustrates that the cognition of “*indīvara*” is impossible without

³⁴⁴This is also the central point of the critique of the affirmationist and negationist positions (*vidhi*- and *pratishedhavādin* positions) in this passage. This distinction made by Ratnakīrti has been an important factor in assessing the *apoha* theory's development. The main secondary literature on how to understand this aspect is: Mookerjee 1935: 132 ff., Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 125, n. 338, Akamatsu 1986, Katsura 1986, Siderits 1986, Patil 2003: 230 f., and—given the similarity of the *AS* to Jñānaśrīmitra's *AP*—also McCrea and Patil 2006. More recently, Okada 2017 has examined Śākyabuddhi's interpretation and concluded that this distinction has its roots already in this early commentator's work.

the qualifier “blue” being cognized in the same moment as “water lily”.³⁴⁵ This means that what can be understood as the *vidhi*’s quality, exclusion from others, is essential to it in the sense that it cannot be grasped or cognized without it. Understanding the word “cow” is simultaneous to, and cognitively not separable from, understanding “not non-cow.”

This analysis leads to the following question: given that the positive element is both present in the mode of appearance and determination (cf. section 5.3.2.1, section 5.4), is its qualifier, the exclusion from others, also present in both modes?³⁴⁶ Against the background of the arguments above (section 5.3.3), this should be affirmed. Ratnakīrti unambiguously states, in § 15, that, in the context of determination, the term “positive element” refers to an external object that is differentiated from others, and that, in the context of direct appearance, the term refers to the form of awareness. Accordingly, the main constituents of the “complex entity” (Patil 2003: 230) that is the referent of words, the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ*, might be analysed as follows: any conceptual awareness event can be analysed as possessing a positive element which is qualified by exclusion, and it can be so analysed in two respects, according to whether it is regarded as directly perceived by self-awareness or whether it is regarded as determined. Both the positive and the negative elements (the exclusion) are present in each of these modes

³⁴⁵As mentioned in footnote 89, the Sanskrit word “*indīvara*” is not composed of parts that would correspond to “blue” and “water lily”.

³⁴⁶This is not supported in the place where a direct clarification could have been given by Ratnakīrti, l. 93 ff., § 15: “And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation a form of awareness [is meant].” Here Ratnakīrti qualifies only the determined aspect of the positive element, the external object, as distinguished from that of another nature, but not the form of awareness. On the other hand, if it were not the case that differentiation from others would qualify the form of awareness also, it would be hard to see how Ratnakīrti separates his view from that of the affirmationists (*vidhivādin*), who take the positive element as the primary element, at least temporally speaking. Cf. Akamatsu 1986 for a description of their view.

of awareness; in the perceptual apprehension of the conceptual state that this awareness has, the form of cognition is the positive element and its quality, the exclusion of what is different from it (including other images), is its property. In the determination of this image, that is to say, in the potential for generating useful activity that this conceptual state has, an external object, the positive element, can be distinguished from its quality, the exclusion of other things (including other external objects). In each case, furthermore, the positive element is so called because it is known positively, in the sense of an implicative negation (*pariyudāsa*), whereas its quality is known wholly negatively, in the sense of a non-implicative negation. The result of this is that the quality “other exclusion” is primarily present as the capacity that a conceptual awareness event has to generate other awareness events (some of which will produce everyday activities visible to others) which will be able to avoid the group of things so excluded.

The statement above that this complex object is “present in each of these modes of awareness” can now be refined so as to avoid a misunderstanding: the fundamental way in which one is aware of anything is through self-awareness, i.e., the awareness even of a conceptual awareness state is a perception of awareness by itself. We must thus conclude that “determination” is not an irreducible type of awareness state.³⁴⁷ A conceptual cognition, in other words, must be analysed as a particular case of self-awareness. The connection between determination and appearance will be more fully examined below (section 5.4). Here, one should note that Ratnakīrti has divided the phenomenal and the causal aspects of conceptual cognitions very neatly: just like an external object is (for a Buddhist epistemologist like Ratnakīrti) differentiated from everything else, so the form of awareness is too. It is simply a particular. What it shows or what we might judge it to represent, the *vidhi*, is functional for Ratnakīrti’s

³⁴⁷We shall see below (page 253) that, in effect, the only true distinction between conceptual and perceptual awareness events lies in the distinctness of the images that they have.

theory of conceptual cognition only due to one of its qualities, other-exclusion, not due to its content. The similarity that the *apoha* theory aims to explain as the exclusion of everything that is something else, is “present” only as the capacity to direct subsequent activity in such a way as to correspond to particulars that are likewise so differentiated. It is not present in any meaningful way of “to know.”³⁴⁸ What it represents is not the question, though it might satisfy the common (apparently even at Ratnakīrti’s time) assumption that some kind of sameness or similarity is actually apparent in many, and all conceptual, cognitions.

Furthermore, the implicative and non-implicative types of negation must be known simultaneously: this is the whole point of § 8, where it is stated that a quality (here, exclusion) and that qualified by it (the positive element, either the external object or the internal appearance) must be apprehended in one cognition. It is somewhat less obvious whether the characterization, made above, of appearance and determination pertaining to the same awareness event that follows the perception of a word, can be correct: the simultaneity of perception and determination would seem to blatantly contradict the difference between perceptions and conceptual cognitions that is central to the Buddhist logico-epistemological school’s tenet that there are two, and only two, means of valid cognition, perception and inference. Indeed, there is at least one passage in which Ratnakīrti argues against the simultaneity of conceptual and non-conceptual cognition, SJS 24,5–7:

*nanu vakṛtṛtvam virudhyata eva sarvaviṣayanirvikalpa-
jñānaviruddhavigalpakāryatvād vakṛtṛtvasya. naitad yu-
ktam, savikalpāvikalpayor yugapad avṛtter vikalpatvena
sarvajñāsyāvirodhāt.*

[Opponent:] Is it not so that the fact that [an omniscient being] speaks is actually contradicted [by what you have

³⁴⁸This is the problem at the core of the discussion in §§ 51–52. Ratnakīrti’s solution is built on the causal continuity that runs from previously experienced particulars through particular cognitions to future particulars.

said], because to be a speaker is the result of a conceptual cognition, which contradicts [this omniscient being's] non-conceptual cognition of all objects? [Proponent:] This is not correct, because, since conceptual and non-conceptual cognition do not occur simultaneously, an omniscient being is not contradictory to there being a conceptual cognition.³⁴⁹

This is a response to the charge that an omniscient being, as defined by the Buddhists, could not speak, since speech is the effect of conceptual cognition but omniscience is a non-conceptual cognition. Ratnakīrti's answer must be taken seriously. However, it does not make the analysis presented here impossible.

On the one hand, if the impossibility of a simultaneous conceptual and non-conceptual cognition were his final position, it would contradict the principal position that any moment of awareness is based on the perception of a form of cognition. I.e., since conceptual cognitions have forms (*sākāra*), and these forms are perceived by a perception of the type self-awareness, it follows that conceptual cognitions must be perceptions, albeit internal ones. If so, one would have to interpret Ratnakīrti's argument as saying that the perception of external things, but not that of the form of awareness by awareness itself, is never simultaneous with conceptual cognition. This interpretation would also accord with Ratnakīrti's arguments about the "distinct" and "indistinct" forms of awareness that differentiate perceptual and conceptual awareness events in §§ 17–20.

On the other hand, one should consider that Ratnakīrti also gives a second answer to the opponent's objection, based on an argument by Prajñākaragupta.³⁵⁰ This answer is based on the possibility of habituated concept usage, which involves concepts only during the formation of a habit, but not when these habits are exercised. It is possible that this is the explanatory model preferred by Ratnakīrti,

³⁴⁹Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 69–70 for an annotated translation into German.

³⁵⁰This alternative answer is found in SJS 25,11–20, see Bühnemann 1980: 72 ff. for a German translation.

though this is not examined in much detail by Bühnemann (1980). She notes only that Ratnakīrti presents different answers, and that the first one, that conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions are not contradictory because they do not occur simultaneously, is the one he endorses.³⁵¹

We may thus conclude that the perception of the type self-awareness and conceptual cognition are, and indeed must be, simultaneous, given Ratnakīrti's arguments in § 8 and his general theory that awareness always really possesses a form (*sākāra*). The "positive element" (*vidhi*) and the exclusion (*apoha*) which qualifies it are, equally, cognized at the same moment in a conceptual cognition. They are known in the forms of an implicative and non-implicative negation, respectively. A conceptual cognition can therefore be analysed as consisting of a self-perception of an indistinct form that awareness has, and the potential in this self-awareness to generate activity consistent with the form that appears. A conceptual cognition is thus an ephemeral phenomenon, the particular state of a self-perception of awareness in which it has an indistinct form. Other-exclusion, on this interpretation, is nothing but the causal potential that qualifies the perception of an indistinct form of awareness. Just as the perception of an empty stretch of floor potentially includes a practically infinite amount of explicit negations (one for every thing that is not on that stretch of floor) without a concrete awareness of all these things that are negated, so the self-perception by awareness of its own indistinct form potentially negates all things that are not perceived there.

5.4 TWO MODES OF AWARENESS: *PRATIBHĀSA* AND *ADHYAVASĀYA*

In describing the complex object that is the word referent (cf. § 15, § 48), Ratnakīrti distinguishes the appearance and determination of that

³⁵¹"Nach Ratnakīrti besteht zwischen vorstellender und vorstellungsfreier Erkenntnis kein Widerspruch, weil beide nicht gleichzeitig vorkommen." Bühnemann 1980: xiv

complex object. Some comments on this distinction are necessary in order to gain a clearer picture of Ratnakīrti's general idea of cognition, its structure, and the place of verbal or conceptual cognition within that structure. The analysis of cognitions in terms of appearance and determination is, furthermore, one that is repeatedly used by Ratnakīrti, and a good understanding of it will help in exploring his other texts.³⁵²

Patil (2009: Chapter 5) has provided the most extensive analysis of this matter. The basic interpretation developed by Patil (2009: 250–299) is that for Ratnakīrti each type of cognition, *pratyakṣa* and *vikalpa*, has two kinds of object: a direct object, grasped in virtue of directly appearing (*pratibhāsa*) to either perceptual or conceptual awareness, and an indirect one, known to perceptual or conceptual awareness by virtue of determination (*adhyavasāya*). Patil (2009: 253) summarizes this:

There are, therefore, three pairs of concepts that are used to classify the contents of awareness: “perceptual” or “inferential/verbal,” which indicate the kind of awareness-event in which a particular object/image appears; “manifest” or “determined,” which indicate the way in which it appears; and “particular” or “universal,” which indicate (in retrospect) what appears.

His analysis then goes on to show how the direct and indirect objects of perception and conceptual awareness are related to these

³⁵²See, for example, SJS 20,11–14: *āgamānumānāyor dviividho viṣayah grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. tatra grāhyaḥ svākārah, adhyavaseyas tu pāramārthikavastusvalakṣaṇātmā. asya ca paroḁṣatve 'numānasāmagrīsambhave 'numānaviṣayatvam, pratyakṣasāmagrīsambhave ca krameṇa pratyakṣaviṣayatvaṃ dṛṣtam eva.* (Both scriptural tradition and inference have a twofold object, grasped and determined. Amongst these, the grasped [object] is the form [of awareness] itself, but the determined [object] has the nature of a particular, an ultimately real thing. And if this [object] is beyond the senses, then it is considered the object of inference if the complete causal complex of inference comes about; but if the complete causal complex of perception comes about, it is considered the object of perception.); KBhSA 73,20: *dviividho hi pratyakṣasya viṣayah, grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca.* (For perception has a twofold object, grasped and determined.), as well as CAPV 131,4–5 (see page 252).

concepts, resulting in the scheme shown in table 5.4: perception grasps, or directly knows, a particular, and determines, or indirectly knows, a universal; conceptual cognition grasps a universal and determines a particular. He thus differentiates four objects: perception has a “manifest particular” and “determined universal” as its objects, and conceptual cognition has a “manifest universal” and a “determined particular” (Patil 2009: 252–253).

In the further discussion by Patil (2009: 253–288) it becomes apparent that this interpretation entails positions that are at odds with the usual ontological categories as Dharmakīrti uses them. The result of this understanding is that, as Patil (2009: 279) puts it,

...for Ratnakīrti, particulars and universals are defined relative to one another—there is no object that is in and of itself either a “particular” or a “universal.” The image that appears in the first stage of the perceptual process is not a “grasped object of perception” because it is a particular, rather it is a “particular” because it is the grasped object of perception. In the same way, the image that appears in the first stage of the inferential process is not a “grasped object of inference” because it is a universal, but rather it is a “universal” because it is the grasped object of inference. Objects/images are labelled as “particulars” or “universals” only in relation to a subsequent determination. Thus for Ratnakīrti “particular” and “universal” are not really ontological categories at all. Instead, they are defined contextually.

Two points are made here that will be important to the analysis given below: the first is about ontology, namely that the “determined particular” of conceptual cognition is not the particular that is defined by having causal efficacy, and that the “manifest universal” is not the universal that is defined by the lack of that efficacy. This constitutes a clear break from Dharmakīrti’s fundamental differentiation between these two kinds of entities.³⁵³ The second point, which concerns the

³⁵³See PV III 1–3, recently translated and interpreted in Franco and Notake 2014.

logic of determination and therefore an epistemological matter, is that these two objects are categorized as they are due to a *subsequent* determination. The interpretation that will be proposed here differs in these two points: first, determination, at least in the context of conceptual cognitions, cannot be factually and temporally separate from the grasping, though it can be separated analytically; second, “particular” and “universal” are primarily ontological categories for Ratnakīrti, and he employs them in general accordance with Dharmakīrti’s notions throughout his works. Anything he calls a “particular” is a particular insofar as it is a point-instant resulting from an immediately preceding particular and possesses the capacity to cause a new one. Universals can be reduced to relation properties that characterize such particulars, and as such they lack causal capacity (cf. section 5.3.3).

Ratnakīrti’s various statements about the two kinds of cognition, perception and conceptual cognition, and their objects are not, at first sight, easy to align with each other. A problem might arise, for example, if the following statements from the *VyN* and the *KBhSA* are read alongside each other:

VyN 8*,12–15 (*VyN*₂ 109,14–18): *yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad grāhyam. yatra tu yataḥ*³⁵⁴ *pravartate, tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇam grāhyam, adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ.*

For, what appears in some cognition, that is what is to be grasped. But with regard to which [someone] acts because of some [cognition], that is what is to be determined. Amongst these [two objects], for perception it is a particular that is to be grasped. But what is to be determined is a universal, having the nature of a mere

³⁵⁴Read *yataḥ* acc. to *VyN* 8*,13, against Thakur’s emendation to *tat* *VyN*₂ 109,16.

Table 5.4 – Four objects (O₁₋₄) of awareness. (Page numbers refer to Patil 2009.)

	O ₁	O ₂	O ₃	O ₄	comment/quote
<i>grāhya</i> (by <i>pratibhāsa</i>)	x		x		“...directly grasped (<i>grāhya</i>) by awareness.” (p. 251)
<i>adhyavaseya</i> (by <i>adhyavasāya</i>)		x		x	“similarity class”, “constructed through exclusion” (p. 251)
<i>svalakṣaṇa</i>	x			x	“...O ₁ is a manifest particular and O ₄ a determined particular.” (p. 252)
<i>sāmānya</i>		x	x		“...O ₂ is a determined universal and O ₃ a manifest universal.” (p. 252)
mental images (<i>ākāra</i>)	x	x	x	x	“Both direct and indirect objects can also be understood as mental objects/images” (p. 252)
ultimately real	x				“...under the most rigorous philosophical description, only objects like O ₁ really exist.” (p. 253)
ultimately unreal		x	x	x	“In the final analysis, ...objects like O ₂ , O ₃ , O ₄ [do not] really exist.” (p. 253)
<i>nirvikalpa</i>	x				Object O ₁ “...is the only object ...not necessarily associated with some form of mental construction (<i>vikalpa</i>).” (p. 253f.)
<i>svikalpa</i>		x	x	x	associated with <i>vikalpa</i> (consequence of previous item)
<i>viśayīkṛta</i>		x		x	“...objects that appear to us as though we can act upon them (O ₂ /O ₄) ..” (p. 256); cf. also p. 265–266
<i>bahis</i>		x		x	O ₂ as external is “...an externally projected mental image that only appears to be independent of us.” (p. 264); “O _{4e} is just the external projection of O ₄ .” (p. 281)

Table 5.5 – Objects of *pratyakṣa* and *vikalpa*

Mode of awareness	Obj. of perception	Obj. of conc. cognition	Ontological status
<i>grahaṇa</i>	<i>svalakṣaṇa</i>	<i>svākāra</i>	<i>svalakṣaṇa</i> (present)
<i>adhyavasāya</i>	<i>vastumātra</i>	<i>bāhyo 'rthaḥ</i>	<i>svalakṣaṇa</i> (future)

particular that is excluded from that of another form.
But for inference the opposite is [the case].³⁵⁵

Apparently Ratnakīrti here claims that perception and inference have the same kinds of objects, but in inverse modes of awareness. This passage, taken by itself, would thus mean that perception's grasped object, a particular, is the same as the determined object in inference, i.e., a particular, and the determined object of perception is the same commonness or universal³⁵⁶ that is grasped in an inference.

On the same topic, Ratnakīrti has the following to say in KBhSA 73,8–17:

*yac ca gr̥hyate yac cādhyavasīyate te dve 'py anyanivṛttī,
na vastunī, svalakṣaṇāvagāhitve 'bhilāpasamsargānu-
papatter iti cet, na, adhyavasāyasvarūpāparijñānāt.*³⁵⁷

³⁵⁵Cf. also the translation and note in Lasic 2000b: 63–64. This passage is closely modelled on VC 13,3–6. In the translation of that passage, Lasic (2000a: 95, n. 52) refers to Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 58, Steinkellner and Krasser 1989: 77 f. and Krasser 1991: 41 ff. for information about the view that every cognition has two objects. To this should be added the translation of the same passage and the discussion in McCrea and Patil 2006: 334–336, as well as in Patil 2009: 251, n. 7.

³⁵⁶As pointed out by Patil (2009: 259), this universal's characterization, *atadrūpa-parāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam*, is importantly reminiscent of what words have as their objects: *adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram* (l. 306 in § 54).

³⁵⁷Cf. the close parallel of this passage in SJS 10,26–28, where it is part of a quote from NK (see Bühnemann 1980: p. 113, n. 174). Within that quote, it is an objection by a Buddhist opponent, and the corresponding passage in NVT 444,22,

*agr̥hīte 'pi vastuni mānasādipravṛttikāraakatvaṃ*³⁵⁸ *vikalpasyādhyavasāyitvam. apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviśayīkṛtatvaṃ*³⁵⁹ *adhyavaseyatvam. etac cādhyavaseyatvam svalakṣaṇasyaiva yujyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād arthipravṛtته. evaṃ cādhyavasāye svalakṣaṇasyāsphuraṇam eva.*

[Opponent:] But both that which is grasped and that which is determined, all two, are negations of others, but not real things, because a connection with a designation is not possible when [a cognition] is fully immersed in the particular.

[Proponent:] No, [that is not the case], because the nature of determination was not fully understood [by you]. For conceptual cognition, to determine [that real thing] is to produce an activity, like mental [activity] and so on, towards [that] real thing, even though it is not grasped [by the conceptual cognition]. To be made the object of activity, even though there is no appearance [of the real thing the activity is directed at], is what it is [for that thing] to be [the object] determined [by conceptual cognition]. And this fact of being what is determined is coherent only for the particular, [and] nothing else, because someone with an aim acts due to having a causal efficiency [of a real thing] as an aim. And in this way there is absolutely no appearance of a particular in a determination [of it].

This passage says that the object of determination is most definitely the particular. That is, it flatly contradicts one point of the

as the position in general, can be attributed to Dharmottara (see Frauwallner 1937: 277, McCrea and Patil 2006: 333). That is to say, Ratnakīrti is here refuting a view held by his fellow Buddhist Dharmottara.

³⁵⁸Corrected against *mānasyādi*° acc. to Woo 1999: 72.

³⁵⁹Patil 2009: 257, n. 23 and Patil 2003: 247, n. 17 both read *pravṛttiviśayīkṛtam* instead of *pravṛttiviśayīkṛtatvam*. This is probably only a typo, since neither RNĀ 73,10 nor Woo 1999: 72 note any variants to *pravṛttiviśayīkṛtatvam*, which is also what RNĀ_{ms} 40b3 supports.

passage from the VyN (page 238), namely that perception determines a universal. In order to avoid the assumption that Ratnakīrti, a meticulous logician, trapped himself in a self-contradiction with these two passages, we will have to revise our understanding of *sāmānya* in the VyN passage (page 238). The following arguments should show that, in fact, the determined object is a particular as well.

Note, first of all, that the attribute that Ratnakīrti adds to *sāmānya* in VyN 8*,14–15 passage (page 238), that it has “the nature of a mere particular that is excluded from that of another form”, can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it could mean that, as Patil (2009: 251, n. 7) takes it, “the determined object is a universal, i.e., a genericized-particular excluded from those that do not have its form”, an interpretation that underlines the generic or universal aspect so much that the particular is not a particular in the strict sense of the point-instant any more. On the other hand, it could mean that what is here stated to be a universal is really (“has the nature of”) a particular, a particular that has said exclusion as its attribute; this is how it is understood by Lasic (2000b: 64).³⁶⁰

In order to decide between these options, two things should be considered: first, the model passage in VC 13,6–8 has no equivalent for the phrase “*atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātma*”, containing only the noun “*sāmānya*”. So Ratnakīrti added something here on purpose. Second, Jñānaśrīmitra adds the following sentence in VC 13*6–8:

*tatra sādhanapratyakṣaṃ tadaivārthakriyārthinaḥ kṣa-
ṇavīkṣaṇe 'pi santānāpekṣayā sāmānyaviṣayam.*

There, [amongst inference and perception], the perception of what accomplishes [a goal] has, with respect to the continuum, a universal as its [determined] object, even

³⁶⁰The latter translates: “...das Bestimmte aber eine Gemeinsamkeit, die wesentlich nichts als das Individuelle ist, insofern es von anderen (Individuellen), die nicht seine Form haben, ausgeschlossen ist.” (Lasic 2000b: 64) One could paraphrase the point in English: “For perception the determined object is a universal that is, essentially, nothing but a particular insofar as this particular is excluded from the other particulars that do not have its form.”

though someone aiming for the achievement of a goal sees, at that exact time [of the perception], only a momentary phase [of the continuum].³⁶¹

With this statement the “universal” determined by perception is unambiguously equated to a continuum of point-instants that constitutes the “object” of everyday activities. Insofar as this generalization from a single phase to a continuum of phases is not essentially different from the generalization from one particular to a class of particulars,³⁶² the use of the term “*sāmānya*” without further qualification is, of course, perfectly justified.

The universal is then analysed by Jñānaśrīmitra as a group of particulars in the same context, VC 13*15–20:

na ca sāmānyam nāma kiṃ cid anyad eva. kiṃ tu svalakṣaṇāny eva parasparam avivecitabhedāni sāmānyam ucyante. bhedavivecane tu pratyekam svalakṣaṇam iti svaśabdenaiva vyavahārah.

But there is actually nothing else[, apart from the particulars,] called a universal. Rather, the particulars as such, [insofar as] their mutual differences are not distinguished, are called a universal. But when [these mutual] differences are distinguished, each is individually a particular, [called *svalakṣaṇa*]. So there is an everyday treatment [of these particulars] just through the word “*sva*”.³⁶³

³⁶¹See the German translation by Lasic (2000a: 95): “Dabei hat die Wahrnehmung eines Mittels [zur Zweckerfüllung] (*sādhana*pratyakṣa), obwohl der, der auf eine Zweckerfüllung abzielt, zu eben dieser Zeit (nur) eine Phase sieht, mit Rücksicht auf das Kontinuum eine Gemeinsamkeit zum Objekt.”

³⁶²Cf. Patil 2003: 233 f., as well as Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: § 7.1.2

³⁶³See Lasic 2000a: 96 for a German translation, which differs slightly in the interpretation of the force of the negation in the first sentence, understanding that the so-called commonness is nothing else at all (“Und die sogenannte Gemeinsamkeit ist ja überhaupt nichts anderes.”). Though Lasic (2000a: 96) does not specify what the universal is different from, the context suggests that it must be the particulars.

In the light of this position, there is no reason not to assume that Ratnakīrti supplied the adjective “*atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmaka*” so as to guard against a misunderstanding of the term “*sāmānya*” in a sense other than the one intended by Jñānaśrīmitra in the corresponding passage of the VC, i.e., as a mere group of particulars.³⁶⁴ The notion of a universal as a group of particulars can be applied to various useful types of such groups: a group of one or more particulars would be the least coherent group, with nothing but the decision to place the particulars in a group connecting them; a stronger connection would be found in the notion of a *santāna*, a group of particulars that is seen in the links of a cause-effect chain, where each particular is the effect of the previous link and the cause of the next; more complex groups could be construed by defining a group of such groups, such as when a herd of cows, or even the group

³⁶⁴Patil (2009: 215, n. 44) characterizes a universal as a “collection”, and analyses the positive object subsequently in terms of such a collection, Patil 2009: 236:

It is this nonspecific collection that is mistakenly taken by some to be a real universal, and is unconsciously associated with a group of particulars in which it is mistakenly thought to be instantiated. According to Ratnakīrti, this object is a positive entity that is neither a real particular nor a real universal. It is a thing-in-general that is constructed through its essential characteristic, exclusion, and is determined to be equivalent to semantic value. According to Ratnakīrti, it is this complex positive entity that best describes what is understood from hearing a token utterance of a term.

The main difference in interpretation is that, on the understanding developed here, Ratnakīrti would not agree that “this object is a positive entity that is neither a real particular nor a real universal.” (Patil 2009: 236) The positive entity has to be either a concrete (but indistinct, “nonspecific”) mental image or an external particular. As such, it would indeed not be a real universal. In both variants, however, it would be a real particular, though in the former case not one that common activity would be directed at and in the latter case not one that could appear in conceptual cognition. The “collection” thus has to be taken in a purely extensional sense (cf. the comments in Patil 2009: 215, n. 44). Though not directly present to awareness, it is present to the extent that the activity of a rational agent will be directed at it, so that one of its elements can become the object satisfying the agent’s expectation.

of all cows, is defined as all the momentary particulars that each belong to a *santāna* that we would be prepared to classify as a cow.

For inference, the determined and grasped object is opposite to the case of perception. That this is meant literally is evident from Jñānaśrīmitra’s characterization of the objects of inference at VC 14*7–9:

*tatrānumāne tāvad vastuno ’pratibhāsād adhyavaseyam
eva svalakṣaṇam. grāhyas tu svākāraḥ. evamvidham
nirloṭhitam asmābhir apohaprakaraṇe iti na prastūyate.*

To begin with, for inference there [amongst all kinds of cognitions], the particular is only what is determined, since there is no appearance of a real thing [in an inference]. But what is grasped is the form [of this cognition] itself. We have explained this fully in such a manner in the *Apohaprakaraṇa*, so it will not be discussed [here].³⁶⁵

This passage equates the grasped object of inference with the form that awareness itself has in the inferential cognition. In the description of perception above (page 238 and page 243), the corresponding object, but as determined by perception, was analysed as a certain group of particulars (the type *santāna*). We will thus have to conclude from Ratnakīrti’s statement that “for inference it is the opposite” (see page 238), that these are two equally valid ways of addressing this object: the group of particulars that perception determines can be called the form of awareness that an inferential cognition directly grasps.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁵In his translation of this passage, Lasic (2000a: 97, n. 56) says that this is a reference to AP 225,12–230,8, and that that passage in turn refers back to the VC. See McCrea and Patil 2010: 87–93 for a translation of the corresponding passage. In the last section of this discussion, Jñānaśrīmitra explicitly criticizes Dharmottara’s notion of the object of activity, see the references in McCrea and Patil 2010: 171, nn. 242–245, and McAllister 2014 for a closer study. This constitutes a significant difference between Dharmottara’s and Jñānaśrīmitra’s theories concerning what a conceptual cognition “knows” about the particular that it directs activity towards (see also above, page 240).

³⁶⁶It is still unclear how to make sense of this equivalence. It will be more fully discussed in the context of CAPV 131,4–13 (page 252), but the basic idea is that the

Ratnakīrti's phrase "*adhyavaseyaṃ tu sāmānyam atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam*" in the VyN should thus best be interpreted as "But [the object] that is determined [by perception] is a universal, [insofar as a universal] has the nature only of particulars that are differentiated from [other particulars] that have a form different from these [particulars]." The determined object of perception is therefore to be understood only as a group of particulars. The grasped object of inference is said to be the same as this determined object of perception: a group of particulars, which we can also call a form of awareness in the case of inference.

Furthermore, VyN 8*,14–15 does not differentiate between the particular that is grasped by perception and determined by inference; this, we must then understand, is in both cases the external particular that perception grasps.³⁶⁷ With this interpretation, the apparent contradiction between VyN 8*,14–15 (page 238) and KBhSA 73,8–17 (page 240) can be resolved. VyN 8*,14–15 states that perception grasps a particular and determines a group of particulars, and that inference grasps a group of particulars and determines a particular. Accordingly, KBhSA 73,8–17 states that a conceptual cognition (of which inference is a subtype) determines a particular. Furthermore, in the last sentence of the second passage (page 240), Ratnakīrti categorically ("*eva*") denies that a particular can appear in determination.

So, according to these passages, perception and conceptual cognition can both have two objects, *each of which are particulars*. Perception grasps an external particular and determines another particular³⁶⁸ as contained in a collection of particulars. Conceptual

directly grasped form of awareness in a conceptual cognition connects the cognition to the class of particulars through the same other-exclusion (*apoha*). In other words, the image appearing in awareness (the *vidhi* as a *buddhyākāra*) is qualified by an other-exclusion that corresponds to the other-exclusion qualifying the group of external objects at which a subsequent activity can be directed.

³⁶⁷This would also have to be understood from SJS 20,11–13, quoted and translated in footnote 352.

³⁶⁸Since determination has been defined as a capacity to act (see section 5.3.3), this does not mean that the perception itself should be deemed to ascertain its object.

cognition is said to grasp a collection of particulars, which means that it grasps a mental image that “represents” this collection insofar as it is qualified by a property that makes the cognition in which it is grasped capable of promoting activity in line with this property. In grasping this mental image with this property (and an indistinct appearance), conceptual cognition determines the object that will become the object of activity, a future particular, without representing it positively. In other words, Ratnakīrti’s model describes cognitions as bridging one particular to another: a perception of one particular leads to activity that attains another particular, and a conceptual cognition, grasping the particular that is the form that cognition has or shows at that time, likewise leads to activity that might attain another particular. The main difference between the two types of cognition is that perception’s grasped particular is a cognitive form that is distinct, directly caused by an external particular, whereas conceptual cognition’s form is indistinct, having been augmented by various contributory factors such as memory, habituation, disposition, and so on. And the only difference between the grasped and determined particulars is that the first is directly present and that the other is not: it lies in the future, is the object that an activity is directed at, and is, unlike a particular that appears directly, present to awareness only through one other-exclusion that integrates the particular within a group.³⁶⁹

There is a second set of statements that complements this picture by positively characterizing inferential knowledge. They discuss inference, or conceptual cognition in general, in a form reduced to self-awareness, a type of perceptual cognition. The passages in which inference is so described often appeal to “highest reality” (*paramārtha*), here to be distinguished from the everyday reality of

³⁶⁹See table 5.5, page 240, for a schematic overview. It might be debatable as to how being an object of intentional activity is actually a mode of awareness. Cf. footnote 75 for the various modes of activity Ratnakīrti considers. A more detailed argument about *pravṛttiviśaya*, highlighting that determination is what makes something into an object of activity, is found in KBhSA 73,9–12 (cf. the references in footnote 185).

mind-external entities that are temporally and spatially extended, and with regard to which the usual means of valid cognition, sense perception and inference, can reliably regulate activity. Probably the clearest example for this reduction in Ratnakīrti's œuvre is the following, where he answers a Mīmāṃsā objection that, on Ratnakīrti's theory, inference would have to be a perceptual and non-perceptual cognition, a non-conceptual and conceptual cognition, and a superimposition and not a superimposition at the same time. Ratnakīrti's answer is this, SSD 118,8–11:³⁷⁰

*...[i]ty apy ayuktam. anumānasya hi paramārthataḥ
svasaṃvedanapratyakṣātmano 'vikalpasyāsamāropasva-
bhāvasyāpratyakṣatvavikalpatvasamāropatvādeḥ parā-
pekṣayā prajñaptatvād viruddhadharmādhyāsābhāvāt
kathaṃ bhedasiddhiḥ.*

That [criticism] is not correct either. For, how should a difference of inference[, due to which it would have said contradictory properties,] be established, since, in reality, [inference]—which has the nature of the perception self-awareness, is non-conceptual, and does not have the nature of a superimposition—is not determined as having contradictory properties because being perception, conceptual cognition, super-imposition, etc., are defined in respect of each other?

³⁷⁰Cf. the translation by Mimaki (1976: 123):

...cela ne pas juste non plus. En effet, du point de vue [de la vérité] absolue ..., l'inférence possède la nature de la perception en tant que connaissance-de-soi ..., n'est pas imagination et a la nature propre de non-surimposition Mais [du point de vue de la vérité conventionnelle] on qualifie l'inférence, par rapport à l'autre [c.-à-d. la perception], de non-perception, imagination et surimposition. Donc, pour l'inférence on ne peut pas mettre [ces] attributs contradictoires [sur le même plan]. Ainsi comment peut-on prouver une différence dans l'inférence?

So, according to this passage, inference is reducible to a perceptual cognition of the type self-awareness: it is hence non-conceptual, has the nature of self-awareness, and does not perform any superimposition.³⁷¹ But if inference is thus reducible to perception, then how can the above distinction of two objects in two modes of awareness hold true? The answer is that, for Ratnakīrti, determination is reducible to self-awareness. Since it is only a capacity that a certain state of awareness has (§ 8), and since its object is one that is not meaningfully “presented” or “shown” by it at all,³⁷² it is not a temporally separate cognitive act or state of awareness. This reduction is thus an explanation of how things really are, and the prior distinction of different objects concerns how things are conventionally treated.³⁷³

This is also supported by § 48 of the *AS*. There, too, a double standard, “in reality” and “conventionally”, is appealed to in order to explain what the word referent actually is. Neither in reality nor conventionally is a form of awareness an object of activity, because it appears in the perception self-awareness. This corresponds to the claim in *SSD* 118,8–11 (see page 248) that conceptual awareness is

³⁷¹This contradiction, or at least tension, arises also in light of formulations important for understanding central issues in the *AS*, e.g., that the objects appearing are not different for perception and conceptual cognition (l. 53 in 8: “...*ubhayor aviśiṣṭam*.”); cf. also l. 278 in § 48, and the analysis of this statement in section 5.3.3.

³⁷²See the interpretation of *KBhSA* 73,8–17, above page 240.

³⁷³This corresponds to the well-known distinction of levels of analysis, one according to reality and one according to everyday activities. See the “sliding scales of analysis” suggested in Dunne 2004. The possible problems for using the idea of self-awareness as a “bridging concept” between contradictory theories about reality or its cognition are mentioned in Kellner 2010: 227 (for Dignāga), and more generally discussed in their relevance for Dharmakīrti in Kellner 2011 and Kellner 2017: 311–312. However, in the current context this is not really an issue. Ratnakīrti is here being interpreted as explaining the move either, in the case of perception, from a mind-external particular to another mind-external particular, by means of one generalization, or, in the case of conceptual cognition, from one mind-internal particular which is the generalization to a mind-external particular. The point is that self-awareness bridges the transition between the start and end of this process, or explains how one reaches one from the other. It is not used as a device to show that a contradiction is not, in fact, the case.

no different from perception. A true particular is the grasped object in both cases, and, since this is in both cases the perception of a particular, there is no determination (or superimposition)³⁷⁴ of that particular. And an external particular is the determined object of both a conceptual and perceptual cognition, insofar as practical activity is directed at it by them. This intends to explain the conventional notion of dealing with external, temporally extended objects.

The picture presented here diverges in several respects from the distinction of four objects of cognition, a grasped and a determined object each for perception and conceptual awareness, prefigured in McCrea and Patil 2006, and fully worked out in Patil 2009: chapter 5. Whilst the solutions developed there certainly fit most of the passages considered up to this point, the analysis proposed here has made a simpler solution possible.³⁷⁵ The central difference between the two interpretations is that instead of four objects, we here are attempting

³⁷⁴Whether this equation of superimposition and determination is appropriate to Ratnakīrti's understanding of the matter is a very difficult question. Cf., e.g., CAPV 135,31–136,2 *tathā vikalpāropābhīmānagrahaniścayādayo 'py adhyavasāyavat svākāraparyavasitā eva sphuranto bāhyasya vārtāmātram api na jānantīty adhyavasāyasvabhāvā eva śabdappravṛttinimittabhede 'pi, tat katham yuktyāgamabāhirbhūto 'nātmāsphuraṇam ācakṣita* (Read *śabdappravṛttinimittabhede 'pi* acc. to RNĀ_{ms} 73a1 against the misprinted *śabdappravṛttimittabhede 'pi* in CAPV 136,1. The emendation by Thakur from *yuktyāgamābahir* in RNĀ_{ms} 73a1 to *yuktyāgamabāhir* does not seem necessary to me. Trl.: In the same way, also conceptual cognition, imposition, conceit (*abhimāna*), taking [something for something else], ascertainment and so on, like determination, only ending in the form of awareness itself [insofar as they are] appearing, know not even the merest news of the external thing. So (*iti*) [these] have the nature of determination indeed, even though there are different causes for the use of [these] words. Thus, how should someone not transgressing reasoning and scripture assert a manifestation of [something that] is not the nature [of awareness]?)

Ratnakīrti here equates forms of conceptual cognition, imposition, etc. with determination, but immediately adds the reservation that there are different causes for the employment of the different terms.

³⁷⁵As noted in Patil 2003: 237, and explicated in Patil 2009: 249, an assessment of Ratnakīrti's epistemological framework, or "...theory of mental content ..." has to proceed "...by providing an interpretation of his scattered remarks on...mental objects/images ...and does not present Ratnakīrti's position as he himself presented it" (Patil 2009: 249) So all attempts at outlining this framework can only be

to show that *whatever appears* to awareness is a particular, and *whatever is determined* is a universal. Thus there would be only two objects of awareness, instead of four. Furthermore, considering that a universal reduces to a particular (or several thereof) insofar as it excludes (or they exclude) other particulars, only one kind of real entity—the particular—has to be posited, with the absence of a mutual difference (through *anyāpoha*) accounting for the commonness that qualifies such entities.

A first argument can be made by reminding ourselves that, according to Ratnakīrti, perception and conceptual cognition each have a twofold object, a grasped and a determined one.³⁷⁶ As explained, this in itself leads into interpretative difficulties. In some instances this object is said to be, respectively, a particular (as grasped) and a universal (as determined) for perception, and a universal (as grasped) and a particular (as determined) for conceptual cognition.³⁷⁷ In other instances, especially where self-awareness is discussed or mentioned in the context of conceptual cognition, this clear differentiation is not upheld.³⁷⁸ The key to resolving this puzzle lies in the fact that Ratnakīrti is able to call the grasped object of conceptual cognition a “universal”, as he does the determined object of perception. The final clue to resolving this puzzle is found in Ratnakīrti’s CAPV 131,4–12:

interpretations and reconstructions.

Among the passages considered until now, the four-object model does not seem to offer a clean solution for VyN 8*,14–15 (see page 238) and KBhSA 73,8–17 (see page 240). In the former case, the difference hinges on the interpretation of how the objects are inverse for perception and inference. While Patil essentially argues that this inversion does not apply on the ontological level, because perception perceives an actual particular whereas inference determines a generalized particular that is, actually, a universal, here we can maintain that both items—grasped and determined—are ultimately particulars. In the latter passage, the problem is that the determined object of inference is said to be simply the particular, without any qualifications. If this were not the actual, momentary thing that can satisfy a desire, it would be strange for Ratnakīrti to invoke Dharmakīrti as an authority: the very reason that perception and inference are means of valid cognition is that they make activity possible that can target particulars.

³⁷⁶Cf. footnote 352 for textual evidence of this claim.

³⁷⁷Cf., e.g., VyN 8*,12–15 (VyN₂ 109,14–18, quoted and translated section 5.4).

³⁷⁸Cf. the material page 248, as well as l. 278 in § 48.

iha dvividho vijñānānām viṣayaḥ grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. pratibhāsamāno grāhyah. agrhīto 'pi pravṛttiviṣayo 'dhyavaseyaḥ. tatrāsarvajñe 'numātari sakalavipakṣa-pratibhāsābhāvān na grāhyatayā vipakṣo viṣayo vaktavyaḥ, sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt, sarvatra sakalavipakṣapratibhāsābhāvāt tato vyatirekāsiddheḥ. pratibhāse ca deśakālasavbhāvāntaritasakalavipakṣasākṣātkāre sādhyātmāpi varākaḥ sutarāṃ pratīyata ity anumānavaiyarthyam. tasmād apratibhāse 'py adhyavasāyasiddhād eva vipakṣād dhūmāder vyatireko niścitaḥ. tat kim artham atra vipakṣapratibhāsaḥ prārthyate. yadi punar asyādhyavasāyo 'pi na syāt tadā vyatireko na niścīyata iti yuktam, pratīyataviṣayavyavahārābhāvāt.

Here, the object of cognitions is twofold, [one that is] grasped and [one that is] determined. [The one that] appears is [the one that is] grasped. [The one that is] to be determined is the object of activity, even though it is not grasped. With regard to these [two objects], in the case of a non-omniscient [agent] of an inference, the counter-instance is not to be called an object on account of [its] being grasped, because there is no appearance of the whole counter-instance; because of the [unwanted] consequence that all inferences would be destroyed, since, because there is no appearance of all the counter-instances in any [inference], there is no establishment of the [reason's] exclusion from this [whole counter-instance].

And if there were an appearance, which is a direct presentation of the whole counter-instance distant in space, time, and its own nature, then even that which has the nature of what is to be proven, that poor fellow, would be easily cognized. Thus an inference would be useless.

Therefore, even though there is no appearance [of the whole counter-instance], the exclusion of smoke etc. from the counter-instance, which is indeed established through determination, is ascertained. Therefore, with what

aim is the appearance of the counter-instance desired here? If, however, there were not even a determination of this [counter-instance], then the exclusion would not be ascertained. This is logically coherent, because there is no everyday activity towards an object that is limited [as to its place, time, and condition].

Ratnakīrti here explains how the counter-instance of an inference can be known.³⁷⁹ It is central to the functioning of inference that this counter-instance can be known in at least one respect. It must be possible to ascertain that the reason, which establishes the presence of the intended property, is absent from these dissimilar cases. At the same time, it is impossible to know each of these dissimilar cases individually. Ratnakīrti thus emphasizes the fact that these dissimilar cases are known, or established, through determination. That is, they are known in general, through the exclusion that is common to them. The judgement that smoke is absent in each individual instance of “non-fire” is possible, without having to know each instance of fire individually.

What is it then, in the final analysis, that distinguishes a conceptual from a perceptual cognition? Ratnakīrti’s concisest statement can be found in CAPV 140,18–19:

*tatra nirvikalpakaṃ spaṣṭapratibhāsatvād grāhakaṃ vya-
vasthāpyate. vikalpas tv aspaṣṭaikavyāvṛtṭiyullekhād*³⁸⁰
āropakādivyavahārabhājanam.

³⁷⁹The counter-instance (*vipakṣa*) is the group of cases which are dissimilar to the case that an inference is considering, insofar as the property that that inference intends to establish is absent in them.

³⁸⁰Read *aspaṣṭaika* against CAPV *spaṣṭaika*. In the manuscript, the difference between *stva* and *stu* is so small as to make a decision difficult, but the parallel in SāSiŚā 395,1–3 supports *aspaṣṭaika*: *tatra nirvikalpakaṃ bhrāntam api spaṣṭapratibhāsavasāt grāhakaṃ avasthāpyate. vikalpas tu vimarsākārataṃ svayam anyānapekṣapravartakatve ’py aspaṣṭaikavyāvṛtṭiyullekhād āropakādivyavahārabhājanam.* (“There, non-conceptual cognition, though erroneous, is classified, in virtue of a distinct appearance, as [a cognition that directly] grasps [its object]. Conceptual cognition, however—even though it causes activity independently of another [cognition] by itself, since it has the form of a judgement—is subject to an

There,³⁸¹ [amongst cognitions based on other words and means of valid cognition,] non-conceptual [cognition] is defined as [directly] apprehending [its object] because there is a distinct appearance [of that object]. Conceptual cognition, however, is subject to an everyday treatment as superimposing and so on, because it depicts a single, indistinct exclusion.

The difference of conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions is thus based only on what appears in them. It is important to note that the classification into conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions is not due to the mode in which something appears in them—by determination or appearance—but is, rather, due to a characteristic of the image. If it is clear or vivid, the cognition is non-conceptual; if it is not, the cognition should be deemed conceptual. With this, Ratnakīrti has broken down the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions to such a degree that he can make them independent from

everyday treatment as [a cognition that] superimposes [something on object] and so on, because it depicts an indistinct, single exclusion.”)

This would also accord with Prajñākaragupta's main reason for distinguishing inference and perception, e.g., PVABh 218,26: *pratyakṣaviśayappravarttakatve 'pi spaṣṭāspaṣṭabhedāt pramāṇadvitayam eva*. (“Even though [inference] causes activity towards a perceptible object [like perception does], there are two means of valid cognition, because there is a difference in [that an object can be] distinct and indistinct.”)

³⁸¹In both the CAPV and the SāSiŚā, the *tatra* (“there”) is somewhat unclear: it is here understood as referring to “*śabdapramāṇāntara*”, taken as “other words or means of valid cognition” Ratnakīrti is here arguing that his position does not contradict the obvious fact that in certain cognitions, other words or means of valid cognitions are necessary in order to ascertain an object correctly. The whole discussion here is close to the treatment of perception and inference, and their difference and relation, in the PVABh (see McAllister forthcoming a).

Ratnakīrti's arguments in this passage are introduced by a quote from the PVABh in the CAPV 140,10–11 (but not in the SāSiŚā): “*yad āha alaṅkārah-katham tadviśayatvaṃ tatra pravartanād iti*” (Which the author of the *Alaṅkāra* stated: “How is that [external thing] the object [of a conceptual cognition]? Because [there is] an activity towards it [due to this cognition].”). Cf. PVABh 221,28–29 for such a statement.

determination or appearance: it is thus possible to link them to both. In other words, Ratnakīrti is now free to claim that determination and appearance can occur simultaneously: determination is not the unique marker of a conceptual cognition any more; it has been detached from any representational function and redefined as the capacity that a cognition has with regard to a subsequent activity. It is thus possible for Ratnakīrti to describe a conceptual cognition as one that unites both “appearance” and “determination” without either a temporal distinction between the two, or a contradiction in that cognition being both perceptual and non-perceptual at the same time.

It is now possible to fully appreciate Ratnakīrti’s comparison, in § 8, between the perception of absence and the conceptual cognition of something excluded, or, in other words, the quality of other-exclusion (section 5.3.3). As seen above, Ratnakīrti equates perception and conceptual awareness as to the object that directly appears in them: “*paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇaṃ tu niyatasvarūpasamvedanam ubhāyor aviśiṣṭam.*” (ll. 52–53 in § 8) This object corresponds to the grasped form of awareness itself, which could be either distinct or indistinct, making the cognition that has this form either a non-conceptual or conceptual one. This passage also shows an equivalence between grasping absence in an implicative form (i.e., as the presence of something else) and an awareness of something having a “limited own form”, meaning that this awareness has an object that is fixed as to its location, time, etc.³⁸² So both perception and conceptual cognition do have a particular as their object, at least in respect of the form of awareness that they each have. In the AS, this is

³⁸² Cf., e.g., the (negative) formulation in § 15: “...*deśakālāvasthāniyata-pravyaktasvalakṣaṇāṣphuraṇāt.*” This is the defining characteristic of a particular: “The term *svalakṣaṇa* ...entails from the beginning that the phenomenon is individual, unique and distinct.” (Yoshimizu 2004: 119) Cf. also the similar formulation SSD 124,22–23: *nanv ananuvṛttāu api tadarpitākārasvarūpasamvedanam eva tadvedanam. tad eva ca saviṣayatvam.* (Trl. by Mimaki (1976: 159): “[Les Bouddhistes:] Même si [l’objet] ne dure pas [jusqu’au moment de la connaissance], la connaissance de la nature propre de la forme projetée par l’[objet], c’est la connaissance de l’[objet], n’est-ce pas? Et ce fait [montre] précisément que la [connaissance] a un objet”)

supported by Ratnakīrti's statement that a form of awareness is not positively or negatively acted towards since it is present to awareness through the perceptual mode self-awareness (l. 278 in § 48).³⁸³ And perception has, by definition, a particular as its grasped or appearing object: again, this is only the form of awareness itself, but caused by a different set of causal factors, usually considered to involve sense faculties and external objects, which result in a cognition with a distinct form.³⁸⁴

As its determined object, conceptual cognition has a real thing, a particular which can be called a universal insofar as it is differentiated from others, just as perception has this as its determined object. Within the AS, a number of passages support this as far as conceptual cognition is concerned.³⁸⁵ The argument for perception can be made by an interpretation of the following passage, KBhSA 73,18–24:

tathā tr̥tīyo 'pi pakṣaḥ prayāsaphalaḥ, nānākālasyaikasya vastuno vastuto 'sambhave 'pi sarvadeśakālavartinor atadrūpaparāvṛttayor eva sādhyasādhanayoḥ pratyakṣeṇa vyāptigrahaṇāt. dvividho hi pratyakṣasya viśayah, grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. sakalātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātram³⁸⁶ sāḁṣād asphuraṇāt pratyakṣasya grāhyo viśayo mā bhūt, tadekādeśagrahaṇe tu tanmātrayor vyāptiniścāyakavikalpajananād adhyavaseyo viśayo bhavaty eva, kṣaṇagrahaṇe santānaniścayavat, rūpamātragrahaṇe rūparasagandhasparsātmakaghaṭaniścayavac ca. anyathā sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt.

³⁸³ Cf. also page 248.

³⁸⁴ Cf. above, footnote 352.

³⁸⁵ Cf., e.g., the guiding inference of the AS (cf. section 5.2): *yad vācakam tat sarvam adhyavasītātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram.* (ll.305–306 in § 54), and see also table 5.1 on page 212 for a list of passages where these points are argued for.

³⁸⁶ Emend “^oparāvṛttam vastumātram” (KBhSA 73,20) to “^oparāvṛttavastumātram” according to Woo 1999: 74; this is also accepted in Patil 2009: 259, n. 30.

In this way, also the third option is a result [only] of hard effort,³⁸⁷ because, even though a single real thing, [existing] at different times, is not really possible, perception does grasp the pervasion of that to be established[, i.e., momentariness,] and that establishing [it, i.e., existence], which occur at all places and times, [and which] are indeed differentiated from what is not of that nature. For the object of perception is twofold, grasped and determined. The mere real thing that is differentiated from all that is not of its form cannot possibly be the grasped object of perception because it does not appear directly, but it certainly is the determined object, because, if there is a grasping of one part[, or instance,] of this [mere thing], [perception] produces a conceptual cognition that ascertains the pervasion of these two as such (*mātra*), like a continuum is ascertained when a moment is grasped, and like a pot is ascertained that has the nature of a form, a taste, a smell, [and] a feel, when only [its] form is grasped. For, [if it were] otherwise, there is the unwanted consequence that all inference is ended.

As before, Ratnakīrti here asserts that perception has two objects as well: a grasped and a determined object. But he additionally specifies that the determined object of perception is a mere thing

³⁸⁷Acc. to Woo 1999: 189: “The third view is the objection in text [71.28–30] above that no logical reason can have a relationship with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) in terms of the proving property and the property to be proved. ...Beginning with this passage, he [i.e., Ratnakīrti–PMA] demonstrates that perception can grasp the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between existence and momentariness.” The opponent there said, KBhSA 71,28–30: *yadvā sarvasyaiva hetoḥ kṣaṇikatve sādhye viruddhatvaṃ deśakālāntarānanugame sādhyasādhanabhāvābhāvāt. anugame ca nānākālam ekam akṣaṇikam kṣaṇikatvena virudhyata iti.* (Or else, if momentariness is to be established, each and every reason is contradictory, because, given that [the reason] does not continue in a different place or time, there is no relation of that which is to be established and that which establishes it. But if [the reason] does continue, then one non-momentary [entity, namely, the reason, insofar as it exists] at a different time, is in contradiction with momentariness.)

that is excluded from that which is not like it (*sakalātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātram*), a characterization that obviously corresponds to that of the grasped object of conceptual cognition, which is the basis for the determined particular. So the phrase in l. 306 in § 54 containing *adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram* should be understood like this: whatever denotes something, “operates on a determined particular as such that is excluded from those particulars which do not have its form.”³⁸⁸

From a historical perspective, this position is probably the result of merging two theories developed by Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, respectively. Dharmottara posited two objects of cognition, and Prajñākaragupta put the future particular at the core of his interpretation of the relation of perception and inference.³⁸⁹ Dharmottara’s position has often been regarded as the theory with the strongest influence in this regard on Jñānaśrīmitra’s and Ratnakīrti’s positions.³⁹⁰ But the present investigation of Ratnakīrti’s theory of verbal cognition shows some deep differences to that of Dharmottara: for Ratnakīrti, the object of activity is not present to cognition in any way other than as the disposition to act in a way that will allow one to attain that object, whereas for Dharmottara it is a superimposed thing.³⁹¹ Ratnakīrti’s position thus is very close to a central element in Prajñākaragupta’s general argument about why perception and inference are both means of valid cognition: they make activity possible with regard to something that is not “present” to awareness in any way.³⁹² Since this historical perspective would not

³⁸⁸ Cf. also footnote 356.

³⁸⁹ For Dharmottara, see Krasser 1995 and McCrea and Patil 2006; for Prajñākaragupta, see Kobayashi 2011 and McAllister (forthcoming a).

³⁹⁰ See, for example, McCrea and Patil 2006: 333, Patil 2009: 250–251, n. 6 and also the present author’s own article, McAllister 2015

³⁹¹ See McAllister 2014 and Kataoka 2017b. Patil (2009: 225, n. 68) notes that there is a difference between Dharmottara’s and Ratnakīrti’s notions of superimposition or determination as far as the object is concerned. This is still true also on the current interpretation. What has changed, however, is the interpretation of what Ratnakīrti takes as the object of determination. See also above, footnote 365.

³⁹² This issue is explored in McAllister (forthcoming a).

be of much use for a better understanding of Ratnakīrti's *Apoḥasiddhi* and would presuppose a deeper examination also of Jñānaśrīmitra's works, the matter will be investigated on a different occasion.

5.5 OTHER-EXCLUSION AS DOUBLE NEGATION

So far, Ratnakīrti's positions in his *Apoḥasiddhi* have been discussed under their ontological (section 5.3) and epistemological (section 5.4) aspects, because these two aspects are the most prominent ones in the text. All forms of the *apoha* theory have, however, puzzled both historical opponents to the Buddhists and modern authors, mostly with respect to one of their formal features. The Sanskrit word “*anyāpoha*”, literally “other-exclusion”, is usually analysed as “exclusion from others”, or “exclusion of others”, with the “others” being in a case relation to the “exclusion”.³⁹³ Taking “other” to mean “not that”, or “not the same,” one quickly faces the most baffling and counter-intuitive aspect of the *apoha* theory: it is a form of double negation.

Dharmakīrti expresses the situation as follows, PVSV 38,9–10:

*uktaṃ yādṛśaṃ sāmānyam asaṃsrṣṭānām ekāsaṃsargas
tadvyatirekiṇām samānateti.*

It was explained what a universal is like: that [things] which are unmixed [with each other] are not mixed with one [thing] is the sameness of these things different from that.³⁹⁴

This passage is a succinct formulation of what *anyāpoha* does in supplying a non-substantial substitute for a substantially real universal: it hinges on a mutual difference, differentiating some things from others that are characterized primarily as differentiated from the former.

³⁹³Cf. the discussion of the various options that Ratnakīrti considers (and does not later decide on) in § 2, and the materials indicated there.

³⁹⁴Cf. Vora and Ota 1980: 6–7 for another translation and the context.

On a formal level, the equation of double negation to a positive statement is unproblematic.³⁹⁵ It might be counter-intuitive, unwieldy, and redundant, but a double negation certainly does not turn something true into something false. The problems are, however, not purely formal ones. They are usually considered in either an ontological or epistemological context, or even in both contexts. It is then that these problems become virulent. This has happened not only in historical discussions about other-exclusion, but also in modern scholarship, especially when attempting a philosophical restatement of the theory.³⁹⁶

Ratnakīrti briefly discusses two problems³⁹⁷ that have historically been used as powerful arguments against *apoha*: a circular dependency, that the negation of non-cow is dependent on the notion of “cow”, and a contradiction between that qualified by exclusion and exclusion itself which makes co-reference impossible (cf., respectively, § 12 and § 13). Both discussions are rather short and add nothing substantially new to the more lively discussion of the same problems five centuries earlier in the works of Dignāga, Uddyotakara, Kumārila, and Dharmakīrti.

Circular dependency. The problem of circular dependency is simply that the definition of “cow” as “not not cow” obviously involves and, at least according to the opponent, presupposes whatever one takes “cow” to be. Ratnakīrti’s strategy to rid himself of this problem is

³⁹⁵Cf. Quine 1980: §16(4) showing the equivalence of the schemata “ $\sim\sim p$ ” and “ p ”, or Goldfarb 2003: 12, using “ $-$ ” as the sign for negation: “It should be clear that ‘ $\sim -p$ ’ amounts to the same thing as ‘ p ’. For ‘ $\sim -p$ ’ is true just in case ‘ $-p$ ’ is false, and ‘ $-p$ ’ is false just in case ‘ p ’ is true. Double negations, therefore, are redundant.”

³⁹⁶The most fruitful attempts by modern scholars to restate an *apoha* theory in a form that is independent from its historical manifestations are exemplified in Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011, especially in the contributions to that volume by Ganeri 2011 and Siderits 2011. A critical examination of these restatements is provided by Hale 2011 in the same volume. These interpretations by modern authors shall, however, not be discussed here in detail.

³⁹⁷For the objections of this kind that were made against *anyāpoha*, cf. footnotes 101 and 104.

quite remarkable. He counters the objection by saying that the same fault applies to the opponent's theory of real universals.³⁹⁸ The parallel can be understood as follows: a realist might define a cow as "A cow is what is qualified by cowness.", and an exclusionist might do the same with this sentence: "A cow is what is qualified by exclusion from non-cow." Structurally, both statements are of the form "An x is what is qualified by x-ity."

The realist now says that, in the exclusionist approach, to know what is qualified by the exclusion from non-cow presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. The circular dependency consists in "exclusion from non-cow" (=x-ity) being dependent on "cow" (=x), and "cow" being defined in terms of x-ity. Ratnakīrti does not, at this point, supply a reason for why someone may say this.

Ratnakīrti counters this as follows: to know what is qualified by cowness presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. Here, the dependency consists, again, in x-ity ("cowness") being dependent on an x ("cow"), and an x being defined in terms of x-ity. For this he supplies a reason: when an x like "cow" is not known, the universal cowness (x-ity) is not known, and, when the universal cowness (x-ity) is not known, that to be designated by the word cow (i.e., an x) is not known.³⁹⁹

In other words, Ratnakīrti here shows that setting the convention "cow" for what is qualified by cowness is just as problematic as setting it for that qualified by the exclusion from non-cow.

Co-reference and the contradiction in qualification. Ratnakīrti's explanations in § 13 concerning the contradiction are rather succinct, and any interpretation of his statements will remain tentative.

³⁹⁸This is remarkable because Ratnakīrti is not even trying to save his own position. He merely states that it is just as wrong in this respect as that of his opponents. The same strategy is employed by Dharmakīrti, cf. the discussions in Hugon 2009: 535–540, and Hugon 2011.

³⁹⁹In accordance with this argument, the following reason could be the one that led the opponents to charge the *apoha* theory with circularity: when a cow (x) is not known, exclusion from non-cow (x-ity) is not known, and when the exclusion from cow (x-ity) is not known, a cow (x) is not known. See Watson and Kataoka 2017: 48–49 for a clear statement of this type of argument.

Extrapolating from his solution to the problem, the problem can be reconstructed as follows:⁴⁰⁰ a blue water lily is qualified by two things, a property, blue, and a genus, water lily. Though the opponent might maintain that they are ontologically distinct kinds of entities, they are both assumed to be real entities, and must, in some way, be present in the substance that they qualify (any blue water lily). Amongst various problems⁴⁰¹ resulting from this notion, the contradiction that the substance so qualified would be the location of two different things at the same time is the most serious: just as it is contradictory to say “This is an oak and a fir.”, so it would be contradictory to say “This is blue and a water lily.” This problem, so Ratnakīrti’s claim here, does not afflict the *apoha* theory: it does not assert that two things (a property and a genus) are present in a third (the material entity), but rather that two absences—that of non-blue things and that of things which are not water lilies—are present in a third.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰⁰Dignāga, Kumāriḷa, and Dharmakīrti are known for their discussions of co-reference and of the connected problem of the relation between qualifiers and that qualified by them. The presentation of the problem here draws on Hattori 2006: 62, and the lucid discussion of the matter by J. Taber and Kataoka (2017: 261–263). See Ogawa 2017 for a very detailed study of Dignāga’s position on this matter in its historical context. In view of the restoration of Dignāga’s text in Pind 2015, even the terminology of Ratnakīrti’s statements here is reminiscent of Dignāga’s first statement of the problem.

⁴⁰¹See J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 256–259 for the various incongruities that Dignāga saw in this model.

⁴⁰²To the extent that this is Ratnakīrti’s explanation of why the two traditional problems of co-reference and contradiction do not apply to the *apoha* theory, one must note some important differences to the findings of scholars who have worked on Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s solutions to this problem.

For Dignāga, Ogawa 2017: 114–115 and J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 259–260 understand that the main argument for justifying *apoha* with respect to this problem lies in the fact that “blue” and “water lily” each raise an expectation or doubt as to the other: when one hears “blue” one will ask “What is blue?”, and when one hears “water lily” one will ask “What colour is it?”.

For Dharmakīrti, J. Taber and Kataoka: 264–265 maintain that “the key to the solution of the problems of coreferentiality and qualification is seeing that there is no real distinction between exclusions (*vyāvṛtti*) and the thing that is excluded (*vyāvṛtta*);

5.6 CONCLUSION: DENOTATION IN RATNAKĪRTI'S APOHA THEORY

To conclude this investigation, we can summarize our observations in order to understand how Ratnakīrti sees the relation between something that denotes,⁴⁰³ such as a word or a concept, and that which is denoted, the referent of the word or concept. From the arguments in § 27 and the statements about the denoting-denoted relation in § 54, it follows that Ratnakīrti does not believe that there really is such a relation, but that it is a conceptual construction. Two questions might be posed here: what exactly is the conceptually constructed relation of a word and its object, and why is it important to Ratnakīrti that this relation is only conceptually constructed, but does not exist in reality?

Ratnakīrti supposes that there are two aspects of a word's object: the subjective one, a form of awareness, and the objective one, an external thing. They are known in two different awareness modes, perception (of the type self-awareness) and determination, respectively. The question is what sort of relation a word has to this twofold object, and, more specifically, if it can be said to refer to, denote, or express this object.

In lines 93–97 (§ 15), as well as in § 48 and the following verse, Ratnakīrti argues that in reality no external thing is denoted by words (in the first passage), or is affirmed or negated by words (in the second passage). Rather, it is only due to the determination of a form of awareness that an external object becomes the object of any kind of

their distinction is based merely on convention. [...] In sum, Dharmakīrti's solution seems to be that coreferentiality and qualification are possible essentially because the mind *conceives* of them as possible." (See Hugon 2017 for an examination of Dharmakīrti's usage of the two terms mentioned in the quote.) Ratnakīrti, however, does not mention this element of conceptual construction, and relies solely on the ontological category of an absence of others in his answer.

⁴⁰³Patil usually translates the terms important for this discussion as follows: *vācya* and *vācaka* respectively as "expressed" and "expressor" or "expressive" (Patil 2009: e.g., p. 239, p. 241), *artha* as "meaning, object, or semantic value" (Patil 2009: 202, n. 13).

activity, including the activity of denoting it.⁴⁰⁴ Ratnakīrti explains that an external object is said to be denoted by a word only because of determination, ll. 95–97, § 15 (for a translation see page 96):

*tatra bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācya vyavasthā-
pyate, na svalakṣaṇaparispūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakā-
lāvasthāniyataprayaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.*

Consequently, a word can be said to denote its proper object, the external thing, only by means of determination, not directly. If it were directly denotative of a real external thing, there would be the undesirable consequence that a word would make its object known in the same way as a perceptual cognition of that object.⁴⁰⁵ The fact that Ratnakīrti expressly states that a particular is not shown by verbal cognition is important insofar as it suggests that Ratnakīrti is at least considering the possibility of verbal cognition presenting its object in the same way as perception does. Indeed, his arguments about the relation between a property and property-bearer (§§ 27–31) show that the difference is not so much in the type of the respective cognition, conceptual or perceptual, but in that of their object. These arguments mostly draw unwanted consequences from the counterfactual assumption that if a conceptual cognition were to show anything real, a particular or an actual property, it would, like perception, show the object in its entirety. That it does not is due to the fact that words or concepts have as their object, or denote, exclusions, insubstantial and relational properties of real things. Whilst they are thus able to direct a person at those real things that have the same exclusion, they do not show those things.

There is a direct reference to an exclusion, an insubstantial and relational quality, which qualifies zero or more particulars. Through this reference, the particular can be indirectly made the object of

⁴⁰⁴The details of these arguments are discussed in section 5.3.2.1. For short examples of the various forms of activity that are induced by conceptual cognition, cf. CAPV 139,18–19 (trl. footnote 75). See also the references given in footnote footnote 75.

⁴⁰⁵Cf. the quote of PVin I 15a–c in § 16.

a word, though no appearance of this particular occurs because of understanding this word.

The other aspect of an object of a word is the form of awareness which directly appears to self-awareness, a perceptual type of cognition.⁴⁰⁶ But there is no denoted-denoting relation between a word and this aspect of its object, because direct appearance does not support the real relation of a quality and a thing qualified by it (*dharmadharmibhedasya pratyakṣapratikṣiptatvāt*, l. 165, p. 58), under which the relation of denoting and denoted would fall according to Ratnakīrti (see § 28).⁴⁰⁷

A word thus denotes neither an external particular nor the form of awareness. It is only with regard to the external particular as qualified by the exclusion of others that a referential relation can properly be understood. But since this determined object, which is what everyday activity centers upon, is not present to awareness, words can be said to actually not refer to anything real.

In § 28, Ratnakīrti advances an argument that adds an important element for the correct understanding of the relation of word and object. That argument might be paraphrased as follows: if a relation of property and property-bearer were real, the connection would have to be that of supported and supporter, i.e., a property-bearer supporting its properties.⁴⁰⁸ Perceiving a property bearer, e.g., a tree, entails perception of all its properties, e.g., its height, etc. For a particular (the proper object of perception) cannot be in contact with a sense-faculty with only one of its properties or by itself without its properties (perhaps as a substance), because a supporter is a supporter only as far as it actually is seen to support its properties.

⁴⁰⁶Cf. the arguments in § 48, as well as section 5.3.2.1.

⁴⁰⁷If this relation were real, it would have to be presumed that a word could denote its object (e.g., the word “cow” would denote a form of awareness cow) without all aspects of that form of awareness being known to the person experiencing that cognitive event, so that self-awareness would only have partial knowledge of its own object.

⁴⁰⁸That the only connection is that of supported and supporter was advanced by Dharmakīrti. Cf. the references to the translation of paragraph § 28.

On the opponent's theory, both a word, e.g., "tree", and a logical reason, e.g., "presence of smoke", make something real known (a particular qualified by treeness, a particular place qualified by smokey-ness, cf. § 9). The real thing that they make known must, by the previous argument, be related to its other properties, height, colour, etc., as a supporter. And since this supporting relation is not different from the supporting relation that causes perception to always grasp the whole particular (properties and their bearer), it follows that whatever is made known by words or logical marks would also have to be grasped with all its properties at once. Therefore, if words were to make something real known, and if there really were this difference of properties and their bearer, conceptual cognition would not be discernible from perceptual cognition.

For Ratnakīrti, the theory of *apoha* in combination with the concept of determination offers a way out of this conundrum: since it is only a determined difference from other things that a word makes known,⁴⁰⁹ it is not a real thing (an entity) that is brought to awareness. Thus the consequences involved in cognizing a real thing do not result.⁴¹⁰

Furthermore, that there is no real relation of denoted and denoting should, one expects, hold for Ratnakīrti's theory as well. As the particular height of a particular tree cannot be perceived without perceiving all other perceivable characteristics of that same tree, so that which a word signifies, the twofold positive element qualified by

⁴⁰⁹Here, applied to a determined object, "to make known" has to be analysed as connecting an awareness with a determined object, thereby bringing the awareness into a state from which activity conformant to expectations can result. See above, section 5.4.

⁴¹⁰Cf. the notes above as to how exclusion is a capacity, section 5.3.3. Also, in perception there is a possibility of an (indirectly) perceived generality: absence. Perceiving an empty stretch of floor, an absence of many things in that place can be correctly cognized, although not every absence has to actually be cognized.

Cf. also PV III 167 (translated in A.3.2 page 322) about the word not being a part of the referent. The point there is that the referent is an external thing, and it is not possible that something in the cognition of a speaker (or hearer) really is a part of the external thing. But it can be a part, or aspect, of the conceptual cognition.

other-exclusion,⁴¹¹ must be apprehended in its entirety. For the form of awareness, this is not problematic, since it comes to awareness through a direct appearance in self-awareness. An account of the external object, on the other hand, is more difficult to give. The determined external object, a particular, is known in conceptual awareness by the determination of one exclusion. As argued above, section 5.3.3, the external thing, to which activity can be successfully directed by a correct conceptual cognition, is not directly present to awareness, but is present only in terms of the capacity lying in the self-awareness that any conceptual awareness has of its own form. The external object, the second aspect of the positive element, is thus only a capacity to generate activity. Since it is nothing over and above the cognitive form (including its exclusions), it does not have to be known in any additional way. It is a factor that belongs to self-awareness as a sequence of causes and effects. But, since an external object is what everyday activity meets with, it is this object which is conventionally considered to be denoted by a word.⁴¹²

There is thus no real denotative function at work in conceptual awareness, mainly because neither the subjective nor objective aspect of the object that a word makes known is a thing that is denotable (the form of awareness is private and a particular, the external thing is indicated only through a negation, but is not present in any meaningful way). Since denotation is therefore only conceptually constructed, it does not count as real for Ratnakīrti.⁴¹³ Its components are relata differentiated from each other only conceptually, and have the same ontological status as the relation of a quality and the thing qualified by it, i.e., they do not really have a separate existence.⁴¹⁴ But since the relation of denoted and denoter is necessary for the

⁴¹¹Cf. the analysis in section 5.3.2.1.

⁴¹²Cf. § 48. Affirmative and negative activity are there said to be applicable only to the determined external thing. See also ll. 308–310 (in § 54), where Ratnakīrti says that the relation of denoted and denoting, which does not exist in reality, does exist as something formed by determination.

⁴¹³Cf. § 48.

⁴¹⁴Cf. the discussion in § 28, and footnote 138.

functioning of everyday language and concepts, this relation has to be assumed to be real by anyone who uses such everyday language or concepts.

These users of conventional language and concepts interact with mind-external things. They are the beings considered by Ratnakīrti in the CAPV passage presented above, section 1.1.2 (page 16). It is now possible to understand better how determination instigates activity towards external things, even though those external things are not grasped in any way. Determination operates only on the basis of an image which any awareness has and which it has received in a process that is ultimately analysed as a causal one. A conceptual cognition arises with a certain form that is defined as indistinct, through the additional causes of impressions that have been collected through experiences (cf. § 35). The relative success that conceptual cognitions have in allowing an agent to act towards external particulars is due to other-exclusion. Determination, in mistakenly externalizing the other-exclusion that qualifies the cognitive form that a conceptual awareness has, restricts the activity that beings engage in based on these conceptual cognitions. There is, however, no actual knowledge of the external particular so reached. Determination, in driving this fundamentally erroneous activity, is therefore the factor which has to cease for an unenlightened being to be liberated from the cycle of birth and death.