

A *Dharmakīrti on apoha*

A.1 PASSAGES FROM THE APOHA SECTION IN THE *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKASVAVṚTTI*

Dharmakīrti introduces the concept of *apoha* in an answer to the objection that there is a kind of *petitio principii* in the relation between something that one wishes to infer and the logical reason by means of which one infers this.⁴¹⁵ The problem is pertinent to a logical reason that is the nature or essential characteristic (*svabhāva*) of something. Dharmakīrti states that, in reality, a thing and its qualities are not different from each other, from which it follows that all its qualities are also the same. How then, the opponent asks, is an inference from one property of a thing to another property possible (e.g., from a thing's being a fir to its being a tree)? It would be as much as to say that a thing is a tree because it is a tree—an error both on Dharmakīrti's and the opponent's idea of valid reasoning. It is in his reply to this objection that Dharmakīrti introduces the *apoha* theory.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁵See, for example, Frauwallner 1932: 248 and Siderits 1991: 89–93.

⁴¹⁶Frauwallner (1932: 248) calls it “[...] Lehre von den Vorstellungen, also die Apohalehre.” Also see Frauwallner 1937: 278 f. for some remarks on the relationship between “Vorstellungen” and the object of words. Steinkellner (1971: 198) says that Dharmakīrti explains the main structure of conceptuality (“wesentliche Struktur dieser Begriffslehre”) in the following verses; the same point is also upheld in Steinkellner 2013: II.224.

Vincent Eltschinger, John Taber, Michael Torsten Much and Isabelle Ratié have produced an English translation of many of the passages considered below

A.1.1 PVI 40–42

[PVSV 24,16] Then precisely that which is produced is precisely that which is impermanent, because there is no difference [between these two]. [There] would be a reason that is a part of the object of the thesis.⁴¹⁷ [There is] no such error, for [the following reason:]

(Eltschinger et al. 2018). This precious resource became available to the present author only after he had submitted the manuscript for this book for publication, in the autumn of 2018. It was therefore not possible to systematically include its insights.

⁴¹⁷Cf. PVSVT 108,6 f.: *tathā hi yāvad uktam anityaḥ śabdo 'nityatvād iti tāvad anityaḥ kṛtakatvād iti tathā cāsiddho hetur.* (For it is so: the proposition “Sound is impermanent because of being impermanent.” [would be] as much as [the proposition] “[Sound is] impermanent because of being produced.” And in this way the reason would not be established.)

Linked to this question is the further question of what type of error (*doṣa*, acc. to PVSV 24,17) *pratijñārthakadeśa* is. T. Watanabe (2012) has argued that a reason of this type is of no practical use for an inference, since it would merely repeat the thesis, and is therefore considered *asiddha*.

It further seems that this is not the most problematic result that follows from Dharmakīrti’s claim that the two properties, the one to be inferred and the one on the basis of which we can infer it, are identical. If ‘being a tree’ and ‘being a fir’ are identical, then it follows that all trees are all firs. This is a consequence Dharmakīrti can certainly not have intended. For further discussions of this matter, see Iwata 2003, who does not find a perfectly clear answer to this question in Dharmakīrti’s works (Iwata 2003: 73–74), although one finds both cases where this identity is reversible (such that every fir is a tree and every tree is a fir), and cases where it is not (so that every fir is a tree but not every tree is a fir). Dunne (2004: 203–218) argues that Dharmakīrti does not subscribe to a full identity of the two properties, and suggests that either one has to understand that an instance of the property allowing one to infer the other property has the same nature as the instance of that other property (cf. Dunne 2004: 214), or, where this reading is grammatically not possible, interpret *svabhāva* as the property, and not the essence of the instance (Dunne 2004: 217). Steinkellner (2013) sides with Iwata’s against Dunne’s interpretation (at least for the passage around PV I 23abc), arguing that the direction of explanation is from the pervaded (proving) to the pervading (proved) concept (“...denn die vorliegende Beschreibung geht nur in eine Richtung, vom umfaßten zum umfassenden Begriff” Steinkellner 2013: II.142, n. 278).

Since all⁴¹⁸ entities have, through [their] own nature, a part in the differentiation from both the same and other entities⁴¹⁹ because each subsists in [its] own nature, // PV I 40 //

different genera, which are based on whatever the referents are differentiated from, and which fathom (*ava-√gāh*) [the particulars'] specific differences (*viśeṣa*), are construed (*pra-√klṛp*).⁴²⁰ // PV I 41 //

⁴¹⁸Cf. the recent translation of these verses in Steinkellner 2013: I.60–61. Steinkellner's differentiated translation of *svabhāva* (nature, essence) as either fact or as concept, i.e., the factual nature or the concept a person may have of a thing's nature, is not adopted here. The distinction results only from a close examination of Dharmakīrti's usage of the term throughout his works, but is not explicit in the texts examined here. It is therefore of little use to make that distinction in the few passages translated here.

⁴¹⁹For understanding *svabhāva* as *sajātīya* here, cf. the explanations in PVSV 25,14, and Steinkellner 1971: 198, n. 66.

⁴²⁰Here it is quite obvious that differentiation (*vyāvṛtti*), specific difference (*viśeṣa*), and also difference (*bheda*, which is substituted for *vyāvṛtti* by Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in PVSV 25,15–23) comes to be a synonym for property, aspect, or quality of a thing, in the sense of something that makes it different from other things. This connotation has to be understood in the following also. Cf. also PVSV 111,28–112,5: *yasmād ityādi. yasmāt sarvasmāt sarvabhāvā vyāvṛttās tasmād yato yato nityākṛtakādeḥ śabdādīnām arthānām vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ, vyāvṛttyāvadhivyāvṛttinibandhanā dharmabhedā anityākṛtakādayaḥ kalpyante vikalpair āropyante. kimviśiṣṭāḥ, tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ. tasya svalakṣaṇasya ye viśeṣā akṛtakādivyāvṛttirūpalakṣaṇās tadavagāhinas tadavagāhanaśīlāḥ, tadabhedāvabhāsanaśīlā ity arthaḥ.* (For that reason etc., i.e.,) for the reason that all entities are differentiated from everything [else, as explained in PV I 40], **therefore, from whatever the objects of words are differentiated from**, e.g.,] from permanent, non-produced etc., **based on that**, i.e.,] based on the differentiation of [their] limit[, i.e., what is not something else (cf. PVSV 347,28–30),] **different** properties, such as impermanent, produced, etc., **are constructed** through differentiation[, that is,] superimposed by conceptual cognitions. How [are those different genera or properties] qualified? [As] *tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ*. [They] fathom[, that is, they] have the disposition (*śīla*) of fathoming, its[, i.e.,] a particular's, specific properties which are characterized by the form of a differentiation from [those that do not qualify this particular,] such as unproduced etc.; [in other words, these different genera or properties] have the disposition of manifesting the nondifferences of these [particulars]. This is the point [of this passage.] See also the translation of PVSV to this verse in appendix A.2.1

Therefore, whichever specific difference is recognized through some property, that [specific difference is] not capable [of being recognized] through a [property] other than that one. By this (*tena*) a differentiated subsistence [of two properties with respect to the same thing is shown]. // PV I 42 //

For indeed all entities are in the state of [their] own nature. They do not mix [their] self with a different [entity], because [then] there would be the consequence of this [other entity] not being a different [entity].

Also, that nature is not theirs, which is undifferentiated for them [and] has become [their] self,⁴²¹ because then (*tadānīm*) they[, i.e., these entities with a differentiated nature,] would not exist.

[PVSV 25,1] For there would be only this [one nature for them], because [there] is an undifferentiated [nature]; and because [there] is no [other nature for the entities, which is] distinct (*vyatirikta*) from this [undifferentiated nature] and differentiated [for each of them]; and because, furthermore, a difference of exactly this [undifferentiated nature] would be contradictory. And this [undifferentiated nature,] which [should] subsist in [its] self, [would be] completely unmixed [with the particulars].

[PVSV 25,3] Also a different thing, even if connected to many [things], is not a universal to them, because of [their] not being of that [common] nature, because of the unwanted consequence [that there is a universal] also in [the case of] being two etc.,⁴²² connection, and

⁴²¹Probably the point is that this same form is identified with the particulars themselves. Karṇakagomin glosses *ātmabhūtam* with “unseparated” in PVSVT 115,19 f.: “*teṣām iti bhāvānām, abhinnaṃ ity ekam, ātmabhūtam ity avyatiriktam yad rūpaṃ svabhāvo ...*”. (Read *ekam ātma°* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 44b7 against printed *ekātma°*. Note that Karṇakagomin apparently read *teṣām* instead of *eṣām*.)

⁴²²PVSVT 116,21–24: *tadā dvitvādikāryadravyeṣu api prasaṅgaḥ. dvitvam api hy anekadravyasamavetaṃ(.) ādigrahaṇād bahutvādiḥ. tathā saṃyogo 'nekadravyasamavetaḥ. kāryadravyaṃ cāvayavisaṃjñītam ārambhakadravyeṣu samavetaṃ; ato dvitvādiṣu sāmānyarūpatāprasaṅgaḥ.* (Then **there is an unwanted consequence also** [for the case of] **being two etc.**, [as well as for the case of a] **substance**

substance as effect (*kāryadravya*). For, some [things] are not really [made] the same by another, though it has a connection [to them]; [rather, they] really have that (*tadvat*), like figures [are not made the same] by a garland [connecting them] at the neck.⁴²³ There are no objects of non-different apprehensions, like figures [connected by a garland are not cognized as the same]. For, an awareness, mixing together their very selves, appears as having a universal as an object, but [it does] not [appear such that one could say] “There are two [objects] connected by one.”, as [it does in the case of] the figures.

[Objection:] This is an error of [the awareness] seeing [only] this [universal].⁴²⁴ [Answer:] Why “[an awareness] seeing [only] this”? [Objection:] Because an error not having a cause is impossible. [Answer:] Only those having this same effect are the cause, because [such an error] does not exist for [a cognition of things] possessing

as effect. For [the state of] being two also inheres in multiple substances. From using [the word] “etc.” many-ness etc. [is understood]. In the same way, contact inheres in multiple substances. And a substance as effect, called a whole, inheres in the producing substances. Therefore, there is the unwanted consequence of being a universal for [the state of] being two etc.)

The point is that all these things are not universals in Vaiśeṣika ontology, which can here be taken to be endorsed by Dharmakīrti’s opponent. Plurality and contact are qualities, and the *kāryadravya*, here equated with the whole (*avayavin*), is a kind of derivative and passing substance. Cf. the general explanations in Halbfass 1992: 93 f., and 122 f., as well as in Franco and Preisendanz 1998: § 4.

⁴²³Karṇakagomin explains that the figures are connected by a thread for the purpose of worship (PVSVT 116,28–117,4): *bhūtāni grahanakṣatrāṇi teṣāṃ kaṅṭhe dīrgho guṇo ’rccanārthaṃ nibadhyate. tenaikena kaṅṭhe guṇena yathā bhūtāni tadvanti, na tv ekībhavanti, tadvad vyaktayo ’pi.* (Read *dīrgho* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 45a7 instead of *dīrghā* PVSVT 116,28. Trl.: **The figures**[, that is,] planets and stars; a long **string** is bound **to** their **neck** in order to worship [them]. Thus, like the figures [connected] by one [string] at the neck have that [string], but do not become one [through it], so also the instances [of a universal are not one because of being connected by it].)

⁴²⁴Cf. PVSVT 118,5–6: *sāmānyam kevalam paśyaty eva buddhiḥ. tasyās tu tadda-rśinyāḥ samavāyasya sūkṣmatvāt sā bhrāntir yad etad vyaktinām sāmānyābhedenā grahaṇam iti cet.* (Awareness really sees only the universal. But for this [awareness] **seeing this** there is, because of the fineness of inherence, **this error**, such that there is exactly this grasping of the particulars without a difference to [their] universal.)

number, connection, substance as effect, plurality etc., nor for the figures etc.⁴²⁵ Therefore, because in this way there is no influence [of a universal] on the cognition of a universal, a universal is not something other [than the things]. Or if it is, it would not be mixed with anything else because of subsisting in its own self (*svātman*). Therefore these entities are distinct (*vyatirikta*) from that considered (*abhimata*) to be of the same genus and from something else, because, by [their] nature, they are [each] of only one [individual] nature.

[PVSV 25,15] Based⁴²⁶ on the difference from whatever [things are] different from, multiple properties are cognized through words which are settled upon (*kṛtasamniveśa*) for causing the apprehension of these differences, even though there is no difference in [a thing's] own nature. These words also are only based on this particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), because, even though [they] do not indicate (*anākṣepa*) all differences [of that particular], they indicate a single difference, [so that]⁴²⁷ there is a difference for this [particular] also from that

⁴²⁵The argument is that a cognition as the same can exist for things which are not qualified by any real, common thing inhering in them. This shows that a commonness is cognizable without such a universal being the cause of that cognition, which in turn is an error because particulars do not, in fact, have anything real in common with each other. The question is, of course, what “real” means here. As far as this discussion is concerned, only the same effect has been admitted too. Both a common nature, identical with the individuals, and a thing separate from the particulars but connecting them, have been considered and rejected.

⁴²⁶The following passage is also translated and discussed in Hugon 2017.

⁴²⁷PVSVṬ 119,20: *tadekasmād api yato yato vyāvṛtto ’rthaḥ śabdair viṣayīkriyate tasmāt tasmād atatkāraṇād atatkāryāc caikasmād api tasya svalakṣaṇasyāneka-vyāvṛttasya bhedo ’stīti kṛtvā tadviṣayā ucyante na tu tadviṣayā eva.* (Read °*ānekavyāvṛttasya* acc. to PVSVṬ_{ms} 46a6. Trl.: **This**, a particular which is differentiated from many [differences with other causes and effects], **is different also from this single** [thing, i.e.,] from whatever has another cause and has another effect, differentiated from which an [external] object is made the object [of a cognition] by words. Thinking so, [words] are said to have this [external thing] as an object, but they do not really have it as an object.) In PVSVṬ 119,13–14, *ekabheda codanāt* from PVSV 25,17–18 was glossed by *ekaikasya binnaśya svabhāvasya codanāt* (...because they indicate some differentiated nature [of a particular]). So in these passages, Kārṇakagomin equates “difference” (*bheda*) with a certain aspect of a particular’s real being. It is thus permissible to understand the somewhat awkward phrase

single [thing]. Therefore, as many [things having] different natures [there are] for a single entity, so many differentiations [are there] with regard to these [things of different natures], because [what] has an effect and a cause which cannot occur for this [other thing] is different from that [other thing].⁴²⁸ [PVSV 25,21] And as many differentiations [there are], so many words (*śruti*) [are there] with the purpose of everyday activity (*vyavahārārtha*) [that proceeds] by avoiding [that having] another (*atat*) cause and effect. Like [this expression:] “A sound following immediately on an effort is audible.” has the purpose of avoiding [that having] another cause and effect.⁴²⁹ Therefore, even though the [a thing’s] own nature is without difference, which characteristic (*viśeṣa*) difference is known through some property [or] name, that [difference] cannot be made known by another [property

“differentiated from a difference” simply as “having a certain quality”. We could then render PVSVT 119,20 as “This, a particular which has many qualities, has also only one quality insofar as it is different from a single other thing, that is, from some thing that has another cause and effect”

⁴²⁸PVSVT 119,26–28: *kiṃ kāraṇaṃ. tasmīn vyāvarttye ’vidhibhūte dharminy asambhavi kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ ca yasya vivakṣitasya dharmināḥ, sa tadāsambhavikāryakāraṇaḥ, tasya tadbhedāt, tasmād atakāryād atakāraṇāc ca bhedād vyāvṛttatvāt.* (What is the cause? **Because of a difference of this**[, i.e.], [of] that [property bearer] which **has an effect and cause that do not occur there**; [this] property bearer, which one wishes to express, has an effect and cause that do not occur where [there is] this property bearer that is to be excluded[, or, in other words,] is the limit; [“because of a difference from this” must be understood like this:] because of a difference[, i.e.], because of being excluded, from that[, i.e.], from that which does not have that effect and that which does not have that cause.)

I think the argument works like this: A, which one wants to express, has an effect and cause (properties, for example), neither of which occurs in the case of B. So B is the limit of A, or that which one wishes to exclude. In this sense, A is different from B.

⁴²⁹As explained in PVSVT 120,10–13, and clearly understood by Hugon (2017), the differentiation “preceded by effort” enables activity avoiding things of a different cause, i.e., not preceded by any human activity, like lightning, and “audible” excludes what has a different result, i.e., something other than an auditory cognition (*śrotrañāna*).

or name]. So words do not all have the same referent. Therefore the reason is not a part of the object of the thesis.⁴³⁰

A.1.2 PVI 43–45

[PVSV 25,26] [Question:]⁴³¹ How then is this understood: through both a word and a logical mark a removal (*vyavaccheda*) is cognized, [but] not, in an affirmative way (*vidhi*),⁴³² the form of a real thing?

[Answer: It is known] because of the use of another means of valid cognition and another word. For [it is] so:

Which other part of an object's single nature that is itself directly perceived could be unobserved, [so that] it [would have to be] examined by [other] means of valid cognitions? // PV I 43 //

[PVSV 26,4] For the nature (*ātman*) of an object (*artha*) is one. It is directly perceived, because it is impossible to establish [something] when that having the property [to be established] is unestablished; like sound [has to be established] in order to prove its impermanence. Because this [nature of a thing] is established through perception alone, [there is] an establishment of all [its] forms (*ākāra*), because there is no unestablished [nature] other than this [nature of the thing]. Or, if it exists, [it is] not the nature [of that thing]. For what does not exist as having the same subsistence (*yogaḥṣema*) as something [else], that cannot have the nature of that,⁴³³ because everyday treatment [of things] as different is bound (*nibandhana*) to

⁴³⁰As pointed out by Much 2008: 8, n. 9, this is the preliminary end of the discussion starting at PVSV 24,16 f., and the same point is made at the end of the *apoha* section, PVSV 93,4–5.

⁴³¹Cf. Kellner 2004: 4 f. for another translation of the next few sentences. Nakasuka 2019 discusses the following verses up to k. 49 in greater detail.

⁴³²See the discussion of how to take *vidhinā* here in Kellner 2004: 5, n. 3.

⁴³³PVSVṬ 121,28–29 explains: *alabdhadharmānuvṛttir yogaḥ. labdhadharmānuvṛttih kṣemaḥ. eko yogaḥ kṣemaś ca yasya sa tathā. tulyadharmeti yāvat.* (**Acquisition** [is] an activity towards unobtained properties, **keeping** [is] an activity towards obtained properties. That which has **the same** acquisition and keeping is [called] so. [It means] as much as “having the same property.”) Much (2008: 9,

this alone[, i.e., to the sameness in subsistence]; for otherwise there is the consequence of non-existence [of everyday activity]. [This] has been said.⁴³⁴ Therefore, because in the case of a perceived property bearer there is a complete discernment of its nature, the use of another means of cognition does not have any opportunity [to add anything] here,

unless a cause for an error causes [someone] to attach a different quality (*guṇa*) [to something], like⁴³⁵ the form “silver” [could be attached] to mother of pearl (*śukti*) because of observing a similarity in their forms. // PV I 44 //⁴³⁶

[PVSV 26,14] [This means that another means of valid cognition is not possible] if the cause of an error, which obstructs the ascertainment (*niścaya*) of an entity as [it is], even though it is seen with [its] complete reality, does not cause another quality to be attached, like the form of silver to mother of pearl. For there are not two forms for mother of pearl, one common [to it and silver] and a specific [one], because of the [unwanted] consequence [that there would be] a cognition as such;⁴³⁷ [also] because, if, alternatively, [these two forms are] not cognized separately, this concept of being two would be wrong; and because of an overreaching consequence.⁴³⁸ Therefore, someone

n. 32) cites the following explanation given in Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 99, n. 1: “This is the commonplace *cliché* in philosophical parlance. Things supposed to be identical must have identical *yoga* and *kṣema*. ...That which has the same incidents, gain or loss with another, is identical with the other.”

⁴³⁴Gnoli 1960: 189 notes that PVSVT 122,7 says that this refers to PVSV 20,21.

⁴³⁵For *vā* as *iva*, cf. Gnoli 1960: 26, note to line 13.

⁴³⁶Cf. also the translation in Steinkellner 1971: 194, n. 55.

⁴³⁷PVSVT 123,14–15: ***tathā sāmānyaviśeṣarūpeṇa śavalābhāsāyāḥ pratipatteḥ sarvadā prasaṅgāt.*** (...because of the unwanted consequence that there is always a cognition like that[, i.e.,] a multifarious appearance in a both common and particular form.)

⁴³⁸As Kārṇakagomin explains, this consequence goes too far for the following reason: if qualities or forms could be two without having a difference in appearance, cases where oneness (or identity) is assumed on account of a single appearance

seeing the form of mother of pearl sees [it] only [as] specific[, i.e., as a particular]. But because of the defectiveness of the conditions (*pratyaya*) for an ascertainment [that person], without ascertainment, thinks “I see the similarity to this [form of silver].” Therefore, there is the superimposition of silver for him. In the same way, [there is] the error [of a cognition of] persistence for [someone] because of the superimposition of that state[, i.e., persistence], [since that person] does not notice that [two moments of a causal continuum] are different due to the production of a different [moment], similar [to the preceding one]. As many other states there are for this[, a thing’s own nature,] exactly as many superimpositions there are, coming into existence according to their own cause.⁴³⁹ So the means of valid cognition, being what removes these [superimpositions from the objects], do indeed have a result. But these [means of cognition] resulting in [such a] removal are not applied in order to let one apprehend an unrecognized part of a thing, because that [part] has [already] been perceived; for, moreover, perceiving a partless [thing] by [only] one part is not correct.⁴⁴⁰

would become dubious—since there would be no difference between one and two appearances. Also, it is wrong because the negating judgement, “this is not silver,” could not arise. (Cf. PVSVT 123,17–19: *pratibhāsabhedam antareṇa dvitvakalpanāyām atiprasaṅgāt. anyatrāpy ekatvābhimate dvitvakalpanā syāt. nedaṃ rajatam iti bādhakasyānutpādaprasaṅg ca.*)

⁴³⁹PVSVT 124,12–14: *tasmād yāvanto ’sya śabdādeḥ kṣaṇikānātmādisvabhāvasya parabhāvā nityādayas tāvanta eva yathāsvaṃ nimittabhāvinaḥ yasya yad anurūpaṃ nimittaṃ tadbhāvinaḥ samāropā iti* | (Read *yathāsvaṃ* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 48a1 against *yathāsva*° in PVSVT 124,12. Trl.: From this, i.e., from a word etc., **as many other states**, i.e., permanent etc., **of this**, i.e., of that having a nature such as momentary, without self, etc., **exactly so many superimpositions** [are there], **which have come into existence according to their own cause**, i.e., which have come into existence from a cause according to it.)

⁴⁴⁰Apart from the evidence in the Tibetan tradition mentioned by Gnoli (1960: note to 27,1), PVSVT 124,17 attests to a version where these two reasons are not linked by *ca*: *...dṛṣṭatvāt. kiṃ karaṇam. anamśasyaikadeśena darśanāyogāt*. Since this seems to make quite good sense, I have not taken the two ablatives to be in the same, supporting, relation to the main sentence, but instead understand that the second supports the first (which is the primary reason for the statement). A free

Therefore each quality of an observed entity is indeed observed, [but] is not ascertained because of an error. So a logical reason is applied.⁴⁴¹ // PV I 45 //

This is the recapitulating verse. Therefore no other means of valid cognition is applied to [what was] observed in order to grasp something that was not observed.

A.1.3 *PV I 46–51*

And if a real thing [were] grasped because of an inference, [there would be] a grasping of all [the thing's] properties when [only] a single property is ascertained. This defect does not follow in the case of exclusion. // PV I 46 //

[PVSV 27,9] Not only is there no application of another means of valid cognition for something [that] has been observed by direct perception, but also, if inference caused the apprehension of a thing in an affirmative [form], [and did] not perform [only] a removal [of a wrong superimposition],⁴⁴² then all properties would be ascertained when one property is ascertained, because [they] are not completely distinct from this [one property]. So there [would be] no application of another means of valid cognition. For it is not correct that the self of this [one property] is not ascertained if this [one property] is ascertained. Furthermore, if it is the removal of a superimposition [from an object] that is performed by inference, then, because of this removal of one superimposition, another would not be removed. So, to this end [of removing another imposition] another [means of valid cognition] is applied. [Objection:] Now,⁴⁴³ an ascertainment of an

rendering would be: “Other means of valid conceptual cognitions only ever remove wrong ideas about an object, but never make anything about a real thing known, because that must already have been perceived. And it must have been perceived if the thing was perceived at all, because it is not possible to perceive a partless thing by only one of its parts.”

⁴⁴¹Cf. the translation of this verse in Steinkellner 1971: 198, n. 70.

⁴⁴²For this notion, cf. the formulation *anyāpohakṛt* going back to Dignāga in PV III 164 (see appendix A.3.2 for a translation).

⁴⁴³For more on the context and a translation of this passage, cf. Kellner 2004: 11 f.

uncognized [thing] is not necessarily preceded by a mistake. [It is] like [there] suddenly⁴⁴⁴ [is] a cognition of fire because of smoke. For in this case an [earlier] superimposition of non-fire is not possible. Therefore, a removal is not performed in every case [of conceptual cognition]. [Answer:] To this it was said:⁴⁴⁵ “When a property bearer is cognized, there is the cognition of all [properties] because they are not different [from the property bearer]. Or, if different, there is, in this [case of cognizing a property bearer], no cognition of an unconnected [property].” Therefore, also here [in this example of yours where there is a sudden cognition of fire upon seeing smoke] there is no ascertainment of the nature of this [fiery place as fiery] for someone seeing that [smoke]. Why? Because of a mistake.⁴⁴⁶ And how should he, who ascertains that place as having a nature free of this [fire] through an awareness that is free of the consideration of fire being [there], be called unmistaken? And someone who is free of both a superimposition of this cognitive form [of nonfire onto a smokey place] and doubt⁴⁴⁷ would not follow the [logical] mark [smoke] in the case of this cognition. Neither would he respect its concomitance [with fiery places] and separation [from places without fire].

Therefore the logical mark is proclaimed to have exclusion as an object. [For] otherwise, if the property bearer

⁴⁴⁴PVSVT 126,7–8 explains: *akasmād ity atarkitopasthitāt. sahasaiva kvacit pradeśe dhūmād agnīpratipattiḥ*. (Suddenly[, i.e.,] having come about without having been considered. The cognition of fire because of smoke in some place [occurs] just suddenly.)

⁴⁴⁵As Much (2008: 12, n. 43) observes, this point was made in PVSV 26,5–7, although not in the exact same words.

⁴⁴⁶Acc. to PVSVT 126,18: *viparyāsād evānagnimatā pradeśena tulyatvagrahaṇād eva*. (Only **because of a mistake**[, i.e.,] only because of grasping [this place] as being the same as a place without fire.) The argument is, probably, that because the cognition of fire is inadvertently (*akasmād*) arrived at, there is no proper ascertainment of this fact, and therefore there is no difference between this place and one where there is no fire.

⁴⁴⁷PVSVT 126,30–127,6: *anagnyākārasamāropeṇa saṁśayena ca rahitaś ca puruṣas ...*

is established, what apart from it would [still] be unestablished? // [PV I 47] //

This[, above,] is a summary verse.

Even when something is observed, a cognition having a universal as an object, [i.e., a] conceptual [cognition], has, when another part is not superimposed, exclusion of that [other part] in general as [its] field [of activity].⁴⁴⁸ // [PV I 48] //

[PVSV 28,8] [Objection:] How can an ascertaining cognition, which follows immediately on seeing a form etc. [and] has no logical mark [as its basis], have removal as an object, insofar as it arises when there is no superimposition? [Answer:] [It has removal as an object] because this [ascertaining cognition] does not exist for the object of a superimposition. For there is no [correct] ascertainment concerning that particular aspect (*bheda*) onto which a [person] superimposes [some wrong aspect like] “persistent” or “having a self”,

⁴⁴⁸Cf. the translation of this verse and the next half-verse in Steinkellner 1971: 199, n. 71.

The argument here is that an ascertainment (*niścaya*), even when not based on a logical mark and therefore not a result of a full inference, but when occurring right after seeing something, has the exclusion of a superimposition as its range of activity: even though that imposition has not happened, the mere presence of an ascertainment (that it is otherwise) is the exclusion of that imposition. This is so, since an ascertainment is what precludes, or falsifies, an imposition. A person seeing mother of pearl might think either “Oh, mother of pearl.” or “Oh, silver.” In the first case, an immediate (and correct) recognition, that is, an ascertainment, excludes any other wrong ideas at least about that aspect of the object. The person might still be mistaken as to, e.g., the size of the piece of mother of pearl. In the second case, a superimposition of silver has happened. This is an incorrect cognition, and one that will have to be corrected by a subsequent cognition. It is the kind of wrong cognition—a superimposition (*samāropa*)—that is removed by a valid means of cognition resulting in a correct ascertainment (*niścaya*).

because there is the relation of defeated and defeating between an understanding by ascertainment and by imposition.⁴⁴⁹ // [PV I 49ab] //

[PVSV 28,13] For an entity, even though it is observed as differentiated from everything, is not understood just like that; because a covering is possible for some particular aspect, like in the case of mother of pearl's mother-of-pearlness [which is then thought to be its silverness]. But precisely for that [particular aspect], for which a cognizer has no cause of an error, a remembered ascertainment exists, even though this person does not perceive this [aspect] differently [than the other aspects of the same thing]. Because of the defeated-defeating relationship between superimposition and ascertainment, [there is], for ascertainment,

an application of it when there is a removal (*viveka*) of a superimposition. This is understood. // [PV I 49cd] //

[PVSV 28,19] And precisely the removal of this is other-exclusion. Therefore this [ascertaining cognition] too⁴⁵⁰ has the exclusion of this in general as its object. [It] does not have the nature of ascertaining a thing's own nature. Indeed [it is] so, because, even if some [part] is ascertained, the non-cognition of another is observed, and because if its own nature were ascertained, this [cognition of one part but not another] would not be consistent.⁴⁵¹

As many superimpositions of parts [there are], just that many clear ascertainments and words [there are] in order to remove them. Therefore they[, different words and

⁴⁴⁹The relation is such that an ascertainment “defeats”—shows to be wrong or prevents—a wrong imposition. The translation reflects the structure of the two compounds “*niścayāropamanasor*” and “*bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ*”, inverted for metrical reasons but paraphrased with the expected sequence at the end of the following prose paragraph.

⁴⁵⁰*tad api* refers to *niścayañāna* in PVSV 28,8.

⁴⁵¹Cf. also the argument in PVSV 26,24–27,2. The construction *tathā hi* plus two ablative clauses and no main sentence strikes me as somewhat awkward.

ascertainments,] have different fields of activity. // [PV I 50] //

Otherwise, if a single real thing were pervaded by a single word or by an awareness, [there would] not be any other [uncognized] object.⁴⁵² Thus there would be synonymity [of all words and conceptual cognitions]. // [PV I 51] //

[PVSV 29,5] These are two intermediary verses.

A.1.4 *PV I 52–55*

Also for whom⁴⁵³ a cognition (*dhī*) grasps an object that has different additional attributes⁴⁵⁴ [and] is differentiated [from those attributes], // [PV I 52ab] //

[PVSV 29,7] Whoever thinks this: “Additional attributes [are] different from each other and from their basis. Words,⁴⁵⁵ which are based on them, apply to substrata (*ādharma*) of these [additional attributes], or to these [additional attributes] alone. Therefore there is no such unwanted consequence [as synonymity].” For that [person] also,

⁴⁵²Cf. PVV 306,11–12: ...*nānyo* 'pratipanno viṣayo 'stīti ... (...not any other[, i.e.,] an uncognized, **object** ...). Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 131,26–132,8, see appendix A.2.2) discusses two ways of understanding this “any other”: the first results in an interpretation as given here; according to the second, one would have to understand that there is no object for another word or cognition.

⁴⁵³PVSVT 132,4 identifies this as “*vaiśeṣikasya*” (“for a Vaiśeṣika”). PVV 306,17 identifies the opinion as “*naiyāyikāder mate*”, i.e., as held “in the theory of the Naiyāyikas and so on”. This “and so on” is paraphrased as “*vaiśeṣikāder*”, “for a Vaiśeṣika and so on” in Vibhū 306, n. 3.

For PVSV 29,6–47,13 (kk. 52–94), cf. also the translation in Vora and Ota 1979, Vora and Ota 1980, and Vora and Ota 1982.

⁴⁵⁴*upādhi*, a non-essential attribute or pseudo universal in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theories, is glossed as meaning the proper universals “substance-ness, etc.” by both PVSVT 132,9 (*upādhayo dravyatvādayaḥ*) and PVV 306,17 (*nānopādher dravyatvādyanekadharmaviśiṣṭasyā* ...).

⁴⁵⁵See footnote 560.

if that, which has a nature undifferentiated from the capacities that are an auxiliary (*aṅga*) to the different additional attributes' support, is grasped with all its self, which difference of [that which is] supported would not be ascertained? // [PV I 52cd–53ab] //

[PVSV 29,12] Even if the additional attributes, which are indeed different [from each other and their basis], [were] the cause of other words and cognitions about an object, still only this single [object] having these [additional attributes] is clung to⁴⁵⁶ by these [words and cognitions]. [There is] no difference in the proper self of a [property possessor] whose nature [consists in] the capacities for supporting the various additional attributes; therefore, if grasping [this supporter] with all its self, which particular additional attribute indeed would not be ascertained? For one grasps [this supporter] as being what supports all the additional attributes.⁴⁵⁷ For [it is] not [the case that] a completely different supporter-state of that grasped with its own form is not really grasped. Therefore, exactly that, which is grasped with its own nature, [is grasped] also as being a support. So [it is stated].

Because of a connection of these two[, supported and supporter,] in [their] natures, both [would be] grasped in the cognition of one. // [PV I 53cd] //

[PVSV 29,20] Because of grasping the state of supported and supporter, which is[, respectively,] the nature⁴⁵⁸ of the additional attribute and that having it, all two are grasped in the cognition of one. So (*iti*) where this[, which has an additional property,] is grasped,

⁴⁵⁶PVSVṬ 133,29: "...*upalīyate viṣayīkriyate*." ("...**clung to**, i.e., made an object.")

⁴⁵⁷In other words, a thing's nature is not different from the capacities by which it can support its attributes. Therefore the thing, grasped with its own nature, cannot be grasped without being grasped as supporting these additional attributes. And since there cannot be two separate supporting states for the same thing, it must be grasped as the supporter of *all* its additional attributes.

⁴⁵⁸Cf. the comment above, footnote 421. The idea here is that a supported thing and a supporting thing are so only in virtue of their relation to each other.

even if [it is] characterized by [only] one additional attribute, there there is a grasping of all additional attributes, because grasping that possessing additional attributes is not separable (*nāntarīyakatva*) from grasping that [single additional attribute]. Otherwise, it would not even be grasped as such.⁴⁵⁹

For there is not one supporter of some other [supported thing, such that] this [supporter] would not be grasped. Neither is there a non-grasping of the supported when the supporter is grasped in this way[, i.e., as a supporter], because of the [unwanted] consequence that this [supporter] would not be grasped [as a supporter] either, as in the case of being owner and property.⁴⁶⁰ Therefore, even in the teaching that an additional attribute is a different object [than its supporter], there is the same consequence.⁴⁶¹

Even if [there should be this objection:] “Nevertheless, the capacities through which [something] supports additional attributes are completely different from that which has those capacities. Therefore this consequence [does] not [follow].” [the answer is:]

Given there is a difference of the capacities that are the support of the properties, why are these [the capacities] of this [having these capacities], if there is no support of those [capacities] by that [possessing them]? In this way there would be an infinite regress. // [PV I 54] //

[PVSV 30,3] If the states of being a supporter for each additional attribute are not really the proper self of this [which has the additional attributes], and (*api*) do not experience support from this, why are they called “its”? Or, if there is [this] support, this single [supporter], [which] supports capacities by capacities that have become its own self, is, when grasped even by only a single additional attribute, certainly grasped with its whole self. For [it is] so: if a single additional

⁴⁵⁹PVSVṬ 234,25 f. comments: *upādhiṅām upakāraka upādhimān ity evam api na grhyeta*. (“[It] would not even be grasped in this way: that supporting the additional attributes [is] what has the additional attributes.”)

⁴⁶⁰For the criticism of this argument by Bhāsarvajña, cf. section 4.1.9.

⁴⁶¹I.e., that of synonymity of all words and concepts. Cf. PVSVṬ 135,16–17.

attribute is grasped, the capacity supporting it is grasped. If that is grasped, the entity supporting it—having as its nature the complete support for the capacities [supporting its attributes]⁴⁶² [and] being grasped—causes [a person] to grasp all [these supported] capacities; and these [capacities cause the grasping of] their own additional attributes. So the consequence remains.⁴⁶³

[PVSV 30,10] If [you assume] that also these capacities that support the capacities [supporting the attributes] are really different from an entity, it [still] is the same, because [there is] an endless connection (*ghaṭana*) of the additional attributes and their [supporting] capacities to ever different capacities. [So] this single [entity having additional attributes], not being grasped [together] with these [capacities] at any time, [yet] having a self [consisting in] the support of those [capacities],⁴⁶⁴ is not grasped as having these [capacities]. [Objection:] If, on the other hand, words and cognitions were to adhere exclusively to the additional attributes, then, because there

⁴⁶²The *bahuvrīhi* compound *svātmabhūtasakalāśaktyupakārah* can be analysed in various ways. Karṇakagomin’s analysis is as follows (PVSVT 136,18–20): *kiṃ bhūtaḥ? svātmabhūtasakalāśaktyupakārah svātmabhūtāḥ sakalā upādhyapakāriṇīnām śaktīnām upakārāḥ śaktayo yasya sa tathābhūto bhāvo grhītaḥ*. (Read °*śaktyupakārah* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 52a2 instead of the misprint °*śaktyapakārah* in PVSVT 136,19. Trl.: What is [this grasped entity like]? *svātmabhūtasakalāśaktyupakārah*[, that is,] **the grasped entity** is so [that it is one] whose supports—[that is,] capacities—for the capacities supporting additional attributes are its proper nature [, and are] complete.) This analysis is also supported by the Tibetan translation (PVSVD 277b1 = PVSVD 423b6): *nus pa la phan pa rang gi bdag nyid du gyur pa mtha’ dag dang ldan pa*.

⁴⁶³PVSVT 136,22 points out: *tadavasthaḥ prasaṅgaḥ ko bhedaḥ syād aniścita iti ya uktaḥ*. (So the consequence remains, which was stated by [the words] “Which difference would not be ascertained?” [in PV I 53b].) Indeed, the infinite regress mentioned in PV I 54 does not follow from this argument, but is discussed in the next few lines.

⁴⁶⁴I.e., the secondary capacities, PVSVT 137,7–8 ...*tadupakārātmā. śaktyupakārātmā. upādhyapakārikāṇām śaktīnām yāḥ śakṭayas tadāmeti yavat* (...**having a self consisting in the support of those**[, i.e.,] having a self consisting in the support of those capacities. That is to say, having a self consisting in those which [are] the capacities of the capacities supporting additional attributes.)

is no inclusion of this [entity having the attributes],⁴⁶⁵ there is no cognition of all [additional attributes] by means of the cognition of that [which has the attributes]. [Answer:] Nevertheless, because that [having attributes] is not indicated by words, [one] would not act towards it [due to a word]. So the usage of words would be useless.⁴⁶⁶ For all everyday activity [engaged] with⁴⁶⁷ affirmation and negation has [its] basis in causal efficacy. And, since additional attributes [are] without power as to this [causal efficacy], and that having the power[, i.e., a specific particular,] is not named, what [is achieved by] the usage of words? And therefore the additional attributes would not be additional attributes. For it is with respect to some primary thing that [additional attributes] are so called, because, when [a word] applies to something, [additional attributes] are a part of this [primary thing].

But, since this [primary thing] would not be indicated by words, these [additional attributes] would not be parts of any [thing]. So why [would they be] additional attributes? If this [is said]: “There is no error, because [a thing] is indicated through the [additional attributes] indicated [by words].”,⁴⁶⁸ then there is [that] same consequence.⁴⁶⁹ First of all, that [having additional properties]—which, due to being

⁴⁶⁵PVSVṬ 137,14: *tasyopādhimataḥ śabdajñānair asamāveśād aviṣayikaraṇāt*. (Because [there is] **no inclusion of this**[, i.e.,] because words and cognitions do not make that having additional attributes [their] object.)

⁴⁶⁶*vyartha*, useless, can also literally mean “without a referent”.

⁴⁶⁷This is a qualifying instrumental according to PVSVṬ 137,21–22: *itthambhūta-lakṣaṇā (pāṇiniḥ) ceyam ṛtīyā* Also see Speijer 1886: § 67.

⁴⁶⁸PVSVṬ 138,13–14: *yady upādhimātram codyate tathāpi śabdair lakṣitā ye upādhayas tair upādhimato lakṣaṇāt paricchedād adoṣaḥ*. *śabdaprayogavaiyarthyadoṣo neti cet*. (If it [is said by an opponent]: If only the additional attribute is meant, still [there is] **no such error**, i.e., there is no error of word usage being useless, because of an **indication**, i.e., a delimitation of that having additional attributes by those additional attributes which are **indicated** by words.)

⁴⁶⁹I.e., the consequence of grasping all of the thing’s additional properties. Cf. PVSVṬ 138,15: *...tadavasthaḥ sarvopādhiprahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ*.

inseparable [from the additional attributes]⁴⁷⁰ is indicated by these additional attributes—is, if [it] is indicated by even [only] one [additional attribute], indicated with its whole self. So the [unwanted] consequence remains. For what difference (*viśeṣa*) is there here [in this matter], whether words should let [a person] indicate that [having additional attributes], or the additional attributes indicated by these [words should let a person indicate that having attributes]? [PVSV 31,1] For, [it is] to that [same] extent that this [thing having the additional attributes] is ascertained as supporting all [additional attributes] at that time. So this [explanation of yours]⁴⁷¹ is nothing at all. Therefore,

if that supporting a single [additional attribute] is to be grasped, [there are] no supports that are different (*apara*) from it, which would be unobserved if it is observed. If it is grasped, the whole is grasped. // [PV I 55] //

This is a recapitulating verse.⁴⁷²

⁴⁷⁰This was also argued in PVSV 29,22 f. Cf. also PVSVṬ 138,16: *nāntarīyakatayety upādhyupādhimator avyabhicāreṇa*. (Due to not being separable, i.e., since there is no deviation of additional attribute and that having an additional attribute.) This means additional attributes and that having them do not occur separately from each other.

⁴⁷¹I.e., the objection in PVSV 30,22.

⁴⁷²This repeats the main intent of the section starting at PV I 52ab (trl. on page 287).

A.1.5 *PV I 59*

Moreover,⁴⁷³ in this [case]⁴⁷⁴ words as well as ascertainties, even though [they name and cognize] a differentiation from another and [that] differentiated from another, only conform (*anu-√rudh*) to convention.⁴⁷⁵ // PV I 59 //

[PVSV 32,15] There also, in [the case that] other-exclusion [is the word referent], the differentiation [is] not one, and truly another that [which is] differentiated, because of the unwanted consequence that that which is being turned away from the differentiation of this, is this.⁴⁷⁶ In this way, furthermore, there would not be a differentiation

⁴⁷³This verse and a part of the *PVSV* concerning it are translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f. Hugon 2017 analyses some of the following passages to show in which sense Dharmakīrti says that *vyāvṛtti* and *vyāvṛtta* are not different things.

⁴⁷⁴PVSVṬ 143,14: *tatrāpi cānyāpohe śabdārthe*. (Moreover, in that [case], i.e., when other-exclusion is the referent of a word.) For the discussion preceding this verse, cf. Kellner 2004: 19 f. The main point that Dharmakīrti was trying to prove in the preceding passages (starting with PV I 52, trl. on page 287) was that in all cases of a word denoting a real thing (property or property bearer), the result is an understanding of the whole thing in all its aspects. Dharmakīrti now proceeds to show that this problem does not exist when words denote exclusion.

⁴⁷⁵Cf. PVSVṬ 143,16–17, explaining *saṅketam anurundhate*: *ye śabdā dharmadharmivācanāḥ niścayās cobhayaviśayāḥ, te saṅketam anurundhate*. *saṅketānuvidhānenaiśām dharmadharmiviśayavibhāgaḥ kalpitaḥ. paramārthatas tu vyāvṛttir eva nāstīty arthaḥ*. (Words, naming properties and property bearers, and ascertainties, which have these two as [their] objects, conform to convention. This means that, in conformity with convention, their[, the words' and ascertainties',] separation of objects [into] properties and property bearers is conceptually constructed. But in reality there is no [such] differentiation at all. That is the meaning [of Dharmakīrti's statement].)

⁴⁷⁶This passage is also translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f. and Kataoka 2009: 491. According to these interpretations (which I agree with), the unwanted consequence is that the thing differentiated from others becomes identical to these others, because its differentiation is not identical with it itself, under the assumption that the property and property bearer are distinct entities. E.g.: A cow (property bearer) has the property “excluded from horse”, and is different from that property. This is as much as to say: a cow is not “excluded from horse”. A horse, in turn, has the property “not excluded from horse”, which then makes it identical to a cow, equally not “excluded from horse”. (The way the quotation marks

[between different things]. Therefore exactly that which is differentiated is a differentiation. But the [according] difference in [both] a word and a cognition [which is due to a word exists] because of a difference in convention. There is no difference of that designated.

A.1.6 PVI 64

Therefore⁴⁷⁷ the description [of the errors occurring for] the opinion [that a thing] possesses that [genus] when

move around in the qualifiers shows that the argument banks on equating “is not something” with “not excluded from something.”) Put a bit more schematically, one could say: Cow (*dharmin1*) is qualified by, and different from, non-horse (*dharma1*). Horse (*dharmin2*) is qualified by, and different from, not non-horse (*non-dharma1*). If *dharmin1* is not *dharma1*, then *dharmin1* is *dharmin2*, because *dharmin2* is qualified by “non-*dharma1*”.

This is also how PVSVT 143,21–24 understands this passage: *yadi cāśvād vyāvṛttir anaśvatā godravyasyānyā syāt tadāśvavyāvṛtter api godravyeṇa nivartitavyam bhedaḥ. tataś ca tadvyāvṛtter anaśvatāyāḥ sakāśān nivartamānasya gos tadbhāvaprasaṅgāt, aśvabhāvaprasaṅgād aśvatat. evaṃ hy aśvavyāvṛtter anaśvatvalakṣaṇāyā gaur vyāvṛtto bhavati yady aśvāśvatvaṃ syāt.* (And if the material entity cow’s differentiation from horse, [its] non-horseness, were different [from this cow], then the material entity cow will have to be turned away also from the exclusion from horse, because of a difference [between the cow and its quality, being excluded from horse]. And because, therefore, for a cow[, which is] **that turned away** from non-horseness[, that is,] **from the differentiation from this**[, i.e., horse], **there is the consequence of being this**[, i.e.,] the consequence of being a horse, like a horse. For in that way a cow would become differentiated from the differentiation from a horse, which is characterized as non-horseness.)

⁴⁷⁷ This verse is discussed in Hattori 1996: 393, Kataoka 2009: 493(6), and Tillemans 2011a: 452 ff. Kataoka (2009: 493(6)) interprets “...*tadvatpakṣopavarnanam / pratyākhyātam*...” as “...the [opponent’s] explanation of the [Buddhist] view of *tadvat* (a locus qualified by *apoha*) is refuted ...”. This concurs with the understanding of the same phrase in Hattori 1996: 393: “mention (made by Kumāriḥ) in reference to (the theory of) *anyāpoha*, of (the faults to be found with) the *tadvat* theory (viz., the theory maintaining that a word denotes that which is qualified by the universal) has been rejected.” Both authors thus understand that the agent of the criticism (the “description”, in my translation) to be an opponent, Kumāriḥ. Tillemans (2011a: 452–453; 453, n. 11) takes the agent to be Dignāga. The differences in interpretation are mainly due to how the conditional is construed: either one translates “the description of the errors in the *tadvat*-theory is refuted when exclusion is the word-referent,” or “the description of the errors in the *tadvat*-theory [that result also] when exclusion is the word-referent is refuted.” Judging from Dharmakīrti’s following prose passage,

the [word's] object [is] other-exclusion is rejected. For [this] error would exist [only] if there is a separation of genus and that possessing it.⁴⁷⁸ // PV I 64 //

[PVSV 34,19] What was said [as an objection]: “Also if other-exclusion is the object of a word, every [unwanted] consequence stated for the position that [a thing] possesses that[, i.e., a genus,] [would be the] same, because that qualified by this [exclusion of others] is designated [by words].”, that also is defended against by that [explanation].⁴⁷⁹ For, in this [theory of a thing possessing a genus], a word applying to some [object, that possessing the genus,] in taking up another object[, i.e., referring to the genus,] is oppressed by the

the latter is more likely, and it would thus indicate that Dharmakīrti is rejecting the errors that Kumārila had accused Dignāga of. The difference is a small one, since Dignāga had previously levelled the criticism at the Naiyāyika's *tadvatpakṣa*. PVSVT 153,17–19 comments: *yataś ca vyāvṛttivyāvṛttimator abhedas tena kāraṇe-nānyāpohaviṣaye jātimān śabdair abhidhīyata iti tadvatpakṣaḥ. tatra yo doṣaḥ, so 'nyāpohe 'pi syād iti tadvatpakṣopavarṇanam pratyākhyātam.* (°*viṣaye* corr. acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 57b7 against °*viṣayo* in PVSVT 153,18. Trl.: And for the [reason that there is] no difference between differentiation and differentiated [thing], **due to that**, as a cause, **given that other-exclusion is the object** [of words], [the] **depiction** [of these errors occurring] **for the position of “[a thing] possessing that [genus]” is rejected**[, i.e., the depiction which consist in this statement]: the error, which [exists] for this[, i.e., for] the position [that a thing] possesses this [genus][, expressed as] “Words designate that having this [genus].”, would exist also for other-exclusion.)

⁴⁷⁸ As explained by Frauwallner (1932: 260–263), it was Kumārila's objection against Dignāga's *apoha* theory that it entailed all the same errors levelled against the *tadvat*-theory by him. Cf. the references in Frauwallner 1932: 261, n. 2, the explanations and the references in Kataoka 2009: 493(6), as well as the references in footnote 477.

⁴⁷⁹ I.e., by the explanation that there is no difference between the differentiated thing and the differentiation qualifying it. Cf. PVSVT 153,26–27: *aneneti vyāvṛttivyāvṛttimator ananyatvena prativyūḍham pratyākhyātam.*

errors of not being independent etc.⁴⁸⁰ But⁴⁸¹ differentiation from another is not an object other than that differentiated, because both designate the same. This was explained.⁴⁸²

[PVSV 34,23] [Objection:] How then, [when a differentiated thing and its differentiation are one, could] a differentiation from another [be] a universal, since the one differentiated[, being a particular,] does not correspond to another? [Answer:] Because there is an appearance in this way[, that is, as corresponding to another,] in the awareness of this [universal].⁴⁸³ Indeed, there is nothing called a universal at all. An awareness based on words is generated as mixing together actually unmixed⁴⁸⁴ properties, because of the capacity of beginningless mental impressions. In virtue of the appearance for this [awareness], a universal and coreference are defined, no matter [that everyday activity based on them] has objects that are non-existent,⁴⁸⁵ because objects neither mix [amongst themselves, so as to justify a universal, nor] are they differentiated [into various qualities, so as to justify coreference].⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸⁰PVSVṬ 153,29 (*asamā*° corrected to *asāmā*): *ādiśabdād asāmānādhikaraṇyo-pacāraḍoṣaparigrahaḥ*. (From the word “etc.” the errors of not being co-referential and metaphor [should be] understood.) Cf. Much 1997 for a discussion of the first problem, whether and how words can denote the same thing, and cf. Pind 2015: §5 for a translation of Dignāga’s discussion of all three problems. Ogawa 2017 has studied Dignāga’s position in light of Bhartṛhari’s positions.

⁴⁸¹For another translation of PVSV 34,22–35,7, see Tillemans 2011a: 453, n. 12.

⁴⁸²Cf., e.g., PVSV 32,15–17 (trl. page 293).

⁴⁸³Cf. PVSVṬ 154,7 f.: *sāmānyabuddhau vikalpikāyāṃ tathāikākāreṇa prati-bhāsanād ekākāra eva vyāvartyate ’neneti vyāvṛtīḥ sāmānyam ucyate*. (Because it appears in this way[, i.e.,] with the same (*eka*) form, to the conceptual awareness of a universal, exactly the same form is differentiated by this [appearance]. So differentiation, [defined as the process] “This causes just the same form to be differentiated.” is called a universal.)

⁴⁸⁴For “mixing” in this sense, cf. PVSV *ad* PV I 40 (trl. appendix A.1.1).

⁴⁸⁵Acc. to PVSVṬ 154,24 *asadartho ’pi* refers to a *vyavahāra* involving universals and coreference. See also the other options discussed in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 64, n. 189. Their translation also follows Kaṇakagomin’s analysis.

⁴⁸⁶Cf. PVSVṬ 154,24–26 for this interpretation.

[PVSV 35,2] The basis for all this [conventional activity, such as the ideas of a universal and coreference, are] the objects differentiated from others by having this cause and this effect,⁴⁸⁷ and words allow one to act while avoiding the unwanted. Therefore it is said [that a word] has other-exclusion as an object. In this [theory], [an object], whose external reality is disregarded [by words and concepts], which is one, and differentiated from many in virtue of the appearance in awareness, is made an object by words, [as also] by concepts, [which] have [their] origin in the awakening of impressions that were imparted by the experience of this [singular thing and that] have objects [which are] determined as being so[, i.e., as externally existing things]. And only to these [appearances in awareness] does the everyday usage of property and property-bearer extend itself, [a usage] that cannot be talked about [in terms of the property and property bearer] being the same as, or different from, each other. For there is no property different from a property bearer because [the two] do not [each] denote a different object. Neither is this [property] just [the property bearer], because, as for that denoting this [property bearer], it would follow that also that which denotes a property indicates other distinctions.⁴⁸⁸ And in this way[, that is, given that the property is just the property bearer,] no particular convention would be made, because that which [a person] desires [to express with a word for a property] would not be made clear by [that word, since it would express a property bearer]. This, then (*iti*), is the fact that property and property bearer cannot be talked of⁴⁸⁹ with regard to the object of a word. But, with regard to a real thing,

⁴⁸⁷The interpretation here follows the analysis in PVSVT 154,28–155,5.

⁴⁸⁸Which means that by saying “blue” about something, also other qualities would be known (such as that the thing is a water lily, a plant, etc.).

⁴⁸⁹Acc. to PVSVT 156,28–29: *etad anantaroḅtaṃ tattvānyatvābhyāṃ avācya-tvaṃ dharmadharmiṇoḅ śabdārthe buddhipratibhāsiny arthe uktam*. (**This**, which was just explained, **is the fact that property and property bearer cannot be talked of** as being [the same as,] or different [from, each other], [which] has been explained **for the word referent**[, i.e.,] for the object appearing in awareness.) This argument thus shows that even though property and property bearer are differentiated in everyday activity, this is not really true with regard to the word

a particular, a common characteristic cannot be talked of because [this universal] does not exist.

A.1.7 PVI 107ab

If this is thought [by an opponent]: There is no cognition of different [things] with an undifferentiated appearance. // PV I 107ab //

[PVSV 54,18] We [opponents] do not say: what is not the same (*aneka*) does not create the same (*eka*) effect. Rather [we say: given that there are] different objects, an awareness, into which their forms have been thrown, should not have an undifferentiated appearance. [Answer:] Indeed, there is no appearance of particulars in [awareness events]⁴⁹⁰ grasping a universal, because⁴⁹¹ these [awareness events] exist even if those [particulars] do not exist, and because they appear in a cognition of [the particular] itself[, i.e., in a perceptual cognition,] with another form[, i.e., other than the form of the universal], and because [there is] an overreaching consequence,⁴⁹² since a single [thing] is not consistent with multiple forms. Thus this [conceptual

referent as the object appearing in awareness. And since there is, ultimately, no difference or identity between property and property bearer in this way, the errors that Kumāriḷa thought arose for Dignāga's *apoha* theory (cf. PV I 64) are shown not to pertain to it.

⁴⁹⁰Cf. PVSVT 221,24 *sāmānyagrāhiṅṅsu buddhiṅṅsu* (In [those] grasping a universal, i.e., in [those] awareness events.)

⁴⁹¹The three reasons given now are, according to PVSVT 221,25–222,10, aimed against three different opinions about the relation between what appears to awareness on the one hand, and particulars or universals on the other: first, that the form in which a particular appears to perception is the same as the form in which it appears to conceptual cognition; second, that the form appearing in the awareness of a universal is the form of the particulars; and third, that the same particular has a twofold form—with one it appears to perception, with the other to conceptual cognition.

⁴⁹²PVSVT 222,8–10: *trṅṅyam pakṅṅam nirākartum āha—anekākārāyogād iti. ekasyānekatvaṅṅ ayuktam ekānekatvayor virodhāt. atiprasaṅgāc cety ekasyānekatvakalpanāyāṅṅ na kvacid ekatvaṅṅ syād ity arthaḅḅ.* (In order to refute the third position (cf. footnote 491), [Dharmakīrti] said: “**Because it is not consistent with multiple forms.**” Being many is not consistent **for one**, because being one

awareness] is not [one that could], grasping particulars, appear with an undifferentiated form, [and] arise from these [particulars].⁴⁹³ Even though [it] has no appearance of these [particulars], [conceptual awareness] causes the world to engage in everyday activity because of the confusion that is determination. But this form, appearing in this [conceptual awareness], does not exist amongst the objects, other

and being many are contradictory. **And because there is the overreaching consequence**[, i.e.,] there would not be oneness for anything when there is the option that one [thing] is many [things]. This is the meaning.)

⁴⁹³Cf. PVSVT 222,11–14: *yata evam tasmān neyam sāmānyākārā buddhiḥ bhinnārthagrahīṇy āhitasvalakṣaṇākārā saty abhinnākārā bhāti, tadudbhavā bhinnapadārthodbhavā. kiṃ tu svalakṣaṇagrāhīṇo 'nubhavenāhitam vāsanām āśritya prakṛtyā bhrāntaiveyam utpadyate. pāramparyeṇa ca vyaktayas tasyāḥ kāraṇam kathyante.* (Emend *pāramparye ca* to *pāramparyeṇa ca*, the *na* perhaps having gone missing due to the line ending on *pāramparye*. Cf. the very similar sentence in PVT_D je 122b7–123a1 = PVT_Q je 145a6–7: 'di ni ...rang bzhin gyis 'khrul pa kho nar skye la brgyud pas ni.... Trl.: Since it is so[, i.e., since the three reasons just mentioned are true,] **therefore this** awareness having the form of a universal is not [one that]—**grasping differentiated objects**[, i.e.,] being one into which the form of a particular has been placed—appears as having a form undifferentiated [from the particulars, or one that] arises from this[, i.e., one that] arises from differentiated things. Rather, this [awareness]—by [its] nature completely erroneous—arises based on mental traces that have been put [there] through the experience of [a cognition] grasping a particular. And, indirectly, the particulars are called the cause of this [conceptual awareness].)

Cf. also the the Tibetan translation, supporting Karnakagomin's understanding especially of the relation between *bhinnārthagrahīṇī* and *pratibhāti*, PVSVD 292a3 = PVSVD 441b5–6: *de'i phyir 'di ni de las byung zhing don tha dad pa 'dzin pa yin na tha mi dad par snang bar mi 'gyur ro.*

Note how the three attributes negated here align with the three reasons just mentioned:

1. a conceptual awareness occurs even though the particulars do not exist, hence this awareness does not arise from them (*tadudbhavā*);
2. a conceptual awareness does not appear with the same form as a perception of a particular does, hence it does not appear with an undifferentiated (or the same) form (*abhinnā pratibhāti*);
3. one thing cannot have many forms, hence a conceptual awareness (grasping many forms, like green, tall, leafy) does not grasp the particular.

(*anyatra*) than as a difference that has no difference.⁴⁹⁴ And⁴⁹⁵ this [common form] is unreal. In this way this [awareness] grasping only this [unreal common form] goes astray. This was already explained.⁴⁹⁶

[PVSV 55,6] Moreover, even for those teaching a universal as a real thing, the [individual] manifestations [of such a real universal] are completely differentiated. How [should there be] an awareness having an undifferentiated form with regard to these [particulars]? This is to be questioned in the same manner.⁴⁹⁷ [Objection:] [It is] not

⁴⁹⁴For this way of construing *anyatra*, cf. PW I: 265–266, *anyatra*, 7. A difference that has no difference is nothing but other-exclusion. Cf. PVSVT 222,22–25: *ka-tham tarhi vyaktiṣv abhinnākārapratibhāsa ity āha—anyatra bhedād abhedina iti. bhedo 'nyāpohaḥ sa eva prativyaktyabhedī. tathā hi yathaikā govyaktir agovyāvṛttā tathānyāpi. tad anena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇāny eva vijātiyavyāvṛttāny abhedini bheda ity ucyante. anyatrasabdaś cāyaṃ vibhaktiyantapratirūpako nīpātaḥ. anyāśabdasaṁnārthaḥ. na tv ayaṃ tralpratyayāntaḥ, saptamyarthasyāvivakṣitatvāt. tenāyaṃ artho-yathoktena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇātmaakād bhedād abhedino 'nyaḥ pratibhāsamāna ākāro 'rtheṣu nāsti kiṃ tu svalakṣaṇātmake eva bhedo vijātiyavyāvṛtter abhedī sarvatra vidyate 'bhedādhyavasāyāt. abhedādhyavasāyasya ca sa eva bhedaḥ pāramparyeṇa nimittam.* (Because of [the question]: “How then is there an appearance of a non-different form in particulars?”, [Dharmakīrti] said: **other than a difference that has no difference.** This difference[, i.e.,] other-exclusion alone, has no difference for [particular] manifestations. For [it is] so: as one cow-manifestation is differentiated from non-cow, so also another [cow-manifestation is differentiated from non-cow]. Thus, in this way, the particulars alone, which are differentiated from [manifestations] of another genus[, and, in that sense, are] undifferentiated [from each other], are called “difference.” And this word “*anyatra*” is an indeclinable that accords to a case ending. It has the same meaning as the word “other.” But this is not the *tral* ending[, i.e., *tra*,] because the sense of the seventh[, locative,] case is not meant. Thus this is the meaning: an appearing form, which is different from the non-different difference that has the nature of a particular in the way explained, does not exist among the objects; rather, a difference, which only has the nature of a particular, [and which is] without difference due to a differentiation from [things] of a different kind, is seen in all [particulars of the same class] because non-difference is determined. And for a determination of non-difference precisely this difference is, indirectly, the cause.)

⁴⁹⁵PVSVT 222,31 glosses *ca* as *hi* (“since”) here: *hyarthe caśabdaḥ*.

⁴⁹⁶As pointed out in Gnoli 1960: 190, acc. to PVSVT 223,9–10 the reference is to PVSV 50,16–17.

⁴⁹⁷I.e., in the same manner that Dharmakīrti’s theory was questioned in PV I 107a: *abhinnapratibhāsa dhīr na bhinneṣv iti cen matam*.

[to be questioned] in the same manner, because an undifferentiated universal really exists there [amongst the particulars]. [Answer:] Is it not [so that]⁴⁹⁸ the appearance of this universal amongst those [particulars],⁴⁹⁹ even though it [may] exist, is not noticed? For this [conceptual awareness] is regarded as having an appearance of colour [and] constellation. But the universal is not like this [, i.e., it does not have colour and constellation], nor is there any undifferentiated form separated from this [colour and constellation]. Also for one teaching shape (*ākṛti*) as the universal, there is no occurrence [of this kind of universal] in another object because, like a particular characteristic, this universal is not separated [from the particular]. Therefore (*iti*), because of the difference,⁵⁰⁰ an undifferentiated appearance is not consistent [with manifestations of universals].

A.1.8 *PV I 108cd–110*

[Objection:] Now,⁵⁰¹ a cognition is their [the particulars'] effect and it is differentiated // PV I 108c”d //

⁴⁹⁸Karṇakagomin says that “*nanu*” here introduces the Siddhāntavādin’s, i.e., Dharmakīrti’s statement (*nanvityādi siddhāntavādī*, PVSVT 223,14).

⁴⁹⁹PVSVT 223,14–16 gives two interpretations of *tatra*: first, *vyaktiṣu*, “amongst the individual manifestations”; second, *vikalpikāvikalpikāyām buddhau*, “in a conceptual [or?] non-conceptual awareness”. This should probably be emended to *vikalpikāyām buddhau* (the error perhaps due to an eye-skip in the ms?). It can then be understood as “in a conceptual awareness”. Both options are feasible, though I think the first fits the context better.

⁵⁰⁰The difference here could be understood in two ways: either that between the particulars, which would mean that a universal known through them would not really be the same, or that between the undifferentiated appearance (the common form in a conceptual cognition) and the form that the opponent said is not really different from the particulars (and can therefore not figure in conceptual awareness).

Cf. PVSVT 223,24–25: *iti hetos tad api sāmānyam svalakṣaṇam eva jātam. tato bhedād dhetor vidyamānasya nābhinnah pratibhāso yujyate. vyaktiṣv ity adhyāhārah. (Therefore, for that reason, this universal too[, i.e., the ākṛti] becomes only a particular. Because of the difference of what exists from this [shape], an undifferentiated appearance is not consistent. [To this] one supplies “for manifestations” [in order to understand the sentence].)*

⁵⁰¹Also cf. the translation and discussion of this and the next verse in Dunne 2004: 120–126.

[PVSV 56,11] according to [its] object, because, like this [particular], a cognition, too, in which this [particular] appears is different. How [can particulars] have the same (*eka*) effect? For this [cognition] is their effect and differentiated. Whatever is the same effect of [something like] a pot etc., such as carrying water etc., that also is differentiated because of the difference according to the thing [causing that effect]. Therefore different [things] do not have the same effect. [Answer:] This error [does] not [exist], for [this reason]:

Because⁵⁰² of being the cause for the same judgement (*pratyavamarśa*), a cognition (*dhī*) is without difference. Through being the cause for the same cognition, the particulars also are not differentiated. // PV I 109 //

Earlier, it was made known (*nivedita*)⁵⁰³ how there is no mixing of entities' own natures. An awareness (*buddhi*) having a mixed-together form with regard to these [entities] is merely an error. And this (*iti*) [was also made known]:⁵⁰⁴ "But the different objects (*padārtha*),⁵⁰⁵ in becoming causes for a conceptual cognition, indirectly⁵⁰⁶ generate this

⁵⁰²Cf. also the translation of this verse and the following commentary up to PVSV 57,7 in Steinkellner 1971: 190, n. 46.

⁵⁰³Acc. to Gnoli (1960: 190, note to 56,18) and PVSVṬ 227,26–27, this refers to PV I 40. Dunne 2004: 122, n. 111: "a likely candidate is PVI.68–75 and PVSV *ad cit.*".

⁵⁰⁴PVSVṬ 228,7–8 *ca*kāro niveditam ity āsyānukarṣaṇārthaḥ. *etad api tatraiva prastāve niveditam.* (The word "*ca* (and)" has the purpose of pulling over this [phrase]: "it was made known". This too was made known in that same passage[, i.e., PV I 40].)

⁵⁰⁵*padārtha* here cannot mean the object of a word, because that cannot be the cause of anything. Accordingly, PVSVṬ 227,30 glosses: "...*bhedinaḥ padārthā* vyāvrttāni svalakṣaṇāni..." (...**the different objects**, that is, the particulars differentiated [from others] ...).

⁵⁰⁶The word *krameṇa* could qualify either the immediately following compounded adjective, so that one would have to understand "indirectly becoming a cause for a conceptual cognition" (which is how it is understood in Dunne 2004: 122), or the main verb of the sentence, as translated above. PVSVṬ 227,30 clearly understands it as qualifying the main verb: "**tām** bhrāntiṃ **bhedinaḥ padārthā** vyāvrttāni svalakṣaṇāni **krameṇa janayanti**, na sāksāt." After some further comments, there is the following explanation, PVSVṬ 228,8–10: *krameṇeti yad uktam, tasya*

[awareness] because of [their] own nature.” But this discrimination (*viveka*) from the natures causing non-that[, i.e., different effects], [is] called⁵⁰⁷ their [the things’] undifferentiated difference, because [it is] the cause for some [effect] which is the same, [i.e., the same] cognition etc. This [same effect, such as a cognition etc.,] too, though [it is] differentiated according to the thing (*pratidravya*), appears (*√khyā*) as undifferentiated, insofar as it is (*bhavat*) by [its] nature the reason for the same judgement which covers (°*avaskandin*) [different things] with non-difference. Because of being the cause for an end (*artha*) such as a cognition etc., [which a] is] the cause for such a judgement, [and b] is one] in which a non-difference appears, even particulars generate, by [their] own nature, the same (*eka*) cognition [through which] a form (*ākāra*) is mixed together [with the forms of other things, and for which] the difference [of the thing’s] own nature is the real object. This has often been said.⁵⁰⁸ Therefore the non-difference of entities is only that [they] have the same effect.

And this[, that they have the same effect,] is the separation (*viśleṣa*) from [things having] other (*atat*) effects // PV I 110a //

indeed,

because one does not observe, and [even] negates, // PV I 110c //

vyākhyānaṃ vikalpahetavo bhavanta iti. vikalpakāraṇatvād anubhavajñānaṃ vikalpaḥ, vikalpahetor anubhavajñānasya hetavo bhavanta ity arthaḥ. vyaktayo ’nubhavajñānaṃ janayanti. tac caikākārāṃ bhrāntim ity ayaṃ kramārthaḥ.

(Trl.: The explanation of what is said by “**indirectly**” is “**becoming causes for a conceptual cognition**”. A cognition based on the experience [of some particular] is a conceptual cognition because it causes a conceptual cognition. The meaning is that, from “cause for a conceptual cognition”, [one understands that particulars are qualified as] being causes for an experiential cognition. Particulars generate an experiential cognition. And this [cognition in turn causes] an erroneous [cognition] that has the same form [as other erroneous cognitions]. Such is this meaning of “indirectly”.)

⁵⁰⁷See, for example, PVSV 55,4–5: *anyatra bhedād abhedinaḥ*.

⁵⁰⁸Gnoli 1960: 190, to 57,6: “see f. ex. the words *tām tu bhedinaḥ padārthāḥ*, etc. (above p. 56, ll. 19–20) and stanzas 73–74.”

a real thing

other than that [particular], [such that that other real thing would] be repeated [in different instances] // PV I 110b //

[PVSV 57,13] This has been said: “For a separately observable [thing] does not appear.”⁵⁰⁹ Or [also]: “If [it] exists, how [could it,] having no basis in any [particular, be] the reason for a cognition?” and [also this was said]: “And because of the orderly presentation (*vidhāna*) of [its] negation it is wrong to fantasize about it.”⁵¹⁰

Therefore it is correct that

⁵⁰⁹ Acc. to Gnoli 1960: 190, note to 57,13: “[...] see the stanzas 71–75.” Cf. Dunne 2004: 341–352 for a translation of these verses and Dharmakīrti’s auto-commentary.

⁵¹⁰ There are three statements here, each of which is said to have already been explained. **Statement 1:** an observable thing separated from the particulars does not appear. This is directed at a universal which is supposed to be a real thing qualifying multiple particulars, but never appears separately from any particular. As Gnoli notes (see footnote 509), this was said in PV I 71–75. Especially PV I 71ab makes this point clearly: *vyaktayo nānuyanty anyad anuyāyi na bhāsate* | (Particulars do not conform [to each other]; something else [other than the particulars] which conforms [to them] does not appear.)

The auto-commentary for the second part makes the same point as our quote in very similar terminology, PVSV 39,21–23: *anyac ca na tābhyo vyatiriktam kimcit tathā buddhau pratibhāty apratibhāsamānam ca katham ātmanā ’nyam grāhayed vyapadeśayed vā.*

Statement 2: or if that thing exists, it is of no consequence for cognition. If a universal should exist, however, it would not be a cause for a cognition. This is reminiscent of PV I 75d and its auto-commentary (here quoted without separation of verse and prose): *dhrauvyāc ca / sāmānyasya anupakārataḥ / yadi hy upakuryād anādheyaviśeṣasyānānyāpekṣanāt sakṛt sarvaṃ svakāryaṃ janayet. na vā tajjananasvabhāvam.* (... and because a universal, since it is constant, is of no service [in producing some effect]. For, if a universal were to render a service, every effect of it would be generated at once since [something], which is such that nothing can be added to it, does not depend on something else [for producing an effect]. Or else[, if it does not produce those effects all at once,] it would not have the nature of producing those [effects at all].)

Statement 3: Contriving the notion of a universal is wrong, because it has been refuted. This seems to be a very general remark. It might be referring to PV I kk. 40–42, which can be read as a definition of all that can possibly exist. See also the material referenced from the translation of §§ 32–48, where Ratnakīrti refutes universals.

convention (*saṃketa*) // PV I 110d' //

also

has a knowledge of that [difference] as [its] purpose // PV
I 110d" //

alone. Also the convention which is made should shine forth (*√śubh*) only for the [sake of the] cognition of that which is this mutual discrimination of entities, since [convention] serves [successful] activity by [means of] discriminating [that] causing non-that [from what does cause a desired aim].

If there is no convention with the purpose of cognizing this [discrimination], then, because there is no contact [to that discrimination] even at the time of everyday usage of this [discrimination], one would not act by avoiding other [things than the ones desired]. For [then] a discrimination of these [things have the same effect] from those [having different effects] would not be indicated by a word.⁵¹¹

⁵¹¹The argument here is that if a verbal convention were to be made for something real, then that thing would not exist anymore when that convention is used. This would happen if words did not indicate a difference (*viveka*) of things, as they do in the *apoha* theory.

PVSVT 230,18–21 explains: *etad uktam bhavati. yadā vidhirūpeṇānyavyāvṛtto 'rtho viṣayikṛtas tadānyavyavacchedaḥ pratīyeta. etad evāha — na hītyādi. viveka iti viviktaḥ svabhāvaḥ, teṣāṃ tatkāriṇām, tebhya ity atakāryebhyaḥ. yadi hi tasya viviktasya svabhāvasya pratīyate saṅketaḥ kṛtaḥ syād evaṃ vyavahāre 'pi śabdena codyeta. tathā cānyaparihāreṇa pravarteteti saṅketo 'pi tadvidarthika eva yuktaḥ.* ([By this] the [following] is said: if an object differentiated from others were made an object [of conceptual cognition] in a positive form, then [its] separation from another would be cognized. Exactly this [Dharmakīrti] said: “**For not**” etc. **Discrimination**, i.e., a discriminated nature **of these**, i.e., which have that effect, **from those**, meaning those with different effects. For, if a convention were made in order to cognize this discriminated nature [itself], it would be indicated **by a word** in the same way also in everyday activity. And in the same way one would act by avoiding what is other [than what one wants]. So it is correct that[, as stated in PV I 110d,] convention also has a knowledge of this discrimination as its object.)

A.1.9 PVI 113cd–121

[Objection:] If one grasps the object [of the word] “tree”⁵¹² through the exclusion of non-trees, the two⁵¹³ are dependent on each other. So, if one [of them] is not grasped, neither is grasped. Convention is impossible because of that. So some (*kecit*) say.⁵¹⁴ // PV I 113cd–114 //

[PVSV 58,22] [Objection:] If tree is the difference from non-trees, [then] convention is not possible for [this] object, [which] has not arisen in awareness because this [tree] cannot be grasped in this way

⁵¹²This discussion must be understood as being about the object of the word “tree” and other objects, but not about particular trees. I try to convey this by, somewhat artificially, not adding articles: instead of translating “grasping a tree”, I translate “grasping tree”, which for the opponent here means “grasping something qualified by the universal ‘tree-hood’”, and for Dharmakīrti means “grasping something differentiated from non-trees”, i.e., the referent of words. Cf. PVSVT 233,12–13: **avr̥kṣavyatirekeṇa vr̥kṣārthagrahaṇe** vr̥kṣaśabdasya yo ’rthas tasya grahaṇe ’bhyupagamyamāne, [...] (**If one grasps the object of tree by the exclusion of non-trees**, [i.e.,] if one grasps, [or] intends to designate, the object of the word “tree”,)

⁵¹³Kaṛṇakagomin’s interpretation of *dvayam* differs from my translation. According to PVSVT 233,13–14, **dvayam** vr̥kṣāvr̥kṣagrahaṇam **anyonyāśrayam**, it is the two graspings, that of tree and non-tree, that depend on each other. A translation would then be:

If the grasping of the object “tree” [happens] through the exclusion of non-trees, the two[, the grasping of tree and the grasping of non-tree,] are dependent on each other. So when one is not grasped, neither is grasped.

Whilst the first statement makes good sense, it would seem a bit odd that in the next one Dharmakīrti uses (in a consequence drawn from the first statement), *eka* and *dvaya* again, but this time as referring to the things grasped. Kaṛṇakagomin sees no big problem here, and glosses, PVSVT 233,18, **ekasya** vr̥kṣasyāvr̥kṣasya vā **grahābhāve dvayāgrahaḥ**.

⁵¹⁴PVSVT 233,20–28 cites both Uddyotakara (NBhV 314,5–7) and Kumārila (ŚV Av 83–85ab, cf. appendix B.7 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84) as maintaining that other-exclusion as a word referent leads into a circular dependency between A (e.g., “cow”) and non-A (e.g., “non-cow”). Hugon (2009) and Hugon (2011) has discussed this matter (along with this verse and some following passages) extensively.

without grasping non-tree, [and] because also non-tree, [as] it has the form of a distinction from that [tree], is not known by [someone who] does not know tree. [Answer:] So some [say].

For these [people], are non-trees distinguished in convention or not? // PV I 115ab' //

[PVSV 59,2] For those [persons], who, assuming a universal as a single real thing, thus question (\sqrt{cud}) the mutual dependency when convention [is made] through distinction (*vyavaccheda*) from others, [is it the case for them], when a convention is made also for this [real universal], that non-trees [are] distinguished or not?

If [non-trees are] distinguished, how [are they] known without first grasping tree? // PV I 115b"cd //

[PVSV 59,7] For at that time⁵¹⁵ a cognizer (*pratipattṛ*) does not know tree, nor non-tree, because [the cognizer] starts off due to a desire for [learning] this [convention] only in order to know that[, what tree and non-tree are]. How should this unknowing [person] understand the distinction from non-tree when a convention [is made]? And

if a convention is without negation [of what is other], because⁵¹⁶ a word that, if [the distinction of tree from non-tree] is not understood, is based on [an object] in which that other than that [which is desired] is not excluded, those engaged in everyday activity would not act avoiding that [which is other than what they want to attain], as

⁵¹⁵Acc. to PVSVṬ 234,25–26: *tadeti saṃketakāle, pratipattā, yasmai saṃketaḥ kriyate*. (At that time[, i.e.,] at the time a convention [is made], a cognizer[, i.e.,] one for whose sake a convention is made.)

⁵¹⁶The reason given here for a convention not containing a negation of what is other is not actually part of the verse in the Sanskrit text. But I was not able to translate in a way that this is clear.

one does not act avoiding certain kinds of trees.⁵¹⁷ // PV
I 116 //

[PVSV 59,13] For it is not coherent that, at [the time of] everyday usage [of a word], one acts—due to a word that, at [the time of] convention, was founded without distinction of what is other [than the intended object]—by avoiding that [which is undesired], as in the case of particular kinds of trees, such as a *Śimśapā* etc.⁵¹⁸

Moreover, should [this] be [said by an opponent]:

[As, contrary to your opinion,] one does not affirm [anything] upon negating another [object], [it is] upon showing a single [thing]⁵¹⁹ placed before one that the convention “This [here] is a tree.” is made. This [object that a convention is based on] one cognizes also at [the time of] everyday usage [of the word]. So [there is] not this error [of mutual dependency]. // PV I 117–118ab’ //

[PVSV 59,18] Indeed, by someone teaching that universal is an existing real thing, nothing is affirmed through the distinction of

⁵¹⁷PVV 328,17–18 gives the following interpretation: *yathā vrkṣaviśeṣānām vrkṣasamkete ’vyavacchinnatvāt pravṛttiviśayatvam evam avrkṣāṇām api syāt*. (In the same way that [different] kinds of trees are[, correctly,] the object of activity because, in the convention for tree, [these kinds of tree] are not differentiated, so also non-trees would be[, erroneously, the object of activity because they are not differentiated in setting the convention for tree].)

This is also how the comparison is understood by Hugon (2011: 114). Accordingly, the argument can be paraphrased as follows: in learning the word “tree”, there is no differentiation of tree species. When one acts on hearing the word “tree”, one, correctly, does not differentiate between kinds of trees. In the current discussion, there is no distinction between tree and non-tree, just as there is none between tree and kinds of tree. So the consequence—undifferentiated activity—has to be the same in both cases.

⁵¹⁸The example can be understood as follows: if a person has correctly understood the convention for “tree”, she will in future act correctly towards all kinds of trees, since none of these kinds of trees was excluded at the time the convention was set. Accordingly, one can generalize and say that if something is not excluded at the time of the convention, activity will be directed towards it also at a later time.

⁵¹⁹PVSVṬ 236,18 *ekam iti sāmānyam*. (One[, i.e.,] a universal.)

something. Rather, clearly seeing a single real thing positioned in front [of one], the convention “This is a tree.” is made. Also, at [the time of] everyday activity just this object, as seen at the time of the convention, or that connected with that [object],⁵²⁰ is cognized. So [there is] no similar [unwanted] consequence[, i.e., that tree and non-tree are interdependent]. [Answer:] There is no dissimilar [consequence]. For also here[, when a convention is made for a real thing, by saying]

“This also [is] a tree”, [or] “only this [is a tree]”, the [unwanted] consequence is not averted. // PV I 118b”cd //

Also someone saying “This is a tree.”, [while] pointing out a single [thing], does not go beyond these two options: “That also [is a tree].” [or] “That only [is a tree].” And for both of these there is precisely this error. [Objection:] [There is] no error, because what is opposed to that seen is easily cognized. For, in someone seeing one [thing and then] experiencing an awareness [with a form] distinct from that [thing’s form], an ascertainment of difference, which distinguishes these [things], arises according to the experience “[this is] other than that.” For, someone who has been taught “Only this is a tree.” while being shown [a tree] cognizes all by himself exactly this non-tree just where he does not see this [tree]. This is not possible for someone teaching exclusion, because a form observed in one [instance] does not continue in some [other instance].⁵²¹ [So,] when there is a cognition

⁵²⁰I.e., the particular which is connected to a universal, cf. PVSVT 236,22–23: *tatsambandhinam veti sāmānyasambandhinam āśrayam*. (Or that connected to it[, i.e.,] the basis which has a connection to a universal.)

⁵²¹Following the Tibetan translation, *ananvayāt* should be understood as giving the reason for this sentence, that this is not possible for someone adhering to an exclusion theory, PVSVD 294b1 = PVSVD 444b1–2: *rnam par gcod pa smra ba la ni ’di mi srid de, gcig na mthong ba’i ngo bo ni gang la yang rjes su ’gro ba med pa’i phyir ro*. This is also reflected in PVSVT 237,22–29 (the opponent is speaking): *anyāpohavādino ’py evam iti cet. āha — nedam ityādi. ekatra samketakāle dṛṣṭasyāsādhāraṇasya rūpasya kvacid vyaktyantare ’nanvayād ananugamāt*.

But it would also make good sense to take it as Gnoli did, and construe it as a reason for the next sentence: because a thing’s form is unique, a cognition of it in another instance is impossible.

[of tree and non-tree] through observation, there would not be a cognition in this way[, i.e., as a tree,] even for another particular. [Answer:] In this way then, also here it is the same, for the [following reason]:

For, based (*sthita*) on the same cognition—called the same judgement—a cognizer (*prapattṛ*) divides the referents which are reasons for this [cognition] and for another (*atad*) [cognition] by himself. // PV I 119 //

[PVSV 60,16] As this has been made known earlier,⁵²² certain entities, even though different as to [their] original nature (*prakṛti*), produce the same effect, like a cognition etc., [but] not others. These [things] this [cognizer] cognizes there[, at the time a convention is made], all by herself distinguishing causes for that [same effect] and causes for what is not that [same effect].⁵²³

[The learner of a convention] will, by herself, cognize the entities present to her⁵²⁴ in an awareness of them—[which] appear as the cognition's cause, [which] lack the form of not [being that] cause, [and so are] as if of the same form—as different [from those which do not cause that cognition].⁵²⁵ So an expression is bound to a difference. A cognition, cognizing this [difference] because of this [expression], beholds [this difference] as if it were the same real thing due to an error. // PV I 120–1 //

⁵²²PV I 73–74 acc. to Gnoli (1960: 190, note to 60,13 (sic!)); cf. Dunne 2004: 344–345 for a translation. Also see PVSV 25,15–23, and Hugon 2009: 537, n. 9.

⁵²³The following verses and prose are examined in McAllister (forthcoming b).

⁵²⁴*tasya* is not part of the verse, but I could not find a construction that would have made this clear.

⁵²⁵Cf. PVSVT 239,23: ...*atatkāribhyo bhedena* ...

[PVSV 60,23] [It is] due to the very nature⁵²⁶ of these [things] that the causes for such⁵²⁷ a conceptual cognition—which[, in turn,] is due to an experience [of these things]—are continuous. Because of

⁵²⁶This passage is also translated and discussed in McCrea and Patil 2006: 312 ff. The translation presented here follows Kaṛṇakagomin’s analysis of the passage (PVSVT 240,10–241,25), and is (sometimes for that reason) different from the one by McCrea and Patil (2006) in various details. The main difference lies in our interpretation of the *atathābhūta-tathādhyavasita* clause. McCrea and Patil (2006: 312) translate:

These things, which are not really so [i.e., do not really have the same appearance in his own and the other person’s conceptual awareness] are determined to be so, ...in virtue of their being the causes of that conceptual awareness, and in virtue of the exclusion of what is other than them [i.e., what does not cause that conceptual awareness].

They take the two instrumental phrases to be reasons for the determination, and determination to be the identification of what appears in their own and the other person’s conceptual cognition. Whilst this is possible, and I do think that this identification is actually a form of determination, Kaṛṇakagomin (PVSVT 240,23–28) explains the determination mentioned by Dharmakīrti as follows:

tajjñānahetutayā tasya vikalpajñānasya hetutayā tadanyavyāvṛtṭyā cety ekākārapratyabhijñānahetubhyo ye ’nye tathābhūtavikalpāhetavaḥ, tebhyo vyāvṛtṭyā ca, atathābhūtān api. na hi te vikalpārūḍhās taddhetavaḥ, bahiravidyamānatvāt. ata evāheturūpavikalatvam apy asat, teṣām avastusattvāt. tathādhyavasitān tajjñānahetutayā tadanyavyāvṛtṭyā cāropitān. anena bhāto hetutayā dhiyaḥ. aheturūpavikalān iveti vyākhyātam. (*Emendation against PVSVT_{ms} 88b5 aheturūpavikalatvam acc. to PVT_D je 135a4 = PVT_Q je 159b4: rgyu ma yin pa’i ngo bo dang bral ba nyid.)*

Kaṛṇakagomin is here saying that this passage explains PV I 120bc (*bhāto hetutayā dhiyaḥ. aheturūpavikalān ivā*). But I believe his interpretation of the two instrumental clauses should not be taken causally here: in the paraphrase of *tathādhyavasitān* by *tajjñānahetutayā tadanyavyāvṛtṭyā cāropitān*, “being the reason of this cognition” and “excluding (or as exclusion of) that different from this” are most naturally taken as explicating the “*tathā*”.

⁵²⁷I.e., the conceptual cognition of a thing as the same as another, “called the same judgement” (*ekapratyavamarśākhyā* PV I 119a).

this [continuity in the causes of a conceptual cognition], a learner⁵²⁸ cognizes the reasons for this [conceptual] cognition as different [from others]—[those reasons which] occur in the mind of someone seeing this [thing producing the same effect], are determined as being a reason for this cognition and as excluding what is other than this [reason for this cognition], even though they are not really like [this], [and] have a difference of external and internal [form] that is not distinguished; [the learner does this] in accordance with [her] cognition that “These are trees.”[, as she is] based upon a conceptual cognition after having been shown those [things] appearing as the same in her own and the other’s conceptual cognition.

Therefore [the learner] binds an expression to the difference [of these things] from those [things which are] not reasons for that[, i.e., which are not a reason for the conceptual cognition of tree].

[It is] only in virtue of an error [that] a conceptual awareness, understanding this [difference] because of that [expression], appears as if grasping one single real thing[, i.e., a universal]. Further, no [such] single thing is visible there [amongst the particulars], because of seeing and not seeing⁵²⁹ which [a learner], even though seeing differentiated [things],⁵³⁰ could make a distinction between tree and non-tree, because [she] does not grasp it [the single real thing, e.g., treeness,] separately from the appearances of branch etc. like [she grasps] a stick where [there is] a stick-bearer; also, because [such a single thing] which is not grasped as separate (*pravibhāga*) from others (*āpara*) is not noticed (*anupalakṣaṇa*). Because also a shape (*ākṛti*) seen in one [thing] cannot be seen in another,⁵³¹ only a single particular would be a tree, given that [that] having that [shape] and

⁵²⁸PVSVT 241,7: *yasmai saṃketah kriyate, sa pratipattā*. (For whose sake a convention is made, that is a **learner**.)

⁵²⁹Emend *darśānādarśaṇābhyam* PVSV 61,3–4 to *darśānādarśanābhyam*, supported by PVSVT 242,14.

⁵³⁰That is, the learner sees the particular things. Cf. PVSVT 242,13–15.

⁵³¹According to PVSVT 242,22 f., this is an argument against an *anarthāntara-sāmānyavādin*. Cf. also the reference to an *ākṛtisāmānyavādin* in PVSV 55,21 (cf. PVSVT 223,20–25).

[that] not having that [shape] are[, respectively,] a tree and not a tree.

A.1.10 *PVI 152ab*

[PVSV 76,25] Moreover, some [person] imagining a universal as an object different [from a particular] will imagine [it] either as being in (*gata*) its own basis alone,⁵³² or as being in everything, as [in the case of] ether etc.⁵³³ If, amongst these [options], [it is imagined] as being in its own basis alone, [then], if [things like] pot etc. come into being in places that are free from potness etc., how is a universal, which occurs in substances in different places, possible where these [are]? For this [universal]

does not go // PV I 152a' //

from a previous⁵³⁴ substance into a substance planning to arise, because you assume that [a universal] is without movement. For an entity occurring in another substance, which does not move from this, [and] which does not pervade the intermediate space between the two, cannot be connected with an entity having a different place. This [entity], at an earlier [time],

was not there, [but] is there later // PV I 152a''b' //

and it has not arisen there, nor come from anywhere. So who is capable of shouldering (*ud-√vah*) this burden of obstacles, except out of stupidity (*jāḍya*)?

⁵³²PVSVT 301–302 refers to discussions found with Kumāṛila (*ŚV Āv* 25–29a and *ŚV Vv* 30 and 32, with variations) and Uddyotakara (*NBhV* 302,21–303,13, approximately; I could not find the last few sentences (following *nīlapratyayas*, PVSVT 301,21) in the *NBhV*) for the first position, that a universal exists only in its manifestations.

⁵³³Ether (*ākāśa*) is taken to be ubiquitous in Vaiśeṣika, cf. Halbfass 1992: 74, and see also footnotes 157 and 280.

⁵³⁴That is, it does not move on from a substance in which it was previously inhering. Cf. PVSVT 302,16: ***pūrvadravyād yatra tat [=sāmānyam.] pūrvam samavetaṃ tasmād....***

A.1.11 PVI 162

[PVSV 82,4] [Objection:] How then,⁵³⁵ when there is no undifferentiated real thing[, i.e., no universal], is there now an occurrence of a cognition and a word which conform [to many things]? [Answer:] [In the same way] as in the case of a cook etc.⁵³⁶ [Objection:] But just this is considered: how [can a cognition and a word apply] to these [cooks etc.] also? [Answer:] This has been considered, in which way [this occurrence of a concept and a word for multiple things] is not possible.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵In the preceding discussion, Dharmakīrti has eliminated all possibilities suggested by the opponent for what the cause of the consistency of words and cognitions in face of mere particulars could be. The opponent has suggested universals (*jāti / sāmānya*, PVSV 69,9–79,15, corresponding to PV I 149–157b, cf. Frauwallner 1933: 68–78) activity (*karman*, PVSV 79,15–81,4), and a capacity (*śakti*, PVSV 81,4–82,4) for that activity as causes for the same cognition. All of these have been disproved by Dharmakīrti, and the opponent is now throwing the question back at him.

⁵³⁶PVSV 317,30–318,10 *yathā pācakādiṣu pācakatvādisāmānyan nāsti, tathā prasādhitam. atha ca tatra pravartete anvayinau jñānaśabdau. tathānyatrāpy antareṇa sāmānyan tau bhaviṣyataḥ.* (Correct *bhaviṣyataḥ* in PVSVT 318,10 to *bhaviṣyataḥ* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 117a1. Trl.: **As for cook etc.** there is no universal such as “cookness” etc., as is well established. But still (*atha ca*), conforming words and concepts apply to this cook etc., so also for another [thing] they will exist without a universal.)

⁵³⁷Whether the universal cookness qualifies cooks was discussed following PV I 63 and again in PVSV 80,18–81,23 (cf. the translation of these verses from the Tibetan and their explanation in Frauwallner 1933: 79 ff.).

Taking the sentence this way, we can suppose that Dharmakīrti is hinting at the fact that cookness was not admitted by the opponent as a real universal inhering in things. This could lead the opponent to ask the following question, namely what the reason then is, if we discount the possibility of a real thing causing the same cognitions.

According to Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 318,11–13), however, the subject in the sentence in PVSV 82,7, *yathā na teṣu sambhavati*, is “universal” (*sāmānya*), and not “occurrence” (*vṛtti*) any more:

nanv ityādi paraḥ. teṣv iti pācakādiṣu sāmānyam vinā katham anvayinor jñānaśabdāyor vṛttir iti. tato ’nvayijñānaśabdavṛtteḥ pācakādiṣv api pācakatvādisāmānyam astīti. cintitam etad anantaram, yathā teṣu pācakatvādi sāmānyam na sambhavatīti.

[Objection:] So, then, would these two[, a word and a cognition,] be without a cause? [Answer:] [The two are] not without a cause, but, rather, they do not have a cause that is an external reality. The generation of a concept is due to an awakening—according to [its] self⁵³⁸—of mnemonic imprints. From this [generation of a concept], words [follow]. Further, the basis of a concept and a designation is not the existence of a real thing. This was explained often,⁵³⁹ because one observes continuous [concepts and words] since—even though one observes [only things] different from each other—contradictory forms co-exist⁵⁴⁰ in virtue of the mnemonic imprints, each in its own way, [resulting from] conventions. But amongst these there is no own nature at all to which [a word and a cognition] are bound, because a co-existence of two [things], contradictory to each other, in one [thing] at the same time is not possible.

[Objection:] Then [a word and a cognition] would be without any restriction (*anīyama*). For, what exists without a cause is not capable of restriction such that [it could be said:] “[It] exists somewhere, [it] does not exist somewhere [else].”

(Read *nanv* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 117a1 against *tadvad* PVSVT 318,11; *'nvayijñāna°* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 117a1 against *'nvayajñāna°* PVSVT 318,12; *yathā* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 117a1 against *tathā* PVSVT 318,13; *sāmānyam na* acc. PVSVT_{ms} 117a1 against *sāmānyam sa na* PVSVT 318,13. Note that PVSVT has importantly different punctuation: ...*astiti cintitam ...anantaram. tathā ...*)

One could assume some shift like this, with perhaps one of the real things, the *vastu*-s from PVSV 82,5, becoming the subject. The argument would not change significantly.

⁵³⁸I understand that every conceptual cognition is due to the awakening of a mnemonic imprint with a nature particular to itself; i.e., the imprint left by a mental continuum's encounters with cows is different from that left by its encounters with pots.

⁵³⁹Cf., e.g., PVSV 35,2–9 (appendix A.1.6).

⁵⁴⁰Acc. to PVSVT 318,21–22, one has to understand that different, mutually exclusive ideas are superimposed on objects, such as when one says that the world either is the effect of some primary matter or of god, or is without a cause, or is merely conventionally existent (...*virodhirūpasamāveśena parasparaviruddharūpādhyāropeṇa pradhānakāryam īśvarakāryam ahetukaṃ samvṛttimātram jagad ity evaṃ ...*).

[Answer:] That[, i.e., a cognition as well as a word,] is not truly without a cause, because a particular mnemonic imprint is a cause. But an external [thing] that exists in such a way[, i.e., as a cause for the same cognition,] is not observable. This is what we say. Nor must [a conceptual cognition or a word] not exist, when this [external cause] does not exist,⁵⁴¹ because such a concept is generated when objects are non-existent, grasped by sleepers and [persons suffering from the eye disease] *timira*, and when there are specific forms that are superimposed [due to] mnemonic imprints [resulting] from a convention.⁵⁴² And it is not [the case that] all forms [occur] everywhere because these [concepts] arise for non-existent [objects], since those [objects] which are perceived in such a way[, i.e., separately,] are [also] conceptualized as entirely separate. And about this something was said⁵⁴³ by us: even by the nature [of things there are] certain causes for the same cognition, because of a difference in [these things'] own nature.

Moreover,

by which contact a genus spreads out⁵⁴⁴ into something when [there is] the same difference of things, but not into

⁵⁴¹Additions acc. to PVSVT 319,14–15: *na cāsati tasminn anvayini bāhye nimitte vikalpena na bhavitavyam bhavitavyam eva.* (Nor, when this does not exist, i.e., the continuous external cause [of a cognition], **must** a conceptual cognition **not exist**[, i.e.,] it really must exist.)

⁵⁴²Note that Karṇakagomin glosses both occurrences of *samāvāsanā* in this passage (PVSV 82,11,19) with *samāvāyavāsanā* (PVSVT 318,20; 319,17), each time explaining that one should understand that the impressions left accord to one's doctrine.

⁵⁴³According to PVSVT 319,28–29 and Gnoli (1960: 191), this refers to PV I 73.

⁵⁴⁴McCrea and Patil 2010: 85, translating this verse in the context of its quotation by Jñānaśrīmitra (AP 224,6–7), understand *prasarpati* cognitively: "...given that they are similarly distinct, the basis of verbal awareness is just the connection by which the universal comes to mind in the case of one individual but not another." Whilst a recurring cognition is, within Dharmakīrti's and Jñānaśrīmitra's arguments, certainly one of the central effects that a *jāti* has according to the opponents, the verse seems to be speaking primarily about the ontological relation obtaining between individual things and a genus or universal. PVSVT 320,10 glosses: *prasarpati vyāpya vartate.* (Trl.: "[A *jāti*] **spreads out**, that is, [a *jāti*] occurs having pervaded [a group of individual things].")

another, that [contact] alone should be the basis of both words and cognitions. // PV I 162 //

[PVSV 82,25] This is an intermediate verse.⁵⁴⁵

A.2 MATERIAL FROM THE *PVSVṬ*

A.2.1 *PVSVṬ* 114,9–115,9 ad PV I 41

Because of this⁵⁴⁶, that which was said by Kumāriḷa[, i.e.]:⁵⁴⁷

“But there is no word which performs other-exclusion,⁵⁴⁸ as described on your position. Mere negation is simply not understood⁵⁴⁹ in this appearance.

Rather, from words, such as “cow,” “gayal” (*gavaya*), “elephant,” [or] “tree,” a verbal awareness (*mati*) arises through a determination having an affirmative form.

⁵⁴⁵Acc. to Frauwallner (1933: 69; 83), this verse ends the section, beginning PV I 143, in which Dharmakīrti argues against the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya notion of a universal. Cf. also the introduction of PV I 163 in *PVSVṬ* 320,25, presenting a new speaker: “*atra sām̐khyah̐ prāha.*” On the other hand, the objection that Karṇakagomin quotes while commenting on this verse, at *PVSVṬ* 320,13–16, is ŚV Āv 37–38 by Kumāriḷa, who of course is not a Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika writer. It could be that after having discussed Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika positions, Dharmakīrti touched on Kumāriḷa’s two verses. This would find slight support in this verse being called an “intermediary verse” (*antaraśloka*), which can mean that it does not necessarily have much to do with the context in which it appears (cf. Mimaki 1980). But probably Frauwallner’s assessment of the opponents’ identities in this passage is not quite adequate, since Karṇakagomin repeatedly quotes Kumāriḷa (e.g., *PVSVṬ* 301,4 ff., 305,4 ff.) in the section characterized as refuting Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika positions by Frauwallner.

⁵⁴⁶The reference is to PV I 126, which Karṇakagomin has just quoted. This passage appears towards the end of a three page elaboration on PV I 41.

⁵⁴⁷As pointed out by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), the first two of the following three verses are not found in the ŚV, and might therefore be from Kumāriḷa’s lost *Bṛhattikā*. The last verse corresponds to ŚV Āv 164.

⁵⁴⁸Cf. PV III 164 (trl. on page 321) and the references to Dignāga given there.

⁵⁴⁹The words have been awkwardly separated here, read *pratibhāse ’vagamyate* instead of *pratibhāseva gamyate* in *PVSVṬ* 114,11.

Therefore, only for those words, to which the [negating particle] *nañ* is joined, shall there be an element of negation of another. For others[, i.e., words that are not negated,] only⁵⁵⁰ the nature [of their object] is understood.”,

establishes only what is [already] established [for us], because it is assumed [by us] that the referent of a word has an affirmative form.⁵⁵¹

How then is the Buddhist opinion different from the opinion of others? Or, why is the object of word and [logical] mark called exclusion?

Now, there is a big difference between [these two opinions], because conceptual cognition, which is postulated by the others as being [something that] has a real thing as [its] object, is postulated by the Buddhists as being [something that] has an imagined [thing] as its object. And⁵⁵² the imagined form (*ākāra*), because of being based on exclusion, is called exclusion, or [one states this fact with the words] “[Another] is excluded by this.” But the mere negation of another, which is implicitly (*arthāt*) referred to [in the previous statement], is called [exclusion] since [one says] “[the act of] excluding [is] exclusion.” But the particular is called exclusion since [one says] “In this [particular the other] is excluded.”

A. 2.2 PVSVT 131, 24–132, 10 ad PV I 51

Otherwise[, i.e., assuming] the nature of a real thing were grasped by a [conceptual] awareness or a word[, then,] **if a single [thing] were pervaded by a single word**[, i.e.,] if one [thing] were made an object with its whole form, or pervaded **by an awareness** which has an ascertaining nature, there would **not be another object. Another object** [is analysed as]: this form is another and it is an

⁵⁵⁰Read *svātmaivānyatra* acc. to PVSVT_{ms} 44b2 against *svātmevānyatra* in PVSVT 114,15.

⁵⁵¹Cf. the argument in PVSVT 113,6–7.

⁵⁵²For the rest of this paragraph, cf. the material in PVT_{F2}.

object. No other form of this real thing, which is the object [and] is to be made known, exists. Or else, there is no object for another word or cognition that makes this real thing known. **So**, for this reason [that is], words which are used after the object [of the first word] has been cognized would be **synonymous**, like the words “tree”, “root-drinker”, etc.⁵⁵³ There would be no usage of an awareness that corresponds to a different object such as sweet taste, soft, heavy, cold. So there would be the unwanted consequence that there is only one object for awareness.

A.3 MATERIAL FROM *PV III*

The most detailed modern study of the *PV III* as a whole was carried out in Japanese by Tosaki (1979–1985). I do not understand Japanese, but my friend and colleague Masamichi Sakai was so kind as to discuss with me the main differences he found between Tosaki’s and my interpretations.

A.3.1 *PV III 147*

Even⁵⁵⁴ if [there is] a continuous (*anvayin*) cognition,⁵⁵⁵ it [is a cognition possessing] the manifestation (*avabhāsi*) of a word [and] a particular. [But the universal] cowness is indeed declared [to be] free of the form (*ākāra*) of colour (*varṇa*), shape (*ākṛti*), [and] letter (*akṣara*).⁵⁵⁶ // *PV III 147* //

⁵⁵³In Sanskrit, the words “*vrkṣa*” and “*pādapa*” are synonyms. Since I do not know any English synonym for “tree”, I translate the compound “*pādapa*” according to the meaning of its parts.

⁵⁵⁴For Manorathanandin’s commentary on this verse, cf. appendix A.4.1.

⁵⁵⁵“Continuous cognition” should express that a cognition remains the same for various objects. For example, seeing cows on two different occasions, a person might think “A cow!” each time. The literal idea seems to be that this cognition is concomitant with different particulars.

⁵⁵⁶See section 4.1.10, for Ratnakīrti’s understanding of the compound *varṇākṛtya-kṣarākāraśūnyam*, and cf. the translation of § 33.

A.3.2 PV III 161–173

Objects,⁵⁵⁷ even though [there is] a difference [between them], are causes for such a cognition only due to their nature [of being] a real thing. This cognition, which [occurs] for some [objects], cognizes these [objects] as such[, as being the same]. // PV III 161 //

In the same way, cognitions too, [even though there is a difference [between them],⁵⁵⁸ [are a cause] for a judgement of a non-difference. So the continuity of a separation (*viśleṣa*) from what does not have that effect, but not of a single real thing, exists for real things.⁵⁵⁹ Therefore a word,⁵⁶⁰ referring to this [separation, applies] to a real

⁵⁵⁷The section PV III 163cd–173 is titled *anyāpohacintā* (“A Consideration of Other-Exclusion”) by Sāṅkṛtyāyana (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940: iv), and Miyasaka (1971–1972: 62) probably adopted this title. But it seems natural to understand the question of “continuity” (a word can repeatedly refer to similar objects) and the relation between word, its object, and the real thing, starting in PV III 163cd, as following from the context of PV III 161–163ab. These verses are thus included here.

The translation presented here depends strongly on Manorathanandin’s commentary (PVV 166,16–170,26, trl. appendix A.4.2). Tosaki (1979: 263–272) lets the section start at PV III 163ab (but Tosaki 1979: 262, n. 141 notes, as Masamichi Sakai explained to me, that it can be understood to start with PV III 161). Dreyfus (1997: 225–232) translates and discusses PV III 163cd–170, adding plenty of information about Tibetan interpretations of these verses.

⁵⁵⁸This interpretation follows that of Tosaki (1979: 259 f.) as explained to me by Masamichi Sakai.

⁵⁵⁹Tosaki does not, as Masamichi Sakai told me, construe *vastūnām vidyate* with *anvayaḥ* as I do (and as I think PVV sees it, cf. appendix A.4.2.2), but with a supplied *anyāpohaḥ*. Probably this is due to the fact that, according to Tosaki, a new section starts before PV III 163ab, and I see no substantial difference in meaning (since a uniform difference is exclusion). Also PVABh 261,22 understands the structure like Tosaki, taking “a universal that is differentiated from that having another effect” (*ataḥkāryebhyo vyāvarttamānaṃ sāmānyam*) as the subject.

⁵⁶⁰*śruti* is a synonym for *śabda*, and will not be differentiated in the translation here. This is also how Tosaki 1979: 263 understands it here (according to Masamichi Sakai). Note that a more adequate translation of the two terms might be “sound complex”, since Dharmakīrti considers that also sub-units of full words convey meaning (in the cases of compounds or certain suffixes, for example). Cf., for example, PVSV 34,7–15.

thing. // PV III 162–163ab //

Even though it is not based (*niṣṭhā*) on a distinction of a capacity of external [things], a word [agreed on as expressive] of this [distinction] is bound to [those] reflections in conceptual cognitions [which] are based on that [distinction]. Therefore, because it is based on an exclusion from others, a word was called “making an exclusion [from] others” [by Dignāga].⁵⁶¹ // [PV III 163cd–164] //

Which reflection⁵⁶² of an object appears in a cognition [arising] because of a word, as if separate [from a cognition], that also [is] not the nature of [that] object. This [is an] error arising from impressions.⁵⁶³ // [PV III 165] //

[Objection:]⁵⁶⁴ If this [reflection] is designated by words, [then] which part is understood as regards the object?

⁵⁶¹Cf. PS(V) 5 11d, and see the corresponding passages in Pind 2015: II.54 ff. and the references to TS_g. According to Pind (2015: II.54–55, n. 182) this phrase is part of the last verse in the first part of Dignāga’s exposition of the *apoha* theory, where all realist alternatives for what the word referent could be are shown to be untenable, and *anyāpohakṛt* remains as the only alternative.

⁵⁶²The word “*pratibimbaka*” is here understood as a noun (equal to *pratibimba*), which is also how it is understood in Tosaki 1979. If it is taken as a *bahuvrīhi*, one could understand “as if separate and as if reflecting an object”, but it would be unclear what it is that appears in such a way. However, this latter interpretation has some support in the *PVV_S*, cf. appendix A.4.2.4.

⁵⁶³The idea is that mental impressions or imprints (*vāsanā*), usually said to be without a beginning, accumulate and shape a mind continuum’s inclinations in various ways, e.g., as a propensity towards generalizations (mixing different things together) or as identifying things wrongly. Cf., e.g., Dunne 2004: n. 139, 140–141 for some representative passages from Dharmakīrti, and see Mikogami 1989 for a discussion between realists and *vijñānavādin*-s about how these kinds of impressions can arise (that they do is not doubted by either of them). They are also instrumental in explaining phenomenal variety in Buddhist idealism, as well as in dreams, as has been clearly explained by Ratié 2010: 453. See § 34 and § 52 for examples of Ratnakīrti’s use of this term.

⁵⁶⁴According to the interpretation in Dreyfus 1997: 228–229, this verse is Dharmakīrti’s answer to a Buddhist’s objection. I follow the interpretation in the *PVV_S* and

But if that [part] is not understood, making a convention would be meaningless [as it] has that purpose.⁵⁶⁵ // [PV III 166] //

[Answer:] To this [question that was just raised:] “Which part of an object does a word express?”, exclusion from others is said [in answer]. But this form does not exist in the object. How [should a word] expressing that [form] partake of the object? // [PV III 167] //

A continuous word’s occupation (*kārya*) is with a continuous object. But this [form of awareness], formed by the repetition of [a thing’s] observation, [is] discontinuous, because it is not different from thought. // [PV III 168] //

However,⁵⁶⁶ because that differentiated from others is understood by means (*gatyā*) of a superimposition of that form, there is no contradiction if [there is] this formulation: “That object alone (*eva*)[, the form of awareness,] is the object of a word.” // [PV III 169] //

Or, the apprehensions which are formed by words have an erroneous appearance. And since [these apprehensions] accord to this part of an object, a word [is called] “performing exclusion.”⁵⁶⁷ // [PV III 170] //

the explicit identification of the *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa* in Vibhū 168, nn. 4 and 6 (cf. appendices A.4.2.5–A.4.2.6), according to which PV III 166 is spoken from an opponent’s point of view. One text-immanent argument for this is that the question introducing PV III 167 (*śabdo ’rthāṃśaṃ kam āheti*) seems to make more sense this way, since it can be understood as taking up the central concern of the objection.

⁵⁶⁵Cf. PV I 110d, referred to in Tosaki 1979: 266, n. 151 (cf. trl. on page 305), where Dharmakīrti says that the purpose of convention is to make exclusion known, which is understood as a part of an object (e.g., a thing’s difference from all non-red things, its difference from all non-chair things etc.).

⁵⁶⁶See also appendix B.5.1 for a quotation of this verse by Kamalaśīla in the voice of an opponent.

⁵⁶⁷See footnote 561.

Therefore, even at the time [of forming] a convention, exclusion from others—which has been connected with an indicated object [and which] results in one’s own cognition [of that exclusion]⁵⁶⁸—is connected to the word. // [PV III 171] //

In dependence on a non-observation of this [word] for one [thing and] in dependence on an observation [of this word]⁵⁶⁹ for another [thing], exclusion is bound to a word. This [double dependency] is not coherent in [the case of] a real thing. // [PV III 172] //

Therefore a genus etc., [and] a connection to these, do not exist in an object, and a word is [therefore] not bound to these, because words indeed⁵⁷⁰ are joined to differentiation from others. // [PV III 173] //

A.3.3 *PV III 183ab*

Words designate a universal, and a conceptual construction has the same referent [as words]. // PV III 183ab //

A.3.4 *PV III 233–235*

Even⁵⁷¹ if [a universal such as] whiteness etc. exists, this, [which is] such an object of the sense faculties, is not designated by words, because of the difference of the form [appearing in] the two cognitions[, a perception and a conceptual awareness]. // PV III 233 //

⁵⁶⁸I.e., an object (e.g., a red apple) is pointed out to a person who is learning a convention (e.g., “red”), and this object causes that person’s own cognition of the relevant object’s exclusion from others (“is red”, or different from all non-red things).

⁵⁶⁹This addition follows Tosaki 1979 (as explained to me by Masamichi Sakai). In a convention, a word is bound to some things, but not to others.

⁵⁷⁰Note that PVV 170,26 reads *anyavyāvṛttāv eva*, resulting in “because words are joined only to differentiation from others.” This is also how Tosaki 1979 understands this passage.

⁵⁷¹See appendix A.4.3 for Manorathanandin’s commentary on these verses.

If [this is said:] “Even though awareness [events all] have the same object, this [difference does exist], since there is a different basis [for these awareness events].”, then why is it that cognitions (*citta*) [based on] hearing etc. have different objects?⁵⁷² // PV III 234 //

The basis of thoughts (*cetas*) is truly different [in each case]. [So] why does a real thing, that is in fact only one, have this nature that appears [to awareness] with different forms? // PV III 235 //

A.3.5 PV III 407ab

[That an object is] manifest [or] non-manifest [to awareness] cannot be due to a difference such as distant, near, etc. // PV III 407ab //

A.4 MATERIAL FROM THE PVV_S

A.4.1 PVV 161,9–18 ad PV III 147

[Objection:] If universals do not exist, then how [can there be] a continuous (*anvayin*) cognition for completely differentiated particulars? So [Dharmakīrti] said: **Even [that] continuous cognition,**⁵⁷³ which arises, that also (*ca*) is cognized as having that[, i.e., as possessing] **an appearance**[, or] the form, **of a word** (*śabda*) such as “cow” etc., and **of a particular** with a specific colour (*varṇa*) [and] composition (*saṃsthāna*); [but it is] not [cognized] as having an appearance of a genus (*jāti*).

[Objection:] What then, is [there] no [cognition] at all having an appearance of a universal? So [Dharmakīrti] said: **For cowness is**

⁵⁷²The point is that, if the difference of awareness events were not due to different objects, but to a difference in the basis of the cognitions, i.e., the corresponding cognitive faculty, the perceptions by different sense faculties could not be shown to have different objects.

⁵⁷³Note that PVV (as well as PVV_{ms} 31a5) reads *yad apy* (“Also which”) instead of the *yady apy* (“Even if”) accepted in PV III 147.

explained by the Sāmānyavādins to be empty (*śūnya*) **of the form**, cognized as such, of these[, i.e., of the form of] **colour**[, i.e.,] blue etc., **shape**[, i.e.,] figure, **letter**[, i.e.,] the word “cow.” Therefore, that appearing in a continuous cognition with colour, shape, etc. is not a universal.

A.4.2 *PVV 166,20–170,26 ad PV III 161–173*

A.4.2.1 *PVV 166,20–167,3 AD PV III 161*

[Objection:] If a universal is not differentiated from the particulars (*vyakti*),⁵⁷⁴ then how [can] an apprehension [be] continuous (*anugāmin*) [for various particulars]? So [Dharmakīrti] said: Some **objects, even though there is a difference** between them, are **the cause for such a**, [i.e.,] continuous, **cognition**[, i.e., a cognition] that has the differentiation from that not having that effect as its object, **only due to their nature [of being] a real thing**[, i.e.,] only due to [their] basic nature (*prakṛti*).

The cognition which accords to some objects **cognizes these**, i.e., the objects which are without differences, **as such**, as being the same. But there is no cognition as such in virtue of a single universal.⁵⁷⁵

A.4.2.2 *PVV 167,4–167,13 AD PV III 162–163AB*

[Objection:] May it be that also cognitions are differentiated according to [each] particular. How [then can] a cognition [be] continuous [with regard to these particulars]? So [Dharmakīrti] said:

Cognitions too, [even though there is] **a difference** between them, are, **in the same way**[, i.e.,] like the objects, due to their nature [of being] a real thing,⁵⁷⁶ **a cause for a judgement of a**

⁵⁷⁴The result would be that there are as many universals as there are particulars.

⁵⁷⁵Read °*sāmānyam balāt* in *PVV 167,3* as *sāmānyabalāt* acc. to *PVV_{ms} 32a7*, as suggested by Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The manuscript is difficult to read here, and I was not able to find any decisive clues for separating these two words.

⁵⁷⁶Read *vastudharmatayā* acc. to *PVV_{ms} 32a7* against *vastudharmitayā* acc. to *PVV 167,7*.

non-difference. Therefore, cognitions also are called continuous apprehensions due to having as their object the same judgement of this [difference]. **So**, i.e., in this way, **a continuity of a separation**[, i.e.,] of a distinction of an object from that not having that effect amongst the different things, exists. **But a continuity of a single real thing**[, i.e.,] of a universal **does not exist for real things**,⁵⁷⁷ [i.e.,] for individuals (*viśeṣa*), because that [universal] is refuted by non-perception[, a means of valid cognition]. **Therefore a word, referring to this**[, i.e.,] which has [that] distinction as its object, applies to a real thing.

A.4.2.3 PVV 167,16–168,3 AD PV III 163CD–164

[Objection:] Now, the differentiation from [that having] a different (*atat*) effect is the proper nature of real things. Therefore, given that the object [of a word] is distinction, only the real thing would be the object of a word.⁵⁷⁸ So [Dharmakīrti] said:⁵⁷⁹ **a distinction of a capacity**, such as not having that effect etc., **of an external** real thing; **a reference to this**[, i.e.,] the state of having [that] as an object; **even though that does not exist, a word for this**[, i.e.,] a word designating this distinction,⁵⁸⁰ **is bound** at the time a convention⁵⁸¹ [is made] **to those reflections of conceptual cognitions**⁵⁸²[, i.e.,] to those forms of awareness, **which are bound to these**[, i.e.,] which have a constancy (*vyavasthiti*) for everyday activity concerning those

⁵⁷⁷Vibhūticandra (Vibhū 167, n. 1) glosses “for real things” as: “Amongst the real things.”

⁵⁷⁸Vibhū 167, n. 2: “This [objection] is considered contradictory to this statement: A word does not touch a real thing.”

⁵⁷⁹The verses of the *PV III* printed in Sāṅkrtyāyana 1938–1940 are not actually part of the PVV, cf. Sāṅkrtyāyana 1938–1940: iv. For their translation, cf. appendix A.3.2.

⁵⁸⁰Vibhū 167, n. 3: *katham iti na vṛttena sambandhanīyaḥ* “[This statement] is not to be connected with the mentioned [word] ‘how.’” (I.e., this is not an answer anymore to the question raised in PVV 167,4.)

⁵⁸¹Vibhū 167, n. 4: “Due to the mistake of [thinking] that a particular and an object of conceptual cognition are one.”

⁵⁸²I take the sixth, genitive, case as possessive here, i.e., reflections of external things that a conceptual cognition has.

[things] due to the fact that a classification (*vyavasthā*) [of these things] has an object since the differentiation of these [things from that not having that effect] is real.

Therefore, because reflections of conceptual cognitions are the object of everyday activity due to being of the nature of the external [thing]⁵⁸³ which is differentiated[, that is to say,] **because of being based on to an exclusion from others**[, i.e.,] because of [this] cause, **a word was called “making an exclusion from others.”** [I.e.,] because of the generation of a conceptual cognition through a form that is differentiated from others, and because of the application⁵⁸⁴ to those [real things] differentiated from others, a word is called “making an exclusion from others.”

A.4.2.4 *PVV* 168,4–10 *AD* *PV* III 165

[Someone objects]: Now, that to be grasped in a verbal cognition is recognized only as an external [thing], not as being the image in cognition. So [Dharmakīrti] said: **What appears in a cognition, which arises because of a word, as if reflecting an object [and] as if separate**[, i.e.,] as if differentiated [and] external, **that also [is] not the nature of [that] object**[, i.e.,] does not have the own form of an externally [existing] object; rather, **this [is an] error arising from impressions.**⁵⁸⁵

Everyday activity that [treats] the form of conceptual cognition [as] external in virtue of ignorance is like the mistake [of treating objects like] the hair etc., which are seen by someone [suffering from] *timira*, as external. Such (*iti*) [is] the meaning [of this verse].

A.4.2.5 *PVV* 168,11–18 *AD* *PV* III 166

Then the form of cognition,⁵⁸⁶ which is a real thing, would be what is to be denoted. [So, explaining the objection,] [Dharmakīrti] said

⁵⁸³Vibhū 168, n. 1: “Because of being based on the distinction of a real thing.”

⁵⁸⁴Vibhū 168, n. 2: “Because of identifying a visible [thing] and a concept.”

⁵⁸⁵Vibhū 168, n. 3: “The reason [being] the impression [left by] the experience of particulars.”

⁵⁸⁶Vibhū 168, n. 4: “The verse introduced (*sāvatāra*) [here] is an objection.”

[as follows:]⁵⁸⁷ **If this form of a cognition is designated by words, which part is understood as regards the object**, which is differentiated from that not having that effect [and] not named by a word? None at all. **But if that**[, i.e.,] an object that is excluded from that which does not have that effect⁵⁸⁸ **is not understood**, truly **making a convention would be meaningless** because⁵⁸⁹ this [making of a convention] is assumed **to have that purpose**[, i.e.,] to result in a cognition of an object differentiated from that not having that [same] effect. In this way, then, if a convention is made, even with regard to the exclusion from others, there would be no activity towards the referents, because this [exclusion from others] lacks the nature of a referent.⁵⁹⁰

A.4.2.6 PVV 168,18–24 AD PV III 167

[Answer:] Because of that [objection, Dharmakīrti] said: **to this question: “Which part of an object does a word express?”, exclusion from others**[, i.e.,] a differentiation from that not having that effect, which is possible for all distinctions, **is said**[, or declared] as that which is to be designated. Therefore a person who has grasped a convention with regard to other-exclusion, which has the nature of

⁵⁸⁷ According to Śākyabuddhi, this is the objection of a Buddhist, PVT_D nye 191b4–6 = PV_T_Q nye 236a8–236b2: *de nyid kyi phyis bstan par bzhed nas, de lta na yang don gyi rnam pa 'dzin pa zhes bya ba la sogs pas re zhid rang gi sde pa la brgal zhing brtags* (P: *brtag*) *pa byed pa yin te, gang dag rnam par rtog pa la snang ba'i ngang tshul can gyi rnam pa dngos su sgra'i brjod par bya ba yin no zhes de ltar zhugs pa'o. don gyi rnam pa zhes 'dzin pa ni don gyi rnam pa 'dzin pa ste, rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa la snang ba'i gzugs brnyan no. don gyi zhes bya ba ni phyi rol gyi rang gi mtshan nyid kyi'o. gang gi tshe de las gzhan pa las ldog pa zhes bya ba ni dngos po la gnas pa'i* (P: *pa*) *gzhan sel ba'i rang gi mtshan nyid kyi bdag nyid can no.* Acc. to Dreyfus 1997: 228 f., also Go rams pa understands this as an objection by a Buddhist.

⁵⁸⁸ Perhaps °*ścittadakārya*°, appearing in both PVV_{ms} 32b3 and PVV 168,15, should be emended to °*ścitatadākārya*°. The meaning would be the same in both cases.

⁵⁸⁹ Vibhū 168, n. 5: “[Asked] ‘Why?’ he says.”

⁵⁹⁰ Vibhū 168, n. 6: “To this the Siddhantin says.”

[being] a part of an object, acts towards that [object], having recognized the object because of an uttered word.⁵⁹¹ This is correct. **But**⁵⁹² which form of awareness is to be grasped,⁵⁹³ **that does not exist in the object. How** should a word, **expressing that** form of awareness, **partake of the object**[, i.e.,] be qualified by expressing the external object?

A.4.2.7 *PVV* 169,1–6 *AD* *PV* III 168

Moreover: **A continuous word's occupation**⁵⁹⁴ [is] **in a continuous object**, [, i.e., a word's] purpose has the character of a cognition [of the same object] at the time of everyday activity. **But this** form of awareness **is formed** from impressions **through the repetition of observing** particulars, [and is] **discontinuous**,⁵⁹⁵ **because it is not different from thought** which is [itself] not continuous.

A.4.2.8 *PVV* 169,7–14 *AD* *PV* III 169

[Opponent:] Now, if the [real] object is not the word's object, then how can other-exclusion, even though it is of the nature of a part of that [object], [be] what is to be designated? So [Dharmakīrti] said: **By means of a superimposition of that form**[, i.e.,] of the exclusion which is a part of the object, onto the form of awareness,⁵⁹⁶ [that is,] through a determination [of exclusion and form of awareness] as being one, the object,⁵⁹⁷ **differentiated from another, is understood;**

⁵⁹¹Read *śabdād uccarītād arthaṃ pratītya* (*PVV_{ms}* 32b4) against *śabdād uccarītārthaṃ pratītya* (*PVV* 168,22).

⁵⁹²Read *yas tu grāhyākāraḥ* acc. to *PVV_{ms}* 32b4 against *yas tatrākṣarākāraḥ* *PVV* 169,23.

⁵⁹³*Vibhū* 168, n. 7: “What was attained (*āyāta*) by the repetition of observing an external blue [thing] etc. is to be known.”

⁵⁹⁴*Vibhū* 169, n. 1 glosses *śabda* as: “Cow, cow.” Probably the point is that the word “cow” can be used twice with the same meaning, and is so continuous.

⁵⁹⁵*Vibhū* 169, n. 2: *yatra buddhau bhāsate tato 'bhinnāḥ jñānavat*. “[The cognitive form (?)] is not different from that awareness in which it appears, like a cognition.” This short phrase is not quite clear to me.

⁵⁹⁶*Vibhū* 169, n. 3: *vināropam vyavahārābhāvāt yathā saṃgatis tasya tathāha* Tentatively: “Because there is no everyday activity without imposition, [Dharmakīrti] spoke so as if it is applicable to this [form of awareness].”

⁵⁹⁷*Vibhū* 169, n. 4: “A particular [...is understood].”

because [of this understanding,] exclusion, which is a part of the object of a word,⁵⁹⁸ is called word object. But an object is not understood from a word because of a universal. If, **however**, because of cognizing a form of awareness as being the differentiated object, **this very** form of awareness is metaphorically called “**word referent**” by someone proclaiming that the form of awareness is the word referent (*buddhy-ākāraśabdārthavādin*),⁵⁹⁹ then, **if there is such a formulation, there is no contradiction** at all, because there is no assumption by [Dharmakīrti] that a form of awareness, which is not qualified by continuity, is the word referent.

A.4.2.9 PVV 169,17–170,3 AD PV III 170

Or, the apprehensions which are formed by words have an erroneous appearance. For [it is] so: first of all a [real] object is not the object of an awareness [that is] due to a word, because the own form of this [object] does not appear [in that awareness], and because for this [object] there is no convention of words. Neither [is] the form of awareness [the object of a word], even though there is an awareness of this [form], because [this form] is not determined as being the object, because it is a particular, and because there is no convention [with regard to it]. For the form of awareness is not external, nor is an external [thing] a form of awareness, due to which an appearance as “like”⁶⁰⁰ would be a true appearance. In reality, therefore, verbal apprehensions do not let a real thing appear.

⁵⁹⁸ Perhaps *śabdārthāśāpohaḥ* should be emended. One possibility is an emendation to *śabdārthānyāpohaḥ* (“...other-exclusion, which is the word object...”). This is, as Masamichi Sakai informs me, also how Tosaki 1979: 269, n. 160 translates this passage, albeit without making an emendation in the text.

⁵⁹⁹ A similar position is shown to be different from that of an exclusion theorist in TSP_§ 352,5 ff. (cf. appendix B.5.1), where PV III 169 is also quoted. Manorathanandin is here saying that Dharmakīrti’s explanation is not contradictory to the position that the word referent is the form of awareness, but qualifies that position as metaphorical usage. This qualification is not made in the TSP.

⁶⁰⁰ I.e., either the external thing would be like the form of awareness, or vice versa.

[Opponent:] In this case then, how is a word called performing an exclusion [that is] a part of the referent?⁶⁰¹ [Proponent:] So **Dharmakīrti** said: Words, even though they do not have an appearance of that [object], **accord to this**, exclusion from others, [that is to say,] **a part of the object**, [meaning they] cause a classification as being the object of activity (*vṛtti*), because [they] are indirectly connected with it due to being arrived at by an observation of an [external] object.⁶⁰² **And so a word [is characterized as] “performing exclusion”.**⁶⁰³

A.4.2.10 *PVV* 170,5–12 *AD* *PV* III 171

For the [reason] that, due to a word, [there is] a cognition of that separated from another [thing] at the time of everyday activity, **therefore also at the time [of forming] a convention is the exclusion from others connected to the word** as that to be designated [by that word], [but] nothing else.

[Objection:] Now, a convention is made indicating an object. So how [can it be] called exclusion? So [Dharmakīrti] said:

Connected with an indicated object [i.e.,] [an object] that is excluded from others, [and] whose **result** [i.e.,] purpose, is [**one’s own a cognition** [of that exclusion] at the time of everyday activity—[connected with such an object, i.e.,] made identical [with that object] because of a determination of non-difference [between the two object’s exclusions], **other-exclusion**, having the nature of a form of awareness, is connected to a word, [but] the [external] object itself (*eva*) [is not connected to a word].

⁶⁰¹Vibhū 169, n. 5: *aniṣṭam parityajya iṣṭe pravartanāt śabdāḥ*. “Words [perform exclusion], because of activity towards that which is desired avoiding that which is not desired.”

⁶⁰²Read *paramparayā* acc. to *PVV_{ms}* 32b7 against *parasparaṃ yā* in *PVV* 170,2.

⁶⁰³Vibhū 170, n. 1: “Dignāga [said]: ‘Not to these, [but] to the object should they apply.’” I was unable to locate this statement in Dignāga’s works.

A.4.2.11 PVV 170,13–21 AD PV III 172

For [it is] so:⁶⁰⁴ **In** a convention's **dependency** on [a word] not being observed **for one** [thing, i.e.,] for a non-tree that is to be distinguished [from trees, and] **in [its] dependence on an observation of this [word] for another** [thing, i.e.,] for one instance (*ekadeśa*) of a tree that is not to be distinguished, **exclusion is bound to a word**. This is ascertained.

In [the case of] **a real thing**[, i.e.,] for an object of convention [such as] a universal etc., [this] dependence on the observation and non-observation of that to be distinguished and that not to be distinguished **is not coherent**.⁶⁰⁵ If a real thing is to be cognized in an affirmative way, what use is the dependence on the non-observation in some other place? But it depends [on this observation]. Therefore, only a distinction from others is to be cognized. This is understood. If [an opponent says] that distinction from others depends on [such things as] a universal etc., which have the aim of an apprehension by avoiding a dissimilar instance,⁶⁰⁶ then [we say] enough with [this] universal. Because only by the distinction from others is everyday activity fully achieved.

A.4.2.12 PVV 170,22–26 AD PV III 173

And for the [reason that] qualifiers such as genus, quality, movement, etc. do not appear in a cognition grasping a real thing, **therefore genus etc., and a connection to these**⁶⁰⁷ **do not exist in an object**.⁶⁰⁸ **And, therefore, a word is not bound to these, because words are joined only to a differentiation from others** that is established by cognition.

⁶⁰⁴Vibhū 170, n. 2: “[Manorathanandin] states the error in the case of the application of a word caused by a universal [existing] in an affirmative way[, i.e., in the case of a real universal].”

⁶⁰⁵Vibhū 170, n. 3: “For it is so: in the case of a universal[, which is a real thing].” (Introducing the following argument.)

⁶⁰⁶Vibhū 170, n. 4: “Grasping an object that is filled with constructions.”

⁶⁰⁷Vibhū: “Connection (*sambandha*).” He is giving a synonym for *yoga*, which I have also translated by “connection” here.

⁶⁰⁸Vibhū 170, n. 6: “In the object of sense faculties.”

A.4.3 *PVV 189,14–190,9 ad PV III 233–235*

Or may it be that a universal truly is a real entity, nevertheless, this is not an object of words and concepts. So [Dharmakīrti] said: **Even if whiteness etc.**, i.e., a universal, **exists**, in a property bearer such as a garment etc., **such an object of the sense faculties**, which has a clear form of whiteness etc., [nevertheless] **this** [i.e.,] an object that is the object of a cognition of the sense faculties, **is not designated by words, because** there is a **difference** [between the two objects] due to the clarity or vagueness of the **form**, i.e., the form of awareness, **of these two cognitions**, which are generated by the sense faculties [and] words.

If [this is said by an opponent]: “**Even though awareness events**, which are generated by sense faculties and words, **have the same object** [i.e., even though] they have the same object,⁶⁰⁹ [there is] **this**, a difference of the forms of awareness which has the nature of the difference of their cause [i.e.,] **since there is a different basis** [for these awareness events.]” , **then** [i.e.,] in such a situation, this is explained: **cognitions** [based on different] sense faculties such as **hearing etc. have different objects** [i.e.,] have different objects such as sound (*śabda*), shape, smell etc. **Why is that** [i.e.,] from [which] means of valid cognition is this ascertained?

Also, what is not contrived [in this result of your thesis]: “These cognitions, even though there is no different object for them, have different forms of awareness because of the difference of the sense faculties that are their basis.”?

Moreover, **the basis of cognitions** of universals etc. [i.e., their] cause **is truly different** [i.e.,] a sense faculty and a word. Nevertheless, **why does a real thing that is in fact only one**, like a universal etc., **have this nature that appears with different forms [to awareness]** [i.e., a nature that] appears as clear and unclear [or, a nature having] a clear and unclear appearance? For insofar as a single [thing] appears with its own form, [its] having a differentiated appearance is not coherent.

⁶⁰⁹Manorathanandin glosses *artha* with *viśaya*, both of which have to be translated as “object” here.

