BASELINE STUDY ON SUPER-DIVERSITY AND URBAN POLICIES IN AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS

ICEC – INTERETHNIC COEXISTENCE IN EUROPEAN CITIES: A COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED ORIENTED ANALYSIS OF NEIGHBOURHOOD-RELATED POLICIES

Myrte Hoekstra

University of Amsterdam
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1. The city of Amsterdam in the immigration context

1.1 Basic socio-demographic structure of Amsterdam

On January 1, 2014, Amsterdam’s population consisted of 411,585 women and 399,600 men, resulting in a surplus of almost 12,000 women. With respect to the age structure there are slightly less inhabitants under 20 years of age compared to the Netherlands as a whole (20.3 per cent versus 22.9 per cent) and also less elderly inhabitants above 65 years of age (11.7 per cent versus 17.3 per cent). Characteristic to Amsterdam is the large share of single-person households: 53.3 per cent of overall households (national average is 37 per cent). 20.1 per cent of households are couples without children, 16.3 per cent are couples with children, and 9 per cent are one-parent families.

From 2007 onwards the population has been increasing at a fast rate, which has slowed down slightly since 2010. This growth is caused both by a settlement surplus and a birth surplus (see Table 1). The financial crisis which started in 2008 led to a reduction in the internal out-migration as people in their thirties are less likely to move out to the broader Amsterdam region, or are simply unable to sell their house. Consequently, the share of (especially native Dutch) families and young children has also increased (O+S, 2013a).

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1 If not otherwise indicated, quoted statistics are derived from O+S (www.os.amsterdam.nl) for data at the municipal level and CBS Statline (www.statline.cbs.nl) for data at the national level.
Table 1. Population growth in Amsterdam, 2002-2013

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Birth balance</th>
<th>Internal Migration balance</th>
<th>External migration balance</th>
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<td>+1,837</td>
<td>+11,743</td>
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Source: O+S

1.2 The socio-economic structure of Amsterdam

*Urban economy*

The Amsterdam economy has been growing since the 1990s, and from 2000 to the start of the economic recession in 2008 growth percentages in Amsterdam have been above the national average. The strength of the urban economy is located in the relatively highly educated workforce, the service sector (especially ICT and the creative industry), the large number of relatively small companies, and Amsterdam’s international orientation. Amsterdam is one of the five most attractive European locations for business, and in addition receives a lot of tourists.

Amsterdam has a very strong tertiary and quaternary sector (see Figure 1). These two sectors together represent almost 95 per cent of the working population. In the past ten years, especially the financial service industry and information and communication industry have grown rapidly. However, the economic crisis has led to decreasing revenues in the tourist and retail sector, as well as in the financial sector, construction, and
Loss of jobs was most pronounced in the financial sector. During the first recession (2008-2009), the consequences for the Amsterdam economy in terms of economic growth and unemployment were relatively small. This changed during the second recession (2011-2012) because of municipal budget cuts and insecurity about the future among businesses and consumers. Employment has decreased since mid-2012 and unemployment, especially youth unemployment, has increased. The consequences of the crisis are also apparent in the housing sector. Prices are low and still decreasing, as are the numbers of sold and newly built houses (O+S, 2013a).
Income and labour market

Of the population between the ages of 15 and 65, in 2011 73.8 per cent belonged to the labour force (defined as those willing to work at least twelve hours per week). Of the total population belonging to the labour force, 8.2 per cent was unemployed. This is higher than the national average which is 6.5 per cent. A slight majority (52.9 per cent) of those on unemployment benefits (WW) are men. In recent years, the number of people receiving unemployment benefits has increased (by 22 per cent in 2013 compared to 2012), as well as the number of people on welfare (an increase of 8.3 per cent). The number of people on unemployment benefits increased the most for those under 25 years of age (62.1 per cent) and for those between the ages of 55 and 64 (27.2 per cent). The increase in unemployment is more pronounced for women than for men. Of the employed population 66.2 per cent have permanent employment, 15.8 per cent have flexible employment, and 17.9 per cent are self-employed. Women are less likely to be employed than men and if they are, they are more likely to work part-time.

In 2010, the average yearly disposable income was 15,500 Euros per person and 30,700 per household. Purchasing power of Amsterdam households used to lag behind the Dutch average, but it has increased more sharply over the past decades and is now generally around the Dutch average. Recently there has been a small decrease compared to the Dutch average since small business owners and the self-employed have suffered a relatively large loss in income due to the crisis. Amsterdam has a relatively polarised income distribution, with a lack of middle-income groups. The share of very high income households (top ten per cent of income distribution) has increased from seven per cent in 2001 to twelve per cent in 2009. The percentage of very low income households (lowest ten per cent) on the other hand has remained the same.

In 2012, 17.2 per cent of individuals and 16.7 per cent of households had an income below 110 per cent of the social minimum income\(^2\). Seventy per cent of ‘social minimum’ households fit this classification for a period of three or more years, indicating prolonged financial precariousness. Poverty is concentrated among the young and the elderly: 23 per cent of people below the age of 18, and 23 per cent of people above 65 years of age live in

\(^2\) The social minimum income is the amount of money deemed necessary to make ends meet. The precise amount depends on the household form. In 2011, 110 per cent of the social minimum income amounted to a net year income of 12,168 Euros for a single person, 15,645 Euros for a single parent, and 17,383 Euros for a family with or without children (O+S, 2012a).
a ‘social minimum’ household. People living in social minimum households are more likely to be female (54 per cent). Twenty per cent of ‘social minimum’ households consist of single-parent families.

**Educational level**

Similar to the income distribution, the educational level of the Amsterdam population is characterised by a relatively large share of highly educated and a relative lack of people with an intermediate educational level. In 2009, 12 per cent of the Amsterdam population between the ages of 15 and 65 are lowly educated (primary school, low secondary, or low tertiary education), 32 per cent have an intermediate educational level (intermediate tertiary, or high secondary education), and 56 per cent are highly educated (high tertiary education). In the Netherlands as a whole, 24 per cent is lowly educated, 43 per cent intermediate, and 33 per cent highly. The increase in highly educated in the period 1995-2009 is also larger for Amsterdam (17 per cent) than for the Netherlands (8 per cent) (TNO/CBS, 2009).

For all groups, there is a trend towards an increase in educational level, but this is more pronounced for non-Western immigrants (their university enrolment has doubled over the last decade) and for women (56 per cent of university students are female).

In the academic year 2013-2014, 52,877 students were enrolled in intermediate tertiary education (HBO/college) in Amsterdam and 54,771 students were enrolled in high tertiary education (WO/university). In the year 2011-2012, 53,992 students were living in Amsterdam. Over the period 2001-2002 to 2010-2011, the number of students in the city increased with 72 per cent.
1.2 Structure of the housing market in Amsterdam

Amsterdam has a total housing stock of 397,022 houses in 2013. In recent years the construction of new houses decreased due to the economic crisis. Whereas between 2006 and 2010 over 4,000 houses on average were built yearly, in 2011 only 2,939 houses were built and in 2012 only 2,560. Most new buildings are located in the northern and western parts of the city. The age of the housing stock varies but most houses are built before WWII (42.5 per cent) or between 1946 and 1980 (22.2 per cent). 12.1 per cent is built between 1981 and 1990, 9.6 per cent between 1991 and 2000, and 13.6 per cent after 2000. Most houses are relatively small: 28.9 per cent have one or two rooms, and 35.8 per cent have three rooms (25 per cent have four rooms, and 10.4 per cent have five or more rooms). From 2009 to 2013, the average housing occupancy increased from 1.94 to 2.01. This is related to the economic crisis which prevents young people who want to start a family from moving out of the city.

Characteristic for Amsterdam is the large proportion of rental housing. Only 28 per cent of housing is privately owned, 26 per cent is rented out by the private sector, and 48 per cent is owned by housing corporations and destined for social housing. Although the Netherlands in general has a high share of social housing (on average 35 per cent of total housing), these percentages are also high compared to other Dutch cities. Shares of social housing are higher in poorer areas such as in the North and South-East districts, but even in the city centre the share of social housing is still significant at thirty per cent or more (Van der Veer & Schuiling, 2005). Until 2013, all new residential development projects were required to have a share of social housing of at least thirty per cent. Social housing in Amsterdam increased until 1995, when the social housing share was 55 per cent of total stock. Only in recent years the share dropped below fifty per cent, while owner-occupied housing increased. This is due to the liberalisation and privatisation of the housing market which started in the 1990s. Housing corporations gradually became less dependent on the state and were stimulated to sell parts of their housing stock, resulting in tenure conversions from rent to ownership (Musterd, 2014).

Rent levels for both private and social housing are calculated using a points system which takes into account the size, location, quality, and amenities of the house. The municipality also tries to balance the rent with the income of the tenant. For low-rent
housing (up to 681.02 Euros per month), potential tenants should have a maximum yearly household income of 43,000 Euros for private, and 34,339 Euros for social housing (Amsterdam, 2013c). In a recent new government proposal, rents are no longer calculated based on the points system but are based on the *WOZ-waarde*, which is an indication of property value. The new system would result in much higher rent levels in the centre (since property in the centre is in high demand and thus has a high *WOZ-waarde*) and lower rent levels in the North, New-West, and South-East districts. This plan would contribute to the ongoing liberalisation of the rental sector (Nul20, 2013).

The large proportion of social housing means that middle class families often have trouble finding suitable dwellings within the city. In 2003, over half of Amsterdam’s middle-income and a quarter of higher-income households lived in social housing. This means that social housing is not only the domain of those households with a very weak socio-economic position, although this has been changing in recent years. The lack of middle-class housing is seen as a problem because people either stay in cheap social housing (which leads to a low turnover rate and a lack of affordable housing, resulting in long waiting lists for new and poorer inhabitants) or they move out of the city, resulting in an outflow of human capital. Therefore, the current aim of the municipality is to sell social housing, build more ‘mixed projects’ (consisting of both owner-occupied and social rental housing), and discourage *scheefwonen* (mismatch caused by people with relatively high incomes living in social housing, lit. ‘skewed housing’). Because the income level of households is only checked before they gain access to social housing, and because middle-class housing is difficult to find and much social housing in Amsterdam is built on high-quality locations, many households remain in social housing when their income increases. This leads to under-spending on the part of these households and over-spending for those households that would be eligible for social housing but are forced to rent elsewhere due to scarcity. A related problem is the illegal subletting of public rental dwellings in parts of the city that are in high demand. In an effort to discourage *scheefwonen*, the government recently allowed households with a relatively high income living in social housing to be charged extra rent. Furthermore, efforts are made to convert parts of the social housing sector into privately rented or owner-occupied housing. To achieve this, close cooperation with the housing corporations is necessary since they own the majority of housing stock (Musterd, 2014).
1.3 Socio-spatial patterns and segregation in Amsterdam

Levels of socio-economic segregation in Amsterdam are generally moderate. This is due to moderate socio-economic inequality in general and to the ubiquity of social housing. In addition, from the mid-1990s onwards policies sought to actively produce mixed and heterogeneous neighbourhoods in terms of both socio-economic status and ethnicity (which are in practice strongly correlated) through urban renewal. Mixed neighbourhood strategies can be identified across Western Europe. They are characterised by an integrated policy approach, a belief in the effects of population composition on individuals’ life chances (contextual/neighbourhood effects), a decentralised approach, and increased involvement of the private sector and of residents themselves (corresponding with an overall policy shift from government towards governance) (Andersson & Musterd, 2005). However, in the Netherlands the focus on social cohesion and the creation of social mix is more pronounced than elsewhere (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008).

The first integrated approach to tackle physical, economic, and social problems in urban areas was the Big Cities Policy, which started in 1994 and whose main assumptions have been part of urban policy ever since. The policy focused on the restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods to attract the middle classes. Mixing the housing stock was seen as a means to achieve population mix, a recurrent theme in Dutch urban policy. In subsequent updates of the policy, the focus shifted from attracting better-off households to retaining upwardly mobile residents by providing opportunities for a housing career within the same neighbourhood. The focus on social and ethnic composition of the neighbourhood remained, the assumption being that social and ethnic mix is desirable for the economic and social position of residents and for the ‘liveability’ of neighbourhoods, and that it can be created by restructuring and differentiation of the housing stock (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008; Van Kempen & Bolt, 2009). However, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between social deprivation and liveability, or for the presumed ‘neighbourhood effects’ (Van Gent, Musterd & Ostendorf, 2009).

Figure 3 below shows the spatial distribution of three indicators of low socio-economic status in Amsterdam. The areas in light blue indicate concentrations of social housing (more than two standard deviations above the city average). The areas in red

3 Please refer to section 2.3 for a discussion of ethnic segregation.
similarly indicate concentrations of welfare recipients, and the areas in yellow indicate concentrations of single-parent families. Social housing and welfare concentrations are distributed relatively equally across the city. Single-parent families are more concentrated in the South-East district (partly due to the large presence of Surinamese and Antilleans in this area, who are more likely to form single-parent families), but concentrations can also be found in other parts of the city. ‘Social minimum’ households are over-represented in the North and South-East districts, and under-represented in the South and Centre districts. However, there are also large differences within city districts and neighbourhoods. For instance the northern city district houses both the neighbourhood with one of the highest percentages of ‘social minimum’ households (Volewijck, 29 per cent) and the neighbourhood with one of the lowest (Nieuwendammerdijk/Buiksloterdijk, 1 per cent) (O+S, 2012a).

CBS (the national statistical office) has calculated the spatial segregation of low income households for the years 1994-2000. Segregation is expressed in an index ranging from 0 (no segregation) to 100 (complete segregation), representing the percentage of low income households that should move to achieve a completely equal distribution. In 2000, this index was 29 for the Netherlands as a whole and 18.5 for Amsterdam. This number is the lowest of the four major cities in the Netherlands. Moreover, it has decreased with one percentage point since 1994, which is remarkable since most large Dutch cities experienced an increase in segregation during that time period (Lautenbach & Ament, 2000). However, a different picture emerges when the segregation index is calculated based on the distribution of high income households. In 2008, this index was 28.6 for the Netherlands as a whole, but 31.3 in Amsterdam (Van den Brakel & Ament, 2010).

Van Gent et al. (2014) have looked at the concentration and segregation of social minimum households in Amsterdam over the period 2004-2012. They found an overall decrease in the number of social minimum households during the period 2005-2009, after which the number increased again. However, during this period only the inner city and Western city-districts showed a decrease in the share of social minimum households, whereas this share increased in the other city-districts (see Figure 4). Maps of spatial

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4 Segregation index is 22.8 for Utrecht, 24.3 for Rotterdam, and 28.9 for The Hague.

5 Of the four major cities, The Hague still has the highest index (42), followed by Rotterdam (36.7), while Utrecht has the lowest (29.5).
concentrations of social minimum households show an increase in both the number and the size of concentrations in 2012 compared to 2004 (see Figures 5 and 6). The authors explain this by referring to housing market developments which lead to increased residualisation of the social housing sector and thus the increased spatial marginalisation of social minimum households.

Figure 3. Spatial concentration (>2sd) of social housing (light blue), welfare recipients (red), and single-parent families (yellow) in Amsterdam, 2012

Source: Regiomonitor
Figure 4. Share of ‘social minimum’ households per citydistrict, 2004-2012

Figure 5. Concentrations of social minimum households in 2004 (darker colours indicate stronger concentrations)
Figure 6. Concentrations of social minimum households in 2012 (darker colours indicate stronger concentrations)

Source (Figure 4-6): Van Gent et al. (2014)
2. Immigration and super-diversity in Amsterdam

2.1 Migration to Amsterdam - historical overview and main components

2.1.1 The national immigration framework

The Netherlands has received large groups of immigrants dating back to at least the 16th century. Early migrant flows consisted both of economic migrants and political and religious refugees. Notable groups among the latter category were the Huguenots (a French protestant minority) and Jews from Central and Eastern Europe. In the 17th and 18th century, the percentage of immigrants was around ten per cent of the total population (Lucassen & Penninx, 1994). After the Second World War emigration exceeded immigration, with many Dutch leaving for the United States, Canada, and Australia (see Table 2). From the 1960s onwards the Netherlands again became an immigration country, although this was at first not recognised by policy-makers (see also section 3.1). Between 2003 and 2007, the Netherlands temporarily became an emigration country due to restrictive immigration policies.

Table 2. Estimates of net migration to the Netherlands, by five-year intervals, 1950-2010 (in thousands)

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The second half of the 20th century is characterised by three large migration flows: migrants from the former colonies (Indonesia, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles), labour migrants from Southern Europe, North Africa, and Turkey, and asylum seekers. The first colonial migrants came from Indonesia (the former Dutch East Indies). From 1945 to 1975, net migration from Indonesia was 273,000. After Indonesia’s independence in 1949,
most Indonesians with Dutch citizenship opted to come to the Netherlands. An additional
group (whose members did not possess Dutch citizenship) were the Moluccan⁶ migrants,
who had been active in the colonial army and feared retribution from the new Indonesian
government. 12,500 Moluccan soldiers and their families were shipped to the Netherlands
for what was thought at the time to be a temporary stay. The second wave of colonial
migrants came from Surinam. At first these were mainly labour migrants but after
Surinam’s independence in 1975 and the military coup in 1980 they were joined by
political refugees. Over the years, about a third of the Surinamese population has migrated
to the Netherlands. Migration from the Netherlands Antilles was mainly economically
motivated. These migrants (as well as many Surinamese) possess Dutch citizenship
(Lucassen & Penninx, 1994).

From the 1960s onwards businesses started recruiting foreign labourers on a large
scale, since rapid economic growth had led to labour shortages. The first so-called ‘guest
workers’ came from Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Later on these groups were
eclipsed by large numbers of Moroccan, Turkish, and Tunisian labourers. In the 1970s it
became clear that many ‘guest workers’ would in fact not return to their countries of
origin, and their permanent settlement gave rise to additional migration flows of family
reunification and - after 1985 - family formation. During this period there were also
smaller flows of economic migrants, notably from the United States, Canada, Japan, and
China (Lucassen & Penninx, 1994). A recent and growing group are Western immigrants
from Central and Eastern Europe. Estonians, Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles,
Slovenians, Slovaks and Czechs have been free to travel to the Netherlands since the
accession of their countries to the EU in 2004, and have been free to be employed in the
Netherlands since May 2007 (between 2004 and 2007 they could work as self-employed
workers). Bulgarians and Romanians can travel freely to the Netherlands since 2007 and
are allowed to be employed since 2014. Together, these groups form 1 per cent of the
total Dutch population, of which half are Poles (CPB, 2011).

Asylum seekers have been arriving in substantial numbers since the 1980s, with a
sharp increase in the first half of the 1990s (with a peak of 52,600 applications in 1994)
(Schuster, 2000). The origins of these migrants are reflective of the major conflict regions

⁶ The Moluccas are an archipelago within Indonesia.
in the world: former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, and Afghanistan (Nationaal Kompas, 2013).

2.1.2 The urban immigration context

In the course of Dutch migration history, cities have generally received a higher share of immigrant flows compared to rural areas. Amsterdam for example had a share of foreign-born of around thirty per cent in the 17th and 18th century, while the national average for that time period was ten per cent (Lucassen & Penninx, 1994). In the present day as well non-Western immigrants and their children are more likely to live in the big urban centres. Not only the overall presence of immigrants is larger in the big cities but these cities are also more likely to be super-diverse (Vertovec, 2007). 181 different nationalities are represented in Amsterdam (O+S, 2013a), who furthermore differ from each other socio-economically, religiously, in terms of legal status etc. (see also section 2.2).

In 2014, 49.3 per cent of the Amsterdam population was of native Dutch background (with two parents born in the Netherlands). The largest immigrant groups are Moroccans (9 per cent), Surinamese (8.3 per cent), Turks (5.2 per cent), and Antilleans (1.5 per cent). Furthermore there are 10.7 per cent non-Western immigrants from other countries and 15.9 per cent Western immigrants (see section 3.1 on the registration terms used for immigrants). In the last decade, the percentage of Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam has decreased slightly due to increasing out-migration of the Surinamese middle-class. The percentages of all other immigrant groups, but especially the percentage of Western immigrants, have increased. 56.2 per cent of immigrants belong to the first generation (born abroad); the remainder belong to the second generation (born in the Netherlands). As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, the largest immigrant groups in Amsterdam are also the largest in the Netherlands as a whole. Compared to the Dutch average, Amsterdam has relatively high numbers of Moroccan immigrants, perhaps due to hiring policies of Amsterdam businesses during the ‘guest worker’ period (Entzinger & Scheffer, 2012). Surinamese in Amsterdam are primarily Creoles (Afro-Surinamese) (CBS, 2011). The largest Western immigrant groups in Amsterdam as of 2014 are from Indonesia (26,287 people, counted as Western due to the Dutch colonial history), Germany (17,453), Great-Britain (11,124), the United States (7,414), and Italy (6,359). The largest other non-
Western immigrant groups are from Ghana (11,742), Egypt (5,884), Pakistan (5,384), India (5,063), and China (5,013).

In recent years, the number of EU-migrants has increased significantly due to the expansion of the European Union and the subsequent labour migration from Eastern to Western Europe. European migrants to Amsterdam are mostly labour migrants (both highly and lowly educated). Southern Europeans are overrepresented in the creative industries, while Eastern Europeans often do low skilled work. Although the situation of most EU-migrants is unproblematic, Romanians, Poles, and Bulgarians in Amsterdam commit crimes relatively often and Eastern European women are overrepresented in the prostitution sector (O+S, 2013b). Compared to the Netherlands as a whole, Amsterdam has a slightly higher share of Central and Eastern European migrants (1.6 per cent). One third of this group are Poles, while Bulgarians are the second largest group. Especially Bulgarians and Romanians are more likely to live in Amsterdam than elsewhere in the Netherlands (O+S, 2012b).
Table 3. Number and percentage of first- and second generation immigrants in the Netherlands, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number x 1,000</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% Second generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native Dutch</td>
<td>13,215</td>
<td>797.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western immigrant</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Western</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western immigrant</td>
<td>1,858</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Antilles/Aruba</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,575</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS StatLine
Table 4. Population of Amsterdam by origin and generation, January 1 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Native Dutch</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Native Dutch</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td></td>
<td>37,393</td>
<td>30,097</td>
<td>67,490</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,877</td>
<td>5,211</td>
<td>12,088</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,921</td>
<td>20,290</td>
<td>42,211</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td></td>
<td>34,115</td>
<td>39,196</td>
<td>73,311</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
<td></td>
<td>57,047</td>
<td>29,920</td>
<td>86,967</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-Western</td>
<td></td>
<td>157,353</td>
<td>124,714</td>
<td>282,067</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td></td>
<td>73,531</td>
<td>55,494</td>
<td>129,025</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Dutch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>400,093</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>230,884</td>
<td>180,208</td>
<td>411,093</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: O+S

2.2 Immigration and diversity in Amsterdam

Age, gender, and household composition

The age composition of immigrant groups in Amsterdam differs from that of the native Dutch. There are not many elderly immigrants (yet) and more children and young people. Whereas in 2014 16.4 per cent of native Dutch was aged 65 or above, for immigrants these numbers are much lower. Surinamese have a relatively high proportion of elderly (9.1 per cent), especially compared to Moroccans (5.6 per cent) and Turks (5 per cent). On the other hand, immigrants have more children between the ages of 0 and 18: this age group constitutes 36.1 per cent of Moroccans, 30 per cent of Turks, and 21.2 per cent of Surinamese but only 16.2 per cent of native Dutch. Of the newer Western migrant groups, Poles, Bulgarians, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are relatively likely to have children between the ages of one and three, while Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks have a relatively large share of elderly (O+S, 2012b).

In the Netherlands as a whole, the gender ratio within the ‘old’ immigrant groups is approximately fifty-fifty. Refugees are more often male, while newer economic migrant groups consist of more women than men (Van Heelsum, 2008). For example, 58 per cent of Poles and 63 per cent of Romanians in Amsterdam is female (O+S, 2012b).
The household composition of immigrant groups also differs from that found among the native Dutch. Surinamese, Antilleans, and other African and South-American groups (notably Ghanaians) have much higher percentages of single-parent families. In 2010, 28 per cent of Ghanaian, 24 per cent of Surinamese, and 19 per cent of Antillean households was a one-parent household (6 per cent for native Dutch). The percentages of single-person households and couples without children on the other hand are lower for all non-Western immigrant groups, but especially for Turks and Moroccans.

Religion

In 2012, 38 per cent of all adult inhabitants of Amsterdam identified with a religious orientation. Identification decreases when educational level and income increase. Thirteen per cent considered themselves to be Christian (seven per cent Roman Catholic, two per cent various Protestant denominations, four per cent Christianity in general), and thirteen per cent Muslim. The percentage of Muslims is above the national average, which is five per cent. Most Muslims are Moroccan or Turkish (see Table 5). Moroccans and Turks are also the most likely to say that they identify with a religious orientation (85 per cent). 69 per cent of Surinamese consider themselves to be religious, but only 20 per cent of native Dutch. The first generation of non-Western immigrants is more likely to be religious (78 per cent) than the second generation (58 per cent). Religious Moroccans are the most likely to attend religious services, with almost half saying that they attend once a week. Almost forty per cent of religious Turks and twenty per cent of religious native Dutch attend once a week (O+S, 2013c).

Table 5. Muslims in Amsterdam (above 18 years of age), 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>36,995</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>22,419</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western immigrants</td>
<td>16,792</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>5,383</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western immigrants</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Dutch</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antilleans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>83,846</td>
<td>14.3*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS

*This percentage is higher than that calculated by the municipality
**Education**

Western immigrants in Amsterdam are comparable to the native Dutch in their educational level. All non-Western immigrant groups are on average lower educated than the native Dutch and Western immigrants, with Turks and Moroccans having the highest number of lowly educated and the lowest number of highly educated. From 2000 to 2008, the average educational level increased for all groups. The second generation of the four largest immigrant groups has less lowly educated people, but except for the Antilleans there is no increase in highly educated (see Table 6). Based on national-level data, research organisation SCP concludes that the educational level of second generation non-Western immigrants is significantly higher than that of their parents. This is especially the case for Antilleans (SCP, 2010).

There is a relatively large increase of non-Western immigrant students in higher education in Amsterdam. Over the last ten years, their numbers have doubled (compared to an increase of 58 per cent among native Dutch). It is expected that the educational level of the second generation immigrants will continue to increase, although the educational gap with native Dutch will continue to exist for the foreseeable future (O+S, 2013a).

**Income and labour market position**

The average yearly personal income in Amsterdam for those with year-round income is highest for Western immigrants (36,500 Euros in 2013), closely followed by the native Dutch (35,100). The average income of non-Western immigrant groups is significantly lower (23,500). In 2009, more than half of Turks, Moroccans, and other non-Western immigrants and almost half of Surinamese had a low income (up to 1,200 Euros/month for a one-person household and up to 1,700 Euros/month for a more-person household). For the native Dutch and Western immigrants, this was 24 per cent. Since 1997 and especially since 2005 the average income has increased, but more so for native Dutch and Western immigrants than for non-Western immigrants. The second generation has a higher average income than the first generation. Non-Western immigrants are more likely to live in a social minimum household. More than one-third of Moroccan households are a social minimum household, and for the other non-Western groups this number lies between 27
and 30 per cent (it is around 10 per cent for Western immigrants and native Dutch). More than half of the total number of social minimum households is a non-Western immigrant household. The proportions of young people and elderly living in a social minimum household are also much higher among non-Western immigrants.

Non-Western immigrants are also more likely to be dependent on social welfare. The percentage of households dependent on social welfare is highest among other non-Western immigrants (seventeen per cent) and Moroccans (sixteen per cent). Fourteen per cent of Turkish and Antillean households are dependent on social welfare and thirteen per cent of Surinamese households. Percentages for the Western immigrant and native Dutch population are much lower (five and four per cent respectively). Relatively little Eastern European migrants are dependent on social welfare (1.7 per cent) (O+S, 2012b).

Unemployment rates are lowest for native Dutch and Western immigrants (six per cent in 2013). For these groups, men are more often unemployed (seven per cent) than women (five per cent), while the reverse is true for non-Western immigrants. Especially among Moroccan and Turkish women, labour market participation is low (see Table 7). Of Eastern European migrants, 4.9 per cent was unemployed in 2012. Eastern European women were more likely to be unemployed than men (O+S, 2012b).

There are some indications that entrepreneurship is increasingly becoming an attractive employment option for immigrants. Between the period of 1999 to 2004, entrepreneurship increased for all population groups, but this increase is larger for immigrants than for the native Dutch and it is largest for non-Western immigrants. In 2004, 13 per cent of all entrepreneurs in the Netherlands had a migrant background, while in Amsterdam this percentage was 33 per cent. Ethnic enterprises are often concentrated in certain districts and neighbourhoods that have low average housing values (and also an overrepresentation of migrant residents) (Nicis Institute, 2008). However, Taşan-Kok and Vranken (2008) argue that the new generation of ethnic entrepreneurs are moving from ‘survival’ to ‘competition’ strategies and are increasingly dispersed over the city rather than remaining concentrated in specific neighbourhoods. In Amsterdam, this development is visible in, for example, the spatial distribution of Chinese entrepreneurs (the ethnic group with the largest share of entrepreneurs in Amsterdam - 14 per cent). While initially Chinese enterprises were located around the Zeedijk and Geldersekade (Chinatown), in 2010 they were more dispersed over the city, although most enterprises are still located in
the inner-city, Southern, and Western city-districts (O+S, 2012c). Similar to the argument of Taşan-Kok and Vranken (2008), financial geographer Ewald Engelen speaks in this context of a transition from ‘ethnic entrepreneurship 1.0’ - characterised by low professionalism, little added value, use of accessible (ethnic) markets, and a precarious economic position to ‘ethnic entrepreneurship 2.0’ which is more similar in character to ‘native’ entrepreneurship (Van Engelen, 2010).

Table 6. Educational level in Amsterdam, 2008\(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin group</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>% low educated</th>
<th>% medium educated</th>
<th>% high educated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antilleans</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>Native Dutch</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: De Staat van Integratie (2012)

\(^7\) These numbers (measured by O+S) differ significantly from those measured by CBS (referred to in section 1.2). This is due to a difference in measurement method. The CBS percentages are more reliable but are not available for different ethnic groups at the city level.
Table 7. Labour force in Amsterdam (aged 15-64), 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>% gross participation*</th>
<th>% net participation**</th>
<th>% unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese and Antilleans</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western immigrants</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western immigrants</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>73</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: O+S
*gross participation: percentage of labour force able and willing to work at least twelve hours/week (including unemployed)
**net participation: percentage of labour force performing paid labour for at least twelve hours/week (excluding unemployed)

Identification and loyalties

Residents of Amsterdam generally identify with the city: 80 per cent of the population in 2011 felt a connection to Amsterdam (in 2013, this number increased slightly to 83 per cent). Identification with the Netherlands is also strong at around 75 per cent. On the other hand identification with smaller levels of scale is less: somewhat more than 60 per cent feels connected to the neighbourhood and only 47 per cent to the city-district (in 2013, this last number increased to 50 per cent). Higher educated residents (both native Dutch and of immigrant background) feel more connected to the city than lower educated residents (O+S, 2011; Basismeetset 2014). In 2011, the degree of connection to the city-district was highest in the inner city (53 per cent) and East (52 per cent) city districts, and
lowest in the New-West (44), North (45) and South-East (45) city-districts. In 2013, identification was still high in the inner city (58 per cent) but also increased dramatically in the North city district (to 61 per cent). The city-districts with the lowest degree of identification were New-West (43) and West (45) (Basismeetset 2014).

Research among young second-generation migrant residents of Amsterdam shows that their identification with the city is strong and stronger than their identification with either the Netherlands or their ‘country of origin’. For these youth, identification with Amsterdam can more easily be combined with an ‘ethnic’ identity than the Dutch national identity (Van der Welle, 2011).

2.3 The dynamics of super-diversity - urban residential patterns and their causal factors

Ethnic segregation in the Netherlands in general and Amsterdam specifically is considered to be moderate, especially compared to US cities (Musterd, 2011). This can be demonstrated with two measures of segregation: the dissimilarity index (D) which expresses segregation between two population categories, and the index of isolation (\(P_x^*\)) which expresses the probability of meeting someone from the same category in a certain spatial unit. The index of isolation is sensitive to the size of the population categories, whereas the dissimilarity index is not. Both indices range from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete segregation). O+S has followed the trends in segregation using the dissimilarity index in the period 1995-2010. In 2010, segregation was higher among Moroccans and Turks (segregation index between 0.40 and 0.45) then among Surinamese (0.35), Antilleans (0.30), and the native Dutch (0.27). Western and other non-Western immigrants are the least segregated (0.18). Since 1995 the segregation index of Turks has increased, whereas the index for Antilleans has decreased. Moreover, in the period 1990-2010 the percentage of non-Western immigrants within the central area enclosed by the A10 railway has remained stable but the percentage outside the A10 has increased (O+S, 2010b). Using the index of isolation \(P_x^*\) results in much lower numbers but also in different trends. Whereas for Antilleans D decreased, \(P_x^*\) remains more or less the same (around 0.04). Segregation increases for Turks (from 0.08 to 0.11) and slightly more strongly for Moroccans (from 0.13 to 0.17). Surinamese remained relatively stable at 0.16/0.17 (Musterd, 2012).
When Moroccans and Turks first started arriving as ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s and 1970s, they were housed in lodgings in the inner-city districts. Later on they moved to 19th century residential districts and post-1945 housing areas (Deurloo & Musterd, 2001). Surinamese and Antilleans are over-represented in the high-rise area Bijlmermeer in the south-east. This is the result of housing in this area being available around the time of large-scale Surinamese migration to the Netherlands (and it being unattractive to other groups who had the option to wait for better offers) (Musterd & Smakman, 2002). Today, the area is seen as having a distinctly ‘Caribbean’ or ‘tropical’ atmosphere, and in addition to Surinamese (32 per cent) and Antilleans (6 per cent) it also houses significant numbers of Ghanaians and Nigerians (Van Heelsum, 2007).

Non-Western immigrants are more likely to live outside the city centre whereas Western immigrants live more centrally (see Figure 7). This is consistent with the generally better socio-economic position of Western immigrants. Eastern Europeans are more likely than other Western migrants to live outside the city centre. They are overrepresented in the New-West city district. Compared to the city average and to other EU-migrants, they are also more likely to rent privately. This is especially the case for Bulgarians and Romanians (O+S, 2013b).

The residential patterns of Moroccans and Turks are quite similar to each other, as are those of Surinamese and Antilleans (see Figures 8-11). Compared to Western immigrants and the native Dutch, non-Western immigrants are less likely to own houses or rent privately and more likely to live in social housing. For all these groups, the percentage of home-owners increases but differences between the groups remain. In 2011, 34 per cent of native Dutch and 30 per cent of Western immigrants were home-owners. Members of these groups living inside the city centre are only slightly less likely to own their home than those living outside the centre. Surinamese, Turks, Antilleans, and other non-Western immigrants are less likely to own their home (around eighteen per cent), and Moroccans are the least likely (seven per cent). Surinamese and Turks are also far more likely to own a home outside the city centre (25 per cent) than inside (less than 10 per cent). These groups are more likely to buy newly built houses outside the city centre (in the case of the Surinamese often in the south-east district Bijlmermeer). The increase of owner-occupied housing thus has the side effect of increasing segregation, in terms of living in- or outside the city centre (O+S, 2013a).
It should be noted that areas with a high number of immigrants are still relatively varied in terms of available tenures types and housing sizes. Exceptions to this are the high proportion of high-rise social housing in Bijlmermeer (although this is changing due to restructuring) and the under-representation of owner-occupied housing in ‘immigrant’ neighbourhoods (Deurloo & Musterd, 2001). It is also worth mentioning that all city districts have relatively high percentages of immigrants (above 30 per cent), that almost all areas are ethnically mixed, and that ethnic concentrations often still contain many inhabitants of other ethnicities (in fact, ethnic concentrations of different groups can overlap) (Van Heelsum, 2007). Moreover, many immigrants do not live in ethnic clusters.

Figures 8-12 show the spatial distribution of strong ethnic concentrations (of four standard deviations or more above the city average) of the largest immigrant groups. Surinamese, Antilleans, and other non-Western immigrant concentrations are primarily located in the south-east part of the city, whereas Western immigrant concentrations are located more centrally. Turkish and Moroccan concentrations are located mainly in the western, and to a lesser extent in the eastern and northern parts of Amsterdam. In the period 2000-2009, the total number of mild concentration areas (of more than one standard deviation above city average) has decreased, but existing areas have grown in size. The percentage of non-Western immigrants living in mild concentration areas has reduced, pointing to increased spatial dispersion. This is especially the case for Antilleans. However, the dominance of the ethnic groups within their concentrations has increased (again except for Antilleans) (O+S, 2011). The situation is slightly different when looking at strong ethnic concentrations (more than four standard deviations above city average). Here as well there is a sharp decrease of Antilleans living in ethnic concentrations, but not so much for the other groups (see Figure 13). Moroccan concentrations become slightly more Moroccan, whereas for other groups it stays the same (see Figure 14) (Musterd, 2011).
Figure 7. Concentrations >2sd and >=50 people of non-Western (blue) and Western (red) immigrants in Amsterdam, 2012.

Figure 8. Concentrations >4sd and >=10 people of Moroccans in Amsterdam, 2012.
Figure 9. Concentrations >4sd and >=10 people of Turks in Amsterdam, 2012.

Figure 10. Concentrations >4sd and >=10 people of Surinamese in Amsterdam, 2012.
Figure 11. Concentrations >4sd and >=10 people of Antilleans in Amsterdam, 2012.

Figure 12. Concentrations >4sd and >=10 people of other non-Western immigrants in Amsterdam, 2012.

Source (Figure 7-12): Regiomonitor.
Figure 13. Percentage of immigrant group living in concentrations of this immigrant group, 2000-2009

Figure 14. Percentage of immigrant group relative to total population, in concentrations of this immigrant group, 2000-2009

Source (Figure 13-14): Musterd (2011)
3. Diversity as a principle of municipal integration policy and measures

3.1 National immigration policy of the last two decades: a content outline and implications for diversity and integration

Policies and institutional context

The post-WWII Netherlands regarded itself as a country of emigration, not immigration. Therefore, even though large groups of migrants had been arriving to the Netherlands for quite some time (see section 2.1.1); the Dutch government only started formulating an immigrant policy in the late 1980s. This policy has (although some say only in hindsight) been characterised as ‘multicultural’. Indeed, the Netherlands has long been regarded as the prototypical example of a European multicultural nation (Joppke, 2007). Dutch multicultural policy can be characterised as ‘integration while retaining the own culture’. Although their economic, social, and spatial integration were stated policy aims, ethnic minorities were allowed and encouraged to retain their cultural distinctiveness (Dukes & Musterd, 2012). Knowledge of the ‘own’ culture and language was thought to facilitate participation in Dutch society. Analogous to historical pillarisation, emancipation would take place within separate ethnic infrastructures (Schrover, 2010). In the course of the 1990s and especially after 2000, this ‘multicultural’ policy received increasing criticism.

From the 1990s onwards, policy discourses started problematising immigrant cultures, which were viewed as causing their structural lags (especially in the labour

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8 Pillarisation refers to a system of vertical segmentation according to religion or ideology which was operative in the Netherlands in the 20th century. The population was divided into four 'pillars' (Catholic, Protestant, Socialist, and Liberal) with their own social and political infrastructure (political parties, schools, media outlets etc.) (Andeweg & Irwin, 2007). At the population level, there was little contact between people of different pillars which paradoxically facilitated political cooperation at the elite level (Lijphart, 1969). This system started to break down in the 1960s but remnants of it are still visible today (e.g. in the education and public broadcasting system). Although at first immigrants were incorporated into the existing pillars, some argue that the multiculturalist policies adopted in the 1980s were especially suited to the Netherlands because they amounted to the creation of a fifth 'immigrant pillar' (Schrover, 2010).
According to Joppke, the shift towards the problematisation of (foreign) culture and the concomitant abandonment of multiculturalism was driven by a concern with the diversification of migration flows, a fear of increasing segregation, and the enduring economic marginalisation of allochthonous (Joppke, 2004). Early triggers of this shift are (the aftermath of) the Rushdie affair in Britain and the debate started by liberal politician Frits Bolkestein on the perceived incompatibility of Islamic and Western values (Bolkestein, 1991). Policies started encouraging migrants to learn the Dutch language and adapt to ‘Dutch culture’. In 2000, publicist Paul Scheffer wrote an opinion article titled “The multicultural drama”, in which he spoke of the existence of an ‘ethnic underclass’ whose members would not feel connected to Dutch society and would not want to adopt Dutch values (Scheffer, 2000). The early 2000s also saw the meteoric rise of populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who campaigned on an anti-immigrant and anti-establishment platform. In combination with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the murder of film director and columnist Theo van Gogh by a radical Dutch-Moroccan Muslim in 2004; this resulted in the narrowing of the integration debate to an almost complete focus on Islam and Muslim immigrants (Uitermark, 2012; Shadid, 2006). In this debate, Muslim values are seen as fundamentally incompatible with Western and especially Dutch culture (cf. Huntington, 2007). The tone of the debate in both media and politics has become increasingly harsh and polarising. Immigration policies have become stricter (in some years even resulting in negative net migration), especially for purposes of family reunification and formation (Schinkel, 2011). At the same time, there is a stronger focus on so-called ‘civic integration’ (inburgering) which aims to make immigrants adjust to ‘the’ Dutch culture and values. Immigrants are obligated to take a ‘citizenship exam’ which tests both Dutch language skills and knowledge of Dutch ‘values’ and norms of interaction. Passing the test is a precondition for receiving a permanent residence permit, coupling integration policy to immigration control (Joppke, 2007).

Another major policy area related to integration is area-based interventions which have as their (implicit) goal the creation of ‘social cohesion’. A focus on cohesion is apparent in Dutch integration discourse which stresses contacts with native Dutch and sharing the ‘norms and values’ of Dutch society as the most important indicators of (socio-cultural) integration (Schinkel, 2013). The presence of many immigrants in a neighbourhood is seen as destabilising and undermining cohesion. An example of large scale area interventions is the ‘40 Vogelaar neighbourhoods’ (40 wijken van Vogelaar).
program for neighbourhood improvement, named after the then-Minister of Living, Neighbourhoods and Integration. This program focused on forty deprived large-city neighbourhoods, all of which had an over-representation of non-Western immigrants (Van Kempen & Bolt, 2009).

Although most of the strictest policies were proposed in the period between 2002 and 2006 when right-wing parties formed the government, in the last two decades all major parties have moved towards more restrictive policies and a discourse of cultural incompatibility (Dukes & Musterd, 2012). After 2006 when a centre-left government came into power, there was a slight change in tone (less polarisation, less emphasis on integration) but previous policies were generally continued.

**Terminology and main actors**

The most pervasive term in Dutch political and societal discourse about immigrants today is ‘allochthonous’, which is contrasted with ‘autochthonous’ or native Dutch (see also section 2.1.3). This term came into use after it was used in a 1989 policy report and replaced the previously common term ‘ethnic minorities’. The rationale for this switch was that the term ‘ethnic minorities’ did not capture immigrant groups which were not deprived relative to the Dutch majority, and that it did not include the children of immigrants (Prins, 2011). Allochthonous was thus seen as more inclusive. Although at first the term was envisaged as a more or less voluntary label for the second generation, who would be able to choose whether or not they identified as allochthonous, this notion was quickly abandoned in favour of a statistically convenient definition according to which all persons of whom at least one parent is born abroad are labelled allochthonous (Van der Haar & Yanow, 2011). The autochthonous/allochthonous distinction is therefore a ‘bright boundary’ (Alba, 2005): the distinction between the groups is envisaged as permanent and based in essential ethnic differences (even a completely assimilated immigrant would still be labelled allochthonous). The distinction between immigrants and natives is considered primary while differences within the category of allochthonous (and of autochthonous) are obscured (Dukes & Musterd, 2012). Whereas previously, policies focused on specific ethnic minority groups, now the focus is on individuals within the broad category of allochthonous. Thus, the term is tied to a more general policy shift from cultural retention within immigrant communities to adaptation to the Dutch culture by individual immigrants.
The shift from ‘multiculturalism’ towards ‘civic integration’ can also be illustrated by changes in the main policy actors (see Table 8). Over the years, the responsibility for immigrant policy has shifted from the Ministry of Home Affairs to that of Justice, indicating the identification of immigration and immigrants with crime and illegality. Moreover, immigration is connected to urban areas and the neighbourhood. The institutional connection between immigrants and urbanity was first made in 1998 when Roger van Boxtel was named minister for Urban Policies and Integration. In 2007, a Ministry for Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration was established, making the discursive connection between physical issues, space, and social issues.

Table 8. Responsibility for national immigration and integration policies, 1994-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Coalition Parties</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende I</td>
<td>CDA, VVD, LPF</td>
<td>Foreigners and Integration (Home Affairs)</td>
<td>Hilbrand Nawijn (LPF)</td>
<td>2002-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende II</td>
<td>CDA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>Immigration, Integration, and Asylum (Home Affairs)</td>
<td>Rita Verdonk (VVD)</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende III</td>
<td>CDA, VVD</td>
<td>Foreigners and Integration (Justice)</td>
<td>Rita Verdonk (VVD, only integration policy, immigration policy under Minister of Justice Ernst Hirsch Ballin (CDA))</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Counting and registration

Since 1999, the national Central Bureau of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS) defines immigrants and their children by making a distinction between autochthonous or native Dutch (autochtoon) and allochthonous or of foreign origin (allochtoon). Everybody of whom at least one of the parents is born abroad is classified as allochthonous. Importantly, this category includes both first- and second generation immigrants and both foreign nationals and Dutch citizens (i.e. being allochthonous is independent of having the Dutch nationality). This definition was adopted by the municipality of Amsterdam in 2006 and is also used by many other Dutch municipalities.

Within the allochthonous category a distinction is made between those of Western and non-Western origin. Immigrants from Europe (including the countries of the former Soviet Union), North-America, Australia, Japan, and Indonesia (the former Dutch East Indies) are considered Western, immigrants from other countries are considered non-Western. For first-generation immigrants, the country of birth is decisive in the classification. For second-generation immigrants, the mother’s country of birth is used if she is born abroad. If the mother is not born abroad, the country of the father is used. Most statistics make a further distinction within the non-Western group according to nationality. Non-Western allochthonous are generally further divided into Surinamese,
Antilleans, Moroccans, Turks (the four largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam), and other non-Western immigrants (CBS, 2013).

A different distinction than the one between autochthonous and allochthonous is that between immigrants with and without the Dutch nationality, and immigrants with dual nationality. The number of people with a foreign nationality has been stable since 2007, at around 4.3 per cent. The number of naturalisations increased from 12,800 in 1990 to 78,700 in 1996, but has since decreased to a low of 20,600 in 2011 (CBS StatLine). In 2012, more than 1,234,600 people possessed dual nationality, of which almost half have Turkish or Moroccan citizenship. This can to a large degree be explained by the automatic dual nationality of second-generation immigrants (many of whom have a Turkish or Moroccan background) and the impossibility to relinquish the Moroccan nationality. Dual nationalities are discouraged by the Dutch government and in case of naturalisation people are required to relinquish other nationalities if this is possible (Rijksoverheid, 2013b).

3.2 National policies and their implications for the municipal diversity and integration policy-making framework

Dutch integration policies are unitary, centrally coordinated and implemented in a top-down fashion (Penninx et al., 2005), which is characteristic of general relations between the national government and lower governments in the Netherlands (Andeweg & Irwin, 2007). Municipal governments are intermediaries between national authorities and local non-governmental actors. They translate and implement national policies into the local context, yet at the same time municipal governments formulate their own policies, based on the problems relating to diversity that manifest at the city level. The debate on integration in the Netherlands has primarily taken place at the national level and is formulated in rather abstract terms (Penninx, 2009). However, local contextual factors influence the implementation of national policies and their success.

Municipalities implement national integration policies and receive funds from the national government to do so. For example, up till 2013 Amsterdam had to organise civic integration courses and exams in accordance with national regulations. Also, five out of forty of the neighbourhoods which were selected for extra support by former Minister
Vogelaar are located in Amsterdam. This latter policy (which is discussed in more detail in section 3.4) was financed by the national government in cooperation with housing corporations. The national government makes money available through the VNG (association of Dutch municipalities), but the largest part (250 million Euros yearly for the Netherlands as a whole, of which 64.5 million for Amsterdam) was expected to be made available by the city’s housing corporations that are active in these neighbourhoods. Separate agreements to this effect were signed between the national government and the municipalities in which the forty neighbourhoods are located. (Rijksoverheid, 2008). Thus, the national government is dependent on the cooperation of municipalities but also of other institutional actors for the implementation of its policies. Municipalities are often given considerable leeway in the practical implementation of national-level integration regulations. In the case of the Vogelaar neighbourhoods, municipalities themselves decided which (type of) interventions were necessary. Moreover, municipalities sometimes ignore or even resist national operatives (Penninx, 2009). In the case of Amsterdam this often means that the municipality focuses on immigrants’ connection with and loyalty to Amsterdam rather than to the Dutch nation.

In addition to more top-down national-level influences, Amsterdam collaborates with a number of other national and international partners. The city collaborates with other Dutch cities in the G4 (the four largest cities; Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) and the G32 (38 medium-sized cities). The municipality also takes part in several city networks at the European level which explicitly seek to compare diversity policies and establish best practices in this regard. Amsterdam is a member of the European Network of Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants (CLIP) which has as its vision for the future an “open Europe of inclusion and integration”. Of their four focus modules, one explicitly deals with “equality and diversity policies” while another one deals with “intercultural policies and intergroup relations”9 (Eurofound, 2013). Amsterdam also takes part in the EUROCITIES network, in which it is a member of the Migration and Integration working group (EUROCITIES, 2013).

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9 The two remaining modules are on the housing market and ethnic entrepreneurship.
3.3 Amsterdam addressing “integration & diversity”

Core concepts

Amsterdam generally has a more positive approach towards integration and diversity than the national government. The city’s orientation can be summarised by the famous saying of former mayor Job Cohen that his aim was to “keep things together” (de boel bij elkaar houden). This approach prioritises social bonding between groups. Terms which are often used in policy documents are ‘diversity’, ‘connection’, ‘citizenship’, and ‘the undivided city’.

Contrary to the national government, in 2013 the Amsterdam municipality officially abolished the use of the terms allochthonous and autochthonous in its communication (Amsterdam, 2013d). Immigrants are referred to as ‘newcomers’, ‘new residents of Amsterdam’ (nieuwe Amsterdammers), or by their hyphenated ethnic-city identity, e.g. Moroccan resident of Amsterdam (Marokkaanse Amsterdammer). Also contrary to the national government, the city of Amsterdam is very aware of and values its super-diverse character (the municipality uses the term hyper-diverse) which is seen as encompassing not just ethnicity (although in practice ethnicity and subdivisions within ethnic groups are the main focus) but also gender, age, and sexual orientation (O+S, 2010b).

The foundation of the city’s diversity policy is the 1999 memorandum “The power of a diverse city”, in which the then alderman for minority policy introduced the concept of diversity and diversity management. The fundamental tenet of this policy is a rejection of dichotomies between immigrants and natives, which are replaced by the notion of the Amsterdammer (resident of Amsterdam) who has a multifaceted identity. The diversity policy aims to encourage inter-ethnic dialogue and counter stereotypes. It emphasises individuals over groups and projects over organisations, thus also rejecting a ‘multicultural’ approach. The diverse city becomes the focal point of identification (Uitermark et al., 2005).

Another central policy concept is ‘connection’ (verbinding). Connection does not only apply to inter-ethnic relations but also to inter-group relations more generally (e.g. between people of different religions or generations) which makes it well suited to the super-diverse nature of Amsterdam’s population. Connection is an especially important
element of policies targeting neighbourhoods, migrant or religious organisations, and anti-radicalisation policies (Van Heelsum, 2010).

The possibilities of local (city) identity to connect are an important rationale behind the recent introduction of the concept of urban citizenship (Dukes & Musterd, 2012). In Amsterdam, citizenship is defined as participation, connection, and ‘civility’, as is concisely formulated in the sentence “Amsterdammers accept diversity, respect each other, and control themselves” (Amsterdam, 2012a: 8). Citizenship is inclusive: “at its core, citizenship means to Amsterdam that everybody can participate in society, and is involved with the city and with fellow residents. Every Amsterdammer is citizen regardless of age, origin, belief, and ethnicity. Citizenship transcends and bridges the differences among the population of Amsterdam” (Amsterdam, 2011a: 1). A positive approach to diversity is an important part of the Amsterdam notion of citizenship (in fact, the policy paper on citizenship is titled “Citizenship and diversity”). Urban citizenship figures in municipal campaigns such as “Wij Amsterdammers” (we, residents of Amsterdam). This campaign (whose title mirrors the city marketing campaign I Amsterdam) incorporates both national and ethnic identities in a shared identity based on the notion of the ‘global city’.

Institutional setting and relevant actors

The politically responsible alderman for diversity policy is Andrée van Es (GroenLinks, green party). Within the municipal administration, diversity policy falls under the responsibility of the Department of Social Development (Dienst Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, DMO). This department organises the implementation of the diversity policy and coordinates the specific services dealing with diversity. Within DMO, the unit Citizenship & Diversity (Burgerschap & Diversiteit) designs policies against discrimination, promoting the emancipation of women and homosexuals, and promoting citizenship. The department has an Advisory Board on Diversity and Integration (Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie) which advises the municipal council and the municipal government on matters related to diversity, integration, and citizenship. DMO is also connected to organisations which operate more at a distance from the administration. The City Consultation Platform for Diversity (Stedelijk Overleg Diversity Amsterdam, SOD) facilitates consultation between the administration and seven civil society organisations concerned with diversity. At its meetings (at least thrice yearly), these organisations contribute issues related to
current societal developments. The seven participating interest groups are COC (LGBT\(^{10}\)), SPE (women), IMA (Moroccans), ITA (Turks), SAAMGha (Surinamese, Antilleans, Arubans, Moluccans, and Ghanaians), ZEG (Southern European communities), and Mozaïek (refugees). The role of organisations representing the interests of specific disadvantaged groups has been radically curtailed in recent years. From 2012 onwards structural subsidies are no longer given, but organisations have to apply for project subsidies, in the context of the policy shift from integration to diversity policy. This resulted in protest from interest organisations, especially Moroccan and Turkish ones, who argue that their role in the emancipation and integration of their constituencies is not recognised by the municipality. Where the municipality considers especially migrant organisations to be outdated and mainly representing elderly, first generation migrants, and to be insufficiently dynamic and too focused on the own constituency, these organisations argue that they offer a broad range of services and activities, and that there is structural and intensive cooperation between different migrant organisations (Verklaring ontkrachten van eigen kracht, 2012). Also the Advisory Board on Diversity and Integration, which has been active since 2004, became the target of budget cuts in 2010 (it was to be replaced by a rotating network of experts). In 2011, the Advisory Board was reinstalled although its number of members, available budget, and agenda were reduced. Whereas before its job description included checking the results of municipal policies, now it mostly focuses on giving pragmatic advice (Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integrasie 2011).

Civic integration, or the organisation of civic integration courses and exams, fell under the department of Work and Income (Dienst Werk en Inkomen, DWI) up until 1 January 2013, after which it became the responsibility of the national government. Neighbourhood- and area-based programs such as the ‘focus districts’ (see section 3.4) but also urban renewal more generally are the responsibility of alderman Freek Ossel (PvdA, labour party). The ‘focus districts’ program, which was operative from 2008 to 2012, was part of the Department of Housing, Care, and Co-existence (Wonen, Zorg en Samenleven, WZS). Its successor program, the ‘Reform Urban Renewal’ (Hervorming Stedelijke Vernieuwing, HSV) which runs from 2013 to 2014 is also coordinated by WZS. WZS supervises both programs, but the city districts are responsible for designing and implementing the projects.

\(^{10}\) LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
The aim of the city is to ‘mainstream’ integration and diversity policy within existing departments (Van Heelsum, 2008). The recently introduced concept of citizenship should likewise be anchored in multiple policy areas (Amsterdam, 2012a). Policies targeting immigrants can therefore be present in different policy arena’s, according to the nature of the policy (health care, education, employment et cetera).

**Principles of urban diversity policy and the policy approach**

Participation is an important principle of Amsterdam’s diversity policy. By participation is meant the reform of the relationship between citizens and the government from a traditional, top-down hierarchical approach to a more cooperative approach. Citizens should become more active and develop their own initiatives as well as a sense of shared responsibility (developing ‘ownership’), and be given the space to do so. Two noticeable examples of this are the aforementioned ‘focus districts’ approach, which reserves ten per cent of its funding for residents’ initiatives, and the citizenship and diversity subsidies of DMO.

Next to citizen participation, the municipality also aims to involve civil society organisations and the private sector. This should take the form of ‘partnerships’ between the municipality and external organisations, whereby new policies are connected to existing initiatives (Amsterdam, 2011a). Important private partners for the municipality are the housing associations whose cooperation is essential for the successful implementation of urban renewal projects, as they own most of the social housing in the city.

The focus on individual responsibility and emancipation is also seen as characteristic of Amsterdam’s diversity policy. In contrast with Rotterdam, the Netherlands second-largest city with similar large-scale urban problems, the Amsterdam approach is more liberal and focuses primarily on socio-economic issues, whereas the Rotterdam approach is more collective, focuses more strongly on socio-cultural issues, and has stronger coercive elements (Metaal et al., 2006).
Objectives of the municipal policy approach

Within the Amsterdam citizenship and diversity policy, three concepts are stressed: participation, connection, and civility (Amsterdam, 2012a). The principal aim of diversity and citizenship policy in Amsterdam is to increase connections and a sense of unity within the city and to counter the coarsening of conduct in the public sphere. Inhabitants of Amsterdam must become active citizens who take responsibility for themselves and for the city. This main aim is divided into five goals:

1) To increase the common ground of people with different backgrounds
2) To promote the ability of Amsterdammers to participate and to take responsibility for themselves and their surroundings
3) To make sure that less people feel unsafe as a result of the behaviour and attitude of others
4) To improve the cooperation between citizens and the government
5) To improve urban citizenship competences (Amsterdam, 2012b)

A ‘good’ citizen is seen as possessing so-called “urban citizenship competences” (grootstedelijke burgerschapscompetenties), which are based on the work of Professor in the field of Citizenship and Diversity Baukje Prins. These competences are identification with ‘the other’, representation (correct behaviour), responsiveness (taking responsibility for your statements and acts), defensibility (being able to defend yourself), and tolerance (Amsterdam, 2012b).

DMO distributes subsidies to citizens and organisations that develop initiatives within the aims of the citizenship and diversity policy. These aims are combating discrimination, encouraging citizenship, promoting emancipation of women, and promoting LGBT emancipation and acceptance. Initiatives should do one (or more) of the following:

- Increase the number of people who possess urban citizenship competences
- Increase the number of people who accept those different from themselves (in terms of origin, religion, race, sexual orientation, or gender) and demonstrate this in their behaviour
- Start a self-help organisation on behalf of a group which is relevant to the citizenship and diversity policy but which is not yet collectively organised in the city (DMO, 2013)
Citizenship is a characteristic of citizens in the public domain. The municipality expressly mentions eleven public ‘fields’ in which citizenship should be exercised: streets and neighbourhoods, schools, sports facilities, arts and culture, (remembrance) rituals, work, places of poverty, voluntary work, media, government and service provision, and civil society organisations.

Participation of the overall population, but especially of immigrants, is likewise addressed within different policy areas: in the educational sector the aim is to bridge the educational gap between immigrant and native children, especially by targeting (young) children with language deficits. With respect to employment, the focus is on unemployment among non-Western immigrant youth and low labour market participation among Turkish and Moroccan women. Within the health sector the focus is on combating youth obesity. In policies dealing with safety and crime, the focus is again on youth and criminal youth gangs. Safety and crime measures are characterised by a zero tolerance policy, but also include preventative measures and attention for the family members of young criminals (especially little brothers, sisters, or children). Finally, the municipality seeks to increase the quality of life and social cohesion of neighbourhoods, as well as the socio-economic position of their residents. To this effect, so-called ‘focus districts’ are targeted for combined interventions in the areas of poverty, care, education, and work (which overlap with the - former - national-level Vogelaar neighbourhoods) (Amsterdam, 2012c). The aim is for the targeted neighbourhoods to achieve average scores on these indicators by 2018.

Ten core characteristics of the policy are identified:

- Area-based interventions by private corporations, residents, and city districts
- Preferential treatment: existing urban policies are executed first in the focus neighbourhoods
- A focus on residents’ involvement and commitment in terms of policy content and policy shape
- A normative end-goal: reaching or exceeding the Amsterdam average on a range of indicators by 2018
- Forging coalitions with businesses and educational institutions
- A longitudinal and sustainable approach
- Continuous monitoring and evaluation of policy output and outcomes
- Coaching and recruiting of professionals who implement the policy
- Possibilities for experimenting and pilots
- Achieving and showing results (Amsterdam, 2010)

In 2013, the funding for the ‘focus districts’ approach was cut (although some projects are still operative) and a smaller selection of neighbourhoods was targeted for the HSV program (see also section 3.4). Both programs are very similar although HSV aims to be more concentrated, more effect oriented, more closely monitored, and better organised in terms of process and governance. Because the program only runs for two years interventions should deliver quick results. The two main policy objectives are improvements in quality of life and residents’ socio-economic position (Amsterdam, 2012e, and see Table 9). The indicators for these policy objectives are no longer expected to reach the city average, but specific targets are decided upon in collaboration with the city-district governments.

Table 9. Policy indicators of the HSV program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of life indicators</th>
<th>Satisfaction with the neighbourhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in the future of the neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attachment to the neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sense of security in the neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic indicators</th>
<th>Average household income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of ‘social minimum’ households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of single-parent families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average CITO test scores$^{11}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amsterdam (2012e)

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$^{11}$ CITO is a national test administered at the end of primary school
3.4 Political and public perceptions of super-diversity

The public perception and experience of super-diversity can be expressed in attitudes towards other groups and in the extent to which people experience discrimination because of their membership of a social group. Inhabitants of Amsterdam have the most negative perceptions of non-Western immigrants, particularly Moroccans (33 per cent has a negative perception of this group), Antilleans (25 per cent), and Muslims (15 per cent). To a lesser extent, there are also negative perceptions of other ethnic and religious groups, and of homosexuals. Western immigrants and the native Dutch are the most negative about Moroccans, with lowly educated native Dutch being the most likely to think negatively about this group. However, almost a quarter of non-Western immigrants also have a negative perception of Moroccans. On the other hand, non-Western immigrants are far more likely to have a negative perception of homosexual men (ten per cent) compared to Western immigrants (two per cent) and the native Dutch (one per cent). Other groups that are viewed negatively by substantial parts of the population are Muslims (15 per cent of native Dutch and Western immigrants, and 8 per cent of non-Western immigrants think negatively about this group) and Antilleans (26 per cent of native Dutch, 21 per cent of Western immigrants, and 18 per cent of non-Western immigrants think negatively about this group). It should be noted that for all these groups, almost half of all inhabitants of Amsterdam indicate neutral perceptions (neither positive nor negative). Whether people have negative perceptions of other (ethnic) groups is related to the homogeneity of one’s own social circle: 43 per cent of native Dutch who mix with people from other backgrounds has a positive opinion of these groups, while only 6 per cent has a negative opinion. Among the native Dutch who do not mix with people from other backgrounds, 30 per cent thinks positively about these groups and 12 per cent have a negative opinion (O+S, 2011).

Unsurprisingly, non-Western immigrants perceive the most discrimination of all groups. Around a quarter of Moroccans and Surinamese, and one-fifth of Turks and other non-Western immigrants report having experienced discrimination over the past year. Although these numbers are still substantial, discrimination of all groups has decreased significantly in the last four years. Most of the experienced discrimination is attributed to race/origin, nationality, or religion. Half of all Jews and Muslims report having been
discriminated on the basis of their religion. Discrimination most often took the form of insults or stigmatisation; physical threat or violence was far less common (O+S, 2011).

The municipality also monitors the existence of (ethnic) tensions in districts and neighbourhoods. Research in twenty neighbourhoods finds that nineteen per cent report ‘not thinking positively’ about people in the neighbourhood with a different background, sixteen per cent report experiencing tensions, and thirteen per cent report avoiding contact. Tensions most often occur between people of different ages (38 per cent report this) and between people of different cultures (32 per cent). Religion plays a relatively minor role. Neighbourhoods that are more ethnically diverse (measured with the Herfindahl index) report more tensions (Broekhuizen & Van Wonderen, 2012).

With regard to the political perception of super-diversity it should be noted that the municipality collects data which explicitly focus on the diversity amongst its inhabitants, as indicated by the information quoted above. This diversity is seen to encompass not only different (national/ethnic) origins but also religion, age, and sexual orientation, as well as differences in income and educational level. However, as is the case for the Netherlands as a whole, data collection and analysis focus predominantly on seven ethnic categories: the four largest non-Western immigrant groups (Moroccans, Surinamese, Turks, and Antilleans), two composite categories (other non-Western immigrants, and Western immigrants), and the native Dutch. Differences within these groups receive less attention. In many publications and campaigns, the municipality presents (super)diversity as positive and as an asset to the city.

3.5 Diversity policy in the urban neighbourhoods

Implementation of policies in the local urban context

This section goes more into detail regarding the focus districts approach as well as its successor program, the HSV. These two programs are the main area-based policies of the Amsterdam municipality. The focus districts approach was operative from 2008 until 2012 and was jointly funded by the national government, municipalities, and local housing
corporations. The HSV, which runs in 2013 and 2014, is funded by the remainder of the focus district budget and other funds for urban renewal.

The focus districts approach started with the national urban regeneration policy of then-Minister Vogelaar in 2007, which singled out forty deprived districts in eighteen Dutch cities. These neighbourhoods were characterised by a combination of social, physical, and economic problems, which would be tackled by large-scale interventions in which the national government cooperated with municipalities and private actors. The policy has been heavily criticised because the selection process equated concentrations of immigrants and social housing with ‘problematic areas’ (Van Gent, Musterd & Ostendorf, 2007). In implementing this policy, Amsterdam has refined the areas of classification by using neighbourhood borders and a wider set of indicators. As a result, some areas which were not selected as focus districts by the national government were included in the Amsterdam focus districts approach. Of the original forty districts, five districts (encompassing eighteen post code areas) were located in Amsterdam. The Amsterdam focus district approach ended up targeting seventeen neighbourhoods in five districts. These neighbourhoods were selected because they deviated significantly and negatively from the Amsterdam average (Normaal Amsterdams Peil, NAP) in terms of liveability, safety, amenities, housing, and living environment. (O+S, 2007). The national aspect of the policy was discontinued in 2011, after which the municipality of Amsterdam decided to continue the policy with municipal funding (until 2012).

The specific interventions which were taken differed between districts and neighbourhoods. They are described in detail in ‘implementation plans’ which are designed by the district government in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, notably housing corporations. The implementation of neighbourhood plans fell under the responsibility of the boards of the respective city districts. Interventions included both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures and covered a wide range of policy areas: specifically mentioned are liveability, safety, basic amenities, urban renewal, neighbourhood economy, integration, educational climate, problem families, art and culture, sports, health, and social mobility (Amsterdam, 2007).

12 These were (parts of) the former city districts Bos en Lommer, New-West, North, East, and South-East.
The focus district program combined a top-down with a bottom-up approach. A part of the budget was set aside for neighbourhood initiatives, and residents and other organisations were also given the opportunity to enter into dialogue with the municipality and help shape the policy agenda (Amsterdam, 2008). The budget available for residents’ initiatives was substantial: in the period 2008-2011 this amounted to more than 3 million Euros per year. In this period, over 2,800 initiatives were realised. In addition, the program ‘Trust in the city’ (Vertrouwen in de stad) facilitates partnerships between municipality, residents, civil society, and private partners. It consists of two parts: neighbourhood enterprises (so-called trusts) are geared towards already active residents, communities, and entrepreneurs who want to start a neighbourhood enterprise or transform an existing initiative into an enterprise. Such neighbourhood enterprises should be able to (partially) support themselves and should offer economic and social benefits to the neighbourhood. Secondly, resident-driven neighbourhood development aims to make residents themselves responsible for the social and economic development of the neighbourhood. Residents take over responsibilities for public amenities and services, or create these themselves. Pilots have started in three city districts (North, West, and New-West) (Amsterdam, 2012d; Werken in de wijk, 2013).

The municipality has produced a report about the residents’ initiatives in the period July 2011-September 2012 (Amsterdam, 2012d). It was found that initiatives vary greatly in terms of allocated subsidy (ranging from less than 1.600 Euros for a project to one initiative - a playground - which received over 25.000 Euros), in terms of duration (initiatives can be one-off or more sustainable, and some - especially physical - initiatives are one-off but produce more structural and long-term effects), target group (some initiatives are specifically targeted towards young people, the elderly, or towards women), and the number of participants. Most initiatives fall under the theme of ‘liveability’, which is one of three themes given priority by the municipality (the other two are education and employment). Other initiatives have to do with recreation and sports, culture, health, or safety.

The HSV is only implemented in eight neighbourhood combinations in four districts, seven of which were also part of the focus districts program (see Table 10). Furthermore, in some neighbourhood combinations only some neighbourhoods or even only specific streets are targeted (see Figure 15). The selected neighbourhood combinations are weak
on all four quality of life indicators and at least four out of five socio-economic indicators. Unlike the focus districts approach, physical characteristics are not a selection criterion. All neighbourhood combinations are located outside the city centre and have a high share of social housing. Again, specific interventions are designed and executed by the district government and build upon those developed in the context of the focus districts program. Objectives can also be tweaked according to the needs and problems of the specific district. The program is financed with 65 million Euros leftover from the focus districts program and other available budgets.

Monitoring will take place thrice yearly, on the basis of data collected by O+S. Monitoring consists of three parts: an outcome-monitor which documents progress in the attainment of the objectives, an output-monitor which documents the interventions that have taken place, and a monitor which documents residents’ perceptions and evaluations. In September 2013, a baseline measurement was performed based on the situation in 2012 (Amsterdam, 2012e).
Table 10. City-districts and neighbourhood combinations participating in the focus districts approach and the HSV (neighbourhood combinations in cursive participated in both projects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City-districts</th>
<th>Focus districts (2008-2012)</th>
<th>HSV (2013-2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volewijck</td>
<td>Volewijck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IJplein/Vogelbuurt</td>
<td>IJplein/Vogelbuurt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nieuwendam Noord</td>
<td>Nieuwendam Noord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banne Buiksloot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>De Kolenkit</td>
<td>De Kolenkit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landlust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erasmuspark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De Krommert</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Van Galenbuurt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hoofdweg e.o.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New-West</td>
<td>Slotermeer-Noordoost</td>
<td>Slotermeer-Noordoost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slotermeer-Zuidwest</td>
<td>Slotermeer-Zuidwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geuzenveld</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Osdorp-Oost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Osdorp-Midden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slotervaart</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overtoomse veld</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>Transvaalbuurt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indische Buurt Oost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indische Buurt West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>Bijlmer Oost (E,G,K)</td>
<td>Bijlmer Centrum (including Venserpolder) Holendrecht/Reigersbos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amsterdam (2008; 2012e)
Challenges and tensions

The focus district program was co-funded by the national government until 2012. The discontinuation of funding in combination with the current economic crisis led to reduced budgets from the side of the municipality as well as from partners such as housing corporations. At the same time, the economic crisis further increases the vulnerability of deprived neighbourhoods. Another ongoing challenge is the sustainability of the policy measures and approach, and especially the engagement of residents (Amsterdam, 2010). Moreover, a recent report by the national social scientific research institute SCP concluded that the national focus districts approach has not been very effective. Between 2008 and 2012, the forty deprived neighbourhoods have not improved more in terms of social mobility, liveability, and safety than neighbourhoods with a comparable level of deprivation (SCP, 2013).
In a national debate about the future of the focus districts approach in April 2011 which was organised by housing corporation Ymere, multiple speakers argued that the aims of the focus districts program are too vague and that results are often not measurable. Alderman Van Ossel stated that the municipality will have to cancel some projects and will focus on those neighbourhoods which are worst off (Amsterdam, 2011b). This approach of concentration has since taken shape in the HSV. Moreover, councillor Rik Winsemius argued in an opinion article published in the Amsterdam-based newspaper Het Parool that the approach of subsidising residents’ initiatives is fundamentally flawed, because its focus on individual initiatives means that the combined effect of initiatives on the improvement of the neighbourhood is not taken into account. Furthermore, initiatives are not sustainable because they remain dependent on government subsidies (Winsemius, 2013).

Tonkens and Verhoeven (2011) evaluated residents' initiatives in the context of the 'focus districts' program. They interviewed projects’ initiators and professionals who helped with the design and execution. It was found that initiators are more representative of the overall population of Amsterdam than is usually the case in participative programs (for example, they are more likely to be female, young, lowly educated, or immigrants) although in most cases they were already active in the neighbourhood before the start of the program. Initiators report having increased their citizenship competences through participation in the program, and both initiators and professionals think that the projects have increased social cohesion in the neighbourhood. Initiators also report having better relations with the municipal government. Relations with other initiators however sometimes become strained because of jealousy about differences in allocated budgets.

3.6 Interventions on the neighbourhood scale: measures and projects

As will have become clear from the previous sections, in the context of the focus district approach and the HSV program a multitude of projects have been developed by district governments, private partners, and residents themselves. To give an impression of the range and impact of these initiatives this section will present some general statistics. Furthermore, two projects are discussed in more detail: Garage Notweg (www.garagenotweg.nl), developed by housing corporation Ymere in the city district New-
Residents’ initiatives

All residents’ initiatives are monitored and documented online (www.uitvoeringsmonitor.nl). In the period between July 2011 and October 2012, 795 initiatives were financed (with money from the focus districts program). Since the start of the program in September 2008, 2,845 initiatives were honoured. From 2008 to 2012, the average project budget decreased from 5,669 to 2,785 Euros. The share of external funding increased: in 2012 57 per cent of initiatives were financed only by the government, in 2010 and 2011 this was 75 per cent. Forty per cent of initiatives are one-off or short-lived, one third is recurrent, and a quarter is one-off but has durable effects. Half of the initiatives are intended for a specific age group. In 2012, 24 per cent was geared towards adults, 12 per cent towards the elderly, 12 per cent towards children, and 6 per cent towards youth. Thirteen per cent of initiatives are intended for women. An initiative attracts on average fifty people (Amsterdam, 2012d).

Two examples of projects

The Garage Notweg project is part of the ‘trust in the city’ program (itself part of the residents’ initiatives part of the focus districts program). The website states that “Garage Notweg is a partnership of socially involved entrepreneurs who, thinking from diversity, form a flywheel for employment. We achieve this by creating opportunities for people to actively contribute to society using their own strengths”. The website lists eight projects that have been completed or are currently operative. These include helping immigrants find a job in the health sector, helping men between 25 and 45 years of age find work, helping people find a job in the catering sector, providing assertiveness training to children, decreasing the distance of non-Western immigrant women to the labour market, providing a course in textile processing, helping young people find a job by matching them with businesses, and organising a creative festival. Furthermore, the project building can
be rented for free for conferences and meetings and houses a neighbourhood kitchen and a meeting place (www.garagenotweg.nl).

The Buurtwerkkamer Venserpolder project is part of the HSV program. It wants to “strengthen Venserpolder [the name of the neighbourhood] by activating, stimulating participation, and bringing together vulnerable and strong residents”. Help and support is offered to vulnerable residents (Stadsdeel Zuidoost, 2013). It is specifically aimed at families with one or more people who are unemployed and aims to activate these people to find employment or to become active as a volunteer. The project leader states that the idea of the project is helping to execute “good ideas ... cooking, doing odd jobs in the neighbourhood, offering homework supervision, offering Dutch language classes, do something with crafts or computers. Or something completely different ... Everything is possible, as long as it contributes to the liveability of the neighbourhood” (www.venserpolder.blogspot.com).

**Monitoring and evaluation**

The projects of Garage Notweg aim to decrease the distance of vulnerable groups (often immigrants) to the labour market. According to their own assessment, this approach is successful. For instance, they state that since 2011 75 women have taken part in the project ‘Vitamine werk’ which aims to ‘empower’ non-Western immigrant women by giving them personal coaching with the aim of helping them find a job or continue their education. Of these women, twenty have found a job or training place. Another project geared towards men (Men@work) coaches 35 men per year (www.garagenotweg.nl). In the policy paper about the HSV program, the Garage Notweg project is called an “inspiration” for other projects and a “neighbourhood icon”. According to the municipality, it has developed into a place for both residents and starting entrepreneurs. The building is used by residents and has helped to put the neighbourhood on the map (Amsterdam, 2012e).

The South-East city district notes that 500 people regularly use the Buurtwerkkamer Venserpolder. 250 of these also become active within this centre or similar ones in adjacent neighbourhoods. Moreover, 100 people have started to do voluntary work (Stadsdeel Zuidoost, 2013). Part of the HSV monitoring progress is a regular survey by O+S, in which they ask residents in the HSV focus neighbourhoods for their opinion on the progress of the neighbourhood and on specific projects. With respect to the neighbourhood
combination Bijlmer Centrum, of which the Buurtwerkkamer Venserpolder project is part, forty percent out of a sample of 169 respondents believe the neighbourhood has improved. Almost half note the extra activities that have been developed, and almost a quarter thinks that the opportunities for youth have improved. Fourteen per cent of respondents know the Buurtwerkkamer project. Of this group, three respondents have someone in their family who participates. Of the respondents who know the project, 17 per cent think that residents profit a lot from it, 44 per cent a little, and 27 per cent not at all. The respondents who think the neighbourhood profits especially mention the importance of social contacts and the increased opportunities to get a job (O+S, 2013d).

Impacts on social cohesion and interethnic coexistence of neighbourhood projects are often difficult to measure. Residents in the South-East city district see improvements in the behaviour of residents and the atmosphere on the street. Some state having increased contacts with neighbours and other residents, sometimes due to the Buurtwerkkamer project. However, for some residents aggressive behaviour and feelings of insecurity remain a concern (O+S, 2013d). In the other city districts which are part of the HSV approach (North, New-West, and West) residents also have noticed an increase in projects and activities in their neighbourhood. Many are happy with these projects and feel that their neighbourhood has improved, but safety, maintenance of buildings, and social cohesion and social control are still often mentioned as concerns. While many residents state having more contact with others in the neighbourhood and appreciating its diverse character, others are not happy with fellow residents who are aggressive or noisy, and many residents also consider the prevalence of foreigners or the 'unbalanced' population composition to be a disadvantage of the neighbourhood.
4. Summary

Socio-demographic structure

- Amsterdam is the capital and largest city of the Netherlands with a total population of 811,185 residents.
- 49.3 per cent of residents are native Dutch (both parents born in the Netherlands). 50.7 per cent have a migrant background. 28.5 per cent of the population is a first generation migrant (born abroad), 22.2 per cent is a second generation migrant (born in the Netherlands, one or both of the parents born abroad).

Socio-economic structure

- The Amsterdam economy is relatively strong and Amsterdam is one of the five most attractive European locations for businesses.
- The largest economic sectors are the tertiary and quaternary sector, especially ICT and creative industries.
- Overall unemployment rate is 8.2 per cent in 2011, with slightly higher rates for men than for women. In 2010, the average yearly disposable income was 15,500 Euros per person and 30,700 per household. 16.7 per cent of households in 2012 had an income below the social minimum level.
- The share of highly educated residents is high (56 per cent) while there is a relative lack of residents with an intermediary educational level.

Structure of the housing market and segregation

- Levels of socio-economic segregation are moderate due to generally moderate socio-economic inequality and the ubiquity of social housing (48 per cent). Social housing does not just house those at the bottom of the housing market, but also middle class households.
- Current housing market policies are aimed at achieving social mix and gradual liberalisation of the housing market and a decrease in social housing.
Social housing and poor households are present in all parts of the city, although there are differences in the number of social minimum households and their concentration between city-districts (with the inner-city and South district being the ‘richest’).

Ethnic segregation is also moderate. Non-Western immigrants are mainly located outside the city centre, while Western immigrants live more centrally. Turks and Moroccans are overrepresented in the West and New-West city districts, while Surinamese, Antilleans and other Non-Western immigrants are overrepresented in the South-East city district.

**Structure of the migrant population**

- The four largest non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands and Amsterdam are Moroccans (9 per cent in Amsterdam), Surinamese (8.3), Turks (5.2) and Antilleans (1.5).
- Migration to the Netherlands took place in waves and for differing reasons: migrants from former colonies (Indonesia, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles), labour migrants or ‘guest workers’ (mainly Moroccans and Turks), asylum seekers (Yugoslavs, Somalians, Iraqis etc.), and labour migrants from Central and Eastern European countries (mainly Poles and Bulgarians).
- Non-Western immigrants are on average younger and lower educated than the native Dutch, they have a lower income and they are more likely to be unemployed and/or dependent on social welfare. Western immigrants are more similar to the native Dutch in these respects.
- Of the Moroccan and Turkish migrant groups, almost 90 per cent are Muslim.

**Integration and diversity policies in the Netherlands and Amsterdam**

- For a long time, the Dutch national government did not want to consider the permanence of migration to the Netherlands. When the first policies were formulated in the 1980s, the focus was on the retention of migrant languages and cultures. In the 1990s and especially the 2000s, there was increasing attention for structural lags among immigrants and the felt necessity of integrating into the
‘Dutch culture’. This has resulted in more strict measures, such as an obligatory citizenship exam.

- The main terminology used in the national integration discourse is that of autochthonous or native Dutch, and allochthonous (of immigrant background, includes the second generation). Importantly, being allochthonous does not mean not possessing Dutch citizenship. Furthermore a distinction is made between Western and Non-Western allochthonous, whereby Indonesians and Japanese are included in the Western category.

- In 1999, Amsterdam took the first steps towards a diversity policy which rejects dichotomies and stereotypes and embraces multifaceted identities. The use of autochthonous and allochthonous is rejected. City identity is seen as a way to connect residents with different backgrounds. This is developed in the notion of urban citizenship.

- Important objectives of the Amsterdam diversity policy are citizen participation, building partnerships with civil society and private groups, emancipation and integration, and the development of ‘urban citizenship competences’. Many policy programs have strong area-based components.

- Within the municipality the department of Social Development (DMO) has a Citizenship & Diversity unit, as well as an advisory council for Diversity and Integration. Within the City Consultation Platform for Diversity there is consultation with ethnic interest groups, as well as women’s and LGBT organisations.

Interventions at the neighbourhood level

- The main policies at the neighbourhood level are the focus districts approach, which started as a national initiative in 2007 and was continued by the Amsterdam municipality until 2012, and the HSV, which runs in 2013 and 2014.

- Both the focus districts program and the HSV target specific neighbourhood combinations which score below average on socio-economic and quality of life indicators. These neighbourhood combinations receive additional money to implement policy projects. City-districts were to a large extent responsible for the design of these projects. Output and outcome monitoring is done by O+S.
- Characteristic for these policies is the combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches, partnerships and co-financing (especially with housing corporations), and stimulating resident-driven development and the development of neighbourhood enterprises (trusts).
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Verklaring ontkrachten van eigen kracht, Oktober 2012.  

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A1. Socio-territorial structure and political-administrative system of Amsterdam

A1.1 Socio-territorial structure

*Historical overview*

Amsterdam is the capital (but not the seat of the government) and also the largest city of the Netherlands with 799,442 inhabitants on January 1, 2013. The city was already a trade and shipping centre in the 13th century, when a dam was built in the river Amstel to collect taxes from passing ships. For a long time it was the most powerful town in the region. Amsterdam was prominent in the international sea trade, first with the Baltic sea region in the 14th and 15th century, and in the 17th century (the so-called Dutch Golden Age) with Asia and the Americas. The city established globally operating trade and shipping companies: the VOC (East Indian Company), which traded spices from the East Indies, was established in 1602 and is considered to be the first multinational company in the world and the first to issue stock. The VOC’s territories later became the Dutch East Indies (contemporary Indonesia). The WIC (West Indian Company) was established in 1621 and took part in the trans-Atlantic ‘triangle trade’ in which European products were exchanged for African slaves, which were in turn traded against raw materials from America. Already during that time Amsterdam was known for its tolerant cultural, intellectual, and religious life. This was partly the result of a pragmatic trading mentality, but can also be traced to the Dutch provinces’ prolonged struggle for independence against the Spanish Empire. The Dutch wanted political independence but also the right to religious freedom (freedom of conscience) (Musterd, 2013; Lucassen & Penninx, 1994).

The initial growth of the city consisted of the construction of canals in a circular pattern (the contemporary inner city). This area is highly differentiated with stately canal houses in close proximity to small working-class houses in the back alleys. Unlike in other European cities, the centre has never been restructured on a large scale. Instead, it fell into disfavour due to the unsanitary conditions of the old housing. When gentrification
started in the 1980s, the city centre gradually became attractive to the middle classes and to tourists (Musterd, 2013).

At the end of the 19th century, economic growth and urban expansion necessitated expansion outside the canal area. The Housing Act of 1901 enabled government intervention and planning and the building of social housing. Among the newly constructed neighbourhoods were the ‘garden villages’ (*tuindorpen*) built for the working classes in the north of the city, as well as housing in the style of the Amsterdam school to the south and west of the older parts (Van Amersfoort & Cortie, 2009). After the Second World War, the construction of social housing on a large scale started in earnest. Two large-scale social housing projects were realised to house the (anticipated) population growth: the Western garden cities (now called New West) and a high-rise area called Bijlmermeer to the south-east of the city. Both areas have since undergone considerable reconstruction. Starting in the 1980s, many pre-WWII areas have also been renovated and in some cases filled up with new housing blocks. The latest large-scale construction project is IJburg, an area in the eastern part of Amsterdam where mainly middle-class housing is built on artificial islands. In contrast to older urban planning projects which were hierarchically designed and executed by the municipal government, IJburg is a public-private partnership in which the municipality cooperates with developers, investors, and housing corporations. The project started in 1998 and the first inhabitants moved in in 2002 (Lupi, 2008). The estimated end date was 2012, but this proved infeasible as construction is currently still under way.

*Spatial/statistical overview*

The city of Amsterdam is divided into:

- 8 city-districts (including the industrial area Westpoort)
- 97 neighbourhood-combinations (see Figure 16)
- 470 neighbourhoods
From this map it can already be seen that the city-districts and neighbourhood combinations are of varying size, with the neighbourhood combinations in the city centre generally being smaller than those more at the periphery. There are also significant socio-demographic characteristics between city-districts and neighbourhood combinations, as has been discussed in this baseline study. Very generally speaking, those city-districts that lie at a distance from the inner city (A in Figure 16) such as the Northern city district (N in Figure 16, separated by the IJ waterfront), the New-West city district (F in Figure 16, separated by the A10 ring road), and the South-East city-district (T in Figure 16, separate from the rest of the city) are less in demand, and thus those city-districts score ‘worse’ than the city average on a number of indicators, among other things the share of non-western Ethnic minority residents, educational level, average SES but also housing values. For these reasons, these three city-districts (and in addition the Western city-district, E in Figure 16) are targeted for area-based interventions by the municipality (see section 3.5).
A1.2 Political-administrative system

National government

The Netherlands can be characterised as a decentralised unitary state with three hierarchical government levels: the national, provincial, and municipal level. At the national level, the core executive body is formed by a Cabinet of ministers and junior ministers, led by a Prime Minister. Legislative power is exercised by a bicameral parliament. The 150 members of the lower house or Second Chamber (Tweede Kamer) are elected directly through proportional representation by those holding the Dutch nationality. The 75 members of the less important upper house or First Chamber (Eerste Kamer) are elected indirectly by the members of the provincial legislatures (who are in turn elected by the Dutch nationals in their respective provinces).

Due to the Netherlands’ history of organisation in strictly separated social groups (so-called pillarisation or verzuiling, see also footnote 8) and a lack of structural barriers to representation such as electoral districts or thresholds, many political parties are represented in the Second Chamber which makes the formation of coalition governments an unavoidable political reality (see Table 11). Coalitions usually consist of two or three parties who will then jointly declare and implement the government’s policy programme (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). The formation of coalitions is facilitated by the existence of cross-cutting cleavages or ideological dimensions between the parties. However, this also results in a build-in instability and consequently many coalitions resign before the end of their four-year term. The three main political cleavages are a socio-economic cleavage (left-right), a religious/ethical cleavage (progressive-conservative or secular-religious, the importance of which has decreased during the 1990s), and, since the 2000s, a new cultural cleavage (attitudes towards immigration, integration, and law and order) (Van Holsteyn, Irwin & Den Ridder, 2003).

Sub-national government

In addition to the national level, the Netherlands can be divided into 12 provinces (provincies) with directly elected provincial legislatures and governments. The provinces
deal mainly with infrastructure and environmental matters. Their policy impact is limited and in most cases, they are not a strong source of identification for their inhabitants (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). On the local level there are currently 408 municipalities (gemeenten), of which Amsterdam is the largest (CBS, 2013a). Municipalities implement national legislation (co-governance) but they can also independently regulate their internal affairs (autonomy). However, which tasks fall under the autonomous ‘municipal affairs’ is determined by the central government. Although the Netherlands is still considered a highly centralised country, decentralisation has been the official policy of Dutch government since 1985 (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). Decentralisation has accelerated in recent years as a consequence of budget cutbacks by the national government. Many tasks have been or will be delegated to the municipalities, among which care for the chronically ill and the implementation of unemployment policies (Rijksoverheid, 2013a).

The provinces are responsible for the financial supervision of the municipalities. Municipalities are dependent on the national government for a large part (around sixty per cent) of their budget: they receive a general grant from the Municipal Fund (gemeentefonds, financed by the central government), the size of which is determined by a weighted allocation system and which can be spent freely, and earmarked grants which have to be spent on specific objectives. In addition, municipalities have limited sources of own income (municipal taxes, administrative charges, income from municipal property, and European subsidies) (VNG, 2008). In 2011, the general grant of the Municipal Fund constituted one third of municipalities’ total income, with earmarked grants forming another quarter. Fifteen per cent of income is derived from municipal taxes, the rest (around one third) from ‘other’ sources, chief among them income from municipal property and European subsidies (Allers, 2012).

**Organisation of the municipal government**

The municipal government is elected directly by the inhabitants of the municipality (importantly, immigrants from outside the EU who do not have the Dutch nationality but who have lived in the municipality for a minimum of five years are also allowed to vote and stand for election). The legislative body is the municipal council (gemeenteraad), the size of which depends on the size of the population (45 members in Amsterdam). The council elects a number of aldermen who, together with the mayor, form the executive
board (College van Burgemeester en Wethouders). Dutch mayors are appointed by the national government, although a local committee can make recommendations. Mayors are chairmen of both the council and the executive board and are additionally responsible for the maintenance of public order (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005).

Political parties are usually local departments of national parties and like at the national level, government is by coalition (see Table 12). From 1949 until the recent municipal elections in March 2014, the Labour Party (PvdA) has always been the largest party and dominated in local government. Similarly, the mayor of Amsterdam has been a member of the Labour Party from 1946 onwards. Currently, D66 (social liberals) forms the largest party in the municipal council, while the Labour Party is the second-largest party.

In Amsterdam (as in some other large cities), there is a sub-municipal level organisation in the form of city districts (stadsdelen) who have their own elected government (in Amsterdam these are 8, of which 7 have their own government) (Amsterdam, 2013a). The relation between city districts and the municipality is comparable to that between municipalities and the central government. From 2014, the right of cities to install city districts is revoked by the national government (Staatsblad, 2013). Instead, Amsterdam has established “administrative committees” who will take over most of the functions of the city districts, but will have fewer responsibilities. Whereas in the past they were able to design their own policies (within the general framework designed by the central city) and had their own financial administration, their tasks are now limited to implementing policies and budgets have to be granted by the municipal council. The electorate for the administrative committees is slightly larger than that for the municipal council: immigrants from outside the EU who have lived in Amsterdam for a minimum of three years (instead of five) are also allowed to vote and stand for election (Amsterdam, 2013b).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Coalition Parties</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubbers I</td>
<td>Ruud Lubbers (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, VVD</td>
<td>1982-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubbers II</td>
<td>Ruud Lubbers (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, VVD</td>
<td>1986-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubbers III</td>
<td>Ruud Lubbers (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kok II</td>
<td>Wim Kok (PvdA)</td>
<td>PvdA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende I</td>
<td>Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, VVD, LPF</td>
<td>2002-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende II</td>
<td>Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende III</td>
<td>Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, VVD</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende IV</td>
<td>Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA, ChristenUnie</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutte I</td>
<td>Mark Rutte (VVD)</td>
<td>VVD, CDA</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutte II</td>
<td>Mark Rutte (VVD)</td>
<td>VVD, PvdA</td>
<td>2012-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 CDA: Christian Democrats
14 VVD: Liberals (economically right-wing)
15 PvdA: Labour party
16 D66: Liberals (progressive, economically more right-wing)
17 LPF: Party of deceased politician Pim Fortuyn, populist and anti-immigrant (now defunct)
18 ChristenUnie: smaller Christian (Protestant) party
Table 12. Municipal governments of Amsterdam, 1982-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Coalition Parties</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ed van Thijn (PvdA)</td>
<td>PvdA, CDA, CPN(^{19}), D66</td>
<td>1982-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed van Thijn (PvdA)</td>
<td>PvdA, CDA, Links Akkoord(^{20}), D66</td>
<td>1986-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed van Thijn (PvdA)</td>
<td>PvdA, D66, VVD, GroenLinks(^{21})</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Cohen (PvdA)</td>
<td>PvdA, VVD, CDA</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eberhard van der Laan (PvdA)</td>
<td>PvdA, VVD, GroenLinks</td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eberhard van der Laan (PvdA)</td>
<td>D66, SP(^{22}), VVD</td>
<td>2014-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{19}\) CPN: Communist party (now defunct)  
\(^{20}\) Links Akkoord: Cooperation of four smaller left-wing parties, predecessor of GroenLinks (now defunct)  
\(^{21}\) GroenLinks: Green, left-wing party  
\(^{22}\) SP: Socialist party
Table 13. Political composition of the city-districts, 2014-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City district</th>
<th>Represented parties (council)</th>
<th>Parties in the administrative committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>D66, GroenLinks, PvdA, SP, VVD</td>
<td>D66, GroenLinks, PvdA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>PvdA, D66, SP, VVD, BPN, PvdO, PvvA</td>
<td>PvdA, D66, SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>D66, VVD, PvdA, GroenLinks, CDA, PvdO, ZP-belangen</td>
<td>D66, VVD, PvdA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>D66, PvdA, GroenLinks, SP, VVD, Méérbelangen</td>
<td>D66, PvdA, GroenLinks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>D66, PvdA, GroenLinks, VVD, SP, Piratenpartij</td>
<td>PvdA, GroenLinks, D66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New-West</td>
<td>D66, PvdA, SP, VVD, CDA, BNW81, Multicultureel Plus Parti</td>
<td>PvdA, D66, SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>PvdA, D66, GroenLinks, Platform Zuidoost, VVD, OZO, ChristenUnie</td>
<td>PvdA, GroenLinks, VVD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 Local party for northern interests (Belangen Partij Noord)
24 Party for the Elderly (Partij van de Ouderen)
25 Party for free residents of Amsterdam (Partij Voor Vrije Amsterdammers)
26 Local party, interests of South and de Pijp (Zuid- en Pijpbelangen)
27 Local party, lit. ‘more interests’
28 Pirate party
29 Local party
30 Multicultural plus party
31 Local party, Platform South-East
32 Local party, independent party South-East (Onafhankelijke partij Zuid-Oost)
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Contact
UNIVERSITY of AMSTERDAM
Human Geography, Planning
and International Development
Studies
Nieuwe Achtergracht 166
1018 WV Amsterdam, NL
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