2 Cross-national vis-à-vis cross-local approach

In order to improve insights into the role of states and policies in migration processes, it is necessary to embed the systematic analysis of policy effects into a comprehensive analytical framework of the sending- and receiving-country factors driving international migration. Although there is consensus that macro-contextual economic and political factors and meso-level factors such as networks all play a certain role, there is no agreement on their relative weight and mutual interaction. Precisely how do migration policies affect migration if we control for the many other factors that drive international migration? The study distinguishes between different migration and integration policy regimes in EE, namely those of Austria and Greece. Austria is part of the North-Western European regime, which evolved from guest-worker policies³ (1960s to 1980s) to national integration policies that recognize migrants as permanent citizens (1990s to 2010s) and, more recently, to policies that promote migrants' cultural assimilation (GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS and PENNINX 2016, p. 7). In this regard, Vienna is characterized as a promoter in terms of designing and implementing pro-active integration policies at both national and local level, taking advantage of its dual role as the capital of the country and as a single province under the federal system of government in Austria. Vienna is the only metropolis in Austria, having had a population of 1.840 million in 2015, 634,933 (36.5%) of whom were born abroad (STADTWIEN 2017).

Greece, on the other hand, is considered as part of the Southern European migration and integration regime, characterized mainly by labour participation with a lesser degree of welfare provisions and a limited number of bottom-up integration initiatives (GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS and PENNINX 2016, p. 7). With reference to the integration of Albanians in Greece (and Italy), MAI and SCHWANDNER-SIEVERS (2003) characterized their socio-economic condition through the term *differential inclusion*, implying that migrants are integrated in some sections of society, mainly in the labour market, but denied access to others, such as citizenship and political participation. In fact, in Greece, most Albanians continue to live in a status of partial integration (GEMI 2017, p. 257), as a result of the model of *differential exclusion* and the non-interventionist integration policies implemented so far. The stance of the Greek state (centralized system of government) over the past twenty years may be broadly summarized as one where the state officially rejected migration through restrictions and closed-border policies, while officially acknowledging the market demand for low-paid labour (GEMI 2017, p. 258). The particular features of the Greek case are associated with the position of Athens within the wider national space. As a Southern European metropolis, the urban complex of Athens dominates in the system of Greek cities, both in demographic terms and in terms of socio-economic activities (LAVRENTIADOU 2006, p. 56). These features in combination with the lack of a social welfare system – according to the classical model of the welfare state of Northern Europe – leave greater space for the role of family and

³ These policies considered migrants only as temporary workers.

informal networks within which the migrant population is accommodated. Despite the presence of a large number of migrants (compared to other urban areas), there are no tailor-made local policies focusing on integration at the local level, which is mostly attributed to the centralized system of government. According to the statistical data of the GREEK MINISTRY OF MIGRATION POLICY (2018), 41% (210,693 people) of the overall migrant population (third-country nationals) in Greece (517,591) is spatially concentrated in the wider region of Athens.

Given the differences between Greece and Austria (Athens and Vienna) in the levels of governance in the national and local domains, looking at integration processes might shed more light on how particular migrant culture and migratory history on the one hand, and general public institutions and migration policies on the other, shape integration outcomes. Indeed, comparing between different countries might enable us to understand not only local and regional policy responses, but also the relationship between the national, regional, and local levels within the same migration system. Most importantly, adopting cross-national and cross-local comparisons that examine the same migrant group in different national and local contexts has been proved to enable scholars to assess the role of contextual factors (e.g., citizenship regimes and integration policies), adding further explanatory tools for conceptualizing differences in migrants' integration outcomes.

2.1 Contextualizing the multi-level governance of migration and integration: Austria compared to Greece

2.1.1 Austria

The genuine trajectory from migration to integration

Today, Austria is a genuine migration country. Corroborating this, the stock of foreign nationals residing in Austria amounts to 1.3 million, or 15.3% of the estimated total population of 8.75 million. Germans are the largest group (181,600) followed by Serbian (118,500), Turkish (116,800), and nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina (94,600) (BIFFL 2017, p. 6).

The definition of terms and the articulation of legal categories are essential for the portrayal of the national narrative and the way that the categorical 'us' and the 'other' have been constructed over time. It reflects the ideological orientation, which in turn exerts great influence on political decision-making on the matter. In Austrian legislation, the term 'alien' (*Fremder*) include all individuals/foreigners that hold another nationality than Austrian (*Inländer*). In the same line, the term 'third-country national' is used for foreigners (*Ausländer*) who are not nationals of a member state either of

the European Economic Area (EEA) or of Switzerland, whilst the citizens of the EEA countries fall under the category of 'Union citizen'. Yet, the term 'person entitled to be granted asylum' (*Asylberechtigter*) is used for individuals to whom the refugee status has been granted, while the terms 'person entitled to subsidiary protection' and 'asylum seekers' (*Asylwerber*) are both used for people entitled to subsidiary protection and for those applying for asylum⁴. The terms 'ethnic group' (*Volksgruppe*) is exclusively applied to the groups of Austrian citizens that are historically located in particular parts of the country's territory, whose native language is other than German and have distinct ethnic characteristics (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 193). What makes the difference, however, is the 'political correctness' approach pertaining to the use of terms: 'lawful' and 'unlawful' entry and residence of aliens, rather than 'legal' or 'illegal' migrants, as typically happens in certain countries (i.e. in Greece)⁵.

Currently, the migrant population in Austria is divided into two categories according to legal status and corresponding rights. The first category comprises citizens of EU member states, divided in two sub-categories: those that joined the EU prior to 2004 (i.e. Germany, Italy, Greece) and those states that became members of the EU from 2004 to date (i.e. Hungary, Slovakia [2004] and Bulgaria, Romania [2007]). Included in the second category are the third-country nationals with the citizens of Western Balkan countries (i.e. Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Albania), and Turkey being by far the predominant group followed by the Russian Federation and Asian countries (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 200). Focusing on the category of 'third-country nationals' would be important for distinguishing among the seven sub-categories differentiated according to legal status: Foreign workers: seasonal and annual workers, dependent employers (salary earners), self-employed workers, highly skilled workers, family reunification, students, and asylum seekers (BIFFL 2017, p. 16).

The Typology of International Migration Patterns in Austria

Austria has a long tradition of migration movements. Throughout its history, Austria has found itself on the crossroad of international migration either as receiving or as sending country. Being in the centre of a multi-ethnic empire, Austria had received large influxes of populations from Eastern Europe and the Balkans (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 41).

In order to get a better insight into the Austrian position on the international migration map, it would be useful to draw on a tailor-made typology aiming at synthesizing the key features of Austrian migration experience over time. Having as reference point the contributions of BAUBÖCK (1994, pp. 155-157), as well as FASSMANN and REEGER (2008, pp. 20 f), this typological approach builds on six distinctive historical stages extending over more than 50 years, from 1950 to the present day.

⁴ In addition, statistical data has increasingly been presented according to place of birth (birth in Austria and outside of Austria), which is used as a proxy for migration (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 193).

⁵ 'Unlawful' here means not authorized by law, whereas 'illegal' means forbidden by law.

(1) **Cold War Era:** three influxes of refugees from countries of the former Soviet Bloc (1956-1981). Given a range of pulling factors such as its geographic location on the borderline between the two 'camps', its neutral status and its Western democratic system, Austria attracted a large number of asylum seekers from countries under Soviet rule. During this period, Austria emerged as a receiving country of about 500,000 refugees in the course of the uprisings in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1981) (BAUBÖCK 1994, p. 156). It should be highlighted, however, that Austria was not seen as a country of permanent settlement, but rather as a transit hub that could lead to other Western destinations.

(2) **Guest-worker (*Gastarbeiter*)** system of the recruitment of foreign workers (1961-1973). Following the German model, Austria embarked on the 'guest-worker' system (CASTLES AND MILLER 2009, p. 97) during the 1960s and early 1970s, whereby the Austrian government actively recruited temporary labour migrants (mostly from Turkey and former Yugoslavia) for low-skilled jobs in the fast-growing economy of the country (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008, p. 10; KRZYŻANOWSKI and WODAK 2009; BAUBÖCK 1994). In the late 1960s, the guest workers represented about 10% of the total active labour force on the Austrian labour market, with (former) Yugoslav workers accounting for 78.5% of foreign workers and Turkish workers making up around 12% of the total foreign work force in Austria (OECD 2014, p. 63). The predominance of (former) Yugoslav citizens in Austria is considered a possible result of the geographical proximity, on the one hand, and the historical and cultural legacy dating back to the Habsburg Empire on the other.

Founded upon the rotation principle (Interview no.10, Vienna), integration was not perceived as an important matter, since the intention was that migrant workers would leave the country as soon as their labour was no longer needed (MERHAUT and STERN 2018, p. 30). Despite the growing magnitude of the phenomenon, their presence remained legally and politically invisible. This can be attributed mainly to the persistence of the political elite in viewing the phenomenon within the realm of 'exceptionality', rather than treating it as regular migration inflow (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008, p. 21).

A migration commission that was established by social partners such as the chamber of commerce and the trade unions managed Austria's guest-worker programme. Taking into consideration the interests of social partners at the regional level, the commission coordinated the guest-worker programme via the public recruitment agencies under the provisions of the corresponding bilateral treaties (BIFFL 2014, p. 48). Meanwhile, the crisis and the economic stagnation that followed the first oil price shock in 1973 altered the economic parameters that in turn led to a rise in inflation, increased public debt and rapidly growing unemployment. In such circumstances, the Austrian government took drastic measures aiming at the reduction of guest-worker quotas and the 'exportation of unemployment' (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008, p. 10) which, indeed, brought the recruitment programme to an end.

(3) Family Reunification and Labour Migration (1973-1989)

On account of the measures taken by the Austrian government to end the guest-worker regime and their persistent efforts to provide incentives for guest workers to leave the country, some did depart, but others remained. Family members subsequently joined those who remained. Therefore, the migration phenomenon was still a rising issue but this time under a different regime, that of family reunification (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 41). The change in human geography and the mode of migration particularly marked a turning point in the Austrian migration model from single male migration to family migration, the relocation from the city's outskirts to the inner urban spaces, and the predominance of the Turkish migrant population followed by citizens of (former) Yugoslavia (mainly Serbs) (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008, p. 21).

In the 1980s, the foreign population numbered about 285,000 and was therefore stabilizing at the level of 4% of the total population of the country. A survey carried out in 1983 showed that more than 50% of the families of (former) guest workers had already been reunited in Austria (BAUBÖCK 1994, p. 157). On the other hand, the persistence of Austrian employers to continue hiring former guest workers by renewing their contracts and thus prolonging their stay on the Austrian labour market, is worth mentioning. This tendency was seen as beneficial for both employers and workers as far as the latter were trained and specialized in offering specific services (Interview no. 10, Vienna). Even more interesting is the fact that trade unions and employment offices were in favour of and supported the extension of work permits (OECD 2014, p. 64). Again, regardless of the increased visibility of migrants on the labour market and in the urban areas, with permanent features attached to their socio-economic presence, no integration policies were foreseen at the time (Interview no. 10, Vienna).

At the institutional level, the introduction of the Foreign Workers' Act (AuslBG) in 1975 and its later amendment in 1988 (Amendment to the Foreign Employment Law) formalised the terms and conditions of foreign employment, which dated back to the 1930s (BIFFL 2017). It brought forward a multilevel scheme of different work permits aiming at regulating the access of foreign workers to the Austrian labour market. The most relevant provisions of the law included those concerning the employer-bound work permission, obliging migrants to leave the country if their work relations with a specific employer were no longer upright. It also demanded eight years of consecutive employment in order to gain the right (certificate of exemption) of unrestricted access to the Austrian labour market, although it was subjected to numerical restrictions extended to certain economic branches (OECD 2014, p. 65).

(4) East-West migration: economic migration and the humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain and break-up of Yugoslavia, including the subsequent application of the quota system (1989-2011). The year 1989 marked a historical turning point, at which Austria became a de facto destination country. The fall of the Iron Curtain brought about freedom of movement for the people of the former Soviet

Bloc, causing the reinstalment of old paths of East-West-migration (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008, p. 11).

Polish citizens were the first large group to begin arriving in Austria, whereas migrants from Romania comprised the second largest group. Despite the large magnitude of inflows from the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, they represented only a small share of total foreign employment in Austria (BAUBÖCK 1994, p. 159). Moreover, at the beginning of the 1990s, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the successive wars in Croatia (1991–1995) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995), millions of refugees fled their countries to find refuge in Austria. According to the census data, the size of the foreign resident population reached the record level of 518,000 in 1991 (compared to 291,000 in 1981), with citizens of Yugoslavia and Turkey accounting for 60% of the total foreign population in the country (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008, p. 11).

A notable structural shift, away from a migration pattern entirely concerned with labour migration to the prevailing inflow of economic and humanitarian migrants from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, occurred at this point. Instead of ignoring the fact of being transformed into a major host country of mixed migration flows, Austria now for the first time realized the inefficiency of its existing migration managing system. Furthermore, in contrast to previous years, the country found itself faced with the dilemma of integration.

As a response to increased migratory inflows, the Ministry of the Interior⁶ took over the responsibility for the overall migration policy. In addition, a number of legal and political reforms were launched, aiming at revising and expanding the previous asylum and labour migration legislation⁷ (BAUBÖCK 1994, p. 155). Among the most important interventions was the replacement of the numerical limits (per economic branch) by a general quota on employment of foreign workers at 10% of total employment in 1990. The quota system was further restricted to 9% in 1993 and again to 8% in 1995, with the latter aiming at counter-balancing the potential free-mobility inflows of EU citizens to the Austrian labour market, following the accession of Austria to the EU in 1995 (OECD 2014, p. 65).

In terms of political climate, the management of migration and subsequent policies became a point of contention in public and political discourse. The far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ), taking advantage of anti-immigrant sentiments, advocated against both the recognition of refugee status for asylum seekers and the social integration of migrants (BAUBÖCK 1994, p. 155). In response to demands fuelled by the highly politicized public rhetoric, the government passed a residence law (Settlement and Residence Law of

⁶ Until then, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs had regulated the labour migration policy in collaboration with the social partners.

⁷ The legal developments: The introduction of the Alien Law and an amendment to the Foreign Employment Law in 1990. The promulgation of the Alien and Residence Laws and an amendment to the Foreign Employment Law in 1993. The EEA-Agreement in 1994. Amendment to the Residence Law in 1995. Amendment to the Foreign Employment Law in 1996, and to the Alien Law in 1998.

1993), which reflected the political commitment to impose further restrictions on labour migration from third countries. The law, among other things, introduced a numerical threshold for residence permits issued at the level of federal states, rendering, thereby, the entrance to and stay in Austrian territory and the access to the labour market subject to different admission systems⁸ (BIEFL 2017, p. 48). In addition, the use of the concept of ‘key workers’ marked a turn from low and semi-skilled labour migration to that of skilled and highly skilled workers (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 6). Furthermore, the introduction of a new system of yearly residence quotas limited the role of the tripartite setting (provinces, public employment services and the social partners) to an advisory level (BIEFL 2017). Under the slogan ‘integration before new immigration’, the Aliens Act of 1997 kept the restriction over labour migration in force via the residence quota, even though it introduced measures to consolidate the legal status of third-country nationals settled in Austria. Later on, in 2002, the amendments to the Foreign Workers Law limited the access of third-country nationals to the legal categories of key workers and family members (OECD 2014, p. 69). Along the lines of EC directives on the status of long-term third-country nationals, a title of permanent residence (residence certificate) issued after five years of continuous stay was introduced, aiming at the harmonization of residence rights with employment rights (KRALER 2011, p. 35; MERHAUT and STERN 2018, p. 35). In addition, the ‘integration agreement’ stipulated the compulsory attendance of language courses as a prerequisite for obtaining the long-term resident permit.

(5) Intra-EU labour migration mobility

As was already discussed above, Austria experienced migration as free-mobility inflows, first after its accession to the EU in 1995 and later due to the eastern extension of the EU (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012). Regarding the latter, Austria, together with Germany, Belgium, and Denmark, made use of the full duration of seven years before granting full freedom of movement to new EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe. The right of free mobility for citizens of the new EU member states of 2004 thus came into force on the 1st of May 2011, and on the 1st of January 2014 for those new EU countries whose accession took place in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) (FASSMANN et al. 2014, p. 5). However, the restriction imposed had little impact in practice. During the period between 2007 and 2016, Austria received 730,582 migrants from other EU member-states. Among them, two countries, namely Romania (172,949) and Hungary (101,331) had the lion’s share (37.5%)⁹ in the country’s labour market (STATISTICS AUSTRIA 2017, p. 3). At the same time, increasing rates of inflows from the ‘old’ EU neighbouring countries (see Germany) and the newly acceded countries (in 2004 and 2007) showed a growing percentage of female workers, which seems to be

⁸ The quota for residence permits was administered by the Ministry of the Interior and the employment quota by the social partners and the (former) Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

⁹ Data taken from the forthcoming technical report ‘Territorial and Urban Potentials Connected to Migration and Refugee Flows’, ESPON 2020, where the author is part of the research team.

connected to a specific demand for female workers in old-age care, health care, tourism or domestic services (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008, p. 13).

Lastly, it is worth noting that the free-mobility inflows of EU nationals are generally perceived as a win-win solution for the Austrian socio-economic reality. This is because the mobility of the intra-EU labour force is deemed necessary to (partly) meet the needs of the Austrian labour market for semi-high-skilled workers, without this workforce being subject to integration programmes and their related costs. Secondly, it is used as countervailing tool to curtail the access of third-country nationals to the Austrian labour market (STATISTICS AUSTRIA 2017, p. 13).

(6) Score-based Migration Scheme and Refugee Crisis (2011-2017)

Since 2010, the immediate need for skilled migrants to perform qualified jobs on the Austrian labour market has become clear. It has also become apparent that the quota system was insufficient in terms of attracting medium-level and highly skilled workers. After a long process of negotiations with social partners and efforts to reconcile the different approaches¹⁰, the government replaced the quota system with a new score-based migration scheme called the 'Red-White-Red' Card¹¹ in July 2011.

The R-W-R Card is employer-bound and is issued for a period of 24 months¹². After its expiry, the labour migrant may apply for a R-W-R-Plus Card in order to gain unlimited access to the Austrian labour market (OECD 2014, p. 70). This scheme initially distinguished among three levels: (a) Very highly qualified workers. (b) Medium-skilled workers in occupations displaying shortages in the workforce. (c) A labour market-specific tier in the medium to highly skilled category based on a salary threshold¹³ (ibid.). In addition, points or credits are collected according to age, qualifications, language and work experience. In other words, following a similar model applied in other countries (i.e. Canada or Australia), highly skilled migrants are identified on the basis of a credit system (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 205). Meanwhile, the same law integrated the Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the EU Blue Card for highly qualified workers from third countries. Interestingly enough, the Blue Card was introduced as an additional work permit category, rather than being integrated into the new point-based migration scheme. Nevertheless, EU Blue Card holders are allowed to switch to the more favourable R-W-R-Plus Card after 21 months of employment in a 24-month period (OECD and EU 2016, p. 192).

In 2015, like other European countries, Austria found itself faced with unprecedented inflows of refugees from the Middle East. Austria ranked fourth in terms of

¹⁰ While the trade unions and Chamber of Labour proposed increased investment in training and qualification of the existing labour force, the Economic Chamber pushed for further introducing highly qualified labourers through migration.

¹¹ The RWR Card combined the work and residence permit in a single document.

¹² For more information see: ><https://www.migration.gv.at/en/types-of-immigration/permanent-immigration/>>

¹³ For more information see: <<https://www.migration.gv.at/en/types-of-immigration/permanent-immigration/>>

absolute numbers of asylum seekers in Europe, after Germany (476,500), Hungary (177,100) and Sweden (162,500) (BIEFL 2017, p. 41). Presumably due to the more restrictive policies and the subsequent international events that led to the closure of the Balkan corridor and the signing of EU-Turkey deal, the inflow of asylum seekers declined during 2016 (OECD 2017, p. 170; SCHOLTEN et al. 2017, p. 14). According to OECD (2017), 42,100 asylum applications had been filed by the end of 2016, marking a drop of 52% in comparison to the previous year.

In general terms, about 214,400 people immigrated to Austria in 2015. It should be emphasized, however, that 42.7% of the total migrant population are citizens of EU and EEA countries. Third-country nationals (107,000) accounted for 50% of the total arrivals, with the citizens from former Yugoslavia being numerically the most significant group (STATISTICS AUSTRIA 2017).

The Governance of Migration and Integration

For obvious reasons, it is not possible to get a clear understanding of migration and integration governance if we do not first outline a ‘map’ of the management structure and the regulatory institutions assigned with designing and implementing the relevant policies. The federal governance model of Austria, which is composed of nine federal provinces, has an immediate impact on the application of integration policies at the federal and provincial levels. In this respect, one can make two distinctions: a horizontal one cutting across all separate ministries, and the vertical hierarchy covering the provincial authorities (HEROLD 2017). Regarding migration and (to a lesser extent) integration, the relevant policies are regulated at the federal level. To this end, the management scheme of migration and integration is assigned to three regulatory institutions: the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour, and the Ministry of Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (since 2013). The Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for issues regulating the inflows and residence status of third-country nationals entering the country. The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour manages access to the labour market, while the Ministry of Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs is in charge of the visa regime as well as migration development policies in cooperation with third-countries of origin. Thus, the co-ordination of the management of migration and the subsequent policies fall under the jurisdiction of Federal Government and are regulated by the corresponding federal laws, whilst the Federal Chancellor’s role is one of mediation as need arises (BIEFL 2017, p. 16).

In terms of integration management, the State Secretariat for Integration (responsible for coordination of integration policies) was established under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior in 2010. This development clearly demonstrated that, contrary to the pro-active integration initiatives at local/provincial level (see the case of Vienna), integration only became a priority for the federal government in 2010. Before that, there was no legal basis for integration measures at federal level (Interview no. 6, Vienna). In

2014, in an attempt to reorganize the ministerial competences, the State Secretariat for Integration was disestablished and integration management became the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was then renamed Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (BIEFL 2017, p. 16). The federal provinces now mostly focus on the implementation of a wide range of social integration policies. Their main goal is to ensure social cohesion and the functionality of the redistributive policies based on the welfare principles of the Austrian state. It should be highlighted, however, that the federal provinces maintain a high degree of independence, as long as these policies are not coordinated by a related federal institution responsible for integration (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 53).

Integration: the point of contention in Austrian politics

In Austria, the term ‘integration’ was already used in the 1950s in relation to labour market integration and the naturalization of ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*), repatriated from then Czechoslovakia (PERCHINIG 2009, p. 229). Since the 1960s, the term was mainly used in connection with the integration of special social groups, such as persons with disabilities and special needs. It was only in the 1990s that the term re-entered the scene of migration management, reflecting as such the urgent need for designing specific integration policies regarding ‘foreigners’ (PERCHINIG 2012, p. 34). The end of the 1980s marked a historical turning point in Austria with regard to migration and the integration of foreigners. This development might be attributed to a range of factors. **First**, the historical events that took place in countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the former Yugoslav Federation led to a rapid increase of the mixed inflow (economic and humanitarian) of migrant populations into Austria. Given the prevalent perception that Austria was neither an immigration nor a destination country, citizens were taken by surprise. At the beginning of the 1990s, the far-right Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*/FPÖ) took advantage of increasing public concerns on the ‘uncontrolled’ inflows of newcomers, and did not neglect the opportunity to promote its political agenda, unleashing anti-immigrant campaigns. Stigmatizing slogans such as ‘lazy immigrant’ and ‘bogus refugee’ became common epithets widely used in public debate (RHEINDORF and WODAK 2018, p. 17). The extreme polarization and the divisive character of public discourse led to the rise of right-wing political forces (FPÖ) and consequently to the ‘legitimization’ of policy measures (on behalf of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition) aiming at imposing stricter migration control, closing borders, deportations and refoulement at the border (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008, p. 28). The problem of migration however did not suddenly emerge from nowhere. This leads to the second factor, namely the failure of the guest-work regime (FASSMANN and REEGER 2008). As we have already seen, a significant number of former guest workers not only did not leave Austria to return to their countries of origin, but were also joined by members of their families. In the absence of any integration policy, the phenomenon of structural exclusion and marginalization gradually became evident.

In addition, specific ethnic, cultural and religious features coupled with socio-economic disadvantage in comparison to the native population contributed to the forging of the perception that there is an ‘integration problem’ (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 45). Under these circumstances, the emphasis was placed on restricting migration by shifting the focus to integration at the beginning of the 1990s (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 202).

Indeed, in the early nineties, the political debate took a new direction oriented towards regulating migration to compensate for demographic ageing (PERCHINIG 2012, p. 34). To this end, it was deemed necessary to embark on a new migration scheme, the priorities of which should be, first, the introduction of an annual quota system for the newcomers and second, the improvement of the legal status of settled migrants. In terms of integration, the same Residence Act introduced the minimum income threshold and the housing criteria as preconditions for having a stable residence permit, which in turn were applied to both categories, namely the newly arriving migrants as well as settled immigrants renewing their permits. Equally important, however, is the reference, for the very first time, to the term ‘integration support’ that was to be provided to migrants working in Austria, their family members, and to recognized refugees in order to facilitate their integration into Austrian economic, cultural and societal life.

Given the increased political pressure from the far right, the coalition government of the Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs/SPÖ*) and the Austrian People’s Party (*Österreichische Volkspartei/ÖVP*) later embarked on a new reform. Under the heading ‘integration package’, the then Minister of the Interior (SPÖ) announced a complete revision of the existing Aliens Law and the Residence Act. This came as a response to the prevailing approach according to which migration should be reduced and instead, more emphasis should be placed on improving integration. At the same time, ‘integration before new immigration’ (*Integration vor Neuzuwanderung*) became the key phrase of the reform (KÖNIG et al. 2015). In terms of policy-making, the introduction of an ‘integration package’ has been viewed “as a first step towards a more pro-active integration policy” (PERCHINIG 2012, p. 35). In the new Aliens Act, the Foreigners’ Employment Act and the Asylum Act (June 1997), integration was addressed as a two-tiered process. On the one hand, the term ‘integration support’ was defined as a set of measures for recognized refugees, while on the other, the phrase ‘advanced integration’ addressed long-term residents along with the associated rights and obligations assigned to third-country long-term migrants (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 202).

By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, the European political scene experienced the rise of the far-right forces. In Austria, meanwhile, the far-right Austrian Freedom Party/FPÖ appeared to be highly successful in mobilizing xenophobic sentiments by adopting a strongly anti-immigrant agenda. The parliamentary elections that took place in October 1999 were particularly crucial in shaping the dynamics of the political development in the field of migration and integration. The new right-wing coalition government formed by the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and

the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) announced the introduction of compulsory German language courses under the rubric of 'comprehensive integration' (KÖNIG et al. 2015). The entire approach derived from the alleged 'unwillingness' of immigrants to integrate, which, according to the Freedom Party (FPÖ), was attributable to the specific cultural features of certain migrant groups. Many believe that the term above was invented and used as an argument to justify the transfer of the responsibility for integration from the Austrian state to migrants themselves (KRALER et al. 2013, p. 41). Whatever the case might be, in line with this approach, migrants were to sign an 'integration agreement', which obliged them to attend compulsory language and integration courses as basic requirements for obtaining a permanent residence permit and gaining access to related rights (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 46). Furthermore, in the case of non-compliance, the immigrants would be subject to increasing sanctions, ranging from financial penalties to expulsion from Austrian territory (MOURÃO-PERMOSER 2012, p. 183; KRALER et al. 2013, p. 40). The argument put forward by the then head of the parliamentary group of the FPÖ, namely that the tests aimed at selecting those who were 'ready to integrate', were met with harsh criticism mainly from civil society and the academic community (PERCHING 2012, p. 231). The approach that viewed language acquisition as an obligatory precondition for migrants to gain access to legal status also stood at the centre of criticism. The SPÖ, who governed the City of Vienna, strongly opposed the proposal of installing compulsory measures, since they had previously taken a leading role in introducing voluntary integration programmes for migrants and refugees. The draft was ultimately adopted in 2002 (HOLLOMEY et al. 2011, p. 12). A striking inconsistency however existed between political discourse and the legal definition of 'integration agreement'. On the one hand, the definition of the integration agreement creates the impression of having the promotion of migrants' autonomy and increasing their capacity to participate in society as primary goals. On the other hand, in public and political discourse the term integration was gradually loaded with negative connotations and used to justify the introduction of more restrictive legal and policy frameworks. Yet it is believed that, viewed from a broader political perspective, the employment of the term 'integration agreement' indeed reflected an underlying exclusionary approach (MOURÃO-PERMOSER 2012, p. 183).

The integration agreement was again revised in 2005, when the Austrian government embarked on a new reform of Austria's migration law, in the particular context of adopting the EU *acquis* on long-term resident permits and family reunification. In 2006, the integration agreement was amended by raising the level of language competence necessary for a permanent residence permit for all migrants except 'key personnel' to the level A2. At institutional level, the Austrian Fund for Integration¹⁴ was responsible for organising the language courses (PERCHING 2013, p. 204). The practical implications of failing to comply with the integration agreement within five years mostly was the imposing of administrative fines (ibid.). The fulfilment of the

¹⁴ It had been established in the 1960s by the Austrian Ministry of the Interior and the UNHCR with the task of supporting the integration of refugees.

integration agreement was the only way to get full access to long-term resident status for third-country nationals and to the rights attached to it. At communication level, the discursive legitimization of these measures took place in the name of the security and the protection of natives against the ‘abuse’ of Austrian institutions by migrants (RHEINDORF and WODAK 2018, p.17).

In 2008, the government proposed a National Action Plan on Integration (NAPI) in order to enhance the cooperation among all parties involved for successful integration measures in Austria (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 204). The National Action Plan on Integration (NAPI), which was finally adopted in 2010, aimed at promoting a more coherent and multi-levelled integration approach¹⁵. It provided an overarching framework, the main aim of which was to mainstream the integration strategy of the Austrian government in seven fields of action (NAPI 2018): language and education, work and employment, rule of law and values, health and social issues, intercultural dialogue, sports and recreation, as well as living and the regional dimension of integration. To this end, it was deemed necessary to establish three bodies: an expert council, a statistical yearbook and an advisory committee on integration (INTEGRATION REPORT 2016).

In April 2011, the Austrian Aliens Law and the Aliens Employment Law introduced a reduction of the minimum time required to prove language knowledge at the level A2 to two years. At the same time, the B1 level of language proficiency, although not compulsory, is recommended to promote the chances of access to both the long-term resident permit (based on the EU directive) and citizenship (KRALER et al. 2013, p. 42). Furthermore, the subsequent amendment introduced pre-entry language tests for immigrants from third countries (‘German before immigration’) at the A1 level. Even though it was not explicitly articulated, the pre-entry testing was de facto restricted to migrants’ family members, as other categories such as the highly skilled migrants (including their family members) had been exempted (ibid.).

The responsibility to ‘integrate’ was thus not only a question concerning individual migrants, either settled or temporary, but was extended to potential migrants prior to their migration (HOLLOMEY et al. 2011, p. 22). After admission, third-country nationals were subject to the integration agreement, which requires the level A2 of German language within two years after arrival, which in turn would allow for the renewal of residence permits (MOURÃO-PERMOSER 2012, p. 188).

On the other hand, the need for a high-skill labour force brought into place a new points-based system, the so-called Red-White-Red Card, which aimed at attracting qualified immigrants (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 205). At the same time, even more emphasis was placed on the efficient processing of asylum applications, fighting irregular migration, and creating an effective system deterring ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (RHEINDORF and WODAK

¹⁵ The NAPI consists of three parts: (a) The integration report, which monitors integration in seven domains. (b) The integration indicators, which measure the level of integration based on several indicators (i.e. school completion, employment, proficiency in German). (c) Integration measures, which serve to operationalize the overall proposals in the seven domains (WODAK and BOUKALA 2015, p. 264).

2018, p. 17). At this point, it would be worth stressing that, despite the controversial rhetoric on values and cultural integration, the basic requirement was simply that of proven language competence, while exceptions included second-generation offspring of migrants and vulnerable individuals. The government facilitated the process of language acquisition through subsidizing and/or organizing language courses. The orientation courses on norms and values give a hint at Austria's integration approach, according to which "The nationwide values and orientation courses ... are an essential basis for a successful integration process" (INTEGRATION REPORT 2016, p. 5). However, it should be added that the required language level and income threshold have been progressively increased, and the criteria of selection introduced since 2011, which found their materialization in the pre-entry tests, definitely affected third-country migrants coming from certain countries (MOURÃO-PERMOSER 2012, p. 190).

The establishment of the State Secretariat for Integration in April 2011 has been one of the most significant institutional developments in terms of integration. In symbolical terms, its establishment can be viewed as an official acknowledgement that Austria is indeed a country of immigration, a fact persistently denied in official discourse until recently. Under the rubric 'integration based on merit', the State Secretary's approach supports the idea that migrants should not be judged on the grounds of their origin, but according to their effort and achievements (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 205). It is highly significant that the foreword of the Integration Report (2016), signed by the then Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, defines integration as "a two-way process, whereby the adaptive capacity of the people who are allowed to stay in Austria must be greater than the capacity of the majority society. The fundamental values of Austrian society are not negotiable and are therefore to be complied with" (INTEGRATION REPORT 2016, p. 5).

As a policy response to the cascade of events caused by the refugee crisis in 2015, the Austrian Council of Ministers adopted the 50 Action Points Plan for the integration of refugees in January 2016. This has since been applied as a guiding principle for a common integration policy (INTEGRATION REPORT 2016, p. 8). It included measures to be taken in the fields of language and education, work and employment, the rule of law, and values. Early in 2015, the public discourse on integration converged with two other discourses, that on educational reform and that on terrorism. In the light of these developments, the Austrian parliament voted in favour of a reform to tighten its asylum legislation in June 2016. One month later, in July 2016, the introduction of the Recognition Act established a right to and the simplification of the assessment procedure for foreign qualifications, including those of humanitarian migrants without documentation of their qualifications (OECD 2017).

In early 2017, the government introduced a new legislative framework that came into force in September 2017. It foresaw the introduction of an obligatory 'integration year' for humanitarian migrants and asylum seekers. The integration measures include, among other things, skills assessment, support for recognition of foreign qualifica-

tions, language training, as well as civic education and professional orientation. The fulfilment of measures is documented in a so-called 'integration pass'. It also provides support to employers who hire beneficiaries and allows asylum seekers to be paid in service cheques for household and childcare tasks (OECD 2017, p. 80). One month later, the elections to the Austrian National Council in October 2017 resulted in a shift to the Right. Issues of immigration and integration dominated the election campaign. It carried the promise of an awakening and a new political style (FALTER and STERN 2018, p. 9). The winner of the election, the ÖVP (and the new Chancellor Sebastian Kurz), capitalizing on the tense political atmosphere, turned the issues of migration and asylum into the centre of its campaign. One major point of its campaign was its leading role in the process of closing the so-called 'West-Balkan Route' (2015-2016) in order to halt the stream of people fleeing the war in Syria and coming to Austria and Germany. At the same time, the emphasis lay on associating migration with other controversial phenomena such as crime, Islamic extremism, difficulties encountered in education, and the excessive cost of the welfare state, which could be addressed by closing borders and introducing stricter policies on migration. The ÖVP leader, Sebastian Kurz, was in favour of applying the Australian immigration model, which in the case of Europe would mean setting up reception facilities and camps located outside European borders, where asylum seekers should wait for a ruling on their asylum status (FALTER and STERN 2018, p. 11). On a more radical stand, the far-right FPÖ, in its campaign programme, was openly positioned against any form of immigration and argued for more protection of the 'homeland' and its 'autochthonous population'. It went a step further in rejecting the principle of multiculturalism, focusing primarily on Muslim immigration. Likewise, being highly critical of the European Union, the FPÖ called for more efforts to secure the external frontiers while wanting to formulate national migration policy. In an atmosphere of a controversial political race, the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) featured similar positions as the ÖVP. It advocated reducing the number of refugees in Austria, the enforcement of deportations, and a fundamental reform of the European asylum system. Like the ÖVP, the Social Democrats opted for the establishment of asylum centres in North Africa, and suggested that the European Union should run them. In the end of 2017, the coalition agreement between the ÖVP and the FPÖ announced restrictions concerning the application for citizenship, massive cuts in financial support for refugees, the closing of the external borders of the European Union, and the enforcement of deportations (FALTER and STERN 2018, p. 11).

In conclusion: there are two levels of policy-making in Austria: national (federal) and provincial. At national level, the federal government is responsible for the overall migration policy, notably the determination of those who are allowed to enter the country, and of the conditions under which his/her status is regulated. The provincial/local level is mostly responsible for implementing integration policies in order to ensure social cohesion, with the City of Vienna historically being in the forefront of pro-active integration policies. The integration topic was only adopted at national level in 2010 for the first time. In retrospect, migration patterns to Austria have changed dramatically in

the second decade of the new millennium. Whereas the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey were the main areas of origin until the late 1990s, migration from old and new member states of the European Union prevailed in the 2000s, with Germans being the largest group of ‘foreigners’. Despite the increase of humanitarian migration recorded in 2015-2016, the general trend towards a decline of migration from third countries is often attributed to immigration restrictions imposed on both humanitarian and economic migration in the early and mid-2010s (PERCHINIG 2013, p. 198). Similarly, the general trend in both migration and asylum policy is increasingly restrictive, prohibitive, and often subordinates humanitarian concerns to national interests, whereas the successive amendments are viewed as reflecting the increasing trend towards control, national security, and combating the alleged abuse of the asylum system (MERHAUT and STERN 2018, p. 44).

In Austria, integration was largely ignored for a long time as a field of political action (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 53). When it did enter the political agenda, that was largely due to a negative politicization of the topic by anti-immigrant actors. Integration was used within a larger discursive strategy that sought to justify restrictive immigration policies by framing resident immigrant communities as a problem. In that context, the allegation of ‘lack of integration’ was often brought up in connection with the religion, values, and attitudes of immigrant communities (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 53). The politics of integration were primarily discursively constructed as pertaining to the cultural dimension. Whenever the topic is discussed and policies are enacted under the label of ‘integration,’ they tend to cover civic integration and focus on language acquisition and civic education, thus emphasizing the sharing of values and norms as well as the cultural aspect of the need to use a common language. Moreover, the discourse refers exclusively to the integration of third-country nationals, that is, of immigrants from outside the EU, even though 40% of all foreign population living in Austria come from other EU countries (KRALER 2011). At the same time, the structural integration of foreign-born population and their offspring (second and third generation) suffers from severe deficits, particularly with respect to educational attainment. Nevertheless, to a certain extent the lack of policies addressing structural integration is mitigated by a strong welfare state (WOLKENSTEIN 2013, p. 181; MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 40). At the institutional level, the parliamentarisation of migration policy in the mid-1980s combined with the reconfiguration of migration policy-making in the late 1980s and early 1990s caused the disappearance of the informal, non-public decision-making mechanisms so characteristic of social partnership in post-war Austria. Henceforth, it was increasingly the political system – and its bureaucracy – that dominated the policy-making process and determined the contents of migration policies. Nevertheless, there is a somewhat paradoxical situation featuring the political scene in Austria. On the one hand, immigration and integration are central issues in almost all parliamentary election campaigns. Yet on the other hand, success (or failure) of political parties in election campaigns seem to have very limited influence on the migration policy eventually adopted by the very same parties once in

government. By all standards, policy-making in the field of immigration and asylum is characterized by continuity (KRALER 2011). To some degree, this might be a reflection of the dominant role the bureaucracy plays in framing and making migration policy as well as of a wider consensus on key principles among political parties.

2.1.2 Greece

Greece is a country on the southeast border of the European Union (EU), and for the greater part of the twentieth century, it was predominantly an emigration country. Emigration flows from Greece started decreasing in the mid-1970s, while the inflows in the 70s and 80s consisted of returning Greek guest workers, members of the Greek diaspora, as well as political exiles from the time of the Civil War of the 1940s (MAROUKIS and GEMI 2010). In the beginning of the 1990s, the size of the migratory inflows grew rapidly due to the events of 1989 in the former socialist countries of the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The country's economic growth, its integration in the EU, and its geographical proximity to the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, contributed to its transformation into an immigration country. In the 1990s, Greece was transformed overnight from what was a largely homogeneous country in terms of language, as well as national and cultural heritage, into a host country of mass irregular migration flows from former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In terms of numbers, migrants from neighbouring Albania formed the largest population of third-country nationals, representing about 65% of the total migrant population according to census data from 2001 and 2011.

In a population of 10.75 million, 525,519 were TCNs¹⁶ legally residing in Greece in December 2017, according to the Ministry of the Interior database on valid residence permits (GREEK MINISTRY OF MIGRATION POLICY 2018). Again, 68% of the legally residing migrant population in Greece are Albanian citizens (356,848), making them by far the largest migrant group, followed by individuals coming from the countries of the former Soviet Union, that is Georgia (18,561) and the Ukraine (18,473), but also Southeast Asia, more specifically Pakistan (16,380) and India (13,675). There is a gender balance trend with men constituting slightly over half (276,726) of the total migrant population, while 46% of the population (243,515) is relatively young, notably between 30 and 49 years of age.

A closer look at the valid residence permits for TCNs as provided by the GREEK MINISTRY OF MIGRATION POLICY (2018), shows that the highest concentration of migration population is found in the category 'other', notably 267,215 TCNs, with those residing in Greece in the context of 'family reunification' following with 207,241. In fact, the residence permits for 'other' reasons includes long-term residence permits of 10-year or indefinite duration as well as permits for humanitarian or exceptional reasons. In contrast to previous years, the ratio of long-term permits to total residence permits has

¹⁶ TCNs = Third-country nationals.

exponentially increased with long-term permits accounting for 37% of all valid permits in 2016 and 2017, compared to 23% in 2012, 26% in 2013, 33% in 2014 and 36% in 2015. Considering the evolution of residence permit data, it could be assumed that the migrant population in Greece is undergoing a period of stabilisation and long-term integration, with overall numbers of long-term residence permits showing a considerable increase, along with the naturalisation of the second generation (TRIANDAFYLIDOU and MAROUFOU 2017). In sharp contrast to the past and as a result of the reformed Greek citizenship law (L. 4332/19.07.2015), a significant increase in the number of citizenship acquisitions of second generation migrants (through birth or study) as well as an increase in acquisitions of citizenship by TCNs can be observed for 2016 alone. With regard to their previous nationality, the vast majority of naturalized TCNs were Albanians, numbering 28,251 persons in 2016 and 11,615 in 2015 (GREEK MINISTRY OF MIGRATION POLICY 2017).

At the beginning of the 2010s, the human geography of the migrant population residing in Greece started to change. The Greek financial crisis and the austerity measures dramatically altered the country's economic and social conditions, also affecting the lives of immigrants. The impact of the economic crisis on immigrant workers as the most vulnerable social group was manifold and largely interwoven with the systemic characteristics of the Greek labour market. The crisis hit the sectors of the Greek economy employing most of the migrant work force harder, notably the construction sector, which has seen significant unemployment since 2008 (GEMI 2013). Surveys (i.e. MAROUKIS and GEMI 2013) point to the fact that regular immigrants were losing their legal status due to high unemployment, which was estimated to be 36% during the third quarter of 2012. Data from the GREEK MINISTRY OF MIGRATION POLICY (2018) showed that the largest number of legal immigrants residing in Greece was recorded in 2010, when 601,675 residence permits were in force, while in December 2014 this number was smaller, standing at 524,242. It is estimated that this reduction in the number of residence permits was due to the effects of the economic crisis, the insecure employment status and the dramatic rise in unemployment. As a result, a significant number of immigrants lost their legal residence status due to their inability to secure the appropriate documents (e.g., sufficient annual income, employment contract, insurance) necessary for the renewal of residence permits. According to MIPEX's results (2015A), employment rates in Greece were the lowest in the EU in 2014 (around 50%), with the economic recession and austerity measures exacerbating the structural problems of Greek social and integration policies. As few immigrants had secured permanent residence and equal rights under Greece's rigid and restrictive residence policies, many of them who had lost their jobs also lost their legal status and therefore their basic social entitlements. As a consequence, Greece ranked 27th out of the 38 MIPEX countries by the end of 2014, the most problematic policy areas being residence status, citizenship, and anti-discrimination policies for the long-settled immigrant population.

In addition, Greece was transformed into a transit country for a large number of asylum seekers from Syria and other war-torn countries of the Middle East and Africa in

the mid-2010s. As a result, Greece experienced an unprecedented influx in 2015, when over 857,000 asylum seekers transited through the country to other countries of the EU, while it has received an additional 200,000 people since January 2016, the majority again coming from Syria (SKLEPARIS 2017). This massive influx showed a dramatic decrease after the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement in March 2016. Nevertheless, arrivals from Turkey to the Aegean islands continued through mid-late 2016, 2017, and even in the first months of 2018. Compared to the 1990s, however, the difference consists in the fact that whereas migrants from the former period perceived Greece as destination country, those from the latter tend to view it as a stopover along their migration route to Western Europe (CRAWLEY and SKLEPARIS 2017). This is corroborated by the fact that although Greece accounted for the majority of arrivals in 2015, only 1.5% of those transiting claimed asylum in the country, according to asylum service data, since other EU countries (i.e. Germany) were seen as their final destinations. However, following the closure of the Balkan route, there has been a sharp increase in asylum applications lodged in Greece in 2016 and 2017 (TRIANDAFYLLOU and MAROUFOF 2017, p. 21). Under these circumstances, one of the most challenging issues for Greece has been the location and integration of those eligible for refugee status on mainland Greece, while processing those sheltered in camps on the Aegean islands.

With regard to the applicants' nationalities, Albanians take in the fifth position on the applicants' list (4.2%), following Syrians (36.2%), Pakistanis (12.4%), Afghans (11.7%) and Iraqis (8.6%), (GREEK ASYLUM SERVICE 2017). Albania, however, is the country of origin displaying the lowest recognition rate (0.2%). Again, in 2017, Albanians were the largest national group in terms of apprehensions at land borders, while Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans remained the national groups most frequently crossing the sea borders.

Migration and integration regime

As has already been pointed out, the migration experience of Greece as a country of destination gained momentum at the beginning of 1990. In order to get a clear picture of the migration and integration regime in Greece, it would be useful to draw on a typology that is structured around three distinctive stages covering more than 27 years, from 1990 to present days (1990s, 2000s, and 2010s).

From emigration to immigration country: the 1990s

The uncontrolled massive influx of Albanians and other migrants from countries of the former Soviet Union in the 1990s found the Greek state unprepared. Its reaction had been characterized as inconsistent and as focused only on the short term (TRIANDAFYLLOU et al. 2013). At the same time, the public discourse of political elites emphasized the need to fortify the borders and protect national identity, while viewing migrants as an imminent threat to social cohesion and ethnic homogeneity as embodied in the foundation triptych of *ethnos*: fatherland, family and religion.

Indeed, the mass influx of migrants, mainly from the Balkan countries, was accompanied by the development of very hostile attitudes, which led to the general rejection of this new 'other'. The only easy path to acceptance was through identification with dominant values and socio-cultural references (for instance changing names). This also implied that immigrants were supposed to discard specific ethnic group features, which were perceived to be antagonistic to the core values of Greek culture (GEMI 2015). This trend is reflected in the persistence of the Greek legislator in attributing a temporary nature to the phenomenon of immigration, starting from the notion that the purity of the Greek race and ethnicity must be preserved (BALDWIN-EDWARDS and APOSTOLATOU 2009). The presence of 'old' ethnic groups (e.g., Albanians and Bulgarians) was considered a threat to the myth of ethnic homogeneity, a fundamental principle of the formation of the modern Greek nation state and ethnic identity.

In the absence of prior relevant policy, the legal framework introduced in 1991 (Law 1975/1991) to deal with what was referred to as 'aliens', was exclusively concerned with security considerations, preventing illegal entrance and facilitating the deportation of undocumented migrants. This made it almost impossible for newcomers to secure a legal status upon arrival or after they had entered the country (TRIANDAFYLIDOU 2009). Given the circumstances and the wider dynamics of socio-political developments in the region, the contradictory result of such non-functioning and poorly implemented legislation was more undocumented migration influx, continuing unabated throughout the 1990s. A few years later, confronted with the uncontrolled situation of the increasing presence of undocumented migrants and irregular entries, the Greek government opted for a series of regularisation programmes, granting amnesty to undocumented migrants. Two presidential decrees introduced in 1997 (P.D. 358-359/1997) signalled the beginning of regularisation procedures or the so-called amnesty programmes. They gave migrants the opportunity to apply for a temporary residence permit or 'white card', which, in turn, allowed them to collect the complementary documents necessary to apply for a 'green card'. A total of 150 days of social insurance contributions were required for the acquisition of the green card. By the end of the 1990s, 371,641 immigrants had been registered for the white card, but only 212,860 had received a green card (FAKIOLAS 2003). In this phase, the integration issue was neither included in the political agenda, nor in any legal text, because Greece persistently refused to admit its irreversible transformation into a country of immigration. As long as the public opinion remained obsessed with and stuck both in the idea of defending national interests and in the phobic dilemma of security, migration was viewed as 'an unwanted burden for the country' (TRIANDAFYLIDOU et al. 2009).

In terms of employment, it has been observed that during the economic growth period of the 1990s, a number of factors played an important role in the attraction of migratory flows, mainly from neighbouring countries. These include the improvement of living standards, the openness and seasonality of certain sectors of the Greek economy, and the relatively easy geographical access in conjunction with the so-called 'developed model' of the informal economy. These economic developments created the urgent need

for a new workforce. The high educational level of the native population in association with economic prosperity led to the departure of Greek citizens from the occasional, seasonal, low-paid, and low socially identified job sector (KASIMIS and PAPADOPOULOS 2012). The massive entry of women into the labour market created a vacuum in the traditionally organized Greek household, which apparently was filled by the services provided by migrant domestic workers (MAROUKIS 2010, p. 248; PAPATAXIARCHIS et al. 2008). At the same time, considering the cumulative causation of migration movements as a self-sustaining process, informal ethnic networks played an important role in attracting new immigrants, mainly due to their mediation in finding housing and employment. This is confirmed by various studies (TONCHEV 2007; MAROUKIS 2010; BELLAS 2012) in terms of access to the Greek labour market. In reality, the dynamics of these developments consolidated a new type of labour division, where immigrants and native population are employed in 'parallel labour markets'. Immigrants mostly occupy unskilled (and seasonal) jobs, often below their educational qualifications in sectors characterized by the production of intensive labour, such as the agricultural and construction sectors, and/or informal activities such as domestic services (IOSIFIDES et al. 2007). The phenomenon of labour division is attributed both to the large size of the underground Greek economy, which displays a seemingly unlimited demand for low-paid unskilled work, and to the inflexible Greek labour and immigration policy in general.

From irregular migration to integration: 2000s

In response to increasing concerns on managing irregular migration, a new law (L. 2910/2001) came into force in 2001, which gave migrants a second opportunity to legalize their status through the 'Green Card II' regularisation programme. To qualify, migrants had to present proof of residence for at least a year before the implementation of the law. By the end of August 2001, 351,110 migrants had applied for the acquisition of a work permit, which was a precondition for the provision of a residence permit. The amendments to the above law, introduced in 2002, also allowed migrants legally residing for 2 years to renew their residence permit for another 2 years and change employers. More importantly, it provided the opportunity to apply for a permanent residence permit, which was extended to legal migrants who had been permanently residing and working in Greece for more than 10 years. Nevertheless, the lack of the necessary infrastructure and persisting bureaucratic constraints created enormous problems and delays in the processing of the applications. This forced the government to extend deadlines and provide migrants with temporary residence permits, which were subjected to successive extensions.

By the mid-2000s, it had progressively become clear that immigration was no mere temporary phenomenon, but rather a permanent one with over 800,000 migrants (both regular and irregular) who 'were here to stay'. In this respect, a new law (3386/2005) on the 'Entry, Residence and Social Integration of Third-Country Nationals on Greek Territory' was introduced and came into effect in 2006. For the very first time, the issue of socio-economic integration was explicitly addressed. In its 'Complete Action Plan for

the Social Integration of Immigrants' (articles 65–66), social integration was defined as “granting rights to third-country nationals, which ensure both their equal participation in economic, social and cultural life of the country, but also, the respect of fundamental norms and values of Greek society [...] with the simultaneous preservation of their national identity”. In order to achieve these aims, the law signalled the development of an integrated action plan focused on three pillars: (a) Knowledge of the Greek language, history, and civilization. (b) Integration in the labour market. (c) Active social participation. Arguably, the main priority was to bring Greece closer to EU legislation, particularly in relation to reunification conditions, and residence and work permit procedures. This was done in compliance with the EU directives for race equality (*Directive 2000/43/EC*), family unification (*Directive 2003/86/EC*), and long-term residents (*Directive 2003/109/EC*).

During the same period, Law 3284/2004 ‘On the Ratification of the Greek Nationality Code’ reinforced the *ius sanguinis* approach, and excluded any residence-based access to citizenship, except for stateless persons who were born in Greece. In sharp contrast to ethnic Greeks, the law enforced a stringent set of conditions for non-ethnic Greeks (*allogeneis*), who were required to have been staying legally in Greece for at least 10 years in the last 12 years, to have a clean criminal record, and to prove knowledge of the Greek language, history, and civilization. The children of immigrants, including those born in the country, had to reach adulthood in order to apply for citizenship.

The first Integrated Action Plan 2007-2013 for the integration of immigrants titled ‘ESTIA’ was introduced by the Ministry of the Interior in 2007 along with the creation of the General Directorate for Immigration Policy and Social Integration (P.D. 234/2007). The central goals of this action plan were: (a) The inclusion of TCNs versus exclusion. (b) The fight against racism and xenophobia. (c) Providing information and support to documented TCNs in order to enable them to access employment, education, health, and other public goods (Common Ministerial Decision No, 25057/2008). During the same period, the Multi-Annual Programme of the EIF for TCNs (2007-2013) was adopted by the Greek government complementary to the ‘ESTIA’ Programme. Taking EU standards into consideration, its main priorities were to implement the EU Common Principles for the Social Integration of TCNs, with particular emphasis on the development of indicators and methodologies, in order to assess the progress and results of integration measures and policies, to collect statistical data, and create data bases related to integration. Despite its efforts to streamline social integration goals into all relevant policy sectors through the active engagement of local, regional, and national authorities, the Multi-Annual Programme 2007-2013 hardly succeeded in meeting these goals.

The dual crisis of the 2010s

From 2010 onwards, the issue of integration started to become a priority for the Greek state, which was reflected in the policy agenda, mostly as an attempt to address issues of contentious politics rather than as a visionary goal. The Citizenship Law

(3838/2010), making “Current provisions for Greek citizenship and political participation of repatriated Greeks and lawfully resident immigrants and other adjustments”, for the first time granted citizenship to the second generation who either were born in Greece or had been educated through the Greek education system from a young age. The law furthermore recognised the right to vote in local elections for long-term residents.

Once again, history repeated itself when this major reform introduced by the centre-left government proved short-lived. In 2013, the Council of State’s decision (460/2013) ruled two key provisions unconstitutional: facilitation of citizenship acquisition for the second generation and the extension of political rights to migrants (TCNs) at the local level. Local voting rights cannot be extended to those who do not hold Greek citizenship without prior amendments to the Constitution. The decision was a clear reflection of the radical rationale embodied in the characteristic phrase: ‘the Greek is born, not made’ that transcends the respective levels of powers in the country. This, along with the historically unprecedented rise of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, was believed to endanger the fundamental democratic values in Greece (GEMI 2015).¹⁷ Meanwhile, following pre-election promises, the newly elected government of SYRIZA passed a law (4332/2015) in 2015, which amended the Greek Citizenship Code (Law 4251/2014), enabling second generation TCNs to acquire Greek citizenship. It however introduced stricter conditions compared to Law 3838/2010, increasing the required length of parents’ legal residence, while it also increased the required years of school attendance in Greece from six to nine years for qualification of children for Greek citizenship.

In an attempt to converge the Greek integration approach with relevant EU norms and policies, the National Strategy for the Integration of TCNs was introduced in 2013. The main priorities of the National Strategy include equal access for TCNs, including economic migrants and those granted political asylum or a permit to stay for humanitarian reasons, and their children, to education in the Greek school system; integration in the labour market; the acquisition of a long-term residence status, and the participation of immigrants in policy-making at the local level. These are considered as the most important components of a successful ‘structural integration’, bearing no reference to citizenship as the main means of integration. In order to achieve integration, TCNs would be subjected to the ‘integration programme’, which includes courses aimed at instilling “a positive attitude towards the Greek state with informing them about the basic values of Greek society and the political system” and to promote “the participation of TCNs in the social life of the Greek state, which can only become feasible when the immigrants are sufficiently informed about the way of life, the mores and values of the host society, and only when they accept directly or indirectly the dominant national and

¹⁷ It should be mentioned that until 2010, naturalisation was an extremely difficult process in practice. Based on the principle of *ius sanguinis*, Greek nationality was only granted to ‘repatriated’ migrants of ethnic Greek origin (*homogeneis*), primarily from the countries of the former Soviet Union, through an exceptional and highly flexible procedure. For TCNs or ‘foreigners’ (*allogeneis*), the access and acquisition of Greek citizenship remained a highly intricate process.

European ideology” (GSPSC 2013, p. 54). By rejecting multiculturalism, the emphasis was put on ‘structural integration’ as the representative national model of integration. The main argument used to justify this approach is that TCNs residing legally in Greece are expected to adapt to the dominant political and cultural frame of Greece, with a view to promote “the necessary social cohesion and cultural homogeneity”. It becomes apparent that the latter formulation comes within the concept of assimilation rather than integration, let alone the definition of the term ‘structural integration’. Indeed, the prevailing ambiguity of labelling integration either as ‘structural integration’ or as ‘assimilation’, demonstrates the degree of confusion and vagueness that characterizes the Greek National Strategy on Integration.

A year later, in an attempt to codify all existing legislation and to systemize the chaotic situation created with settled migrants losing their (temporary) legal status as the result of high unemployment rates, Law 4251/2014, the ‘Immigration and Social Integration Code’, came into force in March 2014.¹⁸ The Code brings together all existing legislation, while incorporating EU Directives into the domestic legislation. It also defines and regulates a series of issues such as the categories of residence permits, the conditions for their issuance and renewal, and the rights and obligations attached to them. It however sets very demanding conditions, which are met when a candidate can provide evidence of a sufficient level of Greek language proficiency and knowledge of elements of Greek history and civilization (articles 89-90 of the Code). The level of language acquisition is B1. When applicants fulfil the residence and income criteria, namely continuous legal residence for at least 5 years and sufficient annual income, they are exempted from the requirement to prove ‘sufficient knowledge of the Greek language’, provided that they have been legally residing in Greece for at least 12 years. In the end, however, neither the Strategy (2013), nor the Immigration and Immigrant Integration Code (2014), make any reference to the citizenship as a key component of formal membership in a political community, on the one hand, and immigrants’ right to preserve their distinct cultural-ethnic or religious identity, on the other. Additionally, in the period 2015-2016 Greece was found in the midst of what has been called the most important refugee influx post World War II. Until the first trimester of 2016, most of the arrivals succeeded in leaving Greece via the Balkan Route. Since the closure of borders with FYROM in March 2016, migrants and asylum seekers were increasingly stranded in Greece. In response to this situation, the Greek government adopted a new law (L 4375/2016) in April 2016, designed to reform the ‘old’ procedures (P.D. 112/2010) for processing asylum claims, with the introduction of an exceptional border regime being a very significant point in the amendment of the law. In addition to the legal ratification of what was agreed in the EU-Turkey Agreement, it also introduces several reforms in

¹⁸ According to the explanatory report of Law 4251/2014, integration is conceptualised as the “smooth introduction of TCNs in the Greek society and the recognition from the part of the Greek society of the aim of equal participation in the economic, social and cultural life of the country. TCNs in the process of their integration in the Greek society gain rights, but also acquire responsibilities, similarly to Greek citizens. Their main responsibility is to respect the laws, but also the fundamental values of Greek society”.

the asylum process and international protection, the border regime, first reception, and labour rights of beneficiaries of international protection. The same law (L.4375/2016) provides access to the Greek labour market.

In terms of institutional reforms (P.D. 123/2016), the Ministry of Migration Policy was established in November 2016, and was organized into three main branches: (a) The General Secretariat for Migration Policy (of the former Ministry of Interior and Administration Reconstruction, except for the Directorate of Citizenship that remains at the Ministry of the Interior). (b) The General Secretariat of Reception of the former Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction. (c) The independent Asylum Service and the independent 'Appeals Authority'.

2.2 Framing the cross-local context: Athens and Vienna

While the migration debate is conducted and framed at the national and supranational (EU) or federal levels, local authorities are becoming increasingly responsible for dealing with the effects of migration and integration of migrants on local societies and economies (KOFF 2002; BALDWIN-EDWARDS 2005). A growing number of studies over the past fifteen years have highlighted the salience of the local government level in confronting the social challenges of multi-ethnic diversity and in implementing measures and practices that are intended to promote the integration of migrants (PENNIX 2010; ALEXANDER 2007; BORKERT et al. 2007).

Local and municipal authorities, alone or in cooperation with other public agencies and non-governmental organisations, are providers of a large scale of social services in the area of health, education, and social and childcare. At the same time, they are also responsible for maintaining the social infrastructure of cities where many ethnic and migrant communities live. Apart from their close contact and better knowledge of local society and conditions on the ground, they tend to be more accommodative and pragmatic towards migrant groups in the formulation and implementation of integration policies in comparison to national, supranational, or federal authorities. This tendency is seemingly inherent to the nature of local government power (POPPELAARS AND SCHOLTEN 2008). Research has shown that local characteristics, initiatives, and arrangements significantly determine the remit of policy opportunities and influence the potential for implementing effective migrant integration policies, notwithstanding variations in national institutional and policy responses to immigrants (ALEXANDER 2007; BOSSWICK et al. 2007).

This chapter addresses the local dimensions of the integration of migrants in an attempt to show why and how local authorities in two different cases, Vienna and Athens, have a newfound and crucial role in designing, managing and implementing integration policies. The starting assumption is that local government institutions have a profound

role in promoting, or conversely hindering, immigrants' integration. Moreover, local government institutions affect immigrants' position in the local society and economy in the course of providing a large array of social services in the local population, as well as in the context of implementing programmes and allocating resources for targeting unemployment, for local development, and for urban regeneration, among others.

2.2.1 Vienna

The "Viennese" system of governance

Vienna is the capital of Austria and one of the nine federal states of Austria. Yet, it is the only metropolitan city in Austria and a federal province at the same time (FASSMANN et al. 2010, p. 9). In terms of demography, Vienna is by far the largest city in Austria with 1.897.491¹⁹ inhabitants 2019, while the population of the second largest city, Graz, does not exceed 280,000 inhabitants. In terms of ideological orientation, the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) has dominated Viennese local government since the 1920s (FASSMANN et al. 2010, p. 9; FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 11). It is no coincidence that the 'Red Vienna' is considered an international model of governance. The traditional core of the political and administrative system in Vienna was constructed as a sort of universalistic welfare state tailored to local conditions (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 12). At the same time, Vienna's consensually oriented political culture is rooted in the concept of 'social partnership', which is a specific Austrian form of corporatism, reflected in involving the interests of social partners in decision-making (FASSMANN et al. 2010, p. 9).

In terms of competences and power structures, the Mayor of Vienna is also governor of the federal province. The City Council acts as a provincial diet, while the City Senate serves a double function as the City and Provincial Government (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 11). Yet, the City Councillors are part of the City Senate and politically responsible for specific areas (planning, environment, health, housing, etc.). In general, the political priorities have been formulated as the outcome of a consultation process involving several political and civil society actors. As such they reflect the diversity of interests and tend to portray integration as a cross-cutting topic (MOURÃO-PERMOSER and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 50).

Austria as a federal state has granted its provinces a certain degree of autonomy, in particular in the field of education and social policy (PERCHINIG 2012, p. 4). In this context, Vienna enjoys the freedom to develop its own approach on immigration and integration, autonomously and regardless of central policies (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 6). In this particular context, integration was established as a policy field on the regional and local level quite some time before the federal state developed integration policies and institutions at national level. In fact, it became an important political issue

¹⁹ See Statistik Austria, Berechnung MA 23 (<<https://www.wien.gv.at/statistik/bevoelkerung/tabellen/bevoelkerung-bez-zr.html>>).

at the local and provincial level already in the 1990s, whereas at the national level it has been institutionalized as a distinct policy domain (involving political responsibilities and specialised institutions) only at the beginning of the 2010s (Interview no. 6, Vienna). Until then, integration was a highly controversial topic between the Ministries of the Interior and regional and local governments, with the former emphasizing security issues, and the latter focusing on social integration and anti-discrimination. The long-standing commitment of the City/Province of Vienna to adopt a more pro-active policy in the area of immigrant integration than its national counterpart stands in particularly striking contrast to national-level politics (MOURÃO-PERMOSE and ROSENBERGER 2012, p. 49). General politics on migration are to a high degree determined by national legislation, whereas special policies focusing on diversity and peaceful co-existence in the urban context are usually developed and implemented by local governments (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 6).

Vienna: a historical city of immigration

Like other metropolises, Vienna is a city of immigration. It can look back on a long-standing tradition of cultural and linguistic diversity, since Vienna attracted many people of a multi-ethnic conglomerate when it was the capital of the Habsburg Empire (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 8). The migrant composition of Vienna's population can be attributed to a cascade of international developments divided in six phases (STADTWIEN 2017, p. 8; FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 8).

1. The immigration of guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s from Turkey and then Yugoslavia;
2. Since 1989, the massive immigration from Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries emerging from the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and former Yugoslavia;
3. The Austrian accession to the EC in 1995;
4. Increased immigration inflows from new EU Member States in 2004 and 2007 respectively;
5. The end of transition periods for the free movement of workers in 2011 and 2014, and
6. The 2015 refugee crisis setting out from the Middle East.

Between 1991 and 2011, the city of Vienna experienced a sharp increase in the number of its foreign residents. During the 1990s, labour migrants from former communist countries, refugees from former Yugoslavia, and family members of former guest workers mainly constituted the immigration population (KOHLBACHER et al. 2014, p. 17). During the same period, the number of immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria had almost tripled along with a considerable increase of Slovakian, Polish and German citizens (KOHLBACHER et al. 2014, p. 38). It is no coincidence that the number of foreign residents in Vienna increased from 16% in 2001 to 21.5% in 2011. This was in sharp contrast to the situation on a national level, where the number of foreign residents

had increased only from 8.8% in 2001 to 11.0 % in 2011 (KOHLBACHER et al. 2014, p. 12). Since 2006, Vienna's population has grown by 11% from 1,652,449 to 1,840,226 (STADTWIEN 2017, p. 8). In 2017, 534,532 foreign citizens were living in Vienna, which was 29% of the total population. The majority are third-country nationals, comprising 16.4% of the total immigrant population of Vienna, while 12.2% are EU/EFTA citizens. In total, 45.3% of all foreign residents in Vienna originate from former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia) and Turkey. Germany (10.4%) is the third most important sending country, with Eastern Europe playing an important role too (i.e. Poland 9.7%).

Integration and diversity policies in Vienna

Before the 1990s, the City of Vienna did not have an explicit integration or diversity policy (PERCHINIG 2012). The first attempts to develop such municipal infrastructure reach back to the 1970s, when the *Zuwandererfonds* was founded (in 1973) to assist labour migrants from other provinces, but also from abroad, to manage life in Vienna, and in particular to find adequate housing (PERCHINIG 2012, p. 37). Faced with the rapid increase of the migration population at the end of the 1980s, the City of Vienna started to turn away from considering immigration a temporary phenomenon, to viewing it as a permanent phenomenon. At the beginning of the 1990s, the City of Vienna started to implement its first integration policies. In this context, the Viennese Integration Fund (*Wiener Integrationsfonds* – WIF) was founded in 1992. Under the slogan 'We are all Vienna', the WIF had been tasked with: (a) Improving German language skills among immigrants through language courses. (b) Organising and managing mother tongue/native language classes in schools. (c) Implementing policy measures towards the improvement of the labour market integration of immigrants. (d) Establishing and expanding advisory and information centres for immigrants across the city (KOHLBACHER et al. 2014, p. 21).

In 1996, the first Councillor of Integration Affairs was appointed as the head of the respective administrative department initiated the first integration policies. One year later, the City Councillor was assigned as the head of the newly established Office for Integration Affairs of the City Council. This move was considered the first crucial step towards mainstreaming integration policies. A few years later, at the beginning of the 2000s, the City of Vienna initiated a paradigm shift from a stringent focus on integration to a discourse on achieving integration through diversity. The substantial change within the city and its administrative bodies was that integration was no longer perceived as an achievement to be accomplished by immigrants, but rather as a process that includes immigrants as well as the members and institutions of the Viennese 'host society' (KOHLBACHER et al. 2014, p. 45). It was the first time that Viennese politicians and the municipality itself explicitly articulated the active (and pro-active) role that the (urban) host society should play in terms of 'integrating the diversity', where ethnic diversity is perceived as the norm, rather than as an exception.

The principle of equality lay at the heart of the new diversity concept of the City of Vienna, and the term ‘integration’ highlighted the effort to foster processes of inclusion and to increase the participation of immigrants in all relevant areas of life. According to the ‘Guidelines of the Integration and Diversity Policy of the City of Vienna’, the core principles of the Viennese diversity concept are: (a) Equal opportunities and participation of all residents in important spheres of life. (b) Facilitating access to relevant resources for everyone. (c) Abolishing discrimination tendencies. (d) Increasing mutual respect. (e) Increasing empowerment (STADTWIEN 2017, p. 7). The Viennese Fund for Integration was dissolved in 2004 and the Department for Integration and Diversity was founded within the administrative structure of the city. In July 2004, the Municipal Department 17 (MA 17) for Integration and Diversity Affairs was established with the task of further developing integration and diversity measures and assisting the municipality in mainstreaming and adjusting its services to the needs of Vienna’s increasingly diverse population (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 12; KOHLBACHER et al. 2014, p. 45). In fact, three similar regional offices operate throughout Austria, which work in close cooperation with local communities, focusing particularly on youth and the second generation, towards mainstreaming diversity at the local level (Interview no. 6, Vienna).

In line with its priorities, a large part of the budget of the MA 17 is allocated to funding German courses that are usually implemented by various specialized educational institutions, while also covering a part of participants’ fees (Interview no. 6, Vienna). It furthermore financially supports integration activities organised by various NGOs, which for instance may offer professional education to young migrants, help them to get qualifications accredited, and obtain access either to the labour market or to further education (Interview no. 6, Vienna). Another institutional step forward was the introduction of the Viennese anti-discrimination law, in 2004 (amended in 2012), which bans any kind of discrimination on racial, ethnic, religious, ideological or sexual grounds.

In principle, the City of Vienna’s integration policies aim at achieving equal rights and chances in all areas of life. This liberal and progressive approach however has brought about repeated controversies between Vienna and the federal government, as the former has repeatedly adopted a critical position towards national regulations (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 14). This was even more problematic as long as the integration policy had not been institutionally established at a national level until 2011²⁰, which means that Vienna was leading the way with its integration policy in Austria. While the legal competencies for migration and integration in Austria clearly rest at the federal level, there have been continuous struggles between federal bodies, specifically the Ministry of the Interior, and provincial institutions to agree on a common integration approach. Against this backdrop, the City of Vienna has opted to emphasise the positive side of diversity as a counter-model to the policy of the Ministry of the Interior, which was focused on restrictive measures along with the assimilation approach

²⁰ Until then, the Ministry of the Interior had been responsible for integration, but there had not been any separate body solely responsible for integration.

in the field of integration. As a result, the City of Vienna established its own commission on immigration and integration, which presented its first report in 2010. The city also promoted an Expert Committee on Integration within the Austrian Association of Cities and Towns established in 2008 as an alternative forum for coordinating integration activities of larger cities and municipalities (KRALER 2011, p. 48).

In 2007, the City of Vienna introduced the Integration and Diversity Monitoring Scheme, which is a tool that enables the ongoing monitoring of levels of integration²¹ and illustrates the quality of the city administration's diversity management (STADTWIEN 2017, p. 3). At the same time, the diversity approach has resulted in increased attention to an 'intercultural opening' of the City's administration. As a part of the campaign to promote diversity mainstreaming, the City of Vienna's public administration opened up its services and re-orientated its programmes in response to the needs and necessities of the increasingly diversified urban population. In order to achieve such a goal, the City of Vienna began to train their employees in intercultural communication and increased the number of employees with a migration background (KOHLBACHER et al. 2014, p. 42). In 2013, 25% of city employees were of foreign origin.

Housing policy²² has been progressively regionalized since the 1980s, while direct housing property ownership of the local authority along with residential building by non-profit housing associations has played an important role in shaping the human geography of the city. In fact, the City of Vienna is not only the largest owner of properties in Austria but also in Europe, with a considerable number of City residences being built during the 1920s and 1930s and largely newly renovated. Although socio-economic and ethnic segregation remain low, there is some concentration of certain migrant groups (such as the former so-called 'guest workers' from Turkey and former Yugoslavia) in certain predominantly working-class areas located around the city centre. In some cases, the population with a migration background accounts for more than 50% of the local population in those areas (KOHLBACHER et al. 2014, p. 38).

In conclusion, the City of Vienna plays a more important role with regard to integration and diversity programmes than the federal government. Indeed, it has been the forerunner of integration policies in Austria (PERCHINIG 2012, p. 37), while 'Red Vienna' is historically considered a social democratic city with a strong welfare profile. From an intra-provincial perspective, Vienna is again far ahead of other provinces, the latter sharing neither the same political structure with Vienna, nor the budget allocated to integration policies (Interview no. 6, Vienna). More importantly, while in other cities/provinces integration is usually part of the social and family affairs department, and not an autonomous one, the city of Vienna has its own department (MA 17) with its own staff of 60 persons and its own budget (Interview no. 6, Vienna). Vienna's integration

²¹ For the City of Vienna, the diversity policy means promoting participation on equal terms, supporting adaption processes as required by institutions, opening access to resources of society, countering discrimination, and developing strategies for strengthening and opening society for diversity (STADTWIEN 2017, p. 5).

²² For several decades, Austrian housing policy was based on corporatist 'social partnership'.

policy has traditionally been characterised by efforts to overcome conflicts, and social cohesion and ‘integration’ are hence firmly established as both objectives and points of reference for the city’s urban policy (FASSMANN and KOHLBACHER 2008, p. 28). From this perspective, migrants are perceived as subject to integration immediately on arrival and settling in the city – this is called ‘integration from day one’, except for humanitarian migrants as long as their legal status is pending (Interview no. 10, Vienna).

However, ‘integration’ at the local level tends to be framed rather as a social matter and a matter of equal opportunities, which means that the primary aim of local integration policies is to maintain social cohesion and social peace. As such, individuals with a migration background that acquire Austrian citizenship are no longer considered as a target group of specific socio-political measures, but rather as Viennese citizens and a regular part of the local population. Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on equal access and equal participation, this is practically not possible in cases in which full access to certain social and political rights is directly dependent on legal status (e.g. political participation at local level). The City of Vienna however is attempting to improve the access and participation at local level, regardless of legal status (Interview no. 6, Vienna). The same approach is applied when it comes to the monitoring methodology of measuring integration indicators. What is measured and compared is the socio-economic mobility (upward or downward) of the entire society, rather than of the foreign population divided along ethnic lines (Interview no. 6, Vienna). This is based on the principle that integration takes place beyond and regardless of ethnic lines and cultural background. What matters is the legal status, which in the end enables the degree of access and socio-economic integration. Whenever the difference in legal status is applied, the outcome of performance and participation would automatically vary. According to this approach, the statistical data is not and should not be allowed to become ‘culturalized’ (Interview no. 6, Vienna).

2.2.2 Athens

The City of Athens is the capital of and the largest municipality in Greece. Being part of a 3.75 million people metropolis, the Municipality of Athens has approximately 700,000 residents (OECD 2018). Migrants and their native-born children account for 23% of Athens’ population, while the number of refugees and asylum seekers has rapidly increased since 2015. In the period of 2014-2015 alone, 500,000 asylum seekers and migrants crossed through the city of Athens on their journey to Western Europe. By the end of 2016, about 60,000 refugees and immigrants were recorded as living in Greece (OECD 2018, p. 15), while in Athens their number is estimated at around 20,000 (OECD and EU 2018). In total, 170,000 foreign citizens from around 170 countries lived in the metropolitan region of Athens in August 2018 (GREEK MINISTRY OF MIGRATION 2018). The ethnic composition is quite unbalanced with Albanians representing 51% of the total migrant population in the city. Other important groups from the Balkans

and Eastern Europe represented more than 15%, while migrant groups from Southern Asia represent over 11%. Other minor groups represent 2.8%, and include people from Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and China, which is considerably more than in the period of 2001-2011.

Migration typology and urban patterns of integration

Athens has experienced two large waves of migrant and refugee flows. First, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Iron Curtain, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the City of Athens experienced a massive influx of economic migrants coming mostly from the neighbouring countries of the Balkans. The fact that the foreign population living in Athens recorded a 463.91% increase between 1991 and 2011 is highly illustrative.

At the beginning of the 2010s, the City of Athens was faced with another phenomenon, namely the gradual increase in the number of humanitarian migrants who did not intend to settle in Greece, but rather to move to other Western European countries. Until March 2016, the majority of migrants who arrived in Greece by crossing the Aegean Sea headed north, via the Balkan Route, to seek asylum in Western EU countries. Athens' city squares and parks were transformed overnight in meeting points and makeshift places of accommodation for thousands of refugees. The City of Athens, with very limited infrastructure in place and no experience in dealing with phenomena of such a scale, suddenly found itself at the forefront of the biggest refugee movement since World War II in Europe (MUNICIPALITY OF ATHENS 2017, p. 31). Following the closure of the Balkan corridor in March 2016, migrants and asylum seekers largely remained stranded in the Greek capital. In the absence of any inclusion policy, the burden was informally shifted to the Municipality of Athens, which was forced almost overnight to accommodate a large migrant population, concentrated particularly in and around Athens (GEDDES and SCHOLTEN 2016, p. 222). In general, the city has been experiencing profound socio-economic and socio-spatial changes during the past two and a half decades. As was already elaborated in section 2.1.2, a key characteristic of migration to Greece in the 1990s was its spatial concentration in urban areas, particularly in Athens and Thessaloniki. This, in conjunction with the prevailing irregular employment in the informal sector, created "a prototype for the trends towards informalisation of work and the increased social inequality and restructuring of consumption into high-income and very low-income strata" (IOSIFIDES and KING 1998, p. 223).

Putting this into context, the particular features of the Greek case are associated with the position of Athens within the wider national space. In fact, the human geography of the migrant population in Athens follows a similar concentration-decentralization model than that of the native population. Thus, according to the statistical data of the Ministry of Migration Policy (2018), approximately 45% (240,467 people) of the overall immigrant population in Greece (540,260) is spatially concentrated in the greater area of Athens (Attika region). Despite the high concentration of immigrants in the region of Attica, studies have shown that Athens is one of the most pluralistic European metropo-

lises (ARAPOGLOU 2008, p. 1). The same observation is supported by other studies, which maintain that migrants are sparsely settled in the city, and despite the existence of small concentrations, there are no ghettos (VAIOU 2007). Researchers have identified urban patterns of interaction both within migrant groups, and between immigrants and the native population (GEMI 2017, p. 176). This picture is likely to be in line with what is described as a form of bottom-up integration taking place in the neighbourhoods of Athens (VAIOU 2007). Integration of migrants in urban life has been made possible through informal practices and arrangements, which are structural components of urban development and characterize Athens in many respects (VAIOU and STRATIGAKI 2008, p. 124). However, as was said above, informality is a key variable of social integration. It should be added that this phenomenon is not exclusive to migrants. It also affects locals and it can be found at the basis of the settings of urban experience and everyday life in the city. On the other hand, spatial proximity does not necessarily mean a reduction of social distances that may lead to mitigation of inequalities. Despite the spatial/residential proximity to the native population, migrants live in substandard housing conditions and often do not have access to public facilities and infrastructures as Greek citizens do (ARAPOGLOU et al. 2009).

At the same time, there are significant differences among ethnic immigrant groups in terms of their spatial distribution/concentration within the urban area of the capital. For instance, Albanian migrants have a high residential mobility and seem to share the same residential areas with Greeks, a fact that contributes to the low levels of spatial segregation (ARAPOGLOU 2008). Contrary to that, migrants from Eastern Europe and Asia are usually concentrated in smaller communities and segregation is slightly evident, mostly in the case of unskilled workers (ARAPOGLOU 2006, p. 29). All in all, the experiences of migrants in their continued efforts to make their way into the social and symbolic aspects of everyday life is part of the urban identity of Athens and not a matter of ethnic group formation in the city (VAIOU and STRATIGAKI 2008, p.128). The dynamics of the urban geography of Athens as shaped by multi-faceted socio-economic relations are reflected in the changing mosaic of local infrastructure and services, the intensive use of public spaces, and the multiple traces of new and long-settled city dwellers.

The institutional context of local governance of integration

Migration and integration policy as well as the reception mechanisms for refugees and asylum seekers are the responsibility of the national authorities in a highly centralized country such as Greece (OECD 2018, p. 32). The structures of the Greek state consist of three levels of governance: the central, the regional, and the local level. The regional governmental level includes 13 regions, with regional councils and governors elected by popular vote every five years. Similarly, at the local level (that consists of 325 municipalities) both its municipal councils and mayors are elected by popular vote every five years. Despite repeated efforts to decentralize the local level, Greece continues to be characterized by a high degree of state centralism (ANAGNOSTOU et al. 2016, p. 46; OECD 2018, p. 33), as is illustrated in the case of Law 2910/2001. This law gave

municipal authorities competences in the implementation of regularisation programmes for migrants, but without assigning any role concerning issues of integration. Thus, the municipal administration was simply responsible for receiving residence permit applications and for the issuing and renewal of residence permits. In fact, since the 1990s the role of Municipalities has been limited and conditioned either by the national law on migration, and/or by providing services to the local population, including migrants, something that varies significantly depending on the local administration's discretion (OECD 2018, p. 35). In an attempt to broaden the scope of municipalities' responsibilities, the Code of Communes and Municipalities (Law 3463/2006, Art. 75) introduced the proper legal frame regarding migrants' integration at a local level, while maintaining the previous competences on issuing and renewing residence permits. In 2010, however, the above competences were repealed and transferred to the regional administration. The rationale behind the decision lay in the assumption that the issuing of residence permits is and should be an exclusive prerogative of the national state rather than of local government (ANAGNOSTOU et al. 2016, p. 62).

The major reform process of the territorial, administrative, and local government structures was the introduction of Law 3852/2010, called 'New Architecture of Local Government and Decentralized Administration', also known as project 'Kallikratis'. It came into effect in 2011. The reform reorganized local and decentralized public administration by transferring new responsibilities and competences to municipalities. The 'Kallikratis' reform increased the competences of municipalities in the sphere of social policy. Following the paradigm of other municipality structures in various EU countries, it particularly gives emphasis to the provision of social services such as the protection of elderly people, support for families and vulnerable groups, and the tackling of social exclusion and marginalization of the poor, including migrants and uninsured individuals (SKAMNAKIS 2011, p. 8). Together with the Law (3852/2010) regarding the participation of citizens, it introduced significant measures intended to promote the political and civic participation of immigrants at the local level. The most important institutional achievement was the establishment of Migrant Integration Councils (MICs) in every municipality. Even though they have no decision-making powers, they are assigned with the tasks of informing the municipal government about the problems that migrants face within a specific local context, of presenting proposals for actions furthering the integration of migrants, and of assisting migrants in accessing regional and municipal services. The councils would serve as a connecting bridge between municipal authorities and migrant communities. It is worth mentioning, however, that the MICs were initially designed as a local institutional body for migrants who would enjoy voting rights and elect their own representatives in local municipal councils. Following the suspension of political rights at local level by the Council of State in 2013, the role and the mission of MICs has however been undermined in practice (ANAGNOSTOU 2016, p. 34).

The economic crisis that hit the country during 2009-2010 has had serious implications, particularly regarding social policy, which is crucial for the integration of

migrants. Therefore, no systematic Greek language courses are organised at national or municipal level any more.²³ Another factor that has further complicated the role of municipalities in migration and integration matters was the culmination of the refugee crisis in 2015-2016. Until 2015, the Municipality had one employee working on migrant issues and administrative support of the Migrant Integration Council (Interview no. 12, Athens). As a response to the refugee peak, the current mayor of Athens appointed a Vice-Mayor for Migrants and Refugees in February 2016. Following his appointment, a Department of Support and Social Integration of Migrants and Refugees was created within the Directorate of Social Solidarity and Health in November 2016 (OECD 2018).

In summary, the involvement of the Municipality of Athens with migrant integration has grown over the past eight years, and it has assumed a more active role than in the past. However, as key informants have stated, no clear aim of integration has been defined, resulting in the application of incoherent multiple policies (Interviews no. 2 and 11, Athens). In addition, there is no official long-term planning, but only problem-solving policies. According to the deputy Mayor of Athens, integration remains at a conceptual level in terms of state policies, and no implementation has taken place yet (Interview no. 11, Athens). Finally, a significant challenging factor is the rising anti-immigrant rhetoric and the rising electoral power of the extremist right-wing party *Chrysi Avgi* (Golden Dawn). It has voiced strong anti-immigrant positions, and it has engaged in a variety of violent and aggressive actions against immigrants.

²³ Between 2008 and 2011, the Ministry of Education and the General Secretary of Lifelong Learning and the New Generation implemented the 'Odysseas' programme, which funded 320 places for the learning of the Greek language, history, and culture. The programme was designed to give the participants the necessary knowledge to reach the level required for the status of 'long term resident' and to participate in the relevant exams certifying this knowledge (OECD 2018, p. 58). Due to a lack of public language classes, NGOs and religious organisations now cover the cost of such language courses.